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PROLOGUE 
 
Gabriele Fornasari & Daria Sartori 
In May 2013, John A.E. Vervaele was Visiting Professor at the 
Doctoral School of Comparative and European Legal Studies of Trento 
University. His lessons on European criminal law were source of 
inspiration for PhD candidates, researchers and professors alike: 
Thanks to his considerable expertise, he successfully enlightened old 
and new challenges faced by the criminal law after the adoption of the 
Lisbon Treaty. It has thus been decided to publish the nine essays on 
which his lessons were based, and to publish the present book in 
English (language in which the course was taught). 
Before introducing the content of this volume, a brief presentation 
of the Author and of the context in which his course was placed is due. 
John A.E. Vervaele is Professor in Economic and European 
Criminal Law at the School of Law of Utrecht University (Utrecht, 
Netherlands). He is also Professor in European Criminal Law at the 
College of Europe (Bruges, Belgium) and president of the World 
Association of Criminal Law (AIDP). He is a renown expert of 
European Criminal law, and his work is widely known and appreciated 
by the Academic community worldwide. He is actively engaged in 
cooperating with the Italian academia, both as visiting professor and as 
member of research groups, and many of his contribution are published 
in Italian. The course he taught at the Doctoral School of Comparative 
and European Legal Studies of Trento University was focused on 
European criminal law. Indeed, the importance of the EU dimension for 
criminal lawyers is steadily growing. The most recent developments of 
the European process of integration include legislative competencies 
for the EU in criminal matters, the replacement of Mutual Cooperation 
with Mutual Recognition, and the creation of a European Public 
Prosecutor Office. These developments call for a strong protection of 
the guarantees which are essential to the criminal law, and it is 
precisely in this context that the work by professor Vervaele is placed. 
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His contributions highlight the need to take a clear stand on the 
protection of substantial and procedural guarantees for the criminal 
defendant. Most of those guarantees have now acquired the status of 
fundamental rights within the EU; however, their definition and actual 
relevance is still ‘work in progress’ (mainly under the Court of Justice’s 
auspice). In every essay, Vervaele demonstrates his support for the 
European harmonisation process, being, however, perfectly aware of its 
many flaws. Harmonisation is still an on-going process, and Vervaele 
stresses the need for it to be accomplished both in substantial and in 
procedural criminal law, as well as in the field of investigation. He also 
insists on the need to comply with the general principles of the criminal 
law, on which domestic legal systems are based. 
In The European Union and Harmonization of the Criminal Law 
Enforcement of Union Policies: in Search of a Criminal Law Policy?, 
the Author firmly underlines the need for the harmonised criminal law 
to pass the test of proportionality, subsidiarity and necessity, being 
conceived as ultima ratio: Thus, every time a different kind of sanction 
can be used to prevent and punish illicit activities, criminalization 
should be avoided. 
In the same contribution, the Author complains that Member States 
of the EU have not shown any interest in elaborating a well-thought 
enforcement and criminal law policy after the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty. The only exception has been a notice from the Dutch Minister 
of Justice and Security to the Chamber of Deputies, in which he 
explains the position and policy of his Department in relation to 
European criminal law under the Lisbon Treaty. The note, however, is 
vague and cannot be the ground for a reasoned proposal on the 
harmonisation of the criminal law. Thus, as the Author concludes: ‘The 
EU is sure about its competence, but still does not know when and how 
to deal with it: certus an, incertus quando. 
In Enforcing the market abuse regime: towards an integrated model 
of criminal and administrative law enforcement in the European 
Union? (wrote by the Author together with Michiel Luchtman), the 
focus is on the investigation, prosecution and punishment of market 
abuse, which are analyzed in a wider context than the mere normative 
one.  
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In order to realise a proper functioning internal market, the current 
proposal of market abuse rules lays down norms for the actors of the 
financial markets and introduces the obligation to enforce these rules 
through (punitive) administrative and criminal law. In addition, 
organisational structures for network building and cooperation, 
investigative powers and sanctions are prescribed at European level. 
This last requirement, however, faces the typical issues affecting many 
of the areas invested by the European harmonisation process: The 
operational rules adopted by domestic authorities are often diverging, 
making it difficult to achieve an efficient cooperation at the 
international level, and there are no adequate rules coordinating 
criminal and administrative sanctions. This means that there is no body 
ultimately responsible for the system as a whole. Furthermore, there is 
no attention whatsoever for the development of fundamental rights 
beyond the context of the nation-state (with the partial exception of the 
ne bis in idem principle). Vervaele’s position in this regard is 
exceptionally important. Notwithstanding his enthusiasm for the 
creation of a truly European criminal law, he holds as a necessity the 
respect for fundamental rights, which is often considered as an obstacle 
to the efficiency of the system. 
Finally, the Author(s) complain that there seems to be no common 
strategy when it comes to the external dimension of the enforcement of 
the financial markets. This lack is remarkable, as strategies are present, 
instead, in the area of competition law, where an agreement has been 
devised to provide for regular bilateral meetings to share information 
on current enforcement activities and priorities, to discuss policy 
changes, and to discuss matters of mutual interest relating to the 
application of competition laws. 
In Gathering and Use of Evidence in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, with special regard to EU-fraud and OLAF-investigations, 
the Author raises the question of whether the harmonisation of 
substantive criminal law requires a corresponding harmonisation of 
criminal proceedings, especially with reference to the gathering and use 
of evidence. Currently, even in areas which are already under the 
competence of the EU, common rules for transnational violations are 
absent. Thus, the Author gives the example of a Spanish fisherman 
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who, being responsible for a serious infringement within Irish waters, 
can be confronted with criminal proceedings in Ireland or Spain, as 
well as with an administrative proceeding relating to the issue of his 
permit. In this case, the items of evidence may originate from Irish 
fisheries inspectors and/or from Community inspection. However, the 
lack of common rules on the use of evidence can lead to the inspection 
reports of the enforcement authorities of another country not being 
accepted by the country in which the proceeding is being held. Thus, 
according to the Author it is very important that the Euro-control 
system is independent, and that any information obtained within a 
Member State is considered as admissible evidence in the legal order of 
any other State (also regarding criminal proceedings). Unfortunately, 
this need will not be satisfied by the creation of a European Public 
Prosecutor Office. In fact, whatever institutional design is chosen for 
the EPPO, it will need assistance by European law enforcement 
agencies, and the status of their investigative powers, as well as the 
evidentiary status of their findings, will have to be used in national 
criminal proceedings. 
In Mutual legal assistance in criminal matters to control 
(transnational) criminality, the Author shows his appreciation for the 
role played by Mutual Legal Assistance in the fight against 
transnational crime. At the same time, he underlines some flaws, that 
currently prevent MLA from developing all its potentials. These flaws 
are due to the fact that Mutual Legal Assistance is shaped on specific 
phenomena (such as drug trafficking, organized crime and terrorism), 
which, although very important, do not constitute all forms of serious 
crimes for which MLA might be needed. In addition, new digital 
techniques of investigation (like digital surveillance or remote 
computer searches) are generally absent from MLA instruments, and a 
modern MLA scheme, updating operational tools and including human 
rights protection, has yet to be elaborated. 
In the EU, the lack of equivalent procedural investigative acts and 
related procedural safeguards in the Member States has led to distrust, 
and the efforts under the Lisbon Treaty to harmonise basic fair trial 
rights are only a first step in the right direction. According to the 
Author, the path to be followed is the deepening of cooperation on 
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Mutual Legal Assistance, its integration with human rights protection, 
and, above all, a much effective independence by national sovereignty. 
In Ne bis in idem: towards a transnational constitutional principle 
in the EU?, the Author points out some relevant flaws affecting the 
European ne bis in idem, notwithstanding its recognition under Article 
50 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Luxembourg Court 
applies different notions of ne bis in idem in criminal law and in 
competition law: thus, the Author criticizes the lack of a harmonised 
approach and, at a more general level, the multiplicity of ne bis in idem 
provisions still in force. Indeed, before being acknowledged by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the principle was inserted in other 
instruments, such as Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the 
Schengen Agreement (CISA), and Article 4 Protocol 7 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. As those provisions were not accepted 
by all Member States of the EU, it is not clear whether Article 50 CFR 
imposes (as the author argues) its own, inclusive notion of ne bis in 
idem, or not. This state of confusion creates a dangerous lack of 
foreseeability, as well as contradicting judgments by national judges. In 
addition, the lack of rules governing the choice of jurisdiction within 
Member States is deemed to exert a negative influence over the 
European ne bis in idem, which is improperly turned into the means to 
solve the conflict between the jurisdictions of the Member States. 
Lastly, two problematic questions are still affecting Article 50 CFR: 
what is the scope and extension of the Article? And what is its ambit of 
application?  
Looking for answers, professor Vervaele has been focusing on the 
case law developed by the Court of Justice, which has frequently filled 
the gaps left by the EU legislator regarding fundamental rights. In The 
application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its ne bis in 
idem principle in the Member States of the EU, the Author analyses the 
Fransson judgment (C-617/10, Aklagaren v Fransson, 26 February 
2013). Two assertions of the Court are considered of great importance: 
first, the choice of referring the ne bis in idem to a notion of criminal 
law defined under the so-called Engel-Bonda criteria; second, the 
Court’s focus on the principles of primacy, unity and effectiveness of 
EU law. According to these assertions, the Author comes to the 
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conclusion that the ambit of application of the European ne bis in idem 
is identified by two thresholds: on the one side, the minimum protection 
afforded by Article 50, as interpreted by the Court of Justice in 
accordance with the Engel-Bonda criteria; on the other side, the need to 
grant primacy, unity and effectiveness to EU law, representing the 
‘upper limit’ for a State intervention on the topic.  
The Author’s contribution on The European Arrest Warrant and 
applicable standards of fundamental rights in the European Union 
helps to understand the consequences of this double threshold. The 
contribution deals with another relevant decision of the Luxembourg 
Court, Melloni, released on the very same day of Fransson (C-399/11, 
Melloni, 26 February 2013). The decision, concerning the guarantees 
afforded to criminal defendants in in absentia proceedings, clearly 
endorses the view that fundamental rights can be afforded higher 
protection by the domestic legal systems than the one afforded by EU 
law, only insofar as they do not compromise its primacy, unity, and 
effectiveness. It is in this framework that all guarantees for the criminal 
defendant (including ne bis in idem) are to be read. The Author 
endorses the choice made by the Court of Justice, stating that this 
position comes as no surprise in view of its long-standing case law on 
the topic of primacy, unity, and effectiveness. However, he also 
foresees problematic situations arising from the fact that, under the 
Lisbon Treaty, the unanimity voting in criminal matters has been 
replaced by qualified majorities: in the future, there might be situations 
in which Member States will be bound to solutions they have not been 
in favour to.  
The attention paid by John Vervaele for the fundamental guarantees 
of the criminal law inspires, also, his contributions dealing with the 
creation of a European Public Prosecutor Office (EPPO). 
In The material scope of competence of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s office: a harmonised national patchwork?, he analyses 
whether the creation of the EPPO will be able to comply with 
substantial legality, protected under Article 49 of the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. According to the Author, this result can be 
achieved only if the EPPO’s jurisdiction will refer to substantially 
harmonized criminal offences, so that all EU citizens will be able to 
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foresee with reasonable certainty the crime for which they will be 
prosecuted, as well as the applicable penalties. On the basis of Article 
86 TFUE, the EPPO’s jurisdiction covers the so-called PIF-offences 
(i.e., crimes affecting the financial interests of the EU), and, if 
specifically approved by the European Council, ‘serious crimes with 
transnational dimension’. The harmonisation of the criminal law on 
PIF-offences relies on a Convention of 1995, which, according to the 
same anti-fraud unit of the EU (OLAF), has been unable to harmonise 
the criminal law of the Member States. Thus, the Author analyses 
whether harmonisation can be grounded on other sources of EU law. 
Article 83 TFEU is reputed unable to reach this goal: first of all, 
directives leave too much room for discretion in their implementation; 
secondly, Member States are allowed to stop the adoption of directive 
in criminal matters by pulling an ‘emergency brake’; lastly, there are 
Member States which do not even participate to this instrument. As for 
other Treaty provisions, such as Article 325 TFUE, it is not clear 
whether they could be of use: the Treaty does not clarify whether 
Article 83 TFUE should be, or not, the only ground for harmonisation 
in criminal law. The Author concludes that the only way to grant 
legitimacy to the EPPO’s functioning would be that of harmonising the 
criminal law of the Member States through regulations. Indirectly, it is 
suggested that the ground for enacting such regulations would be 
Article 86 TFEU. Its paragraph 3 allows the adoption of a regulation 
determining the ‘general rules’ applicable to the EPPO’s office. Even 
though it is not specified whether this rules may include substantive 
criminal law, the predecessors of the provision clearly included 
substantive criminal law in the rules governing the EPPO’s functioning, 
and the author is in favour of this position. 
In European territoriality and jurisdiction: the protection of EU 
financial interests in its horizontal and vertical (EPPO) dimension, the 
Author focuses on procedural legality, protected under Article 52 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Author points out the risks 
deriving from the lack of rules governing the choice and the conflict of 
jurisdiction in the EU area of freedom, security and justice. Currently, 
the choice is left to the national authorities: as a consequence, multiple 
adjudications are prevented only by the transnational ne bis in idem 
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elaborated by the ECJ. Thus, even in key areas such as the financial 
services sector, the choice is not inspired by the need to fulfil EU 
interests, but by a ‘first come-first serve’ rule. In such a context, the 
legitimacy of the EPPO’s functioning could be compromised by the 
lack of clear and foreseeable rules governing its choices of jurisdiction 
in the investigation and in the prosecution phase. In this regard, the 
Author analyses potential solutions, and comes to the conclusion that 
the EPPO’s choice of jurisdiction should ‘contribute to effective 
proportionate and dissuasive law enforcement in the light of the 
objectives of the single area of freedom, security and justice’, while 
being ‘based on a transparent procedure in which criteria are used that 
are accessible and foreseeable’. This last requirement is particularly 
important. On the one hand, it allows citizens to challenge before the 
ECJ the choice of the adjudicative forum, thus providing for the 
creation of a ‘European justiciability’. On the other hand, it represents 
the essential precondition for the development of procedural and 
substantial guarantees in favour of the criminal defendant.  
To conclude, professor Vervaele’s contributions express the need 
that the Europeanization of the criminal law does not imply the 
abandonment of fundamental guarantees for the criminal defendant. In 
sending this message, the Author manages to strike a good balance 
between EU exigencies and fundamental rights, never losing sight of 
the fact that the creation of a ‘EU criminal law’ is the necessary tool for 
the protection of the European people and of the European interests. 
His contributions are never biased by prejudices against the EU, which 
are common among criminal lawyers; at the same time, they highlight 
with clarity flaws and grounds for improvement, often looking for 
solutions within the current legal framework of the EU. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HARMONIZATION 
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OF UNION POLICIES: 
IN SEARCH OF A CRIMINAL LAW POLICY?1 
1. European Integration and Criminal Law - History of Development2 
It is no secret that the European Communities founding fathers 
underestimated the importance of the enforcement of Community law. 
Apart from a few exceptions in primary Treaty law, such as the 
obligation for Member States to criminalize violations of Euratom 
confidentiality or perjury in front of the European Court of Justice, they 
maintained a resolved silence concerning Community law enforcement. 
The EC Treaties did not provide for clear legal bases or assign powers 
for either direct enforcement by the EC (with the exception of the 
enforcement of European competition rules), or for indirect 
enforcement of Community law by the Member States. This means that 
the enforcement of the common agricultural and fisheries policy, the 
Community customs code, the European financial services regulations, 
EU subsidy fraud rules, European environmental policy, European rules 
on law of corporate bodies, was completely left to the autonomy and 
discretion of the Member States. 
The European Commission quickly recognized the enforcement gap 
in the EC Treaties. An attempt was already made in 1976 to supplement 
                                                          
1 This is an actualized version of the same article that is under publication in 
I. CAMERON, M. ULVANG, Essays on Criminalisation and Sanctions, Uppsala, 2014. 
2 For a more detailed analysis, see J.A.E. VERVAELE, The Europeanisation of 
Criminal Law and the Criminal Law Dimension of European Integration, in P. 
DEMARET, I. GOVAERE, D. HANF (Eds.), 30 Years of European Legal Studies at the 
College of Europe, Liber Professorum, Brussels, 2005, p. 277-298 and N. HÆKKERUP, 
C.R. WAGTMANN, Controls and Sanctions in the EU Law, Copenhagen, 2001. 
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the EC Treaties with two protocols concerning EC fraud and corruption 
by EC officials. However, neither protocol gained the political approval 
of the Council of Ministers (Council)3. In the period between 1975 and 
1990, the Commission was therefore forced to explore instead the 
political and legal boundaries of the EC Treaties. The Commission, 
supported by the European Parliament, was already then of the opinion 
that there was a considerable enforcement deficit on the part of the 
Member States when it comes to compliance with EC policies. The 
Commission therefore submitted various concrete legislative proposals 
to the Council, with the aim of obliging the Member States to use both 
(punitive) administrative law and criminal law in the enforcement of 
Community law. 
The Council approved many of the Commission’s proposals 
compelling the Member States to impose punitive administrative 
sanctions, especially in the field of common agricultural policy. The 
regulations in question provide for fines, forfeiture of financial 
guarantees, exclusion from subsidy schemes, professional 
disqualification, etc. This harmonization was not limited to reparatory 
sanctions, but also expressly concerned punitive sanctions and thus fell 
within the scope (at least for the contracting parties) of Article 6 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)4. The Member States 
were obliged to enact these sanctions and apply them. Of course, the 
Member States were also free to impose these sanctions entirely or 
partly by criminal law enforcement means, instead of solely or partly 
using administrative regulation, if this was in conformity with the 
requirements for enforcement as established by the Court. The growing 
influence of EU law on the law of punitive sanctions was not well 
received by all the Member States. Some Member States considered the 
European Community to be applying the EC Treaties quite extensively 
or, further, that it had imposed obligations lacking a proper legal basis. 
In 1990, Germany felt that the limit had been reached. Two regulations 
on agriculture provided the perfect excuse to bring an action for 
                                                          
3 J.A.E. VERVAELE, Fraud against the Community. The need for European Fraud 
Legislation, Deventer, 1992, pp. 85 ff. 
4 I refer to the Engel-criteria of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), 
Engel and Others v the Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22. 
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annulment before the Court. The regulations not only prescribed 
restitution with a surcharge for unjustifiably obtained subsidies, but 
also punitive exclusion from subsidy schemes. Germany was of the 
opinion that the European Community was not competent to prescribe 
punitive sanctions. What was remarkable in this case was that none of 
the other Member States intervened to support Germany in its 
contentions. Germany received a rude awakening when, in 1992, the 
Court in its judgement in Case C-240/905 recognized that the European 
Community was competent to adopt the measures, including the 
punitive sanctions. This landmark judgement finally cleared up the 
controversy surrounding the European Communities’ competence to 
harmonize administrative (punitive) sanctions. 
Concerning the criminal law enforcement it is mainly thanks to the 
ECJ that the enforcement autonomy of the Member States has been 
somewhat limited. The Member States were bound by the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 10 EC Treaty (the duty of co-operation or 
loyalty principle). The Court had established that the Member States 
had a duty to enforce Community law, whereby they have to provide 
for procedures and penalties that were effective, proportionate, and 
dissuasive and that offer a degree of protection that was analogous to 
that offered in the enforcement of provisions of national law of a 
similar nature and importance (the assimilation principle). It not only 
fell to the national legislator to fulfil these requirements; they also had 
to be enforced6. From the case law of the ECJ, it is abundantly clear that 
criminal (procedural) law belongs in the sphere of competence of the 
Member States, but that Community law may impose requirements as 
                                                          
5 Case C-240/90, Germany v Council and Commission, [1992] ECR I-5383. For a 
detailed analysis of the EC harmonization of administrative enforcement, see 
J.A.E. VERVAELE, Administrative Sanctioning Powers of and in the Community. 
Towards a System of European Administrative Sanctions?, in J.A.E. VERVAELE (Ed.), 
Administrative Law Application and Enforcement of Community Law in The 
Netherlands, pp. 161 ff., http://igiturarchive, J. SCHWARZE, Rechtsstaatliche Grenzen 
der gesetzlichen und richterlichen Qualifikation von Verwaltungssanktionen im 
europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht, in EuZW, 2003, p. 261, and M. POELEMANS, La 
sanction dans l’ordre juridique communautaire, Bruxelles, 2004. 
6 See Case 66/88, Commission v Greece, [1989] ECR 2965 and the Communication 
from the Commission as a result of this case, OJ C 147/3, 1990. 
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to the fulfilment and interpretation of this competence within the 
framework of the enforcement of Community law. Criminal law must 
not only be set aside when the rules to be enforced turn out to be 
contrary to Community law (negative interpretation). Community law 
also unmistakably establishes requirements which national criminal law 
enforcement has to fulfil if it is applied with the aim of compliance with 
Community law (positive integration). This duty to enforce in 
accordance with certain requirements also applies to criminal law if the 
Member States decide that this is the tool which they will use to enforce 
Community law7. This includes, for example, shaping policy as to when 
to dismiss a case or indictment, and the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in cases that are relevant from a Community law perspective, 
where the interests of the EC must also be weighed in8. An airtight 
separation between the criminal law policy of the Member States and 
that of the EC has never existed. Both de iure and de facto, the process 
of indirect EC harmonization of national criminal law (mainly 
concerning the definition of the offences), has been ongoing for 
decades. The Community legal order and integration also include the 
criminal (procedural) law of the Member States as a result of which 
Member State autonomy is restricted. The European integration model 
is not compatible with a restriction of criminal law to national confines 
where it would remain out of reach of any Community law influence 
whatsoever. The key question was, however, whether the EC’s 
competence to harmonize reaches so far as to enable the EC directly to 
oblige the Member States to criminalize violations of Community rules. 
Was the EC competent to impose requirements as to the nature and 
severity of the criminal penalties? Did this possible competence also 
extend to the scope of application ratione materiae, ratione personae, 
and ratione loci, to procedural aspects, to the modalities of application 
(statute of limitation, dismissal, or dismissing charges, etc.)? As regards 
these questions, there is has been plenty of debate in the literature. The 
                                                          
7 Case 68/88, Commission v Greece, [1989] ECR 2965 and Case C-226/97, 
Lemmens, [1999] ECR 195. 
8 Case C-265/95, Commission v France, [1997] ECR I-6959. 
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majority of criminal law authors9 in Europe denied that the EC had any 
power, however minor, to directly harmonize criminal law. 
The Commission and the European Parliament have, for decades, 
been attempting to convince the Council to impose a Community 
obligation on the Member States to enforce EC policy by means of the 
criminal law. The legislative proposals to this end, for example in the 
fields of money laundering and insider dealing, were functional in their 
approach and only provided for limited harmonization. By and large, 
these proposals obliged the Member States to criminalize certain 
intentional acts and thus provide for a criminal penalty and, in the case 
of serious offences, a prison sentence. The proposals did not contain 
any concrete provisions as to the substance of these penalties and prison 
sentences. However, even the limited harmonization approach has 
never been able to win the Council over. The Council usually approved 
the proposals, but only after amending them in such a way that the 
obligations were stripped of their criminal law packaging. Any and all 
references to the criminal law nature of the obligations were 
systematically deleted. Criminal law prohibitory or mandatory 
provisions were changed into prohibitory or mandatory provisions of an 
administrative nature. Obligations to impose criminal sanctions were 
replaced by obligations simply to enforce ‘sanctions’. The systematic 
political neutralization of the criminal law harmonization proposals of 
the Commission might give the impression that there was staunch unity 
on the part of the Member States in the Council. However, the Member 
States were internally divided on this question to such an extent that, in 
1990, the Ministers of Justice assigned a Council working group 
consisting of public servants to the task of subjecting the relationship 
between Community law and criminal law to fundamental discussion10. 
The government experts agreed that Community law can set 
                                                          
9 The minority position among criminal lawyers was argued, inter alia, by Grasso, 
Tiedemann, Delmas-Marty, Vogel and Vervaele who all defended a limited functional 
competence. For an interesting discussion between proponents and opponents, see 
ZStW, 2004, p. 332 and B. SCHÜNEMANN (Ed.), Alternativentwurf Europäische 
Strafverfolgung, Köln, 2004. 
10 For the report of the ad hoc working group see J.A.E. VERVAELE, Fraud against 
the European Community, Deventer, 1992, p. 313. 
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requirements for national criminal law, but could not agree on an 
unequivocal position concerning the direct criminal law harmonization 
competence of the EC. The small majority of the Member States that 
were in favour of such a competence nevertheless wished for certain 
conditions to apply. Such harmonization could only be the criminal law 
tailpiece of a Community law policy, i.e., not being criminal law 
harmonization as such. This harmonization should, furthermore, leave 
intact a number of principles or guarantees that were considered by 
(some of) the Member States to be essential for their own criminal 
(procedural) law. Red flags to functional harmonisation were certainly 
at that time: prosecutorial discretion, criminal liability of legal persons, 
minimum penalties and sentencing discretion. The report of the divided 
working group therefore did not result in a political breakthrough. A 
fundamental political difference of opinion started to develop11. During 
the intergovernmental conference for the preparation of the Maastricht 
Treaty, Dutch attempts to integrate aspects of criminal justice, 
including the power of direct harmonization, into EC law were doomed 
to failure. The Luxemburg compromise, known as the three pillar 
structure, organized criminal law co-operation and harmonization into a 
separate semi-intergovernmental pillar which entered into force as part 
of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. With the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in 1999, the third pillar shed its semi-intergovernmental 
character and thereby became a fully-fledged EU policy area. 
2. Criminal Law Harmonization in the EU: From Political Stalemate to 
the ECJ-Ruling in Case C-176/03 on Criminal Enforcement of the 
Environmental Protection 
Structuring the third pillar to include the direct legislative 
competence of the EU in the field of co-operation in criminal matters 
and criminal law harmonization has not caused the struggle to subside, 
                                                          
11 For example, the Member States were prepared to criminalize money laundering, 
based on obligations deriving from the international law made by the UN and Council 
of Europe, but not by the EC. See intergovernmental declaration to Directive 91/308, 
OJ L 66/77, 1991. 
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quite the contrary in fact. After all, the third pillar was a supplementary 
power that could not undermine or interfere with the array of EC 
powers. Both Article 2 TEU and Article 47 TEU, in conjunction with 
Article 29 TEU, were clear on this. Whether or not this power exists 
does not depend on whether, prior to the EU Treaty’s entry into force, 
any regulation or directive was ever created that imposes a duty to 
harmonize criminal law. Neither the lack of use of this power, nor the 
entry into force of the EU Treaty leads to its demise. It is not political 
will that determines legal competence, at least not without an 
amendment of the Treaty. Nevertheless, the third criminal law pillar has 
been defined by many as being exclusive, i.e., excluding any criminal 
law competence within the first pillar. 
It was my belief that it was clear from the outset that the political 
division of the legal regime between the first and the third pillar would 
culminate in an institutional battle of competence concerning the 
position of criminal law within the EU. In the case of many of the 
legislative initiatives during the period from 1993 to 2005, the 
Commission came diametrically to oppose the Council. Both have been 
involved in institutional legislative skirmishes concerning criminal law 
harmonization. There is no point in repeating every single initiative and 
counter-initiative here where the EC and the Member States raised the 
issue in the Council. Altogether different ways of dealing with the 
legislative conflicts could be distinguished. The first type may be 
described as ‘warding off’. The Commission submitted proposals for 
criminal law harmonization of Community law which the Council 
subsequently rejected. At best, the proposal was neutralized and 
stripped of its criminal law packaging. Here, the Council applies an old 
legislative tactic that was used in the period before the entry into force 
of the Treaty on European Union. The Commission proposal for a 
regulation on official feed and food controls12 (2003) is an excellent 
example. The Commission emphasizes the need to provide for a 
functional harmonization of criminal law enforcement supplementing 
the existing harmonization of administrative law enforcement. The 
Commission claims that a basic list of offences committed intentionally 
                                                          
12 COM(2003) 52 final. 
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or through serious negligence which could threaten feed and food 
safety and therefore public health, and for which the Member States 
must provide criminal sanctions, should be drawn up. The list should 
not be limited to offences related to actual placing on the market, but 
include all offences which may eventually lead to the placing on the 
market of unsafe feed or food. For this list of serious offences, the 
Member States should provide for minimum criminal standards 
according to Article 55: 
1. Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to 
infringements of feed and food law and shall take all measures 
necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties 
provided for must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. The 
Member States shall notify those provisions and any subsequent 
amendment to the Commission without delay. 
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, the activities referred to in Annex VI 
shall be criminal offences when committed intentionally or through 
serious negligence, insofar as they breach rules of Community feed 
and food law or rules adopted by the Member States in order to 
comply with such Community law. 
3. The offences referred to in paragraph 2 and the instigation to or 
participation in such offences shall, as for natural persons, be 
punishable by sanctions of criminal nature, including as 
appropriate deprivation of liberty, and, as for legal persons, by 
penalties which shall include criminal or non-criminal fines and 
may include other penalties such as exclusion from entitlement to 
public benefits or aid, temporary or permanent disqualification 
from engaging in business activities, placing under judicial 
supervision or a judicial winding-up order. 
The fact that serious infringements of food safety might threaten 
public health has been conclusively proven by the various food 
scandals in numerous European countries which, in some cases, for 
example, the rapeseed oil poisoning case in Spain, have resulted in the 
death of many. Nevertheless, the Member States did not submit a 
proposal for a framework decision, but rather stripped the Commission 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HARMONIZATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 19 
proposal of its criminal law wrappings in the Council. In the adopted 
regulation13, Article 55 now reads as follows: 
1. Member States shall lay down the rules on sanctions applicable to 
infringements of feed and food law and other Community 
provisions relating to the protection of animal health and welfare 
and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are 
implemented. The sanctions provided for must be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive. 
2. Member States shall notify the provisions applicable to infringements 
of feed and food law and any subsequent amendment to the 
Commission without delay14. 
The second type of legislative conflict may be described as 
‘hijacking’, whereby the content of a proposal for a regulation or 
directive is copied into a proposal for a framework decision or vice 
versa. The competing proposals concerning the criminal law 
enforcement of the environmental policy is an excellent illustration15. In 
a number of cases, this approach has led to a stalemate, whereas in 
others it has led to the adoption of framework decisions contrary to the 
opinion of the Commission and the European Parliament. The third 
type may be termed ‘cohabitation forcée’, whereby two proposals are 
elaborated alongside each other and in harmony with each other. The 
substantive provisions and, as the case may be, provisions concerning 
administrative harmonization are included in a directive or a regulation, 
while the criminal law harmonization aspects are incorporated into a 
framework decision. A good example of what is known as a double text 
approach is Directive 2002/90, coupled with Framework Decision 
                                                          
13 EU Regulation 882/2004, OJ L 165, 30.04.2004, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri 
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004R0882:EN:NOT. 
14 Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of 29.04.2004 on official controls performed to 
ensure the verification of compliance with feed and food law, animal health, and animal 
welfare rules, OJ L 165/97, 2004. 
15 Framework Decision 2003/80 of 27.01.2003 on the protection of the environment 
through criminal law (OJ L 29, 2003) which was annulled by the Court of Justice and 
the proposal for a Directive on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal 
Law, COM(2001) 139 of 13 March 2001, OJ C 180, 2001, as amended by COM(2002) 
544, OJ C 020 E, 2003. 
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2002/946, concerning illegal immigration16. Another good example 
concerns environmental pollution from ships, where both proposals17 
were drafted by the Commission18. Article 6 of the proposal for a 
directive includes the obligation to provide for criminal penalties 
regarding the illegal discharge of pollutants as defined in the Marpol 
International Convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 
including cases of serious infringements, and custodial sentences, also 
for natural persons. The proposal for a framework decision directly 
refers to Article 6 of the Directive and further defines the forms of 
criminal sanctions. The proposal for a framework decision further 
includes provisions concerning joint investigation teams, judicial 
mutual legal assistance, etc. Here too, the criminal law provisions in the 
proposal for a directive proved ultimately unpalatable to the Council. In 
the approved Directive, all references to criminal law obligations were 
eliminated. 
In the proposals concerning migration and pollution at sea, the 
Commission had to accept that it lost, but it did not yet gave up. For 
example, in 2005, before the landmark case C-176/03, the Commission 
made a proposal for a directive and a framework decision concerning 
criminal measures to combat intellectual property infringements of19. 
This proposal was the continued development from directive 2004/48 
                                                          
16 Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28.11.2002 defining the facilitation of 
unauthorized entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328/17, 2002, and Council Framework 
Decision of 28.11.2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the 
facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328, 2002. 
17 Directive 2005/35/EC 07.09.2005 on ship-source pollution and on the 
introduction of penalties for infringements, OJ L 255/11, 2005 and Council Framework 
Decision 2005/667 of 12.07.2005 to strengthen the criminal-law framework for the 
enforcement of the law against ship-source pollution, OJ L 255/164, 2005. 
18 Often, this involves interinstitutional co-operation between the Directorate 
General responsible for the specific subject and the Directorate General for the third 
pillar. 
19 Proposal for a directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement 
of intellectual property rights and the proposal for a framework decision to strengthen 
the criminal law framework to combat intellectual property offences, COM(2005) 276 
final. 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HARMONIZATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 21 
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights20, which 
obliged the Member States to provide for private law and 
administrative law measures, and to implement the obligations 
following from the international TRIPs agreement which makes 
criminal enforcement mandatory. In the proposal for a directive, the 
Commission clearly claimed a direct power to impose criminal law 
harmonization, but, in doing so, restricted itself to the obligation for the 
Member States to criminalize intentional offences, to provide for 
certain methods of criminal participation and to impose criminal 
penalties, including custodial sentences. The further determination of 
the sanctions (level, etc.), the question of jurisdiction and some aspects 
of criminal procedure, such as the initiation of criminal proceedings 
independently of a complaint, were all regulated under the framework 
decision. 
This analysis brings to light several issues. There was no coherent 
European criminal law policy present where all or any actors were 
involved. The Member States were not primarily concerned with the 
enforcement of Community policy, but with the fight against terrorism, 
organized crime, etc. The fact that the obligation for the Member State 
to achieve criminal law harmonization was not imposed through a 
directive or a regulation is not an unbiased conclusion. Framework 
decisions required unanimity. Directives and regulations were usually 
adopted by means of co-decision and qualified majority. Furthermore, 
as opposed to framework decisions, regulations as well as 
unconditional and clear provisions of directives have direct effects. In 
the first pillar, the Commission also has many more trumps up its 
sleeve to oblige the Member States to comply with criminal law 
harmonization. The Commission may initiate infringement proceedings 
against a Member State. The Member States may be held financially 
responsible for non-compliance by means of enforcement duties, and 
the Member States can even be fined for failing to comply with Court 
rulings. The Community approach therefore has many advantages, both 
in terms of legitimacy and in terms of efficiency. 
                                                          
20 OJ L 157/45, 2004. 
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The political stalemate could only be broken by a ruling on this 
issue of principle from the Court. The Commission finally succeeded in 
provoking such a ruling by raising objections under Article 35(6) EU 
against the legality of the framework decision approved by the Council 
on 2003 on the criminal enforcement of environmental law21. With this 
decision, the Council set aside a proposal submitted by the Commission 
for a directive on the criminal enforcement of environmental law of 
2001 with similar substance22. On 2005, the Court delivered its long-
awaited judgement in Case C-176/03. This judgement is a second 
landmark ruling concerning the enforcement of Community law as the 
Court recognized the competence of the EC to harmonize the 
enforcement by criminal law of Community law. No less than eleven 
Member States intervened in the proceedings. Ten Member States23 
supported the position of the Council. The Netherlands was the only 
Member State to argue in favour of a combined criminal harmonization 
competence under EC law: 
                                                          
21 That the Commission did not start proceedings before the Court in the matter of 
EC fraud may be explained by legal reasons. At the time of the approval of the 1995 
PIF Convention under the Maastricht third pillar, approval of a criminal law 
harmonization directive would only have been possible on the basis of Article 209A. 
This provision did not, however, constitute a legal basis for harmonization. This was 
only introduced by Article 280 of the Amsterdam Treaty on European Union. On that 
basis, the Commission in 2001 submitted a proposal for a directive on criminal law 
harmonization without questioning the legal validity of the Conventions. The proposal 
for a directive was provoked, however, by the slow ratification procedures and 
incomplete ratifications of the PIF protocols. 
22 See F. COMTE, Criminal Environmental Law and Community Competence, in 
European Environmental Law Review, 2003, pp. 147 ff., in defence of the Community 
approach. Argued from the contrary standpoint: Y. BURUMA, J. SOMSEN, Een 
Strafwetgever te Brussel inzake milieubescherming, in NJB, 2001, p. 795 and 
I.M. KOOPMANS, Europa en de handhaving van het milieurecht: een pijler te ver?, in 
NTER, 2004, p. 127. For a balanced position, see J. ORTLEPP, R.J.G.M. WIDDERSHOVEN, 
CH.W. BACKES, et al., Lex Dura, Sed Lex. Opstellen over de handhaving van 
omgevingsrecht, Deventer, 2005, pp. 159 ff. 
23 Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom. 
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(…) provided that the penalty is inseparably linked to the relevant 
substantive Community provisions and that it can actually be shown 
that imposing penalties under criminal law in that way is necessary for 
the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty in the area concerned 
(see Case C-240/90 Germany v Commission [1992] ECR I-5383). That 
could be the case if the enforcement of a harmonizing rule based, for 
example, on Article 175 EC gave rise to a need for criminal penalties24. 
The ECJ first of all underlines that the third pillar cannot undermine 
the competences of the first pillar, as Article 47 TEU provides that 
nothing in the Treaty of the EU is to affect the EC Treaty. Concerning 
the criminal law competence in the first pillar the ECJ accept a criminal 
annex-competence, functional to the substantive policy for ensuring 
effective enforcement: 
47. as a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of criminal 
procedure fall within the Community’s competence (see, to that 
effect, Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR 2595, paragraph 27, and 
Case C-226/97 Lemmens [1998] ECR I-3711, paragraph 19). 
48. However, the last-mentioned finding does not prevent the 
Community legislature, when the application of effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent 
national authorities is an essential measure for combating serious 
environmental offences, from taking measures which relate to the 
criminal law of the Member States which it considers necessary in 
order to ensure that the rules which it lays down on environmental 
protection are fully effective. 
49. It should also be added that in this instance, although Articles 1 to 7 
of the framework decision determine that certain conduct which is 
particularly detrimental to the environment is to be criminal, they 
leave to the Member States the choice of the criminal penalties to 
apply, although, in accordance with Article 5(1) of the decision, the 
penalties must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. 
50. The Council does not dispute that the acts listed in Article 2 of the 
framework decision include infringements of a considerable 
number of Community measures, which were listed in the annex to 
the proposed directive. Moreover, it is apparent from the first three 
recitals to the framework decision that the Council took the view 
that criminal penalties were essential for combating serious 
offences against the environment. 
                                                          
24 From consideration 36 in the Court’s Judgment in case C-176/03. 
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51. It follows from the foregoing that, on account of both their aim and 
their content, Articles 1 to 7 of the framework decision have as 
their main purpose the protection of the environment and they 
could have been properly adopted on the basis of Article 175 EC. 
52. That finding is not called into question by the fact that Articles 135 
EC and 280(4) EC reserve to the Member States, in the spheres of 
customs cooperation and the protection of the Community’s 
financial interests respectively, the application of national criminal 
law and the administration of justice. It is not possible to infer from 
those provisions that, for the purposes of the implementation of 
environmental policy, any harmonisation of criminal law, even as 
limited as that resulting from the framework decision, must be 
ruled out even where it is necessary in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of Community law. 
3. The Commission’s View on the Harmonization of Criminal 
Enforcement of EU Policies after Case C-176/03: A First Blueprint for 
a Criminal Law Policy? 
In November 2005 the Commission submitted a communication25 to 
the EP and the Council concerning the implications of the Court’s 
judgement in Case C-176/03. The Commission starts off by analyzing 
the contents and scope of the Court’s decision. Article 47 TEU provides 
that EC law has priority over Title VI TEU, i.e., the first pillar prevails 
over the third. The Court further holds that Article 175 TEU constitutes 
a proper legal basis for the matters regulated in Articles 1-7 of the 
Framework Decision. The Commission subtly points out that Articles 
1-7 are criminal law provisions dealing with the definition of offences, 
the principle of the obligation to impose criminal penalties, the level of 
penalties, accompanying penalties, and the rules on participation and 
instigation. The Court goes further than the Advocate General in his 
Opinion by not only accepting that the EC may oblige the Member 
States to enforce measures by means of criminal law, but may also lay 
down in detail what the arrangements should be. The Commission then 
turns to the scope of the Court’s judgement. The Commission 
highlights the fact that the judgement does not mean that the Court has 
                                                          
25 COM(2005) 583 final. 
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hereby recognized criminal enforcement as an area of Community 
policy. Criminal enforcement is merely the tailpiece of a substantive 
policy area. However, the Commission does find that the Court’s 
judgement may potentially impact all policy areas of negative 
integration (the four freedoms) and positive integration, possibly 
making criminal law methods necessary to ensure effective 
enforcement. This test of necessity must be defined functionally, on an 
area-by-area basis. For some policy areas no criminal enforcement is 
required, but for others it is. The necessity test also determines the 
nature of the criminal measures to be taken. According to the 
Commission, the Court does not impose any restrictions there. Here 
too, the approach is functional. The Commission does not elaborate 
further, but we may conclude that the Commission obviously wishes to 
leave the door open where necessary for harmonization of aspects of 
the general part of criminal law or of criminal procedural law. The 
Commission further indicates its preference for horizontal measures 
where possible, i.e., transcending specific policy areas. Here we might 
think of horizontal criminal measures for the agricultural sector and the 
structural funds in connection with fighting EC fraud or terrorism or 
organized crime. The Commission also believes that the judgement puts 
an end to the double-text approach, i.e., adopting directives and 
regulations for substantive policy and its administrative enforcement in 
addition to framework decisions for the criminal enforcement of that 
same policy. From now on, all this can be laid down in one single 
directive or regulation. 
In the second part of the communication, the Commission discusses 
the consequences of the judgement more specifically. The Commission 
first of all indicates that criminal law provisions concerning police and 
judicial co-operation, including measures on the mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions and measures based on the principle of availability, 
fall within the area of competence of the third pillar. This is also true 
for the harmonization per se of the general part of criminal law or 
criminal procedural law in the framework of co-operation and mutual 
recognition. The criminal harmonization of policy areas that are not 
part of the EC Treaty, but that are nevertheless necessary for the 
objectives of the area of Freedom, Security and Justice are placed 
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within the third pillar. An interesting point is that, in this second part, 
the Commission further defines the conditions for criminal 
harmonization using Community competence under the heading 
‘Consistency of the Union’s criminal law policy’. The Commission 
clearly indicates that criminal harmonization under EC competence is 
only possible if there is a clear need to make the policy in question 
effective. Furthermore, the requirements of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality have to be met. This means that there is 
a strict obligation to provide grounds and reasons. The harmonization 
may concern the definition of offences, the criminal penalties, but also 
what is called ‘other criminal-law measures appropriate to the area 
concerned’. It is clear that the Commission, from the start, does not 
wish to pin itself down to merely the harmonization of offence 
definitions and criminal penalties. The Commission continues by 
stating that: ‘The criminal-law measures adopted at sectoral level on a 
Community basis must respect the overall consistency of the Union’s 
system of criminal law, whether adopted on the basis of the first or the 
third pillar, to ensure that criminal provisions do not become 
fragmented and ill-matched’. Both the Commission, on the one hand, 
and the Council and the EP, on the other, must take care to ensure this 
consistency and also prevent that Member States or the persons 
concerned are required to comply with conflicting obligations. 
4. The Judgement in Case C-176/03: Reception in the Member States 
and in the JHA Council 
Despite the unanimous opinions of the various legal services of the 
EU organs, including that of the Council itself, the Court judgement 
was greeted with amazement and disbelief by many governments. It is 
hardly surprising that the Court decision was not embraced by the 
Member States given their numerous interventions in the proceedings in 
favour of the Council. However, the governments mainly focused their 
criticism on the Communication of the Commission and introduced this 
into the JHA Council. In Denmark, the Minister of Justice wasted no 
time in informing Parliament of the judgement and submitting a 
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reservation26. The Ministry maintained the view that no legal basis 
could be found in the EC Treaty, even though it expressed awareness 
that the Court judgement is not limited to environmental law. In France, 
the initiative came from Parliament itself. On 25 January 2006, the 
European Affairs Commission (EAC) of the French Assemblée 
Nationale informed the Speaker of the Assemblée27. The EAC was of 
the opinion that the Court acted beyond its competence and 
demonstrated a certain fédéralisme judiciaire. The EAC also stated that 
it is high time to end the gouvernement des juges and restore power to 
the entities to whom it belongs, namely the governments of the Member 
States. The EAC therefore proposed to apply the bridging provision of 
Article 42 TEU and thereby build an emergency brake procedure into 
the European Council28. The EAC was not terribly pleased with the EU 
Commission’s communication in response to the judgement either. It 
rejected what it considers ‘its excessive interpretation’. According to 
the EAC, it is impossible to conclude from this judgement that there is 
a Community competence for criminal harmonization in all common 
policy areas of the EC and the four freedoms of the internal market. 
Instead, it argued that the Court limited this power to essential, cross-
sector, and fundamental objectives. 
The EU Commission had meanwhile published a new proposal for a 
directive on the environment through criminal law, replacing the 
annulled Framework Decision29 and the proposal for a directive of 
200130. In this area, we can speak of a legal vacuum to be filled. 
Despite the cautious strategy mentioned above, the Commission did 
submit a varied set of proposals with criminal law substance, most of 
which were related to the further implementation and execution of 
                                                          
26 Memorandum of 13.10.2005, http://www.euo.dk/upload/application/pdf/a16a3e 
79/2005_sv21.pdf. 
27 http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/9345000/1/j9vvgy6i0ydh7th/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f= 
/vh7rdrlf7yxv.pdf. 
28 This refers to the emergency brake procedure provided for in the proposal for a 
European Constitutional Treaty in case of criminal law harmonization which poses a 
threat to essential interests of a Member State. 
29 Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, OJ L 29/55, 09.02.2003. 
30 COM(2001) 139 final. 
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international law instruments, including criminal law enforcement 
obligations. The Commission did submit an amended proposal for a 
directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights31. This proposal was related to the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (the 
“TRIPS Agreement”) which was approved by means of Council 
Decision 94/800/EC32. The criminal law substance of the proposal was 
in accordance with that of the proposal for the environmental directive 
to a high extent. It is interesting to note that, in other proposals, such as 
the one for a new regulation on the Community customs code33, which 
is one of the most harmonized areas of EC law, the Commission did not 
include any criminal offences or criminal sanctions at all in Article 22 
on penalties, even though recital 12 of the regulation underlines the 
need for dissuasive sanctioning. The same can be said of the draft 
regulation concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the 
exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas34. Article 
29 of the Presidency proposal35 seemed to go beyond the Commission 
proposal36. However, both stopped short of imposing criminal sanctions 
for the misuse of data. The least that can be said is that it is not very 
clear from the proposals when and by which criteria the Commission 
does in fact opt for criminal law obligations. A blueprint for criminal 
legislative policy was certainly not guiding the practice yet. 
                                                          
31 COM(2006) 186 final. 
32 OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p. 1. 
33 COM(2005) 608. 
34 COM(2004) 835. 
35 Art. 29 of the Presidency Proposal: “Member States shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure that any misuse of data entered in the VIS is punishable by 
penalties, including administrative and/or criminal penalties in accordance with national 
law, that are effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. 
36 Art. 29 of the Commission Proposal: “The Member States shall lay down the 
rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the provisions of this Regulation 
relating to data protection and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are 
implemented (…)”. 
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5. The Second Ruling of the ECJ in Case C-440/05 on Criminal 
Enforcement of Ship Source Pollution; The Reintroduction of the 
Double Text Approach 
Framework Decision 2005/667 deals with maritime transport issues 
(and its environmental effects) and contains very specific rules on the 
harmonization of criminal sanctions. Both the Member States and the 
Court of Justice considered this case to be a new landmark case. In the 
proceedings before the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice, no less 
than 19 Member States intervened, all in support of the Council of 
Ministers37. 
Advocate General Mazäk in his opinion in Case C-440/05 stressed 
that, contrary to the view expressed by certain governments, Article 47 
TEU establishes the primacy of Community action and law under the 
EC Treaty over activities undertaken on the basis of Title V or Title VI 
of the TEU Treaty38 and that it does not make a difference if the 
Community, at the time of the adoption of the Framework Decision, 
had already or not yet adopted legislation with regard to the matters 
covered39. Second, he pointed out that, if the Court were to find that, for 
one reason or another, there is no such competence under the policy on 
transport, this finding would not, strictly speaking, be the end of the 
story. There can be alternatives for the legal basis in the EC Treaty. The 
AG did, however, reject the argument of the Member States that EC 
criminal competence should be limited to the environment or to 
substantial matters with a horizontal approach in the EC Treaty. His 
approach was mainly that criminal law competence should be a 
corollary to the general principle of effectiveness of Community law 
(effet utile principle). For this reason, he accepted that Art. 80(2) EC 
indeed provides the legal basis for the criminal law enforcement of 
ship-source pollution, instead of Art. 31(1)(e) and Art. 34(2)(b) TEU, 
                                                          
37 The following countries were granted leave to intervene: Portugal, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Slovakia, Malta, Hungary, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Czechia, 
Greece, Estonia, United Kingdom, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Austria, and 
Poland. 
38 Paragraph 53 of the opinion. 
39 Paragraph 57 of the opinion. 
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and he proposed that the Court should annul Framework Decision 
2005/667/JHA. However, he also agreed with the opinion of AG Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer in the C-176/03 case: “the Community legislature is 
entitled to constrain the Member States to impose criminal penalties 
and to prescribe that they be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, but 
beyond that, it is not empowered to specify the penalties to be 
imposed”40. He believed that this could otherwise lead to fragmentation 
and compromises the coherence of national penal systems and that 
Member States are, as a rule, better equipped than the Community to 
translate the concept of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal 
penalties into their respective legal systems and societal context. 
The ECJ first followed the same reasoning as in Case C-176/03. It 
considered it to be its task to ensure that acts which, according to the 
Council, fall within the scope of Title VI do not encroach upon the 
powers conferred on the Community by the EC Treaty. The ECJ 
emphasised that the common transport policy is one of the foundations 
of the Community and that the Council, under Article 80(2) EC, may 
decide whether, to what extent, and by what procedure appropriate 
provisions may be laid down for sea transport. Since Article 80(2) 
contains no explicit limitations, the Community legislature has broad 
legislative powers under Article 80(2) and is competent to take 
measures to improve transport safety. Moreover, environmental 
protection forms part of the common transport policy. 
Concretely, the ECJ took a careful look at the objectives and 
substance of framework decision 2005/667. Its main purpose is indeed 
to enhance maritime safety and improve the protection of the maritime 
environment. The Council took the view that criminal penalties were 
necessary to ensure compliance with the Community rules on maritime 
safety. The ECJ came to a double conclusion. Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the 
framework decision must be regarded as being essentially aimed at 
improving maritime safety, as well as environmental protection, and 
could have been validly adopted on the basis of Article (80)2. This 
means that the definition of the offences (actus reus and mens rea), 
liability issues, the prescription of the obligation to provide for criminal 
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sanctions for natural persons, and the obligation to provide for criminal 
or administrative sanctions for legal persons must be dealt with under 
EC law. However, the ECJ came to the conclusion that the type and 
level of criminal penalties to be applied does not fall within the 
Community’s sphere of competence. The Community legislator may 
not adopt provisions as Articles 4 and 6 of the framework decision. 
This last point comes as quite a surprise. Many EC instruments do in 
fact contain concrete penalty provisions, including on the type and level 
and on the liability of legal persons, and including the prescription of 
administrative or criminal sanctions, defined as administrative penalties 
or prescribed as administrative or criminal penalties. Member States 
remain free to choose between administrative or criminal sanctions 
when defining the type and level of sanctions. Nevertheless, the ECJ 
considered the prescription of the type and level of administrative or 
criminal sanctions a third-pillar competence. 
This ruling has several consequences. The EC functional criminal 
law competence has been confirmed, even outside the horizontal field 
of environmental protection. If the EC policy is an important policy of 
the EC, then functional competence can be included in the discretionary 
powers to take all appropriate measures. However, criminal law 
harmonization remains necessary and the only way to achieve this 
objective (i.e., enforcement of that policy). In other words, also in EC 
law, criminal law is ultima ratio and is necessary for the effet utile. The 
functional criminal law competence has therefore been broadly 
extended, but it is still not clear which EC policies are actually included 
and which are actually excluded. Concerning the scope of the 
competence, the ECJ has clearly stipulated that the nature of the 
criminal sanction can be prescribed under EC law, but that the type of 
criminal sanction and the level of the sanction must be prescribed under 
EU law. The ECJ judgement explicitly does not deal with other 
possible EC criminal law-related issues, such as, for instance, 
jurisdiction and the designation of contact points for transnational 
cooperation. As Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the framework decision must 
have been validly adopted on the basis of Article (80)2, the framework 
decision infringes Article 47 EU and, being indivisible, was annulled in 
its entirety. As a result the Commission had to elaborate a new directive 
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for ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties for 
infringements. The directive was adopted in 200941. The EU 
Commission had meanwhile published a new proposal for a directive 
on the environment through criminal law42, replacing the annulled 
framework decision43 and the proposal for a directive of 200144. The 
new directive on protection of the environment through criminal law, 
adopted in 200845, takes into account the ruling of the ECJ in the ship-
source pollution case and contains in Article 5 only an obligation to 
provide for a criminal law protection in this area, not filling in the type 
and the level of criminal penalties. In fact the directive only repeats the 
formula of the Greek maize case, but applied to criminal penalties: 
Member States must provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal penalties. 
6. Intermediary Conclusions 
Although the ECJ recognised in 1991 in case C-240/9046 that the EC 
was competent to prescribe and harmonise the administrative law 
enforcement of EC policies, even including punitive sanctions, it cannot 
be said that the EC has made exploitive use of this power over the last 
20 years. Quite the contrary, in fact: it is remarkable that, in many areas 
of community law, no initiatives whatsoever have been taken in this 
direction. One might think of, for example, environmental law, tax law, 
financial services regulation (banking and securities), customs 
regulation etc. It is my opinion that the Commission has shown 
insufficient initiative to give any systematic or consistent shape to the 
                                                          
41 Directive 2009/123 on ship-source pollution and on the introduction of penalties 
for infringements, OJ L 280/52, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri 
=OJ:L:2009:280:0052:0055:EN:PDF. 
42 COM(2007) 51 final. 
43 Council Framework Decision 2003/80/JHA, OJ L 29/55, 09.02.2003. 
44 COM(2001) 139 final. 
45 Directive 2008/99 on the protection of the environment through criminal law, OJ 
L 328/28 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:328:0028: 
0037:EN:PDF. 
46 Case C-240/90, Germany v Council and Commission, [1992] ECR I-5383. 
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harmonization of administrative enforcement of EC policies. The 
Commission has failed to make use of its power to outline an EC 
enforcement policy from which it can be clearly concluded in which 
area of policy the harmonization of administrative enforcement by the 
Member States would be needed. Often, an ad hoc approach was 
applied by the Directorates Generals of the Commission. 
The ECJ rulings on the criminal law competence in the first pillar 
were landmark decisions on the division of labour within the 
institutional frame of the EU. Their importance was not limited to 
issues of competence, as they had consequences for the interactions 
with the Member States’ legal order (community method versus third 
pillar method). Thanks to the ruling the first directives with criminal 
law substance were voted in the EU. However, their impact was limited 
as the type and level of criminal sanctions had to be defined in a second 
third pillar instrument. It is astonishing to see that neither the Member 
States nor the Commission submitted a third pillar proposal or a 
proposal for a directive under Article 83(2) of the TFEU, filling in the 
type and level of criminal sanctions in the environmental field. As it 
stands there is less harmonisation of criminal law enforcement of the 
environment under the actual frame than the one adopted by the 
framework decision, as the latter contained far reaching obligations 
concerning criminal law sanctions. The result is that the harmonisation 
in the criminal law field is only aimed at establishing minimum 
constituent elements in respect of certain criminal offences. 
Winding up this part of the article, I can say that neither the 
Commission nor the Member States have submitted legislative 
proposals based on a well-thought enforcement and criminal law policy 
of harmonised EC policies. The Council did already accept in its 
Tampere Conclusions of 1999 that ‘efforts to agree on common 
definitions, incriminations and sanctions should be focused in the first 
instance on a limited number of sectors of particular relevance’47, but 
the Tampere programme48 has clearly provided insufficient direction. 
Even in policy areas of far-reaching integration, such as the internal 
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48 Most recently updated by COM(2004) 0401. 
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market, the customs union, or the monetary union, there was no clear 
enforcement policy. Both in the Council and in the Commission, the 
approach has been predominantly ad hoc and eclectic. What is striking 
in this context is that the Commission has not submitted any EC 
proposal for the criminal protection of the Euro, which is after all 
‘hardcore’ EC monetary policy, and has gone along completely with the 
Council in the elaboration of a framework decision49. It is also striking 
that, in some policy areas, the Commission has failed to develop any 
initiative for the harmonization of punitive administrative law or 
criminal law or has only done so sparingly. In this context, one might 
think of financial services and securities regulations. It is true that the 
Market Abuse Directive of 200350 obliges the Member States to enforce 
the provisions administratively, but no mandatory sanctions have been 
prescribed. Article 14(2) authorizes the Commission to draw a list of 
administrative measures and penalties, but this list is merely 
informative. The lack of any well-contemplated criminal law policy is 
also reflected in the initiatives for criminal law harmonization. Why, 
for instance, does the Commission press for the criminal law 
harmonization of environmental law and criminal law protection of the 
financial interests of the EC, but fails to do the same in the field of 
competition or fisheries or the financing of terrorism? Why do the 
Member States press for the criminal law harmonization of terrorism, 
xenophobia, the protection of victims of crime, but not for the criminal 
law harmonization of serious violations of food safety rules, intellectual 
property infringements, or the financial management of businesses? 
7. The Council’s Criminal Legislative Policy on the Eve of the Entering 
into Force of the Lisbon Treaty 
Both Member States and the Council did feel the need to streamline 
the content of their legislative work in the criminal law field. As far 
                                                          
49 Framework Decision 2000/383, on increasing protection by means of criminal 
penalties and other sanctions against counterfeiting in connection with the introduction 
of the Euro, OJ L 140/1, 2000. 
50 Directive 2003/6, OJ L 96/16, 2003. 
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back as 1992 the Council agreed on an approach regarding 
approximation of penalties51. The Council elaborated a dual approach. 
In some cases, the Council stated, that it may be sufficient to stipulate 
that the Member States shall provide that the offences concerned are 
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties and 
leave it to each Member State to determine the level and type of the 
penalties. In other cases, the Council accepted the need for going 
further and agrees to establish a system of four penalty levels to be used 
in legislation: 
Level 1: Penalties of a maximum of at least between 1 and 3 years of 
imprisonment 
Level 2: Penalties of a maximum of at least between 2 and 5 years of 
imprisonment 
Level 3: Penalties of a maximum of at least between 5 and 10 years of 
imprisonment 
Level 4: Penalties of a maximum of at least 10 years of imprisonment 
(cases where very serious penalties are required). 
In practice the streamlining of the criminal law harmonization 
through minimum requirements for the maximum level of the penalties 
to be provided by national law in respect of specified offences has not 
been very successful and insufficient to elaborate a common approach 
of criminal law enforcement in the EU legislation. This is certainly the 
reason why the Council adopted in 2009 conclusions on model 
provisions52, guiding the Council’s criminal law deliberations. The 
Council was aiming at the following advantages: a) guidelines and 
model provisions would facilitate negotiations by leaving room to focus 
on the substance of the specific provisions; b) increased coherence 
would facilitate the transposition of EU provisions in national law and 
c) legal interpretation would be facilitated when new criminal 
legislation is drafted in accordance with agreed guidelines which build 
on common elements. The main aim is however that the model 
                                                          
51 Doc. 914/02 DROIPEN 33, http://eurocrim.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/cms/en/doc/ 
1304.pdf. 
52 http://eurocrim.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/cms/en/doc/1156.pdf. 
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provisions should guide future work of the Council on legislative 
initiatives that may include criminal provisions. 
The Council’s model provisions do integrate the 2002 conclusion on 
penalties. Moreover the model provisions do refer explicitly to the 
Lisbon Treaty: “If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations 
of the Member States proves essential to ensure the effective 
implementation of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to 
harmonisation measures, as under Article 83(2) of the Lisbon Treaty, it 
should follow the practice of setting the minimum level of maximum 
penalty”. 
The conclusions on model provisions of 2009 are dealing with both 
the need for criminal provisions as with the structure of criminal 
provisions itself. Concerning the necessity test the conclusions insist 
that criminal law enforcement should be introduced only when it is 
considered essential for the protection of the legal interest, and, as a 
rule, be used only as a last resort. This double test (essential for the 
protection of the legal interest and ultima ratio/ultimum remedium) is 
further concretized by insisting on proportionality and subsidiarity. 
Criminal law provisions should address clearly defined and delimited 
conduct (lex certa), which cannot be addressed effectively by less 
severe measures. These criteria are applied in the model provisions to 
two areas: 
- in the areas of particularly serious crime with a cross-border 
dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or 
from a special need to combat them on a common basis, or 
- if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member 
States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a 
Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation 
measures. 
Finally, when defining such a need, a final impact assessment 
should take into account the expected added value of criminal provision 
compared to other enforcement measures, the serious and/or 
widespread and frequent the harmful conduct is and the impact on 
existing criminal provisions in EU legislation and on different legal 
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systems with the EU. It is clear that these criteria of assessment of the 
need for criminal provisions contain general principles of criminal law 
and criminal policy issues and are addressed at the two substantive 
areas under Article 83 TFEU, the euro-offences under Art. 83(1) and 
the criminal law enforcement of harmonised EU policies (annexe-
competence) under Art. 83(2). 
The second part of the model provisions are dealing with the 
structure of criminal provisions as such. The model provision’s scheme 
is addressing actus reus, mens rea, inciting\aiding\abetting and attempt, 
penalties, liability of legal persons and penalties against legal persons. 
This means that provisions on jurisdiction or on mutual legal assistance 
or mutual recognition, dealt with in former EU conventions and 
framework decisions, have not been included in the model provisions. 
Concerning the definition of the actus reus following criteria are put 
forward: lex certa, foreseeability, conduct that causes actual harm or 
seriously threatens the right or essential interest to be protected. 
Abstracted danger to the protected right or interest is only possible if 
appropriate for the protection of interest or right. Concerning the mens 
rea element, as a general rule EU criminal legislation should only deal 
with intentionally committed conduct. However, negligence can be 
included when particularly appropriate for the protection of the interest 
or right. Strict liability is excluded explicitly. The model provisions 
impose criminalization of inciting, aiding and abetting, following the 
criminalization of the main offence. When dealing with attempt, the 
model rules are rather cautious. They refer to a necessity and 
proportionality test and to consideration of the different regimes under 
national law. 
When it comes to penalties, the model rules provide for two regimes 
(let us call them model A and B). In some cases it can be sufficient to 
provide for effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties 
and leave it to each Member State to determine the level of the 
penalties (model A). In other cases there may be a need for going 
further in the approximation of the levels of penalties (model B). In 
these cases the Council conclusions of 2002 on penalties apply. It is 
striking that the model provisions under model B do not deal with the 
type of criminal sanctions. When criminal law harmonisation under Art. 
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83(2) is at stake, it will certainly not be sufficient to limit the 
harmonization to deprivation of liberty. 
Finally, the model provisions contain extended provisions on 
liability of legal persons and penalties against legal persons. They 
introduce the obligation to ensure that a legal person can be held liable 
for criminal offences, but without imposing a criminal liability scheme. 
Attribution of liability is based on benefit for the legal person and 
attribution of (vicarious) liability of natural persons to the legal persons. 
A specific provision deals with the liability for lack or supervision or 
control, but also in this case there must be benefit for the legal person. 
The liability of legal persons shall not exclude criminal liability of 
natural persons. Liability of legal persons is prescribed for entities 
having legal personality, except for states or public bodies in the 
exercise of state authority and for public international organizations. 
When it comes to penalties against legal persons, the model provisions 
do prescribe a list of different penalties (as exclusion of public benefits, 
judicial winding-up, placing under judicial supervision, fines). 
However, these penalties of a criminal or non-criminal nature must 
meet the standard of effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties. It 
is astonishing that the model provisions contain very detailed 
provisions on liability of legal persons, but stick to the practice under 
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty and avoid the possibility of 
mandatory criminal liability in some areas of substantive criminal law. 
Although the Council’s model provisions were adopted one day 
before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force (30 November 2009) and 
were aimed at guiding the future work of the Council on legislative 
initiatives that may include criminal provisions, they are much more a 
systematization of the past performance than a prospective criminal 
policy document. They do not take fully into account the substantive 
changes under the Treaty of Lisbon. The Lisbon Treaty does provide 
for a new legal framework for criminal legislation with the aim to 
prevent and punish crime in the common area of freedom, security and 
justice. Not only has the substance of criminal law harmonization and 
the applicable rules been changed by the Treaty of Lisbon, but also the 
objective of harmonization. Article 3 TEU clearly states that 
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The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and 
justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of 
persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with 
respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime. 
Prevention and punishment of crime has become, compared to 
Article 2 of the Amsterdam TEU, an objective that is related to rights 
and duties of citizens, not only related to free movement of persons. 
Bearing in mind the wording of Article 82 TFEU, harmonization of 
criminal law and criminal procedure is also a necessary tool for 
strengthening judicial cooperation in criminal matters, based on mutual 
recognition and mutual trust. From this perspective the model 
provisions of the Council do not guide us as to the content of criminal 
policy choices. Which legal interests deserve criminal protection and to 
which extent? This is certainly the case for Art. 83(2), for which no or 
very little acquis had been build up in the past, either under the former 
third pillar, or under the first pillar. The criminal law protection 
directives in the environmental field are the exceptions to the rule. In 
the light of Article 2 TFEU which states that, in case of shared 
competence, the Member States shall exercise their competence to the 
extent that the Union has not exercised its competence, it becomes 
more and more necessary to know for which areas and to which extent 
the EU is willing to fill in its competence. As a mitigating factor we 
could say that the Council as such has no right of legislative initiative 
and is thus not very well placed to elaborate legislative police. At the 
other hand the Council’s model provisions are a policy document 
thoroughly discussed and adopted by the Member States in the Council, 
and the Member States do have legislative initiative. 
8. A Criminal Legislative Policy under the Lisbon Treaty? 
Since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty the European 
Commission and particularly DG Justice has taken a proactive stand on 
CHAPTER 1 
 40 
the topic of a criminal legislative policy. On its website53 DG Justice 
spells out three specific competences for criminal law in the TFEU. 
First, the EU can adopt directives providing for minimum rules 
regarding the definition (constituent elements and criminal sanctions) 
of Euro offences under Article 83(1). Article 83(1) contains a list of ten 
particularly serious areas of crime with a cross-border dimension. They 
include terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation 
of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, 
money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, 
computer crime, and organised crime. Second, the EU can also adopt 
directives, under Article 83(2), providing for minimum rules on the 
definition of offences and criminal sanctions if they are essential for 
ensuring the effectiveness of a harmonised EU policy. Third, DG 
Justice refers to the duty to protect the financial interests of the EU, 
under Articles 310(6), 325, 85 and 86 TFEU, which might include, if 
necessary protection by means of criminal law. This would mean that 
Art. 325 TFEU could be used as a proper legal basis for criminal law 
protection of the financial interests of the EU. It remains unclear if DG 
Justice is of the opinion that this competence could also include 
regulations providing for criminal law provisions instead of directives. 
The Commission published moreover in September 2011 a 
Communication titled “Towards an EU Criminal Policy – ensuring the 
effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law”54, 
dealing specifically with the competence under Article 83(2) TFEU. 
The Commission is aware of the fact that, because of a supposed lack 
of an explicit legal basis in this respect prior to the Lisbon Treaty, only 
a very few measures have been taken for the purpose of strengthening 
the enforcement of EU policies. In a first part the Commission 
elaborates on the scope for EU criminal legislation. The Commission 
underlines that Article 83(2) aims at strengthening mutual trust, 
ensuring effective enforcement and coherence and consistency in 
European criminal law itself. Article 83(2) does not list specific 
offences or areas of crime. For that reason the Commission elaborates 
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54 COM(2011) 573 final http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/act_en.pdf. 
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this communication as guidance for the policy choices whether to use 
or not to use criminal law as an enforcement tool, also in relation to 
other enforcement tools, as the administrative one. The Commission 
also adds Article 235(4) of the TFEU, referring to the protection of the 
financial interests of the EU: 
4. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, after consulting the Court of 
Auditors, shall adopt the necessary measures in the fields of the 
prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial interests of 
the Union with a view to affording effective and equivalent protection 
in the Member States and in all the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies. 
However, the Commission is not making any explicit reference to 
directives or regulations with a criminal law substance. However, 
inserting it under the scope of criminal legislation in this document is 
considering the possibility to do so. 
Second, the Commission is dealing with the question which 
principles should guide EU criminal law legislation. The 
communication refers to general principles as subsidiarity and respect 
for fundamental rights, referring explicitly to the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the ECHR, but not referring to Article 6(3) of 
the TEU, and thus not referring explicitly to fundamental rights as 
guaranteed by the ECHR and ‘as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States’. It seems to me impossible to 
elaborate a criminal policy that would not take into account the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and I do 
underline common, as they are a direct source for the general principles 
of EU law under Article 6(3) TEU. After the reference to the general 
principles, the Commission follows the two-step approach of the 
Council’s model provisions. Step 1 is the decision on whether to adopt 
criminal law measures at all (last resort-ultima ratio/ultimum 
remedium). The proposed necessity and proportionality test is written 
in a negative way (restrain unless necessary and proportional) without 
taking into account that there might be positive duties under 
fundamental rights to investigate, prosecute and punish, also under 
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Article 83(2). Step 2 is dealing witch the principles guiding the decision 
on what kind of criminal law measures to adopt. The text refers to the 
concept of “minimum rules” and excludes full harmonisation, but 
underlines at the same time the need for legal certainty. The 
requirements for legal certainty are however not the same as for 
national criminal law legislation, as the directive has to be implemented 
in national law and cannot create or aggravate criminal liability as such. 
It is surprising that the Commission is not further elaborating on the 
concept of minimum rules, as this formulation was already used in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. These minimum rules are related to the Treaty 
objectives, including equivalent protection and common provisions 
when dealing with cross-border crime or enforcement of EU policies. 
This means that the concept of minimum rules is functional to the 
objectives of the Treaty and not an autonomous criterion. Regarding the 
sanctions the Commission is referring both to the type of sanctions as to 
the level of sanctions (taking into account aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances) that should be implemented in national law. The choice 
of sanctions must be evidence-driven and submitted to the necessity 
and proportionality test. Interesting is that the Commission insist on 
tailoring the sanctions to the crime, which has consequences for the 
choice of type of sanctions and consequences for the choice for 
criminal liability for legal persons. It thus becomes clear that the 
Commission does not exclude criminal liability of legal persons and 
criminal sanctions for legal persons of the competence under 83(2) 
TFEU. Finally, the minimum rules can also include provisions on 
jurisdiction, as well other aspects that are considered part essential for 
the effective application of the legal provision. 
Third, the Commission is dealing with the choice of policy areas 
where EU criminal law might be needed. Criteria are lack of effective 
enforcement or significant differences among Member States leading to 
inconsistent application of EU rules. Still in that case the Commission 
will have to assess case-by-case the specific enforcement problems and 
the choice for administrative and/or criminal enforcement. However, 
the Commission is already indicating in this Communication priority 
fields for criminal law harmonisation under Article 83(2). Three 
selected areas are mentioned: 
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- the financial sector, e.g. concerning market manipulation and insider 
trading55 
- the fight against fraud affecting the financial interest of the EU 
- the protection of the euro against counterfeiting. 
The Commission mentions furthermore a set of areas (not an 
exclusive list) in which criminal law enforcement might play a role: 
- illegal economy and financial criminality 
- road transport56 
- data protection57 
- customs rules 
- environmental protection 
- fisheries policy 
- internal market policies (counterfeiting, corruption, public procurement). 
The assessment has to take into account a whole set of factors, 
including the seriousness and character of the breach and the efficiency 
of the enforcement system. The choice for administrative enforcement 
and or criminal enforcement is part of this assessment. The list of topics 
is not exclusive, but it is rather surprising that counterfeiting and piracy 
of products, feed and food safety and corruption are not in the prior list 
of already selected areas. There is already a criminal law acquis for 
corruption58. As already mentioned, as far back as 1995, the 
Commission had submitted a proposal for a directive on criminal 
measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and a proposal for a framework decision to strengthen the 
                                                          
55 See ‘Communication on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector’, 
COM(2010) 716 final of 08.12.2010. 
56 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC(2011) 391 of 28.03.2011, 
accompanying the White Paper ‘Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – 
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57 See the Communication ‘A comprehensive approach on personal data protection 
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criminal law framework to combat intellectual property offences59. The 
Commission had already tried in 200360, in vain, to get a regulation 
adopted containing criminal law enforcement obligations in the area of 
feed and food safety. 
The European Parliament adopted in May 2012 a resolution on an 
EU approach to criminal law61. The resolution combines the tests of 
necessity, subsidiarity and proportionality with the general principles of 
criminal law (lex certa, nulla poena sine culpa, lex mitior, etc.) and 
does correspond fully to the 2011 Communication of the Commission. 
The resolution does not contain any reference to the choice of policy 
areas that should deserve criminal law protection. More interesting is 
the procedural approach. The resolution calls for an inter-institutional 
agreement on the principles and working methods governing proposals 
for future substantive criminal law provisions and invites the 
Commission and the Council to establish an inter-institutional working 
group in which these institutions and Parliament can draw up such an 
agreement and discuss general matters with a view to ensuring 
coherence in EU criminal law. As it stands there is a Council Working 
Party on substantive criminal law (DROIPEN) and a new inter-service 
coordination group on criminal law at the Commission. Furthermore 
the Commission has decided in February 2012 to set up a formal expert 
group on EU criminal policy group. At the EP there is no formal 
structure at all. 
9. Criminal Harmonisation under the Lisbon Treaty in Practice 
Directive 2011/36 on preventing and combating trafficking in 
human beings and protecting its victims62 is the first directive that has 
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been adopted under Article 83(1). It contains the classic content as 
foreseen under the Council’s model provisions and includes specific 
harmonization of type and level of sanctions (model B of the Council’s 
model provisions), but goes also beyond it, as it deals with aspects of 
jurisdiction, seizure and confiscation, and some aspects related to 
investigation and prosecution and of course many aspects of victim 
protection and victim rights. Directive 2011/9263 on combating the 
sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography 
follows completely the same pattern. Meanwhile the Council also 
reached a general agreement64 on a proposal for a directive on attacks 
against information systems, replacing framework decision 
2005/222/JHA. Also in this directive has been opted for the 
harmonization of type and level of criminal sanctions (the B model). 
However, these directives do not always follow the four type levels of 
harmonization of custodial sanctions as elaborated in the 1992 
agreement on criminal sanctions, as incorporated in the Council’s 
model provisions. The influence of the EP as co-legislator has resulted, 
through amendments for more severe repression, in other sanction 
levels. 
The first initiative under Article 83(2) is indeed in one of the three 
already selected areas in the Communication of September 2011, 
namely in the financial sector and on criminal sanctions for insider 
dealing and market manipulation. The Commission has used the policy 
criteria of Communication of September 2011 for its assessment and 
has even produced in 2010 a communication on “Reinforcing 
sanctioning regimes in the financial service sector”65, based on 
comparative research by the three Committees of Supervisors 
(Committee of European Banking Supervisors-CEBS, Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors - CEIOPS 
and Committee of European Securities Regulators - CESR) on the 
equivalence of the sanctioning regimes in the financial sector in 
Member States. The review by the Commission in cooperation with the 
                                                          
63 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:335:0001:00 
14:EN:PDF. 
64 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st11/st11566.en11.pdf. 
65 COM(2010) 716 final. 
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Committees of Supervisors spells out substantial divergences and 
weaknesses in national sanctioning regimes: 
- some competent authorities do not have at their disposal important 
types of sanctioning powers for certain violations 
- levels of administrative pecuniary sanctions vary widely across 
Member States and are too low in some Member States 
- some competent authorities cannot address administrative sanctions to 
both natural and legal persons 
- competent authorities do not take into account the same criteria in the 
application of sanctions 
- divergence exists in the nature (administrative or criminal) of 
sanctions provided for in national legislation 
- the level of application of sanctions varies across Member States. 
As a consequence the Commission considers that a minimum 
common standard should be set and that this minimum common 
standard might include criminal sanctions for the most serious 
violations. The proposed directive on criminal sanctions for insider 
dealing and market manipulation66, submitted in October 2011, is part 
of a legislative double text package, which includes also a proposal for 
a regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (market 
abuse)67. In fact the proposed regulation, based on Article 114 TFEU 
and aiming at replacing directive 2003/6/EC68, is the basic regulatory 
framework. The proposal regulation contains all definitions, 
obligations, and prohibitions and does also regulate the applicable 
administrative enforcement regime, including administrative sanctions 
of a non-punitive and punitive character. This means that the proposed 
regulation contains very detailed provisions on the definition of the 
illicit behaviour and on the applicable administrative sanctions, 
including the type and level of sanctions (such as withdrawal of the 
authorisation for legal persons, or pecuniary sanctions for up to 10% of 
                                                          
66 COM(2011) 654 final, 20.10.2011. 
67 COM(2011) 651 final, 20.10.2011. 
68 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:096:0016:00 
16:EN:PDF. 
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a legal person’s total annual turnover in the preceding business year)69. 
The proposed directive is the result of the assessment of the 
Commission on the need, proportionality, and subsidiarity of criminal 
law enforcement in the financial sector. The Commission came to a 
positive result as far as serious market abuse offences are concerned. 
The proposed directive is surprising from different angles. Although the 
proposed regulation and the proposed directive are a regulatory package 
and contain quite some cross-references, the proposed directive refers 
only to the definitions of financial instruments and inside information 
in the proposed regulation, but strangely enough reformulates the 
definition of insider dealing and market manipulation. These definitions 
in the proposed directive and regulation are not shaped in the same 
way; the ones in the proposed directive are written in a more precise 
style and do not contain further explanations and details. Second, 
bearing in mind the assessment of the necessity of criminal law 
harmonisation to ensure effective enforcement of Union policy against 
market abuse, it is also surprising that the proposed directive chooses 
from what I have called model A of the Council’s model provisions. 
This means that it is, in this area, sufficient to provide for effective, 
proportionate, and dissuasive criminal penalties and to leave it to each 
Member State to determine the type and level of the penalties. This type 
of criminal law harmonization was already possible under the 1st pillar 
of the Amsterdam Treaty, even after the ruling of the Court of Justice in 
the ship source pollution case. And this brings me to the third point. 
The choice of Article 83(2) as a legal basis is not discussed. There is no 
consideration as to why Article 83(2) is more appropriate than a legal 
basis linked to the substantive policy area (financial services). The 
consequence of the choice of Article 83(2) is at least that Denmark is 
not taking part in the adoption of this Directive70 and that the UK and 
Ireland have an opting in choice, but no obligation to become part of 
and bound by the directive71. In other words it is under Article 83(2) 
possible that criminal enforcement obligations, considered in line with 
proportionality and subsidiarity and considered necessary for the 
                                                          
69 Article 26 of the proposal. 
70 In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol no 22. 
71 In accordance with Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Protocol 21. 
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effective enforcement of a harmonised EU policy, will not be binding 
in three EU countries, including the EU country with the biggest centre 
of financial services. In April 2014 the EU institutions came to a 
tripartite agreement on the draft regulation and draft directive72. 
The second priority area under Article 83(2) concerns the protection 
of the financial interest of the EU. The acquis in this field dates from 
the Maastricht Treaty, being the 1995 regulation on administrative 
enforcement73 and the 1995 Convention and two protocols74 on criminal 
enforcement. The Commission did already submit in 2001 a proposal 
for a directive on the criminal-law protection of the Community’s 
financial interest75, but the proposal was never thoroughly discussed at 
the Council. This file concerns not only the “Lisbonisation” of the 
Maastricht-acquis, but also some substantial new points, as the 
broadening of het material scope of the substantive offences, 
redefinition of jurisdiction criteria and the eventual criminal liability of 
legal persons. It is clear, in the light of the acquis, that this proposal will 
be a B model for the harmonisation of sanctions, so including 
harmonisation of type and level of the mandatory sanctions. 
In 2012, the European Commission submitted a new proposal for a 
directive on the fight against fraud on the Union’s financial interests by 
means of criminal law under the Lisbon Treaty76. The proposal not only 
sought to “Lisbonise” the existing acquis, but also included in Article 
2-6 two additional offences not covered by previous third pillar 
instruments, namely fraud in public procurement or grant procedures 
and misappropriation of funds77. The Commission did not include all 
                                                          
72 Document PE 8 2014 INIT of 4 April 2014 and document PE 8 2014 INIT of 4 
April 2014 for the final text of the TRIPARTITE. 
73 Regulation 2988/95 on the protection of the EC’s financial interest, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995R2988:EN:HTML. 
74 Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests of 
26 July 1995, OJ C 316, 27.11.1995; First Protocol of 27 September 1996 to the 
Convention, OJ C 313, 23.10.1996 and Second Protocol to the Convention, OJ C 221, 
19.07.1997. 
75 COM(2001) 272 final. 
76 COM(2012) 363 final. 
77 The Commission has reflected on including the other offences mentioned in the 
Corpus Juris, namely a specific offence of abuse of office and the breach of 
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the offences listed in the Corpus Juris project, neither did it include 
criminal liability for legal persons. The provisions on penalties in 
Articles 7-9 were more innovative. Article 7 required penalties to be 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive”, but Article 8 set out very 
innovative imprisonment thresholds. Fraud on the EU, public 
procurement fraud and misappropriation of funds were to be punishable 
by a minimum penalty of at least six months imprisonment and a 
maximum penalty of at least five years imprisonment in cases involving 
an advantage or damage of at least €100,000. For money laundering 
and corruption, the same imprisonment thresholds were to apply in 
cases involving and advantage or damage of at least €30,000. In cases 
of involvement within a criminal organisation for all PIF-offences the 
minimum maximum penalty was required to be at least ten years 
imprisonment. The introduction of mandatory minimum penalties was 
entirely new. The proposed directive was based on Article 325(4) 
TFEU. 
During the negotiations at Council level, Member States obtained 
very substantial changes to this proposal. In the agreed general 
approach in the Council in June 2013 the legal base was changed from 
Article 325(4) TFEU to Article 83(2) TFEU. From the opinion of the 
Legal Service of the Council, which were in favour of this change, it is 
clear that all the limitations (viz., the fact of not being applicable to 
Denmark, the opting in arrangement for the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, and the emergency brake procedure) apply. In the event of 
there being no opt-in by the United Kingdom and Ireland, these would 
remain bound by the 1995 PIF Convention. Secondly, the Member 
States have explicitly excluded revenues arising from VAT from the 
scope the directive. This is astonishing, as the Court of Justice has ruled 
clearly that VAT revenues are part of the financial interests of the 
Union78, and many serious EU fraud cases are related to VAT carousel 
                                                                                                                               
professional secrecy. However, the Commission decided not to include a special 
offence on abuse of office as “it has been considered a superfluous addition to the 
offence of misappropriation. Similarly, an offence of breach of professional secrecy has 
not been included in the proposal as the conduct is already covered under the 
disciplinary-law measures of the EU Staff Regulations”. 
78 Case C-539/09 Commission v Germany, [2011] ECR I-11235, paragraph 72. 
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cases. In relation to penalties, Member States deleted from the text any 
reference to minimum terms of imprisonment. As regards the minimum 
maximum terms of imprisonment, this was lowered to at least four 
years in the case of serious offences. 
Whether an offence is serious is defined according to national law, 
having regard to all relevant circumstances, such as the value of any 
damage done or advantages gained, or the damage to the integrity of or 
confidence in systems for managing the Union’s financial interests 
(recital 16). The commission of an offence within a criminal 
organisation is an aggravating circumstance. At the time of writing (the 
end of March 2014) the proposal is prepared to be submitted to for 
voting in April in the general assembly in the European Parliament. 
Both the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affaires 
(LIBE) and the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) of the 
European Parliament have amended substantially the Council text and 
agreed on a new version. The scope of the offences has been widened 
again to include fraud in public procurement and VAT fraud. By doing 
this, the text has been reoriented in the direction of the original 
Commission proposal. However a strong lobby of NGO’s has changed 
the mind of the Parliamentary Committees with the result that 
minimum sanctions will not be reintroduced and that the legal basis will 
remain Article 83(2). The emergency break procedure is seen by the 
NGO’s as a method to block proposals that does not offer sufficient 
protection of procedural safeguards. 
As far as the third priority area is concerned, the criminal protection 
of the counterfeiting of the single currency, the file concerns the 
“Lisbonisation” of the framework decision of 2000 on increasing 
protection by criminal penalties and other sanctions against 
counterfeiting in connection with the introduction of the euro79. The 
European Commission submitted a proposal in February 201380 in 
order to replace the framework decision 2000/383/JHA. Also this 
                                                          
79 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/fight_against_fraud/fight_against_counter 
feiting/l33090_en.htm. 
80 Proposal for a directive on the protection of the euro and other currencies against 
counterfeiting by criminal law, http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/euro-protec 
tion/directive_conterfeiting_en.pdf. 
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proposal contained minimum criminal penalties, but did not provide 
either for criminal liability of legal persons. In February 2014 in the 
Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER II) the Member 
States confirmed in February 2014 the political agreement reached by 
the Greek EU Council Presidency on February 12 in negotiations with 
the European Parliament. This allows reaching a first reading 
agreement after the formal voting in the European Parliament and in the 
Council. However in this agreement the minimum criminal penalties 
did not survive the negotiations either. 
Concerning the other areas for which the Commission still has to 
decide if and to which extent harmonisation of criminal enforcement is 
necessary (like customs policy, illegal economy and financial 
criminality, data protection, etc.) there are no legislative proposals in 
the pipeline either. The Commission has published a communication on 
“A Single Market for intellectual property rights. Boosting creativity 
and innovation to provide economic growth, high quality jobs and first 
class products and services in Europe”81, dealing also with enhanced 
fight against counterfeiting and piracy. However, until now there is no 
legislative proposal in the pipeline, although the Commission submitted 
already in 1995 a proposal for a directive on criminal measures aimed 
at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights and a 
proposal for a framework decision to strengthen the criminal law 
framework to combat intellectual property offences82. Concerning 
corruption the Commission has published a communication on fighting 
corruption in the EU83. In some of the mentioned policy areas the 
Commission has tendered a study, like the one on sanctions in the field 
of commercial road transport. 
                                                          
81 COM(2011) 287 final, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ipr_ 
strategy/COM_2011_287_en.pdf. 
82 COM(2005) 276 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/ 
com2005_0276en01.pdf. 
83 COM(2011) 308 final http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/110606/ 
308/1_EN_ACT_part1_v12[1].pdf. 
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10. Concluding Remarks 
The impact of the European integration process on criminal law has 
been substantial. 
The enforcement deficit of EU policies, both in law and in practice, 
has resulted in EU enforcement obligations, including punitive 
administrative and criminal law obligations with the aim to achieve 
effective application of EU policies in the Member States. Since the 
coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the creation of an area 
of freedom, security and justice substantive areas of serious crime (the 
so-called euro crimes, as organized crime, terrorism, trafficking in 
human being, cybercrime, etc.) have been harmonised with the aim of 
strengthening judicial cooperation in criminal matters, based on mutual 
recognition and mutual trust. The overall aim of both approaches is to 
prevent and punish crime in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
Bearing in mind the shared competence84 in the field of criminal 
law, based on shared sovereignty and common goals between the 
Member States and the EU, it is logical that both the EU and the 
Member States elaborate criminal policies, also in the area of European 
criminal law. But the shared competence also means that both European 
and national criminal policies must and should have a double 
dimension, a European, and a national one. In fact, European criminal 
policy has to take account of common traditions in the Member states 
and the national criminal policies have to take into account the 
European dimension of their national criminal law enforcement. The 
prevention and punishment of market abuse, the commercialisation of 
dangerous food stuffs or of trafficking in human beings, just to give a 
few examples, can only be achieved through the integration of EU and 
national criminal policies. 
What is needed to offer EU citizens an area of freedom, security, 
and justice in which free movement of persons is ensured in 
conjunction with prevention and combating of crime? It is quite clear 
that we cannot address only serious cross-border crime, but have to deal 
also with the criminal law enforcement of EU policies, if necessary. 
                                                          
84 Article 2 TFEU. 
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What type of legal interests need and deserve criminal law protection? I 
think that we still can make a difference between 
- legal interests of the EU as such (counterfeiting of the single currency, 
protection of the financial interests of the EU, corruption of EU 
officials) 
- common legal interests in the area of freedom, security and justice 
(euro-crimes – Article 83(1) TFEU) 
- legal interests linked to harmonised EU policies (annex-competence – 
Article 83(2) TFEU). 
Both EU and national criminal policy documents should deal with 
these three dimensions. 
Criminal policy must be principle-based, combining the tests of 
necessity (ultima ratio), subsidiarity and proportionality and general 
principles of criminal law. But that is only a part of the story. Criminal 
policy is of course also about policy, meaning that political choices 
must be made about the interests that deserve and need criminal law 
protection. This criminal law protection has to be defined in relation 
with other enforcement regimes, especially punitive administrative 
enforcement. Criminal policy also includes the elaboration of 
instruments of integrated enforcement of community policies, including 
prevention, administrative enforcement, and criminal enforcement. In 
the light of Article 2 TFEU that states that, in case of shared 
competence, the Member States shall exercise their competence to the 
extent that the Union has not exercised its competence, it becomes 
more and more necessary to know for which areas and to which extent 
the EU is willing to fill in its competence. The minimum rules 
concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions, as defined 
in Article 83 cannot be read as minimum harmonization. Once the EU 
has used its competence, it will be impossible to decriminalize the 
offence at the national level or even to change substantially the 
constituent elements of the offences or of the penalties or to over 
criminalize it. Moreover, it can be seen from the new directives based 
on Article 83(1) TFEU the minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions also include related aspects of 
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jurisdiction, judicial cooperation in criminal matters, victim protection 
etc. From this perspective of common equivalent standards in the area 
of freedom, security and justice it becomes less and less evident that 
Member States can claim that this harmonization should leave intact a 
number of principles or guarantees that were considered by (some of) 
the Member States to be essential for their own criminal (procedural) 
law. As mentioned before, red flags to functional harmonisation have 
traditionally been: prosecutorial discretion, criminal liability of legal 
persons, minimum penalties and sentencing discretion. Procedurally the 
emergency brake under Article 83 TFEU can be used for this purpose, 
but this instrument is rather a political ultima ratio, although it could 
have a preventive effect during the negotiations. In my opinion national 
red flags can have only sense if they do not obstruct the European 
common goals in the area of freedom, security, and justice. Finally 
criminal policy is not limited to criminal law legislation, but should 
also address implementation and application in the Member States (in 
the books and in practice). This means that the administration of justice 
in the broad sense (from police authorities until criminal courts) in the 
Member States also has to be addressed from a perspective of effective 
application with the aim to realise the European common goals. 
Prevention and punishment of crime has become an objective that is 
related to the rights and duties of citizens in the area of freedom, 
security, and justice (Article 3 TEU). Bearing in mind the wording of 
Article 82 TFEU, harmonization of criminal law and criminal 
procedure is also a necessary tool for strengthening judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters, based on mutual recognition and mutual trust. From 
this perspective neither the model provisions of the Council, nor the 
draft resolution of the EP guides us as to the content of criminal policy 
choices. Which legal interests deserve criminal protection and to which 
extent? This is certainly the case for Article 83(2), for which no or very 
little acquis had been build up in the past, either under the former third 
pillar, or under the first pillar. The Commission Communication of 
2011 goes a step further and deals with the policy choices. This is 
clearly of added value, but it remains unclear on which basis and by 
which criteria policy areas have been selected or could be selected for 
criminal law protection. Once it has been decided that a policy area 
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does need criminal law protection it remains also unclear what the 
substance should be of it. It is limited to substantive criminal law or 
should it also include related aspects of criminal procedure? Is it limited 
to imposing effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions 
(A model) or does it include harmonization of type and level of 
sanctions (B model)? The Green paper on the approximation, mutual 
recognition and enforcement of criminal sanctions in the EU85 does 
offer us in the annexes an interesting inventory and comparison of 
Member States’ legislation, but does, unfortunately, not include specific 
sanctions as financial penalties, disqualifications, confiscations, 
withdrawal of licenses, temporary closure of activities. This means that 
the specific sanctions for the enforcement of EU policies, so important 
in the area under Article 83(2), have been left out of the inventory and 
comparison. 
Although the European Union is definitely in search of a criminal 
law policy for the enforcement of EU policies, it is doing it without any 
inter-institutional coherence. Moreover, the EU has difficulty in finding 
criteria to make consistent choices as to whether criminal law 
protection is necessary and if so, what the substance of it should be. 
The Stockholm programme gives us little to no guidance in relation to 
Article 83(2). The substantive list of topics in the Commission 
Communication of 2011 is quite different from the list of EU policies 
that was selected in the Klaus Tiedemann study on economic criminal 
law in the EU86. In that study the selection was: EU labour policy, EU 
food stuffs policy, EU competition policy, EU environmental policy, 
EU policy on corporate bodies and insolvency, EU financial services 
policy, EU intellectual rights policy (especially patents), EU policy on 
commercial embargos. 
For the moment being the Member States, having a right of initiative 
under Article 83(2), are not much help either. They do not come up 
with proposals and have not elaborated criminal policy visions on 
Article 83(2) at all. This means also that they give no guidance on the 
                                                          
85 COM(2004) 334 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/ 
com2004_0334en01.pdf. 
86 K. TIEDEMANN (Ed.), Wirtschaftsstrafrecht in der Europäischen Union, Köln, 
2002. 
CHAPTER 1 
 56 
matter to their national parliaments either. An exception to the rule is a 
recent notice87 from the Dutch Minister of Justice and Security to the 
Chamber of Deputies, in which he explains the position and policy of 
his Department in relation to European criminal law under the Lisbon 
Treaty. In his notice he repeats all the necessity, subsidiarity and 
proportionality tests that have been mentioned and adds a test on 
financial consequences and enforceability. However, when it comes to 
substantive choices in relation to Article 83(2) he is very brief, saying, 
in effect short: I will assess the proposals taking into account that 
administrative enforcement might be an excellent tool for some 
policies. In other words, he is not either coming up with a list of 
harmonised EU policies that need equivalent standards of criminal law 
protection in order to offer citizens an area of liberty, security and 
justice in conjunction with prevention and punishment of crime. 
The EU is sure about its competence, but still does not know when 
and how to deal with it: certus an, incertus quando. 
 
                                                          
87 http://lecane.com/design/eppodesign/pdf/kst-32317-801.pdf. 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
ENFORCING THE MARKET ABUSE REGIME: 
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF CRIMINAL 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION?1 
1. Introduction 
The European Union has long been an important driver for the 
integration of financial markets in Europe. While ongoing 
internationalisation has stimulated the process of European integration, 
the EU, in turn, has further promoted this development by removing 
interstate barriers through the four freedoms, common policies and 
harmonising measures. The European Union sets ambitious goals for 
itself in the Treaty of Lisbon. As regards the internal market, Art. 26(2) 
TFEU holds that the internal market will comprise an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaties. Article 3(2) TEU offers European citizens an area of freedom, 
security and justice (AFSJ) without internal frontiers, in which the free 
movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate 
measures with respect to the prevention and combating of crime. This 
means that the enforcement of internal market policies, such as the 
integration of financial markets, is fully part of the aims of the AFSJ. 
                                                          
1 The article will be published in 2015 as part of a collective volume: L. SENDEN 
e.a. (Eds.), Regulation and Enforcement of Financial Markets, Antwerp-Oxford-
Portland, 2015. 
The article has been written by J.A.E. Vervaele and M.J.J.P. Luchtman. 
Prof. Luchtman is Associate Professor at the Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law 
and Criminology and the Utrecht Centre for Regulation and Enforcement in Europe 
(RENFORCE). 
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This article focuses on the issue of what consequences these 
ambitions have for the legal framework for law enforcement, in 
national and transnational cases. Despite the fact that law enforcement 
powers are considered to belong to the core of the nation-state (and EU 
law is therefore usually enforced by national authorities), those 
authorities and their powers are an essential part of the European legal 
order. They not only need a set of powers in order to effectively enforce 
the EU laws on their own territories, but must also cooperate with each 
other in transnational cases or in domestic cases for which mutual legal 
assistance (MLA) is needed. Moreover, national authorities need to be 
aware that nowadays their tasks have acquired a European dimension. 
There is a wealth of literature on how regulations of the financial 
markets are best enforced2. Within the transnational context of the 
European Union, theories on regulation need implementation in the 
specific institutional setting of the European Union itself. While the EU 
is increasingly defining the scope and parameters of regulatory goals, 
their implementation and enforcement primarily remain in the hands of 
the Member States. The latent tension between common EU-wide goals 
and nationally driven interests has led scholars to focus on the 
regulatory competition that may occur between different EU Member 
States, at worst leading to races to the bottom, to the detriment of the 
common EU goals3. 
As far as we are aware, there is hardly any literature that offers 
accounts of how complex and integrated legal orders, such as those of 
the EU, support the operationalisation of regulation theories. Those 
theories, including Ayres and Braithwaite’s authoritative theory of 
                                                          
2 Cf. inter alia J. BRAITHWAITE, P. DRAHOS, Global Business Regulation, 
Cambridge, 2000; D. VOGEL, R.A. KAGAN (Eds.), Dynamics of Regulatory Change - 
How Globalisation Affects National Regulatory Policies, Berkeley, 2004. 
3 Cf. J. SUN, J. PELKMANS, Regulatory Competition in the Single Market, in JCMS: 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 1995; M. EGAN, Regulatory Strategies, Delegation 
and European Market Integration, in Journal of Public Policy, 1998; A. OGUS, 
Competition between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to 
Comparative Law, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1999. 
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responsive regulation4, provide us with models of which enforcement 
instruments should be used in varying circumstances. Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s picture of the enforcement pyramid, for instance, 
presupposes a framework that supports close cooperation between all 
the enforcement actors involved, as that pyramid entails ‘a hierarchy of 
sanctions, graded from light to hefty, and from horizontal [compliance] 
to vertical [command and control]’ (our italics)5. The adjective 
‘responsive’ indicates that climbing the pyramid towards the levels of 
sanctions or even withdrawal of licences must be warranted by the 
attitude and motives of the specific market actor6. 
Any theory or common approach on how best to enforce financial 
regulations is informed by and needs alignment with the rule of law, the 
separation of powers and fundamental rights (cf. Articles 2 and 6 TEU). 
It is fair to assume, for instance, that theories on responsive regulation 
are best served with well-informed and well-equipped regulative 
authorities. Nonetheless, concerns in respect of, for instance, the 
protection of fundamental rights may point in another direction, i.e. 
towards a division of responsibilities over various authorities or even a 
prohibition on mutually sharing information. Those conflicting interests 
and values need to be balanced. The opposite may also be true: the law 
may impose restrictions on, for instance, the ability of authorities to 
cooperate, for which the previously mentioned values offer no 
convincing explanation. 
The goal of this article is to map how the current and future legal 
infrastructure in respect of the investigation, prosecution and 
punishment of market abuse rules supports the central assumption of 
the EU legislature that, in order to offer a comprehensive package in the 
fight against market abuse, a level playing field throughout the EU is 
necessary. Applying a legal proportionality analysis, we will assess to 
                                                          
4 I. AYRES, J. BRAITHWAITE, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate, New York, 1995; J. BRAITHWAITE, Regulatory Capitalism: How 
it Works, Ideas for Making it Work Better, Cheltenham, 2008. 
5 Cf. A.T. OTTOW, Mastering the Market? Exploring New Forms of Market 
Supervision (inaugural lecture Utrecht), Utrecht, 2008, pp. 11-12. 
6 Cf. H. VAN DE BUNT et al., Hoe stevig is de piramide van Braithwaite?, in 
Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, 2007. 
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what extent the choices made by the European legislature are 
appropriate to achieve the goals it has set for itself. We will make that 
analysis on the basis of the following questions: 
(1) is there any need for EU enforcement at all? If so, 
(2) is it limited to prescriptive jurisdiction7 or does it also include 
investigative jurisdiction in the AFSJ (from coordination to 
supranational enforcement)? And 
(3) does it include an integrated approach of administrative and 
criminal enforcement? 
We will start in the next Section with two cases of market abuse 
which show that, under the present regime, national authorities are by 
no means fully aware of the European dimension of their tasks, which 
not only leads to a duplication of work by different national authorities, 
but also to complications in the legal position of the natural and legal 
persons concerned. After that, we will provide an overview of the 
policy agenda of the European legislative bodies and make an analysis 
of the pending legislative proposals that aim to create a level playing 
field, not only for economic actors and citizens, but also for law 
enforcement authorities (Sections 0 and 0). We will make a distinction 
between measures proposed in the area of administrative law (Section 
0) and criminal law (Section 0). In Section 0 we will argue that these 
proposals still do not fully take into account the central goals of the 
European Union, as formulated in Articles 3 TEU and 26 TFEU 
mentioned above. We will conclude with a brief summary of our 
findings (Section 0). Finally, we should note that this article will focus 
on the structures for enforcement through public law (administrative 
law and criminal law). We will therefore disregard law enforcement 
through private law and private law actors (‘the base of the enforcement 
pyramid’). 
                                                          
7 Prescriptive jurisdiction is the jurisdiction to establish the contents and scope of 
application of certain norms and prescriptive rules. Executive jurisdiction is the 
jurisdiction to enforce orders or prescriptive rules emanating from the judiciary or the 
legislature; cf. European Committee on Crime Problems, Extraterritorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 1990. 
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2. Problem Setting And Problem Analysis 
2.1. Fortis Bank: Market Manipulation and Market Abuse 
In 2007, just before the financial crisis and meltdown of 2008, 
Banco Santander, Fortis Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland obtained 
control over ABN AMRO bank through a hostile takeover, one of the 
biggest ever deals in the financial services industry. Fortis Bank, the 
biggest bank in Benelux, had problems in financing its part of the 
takeover and decided to go to the capital market for fresh capital and 
thus to offer new shares. The operation was widely advertised. 
Although the capital extension was successful, it was not enough to 
guarantee the financial position of Fortis Bank and also, due to the 
worsening situation of the financial markets and the increasing distrust 
in the banking sector, Fortis Bank was about to collapse until the 
governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg intervened 
and nationalised, dismantled and partially sold Fortis Bank. This 
nationalisation and dismantling was certainly not done from the 
perspective of a common European approach, but rather a typical 
example of nationally driven interest. 
Due to the financial meltdown of the company, doubts were very 
soon raised about the financial integrity of the company and of the 
information given to existing and new shareholders. The rules on 
market manipulation and market abuse, a part of hard core European 
law on financial markets8, apply in all EU Member States. However, 
the enforcement of these rules in the Fortis case was equally driven by 
national enforcement design and national enforcement agendas, as the 
European rules leave much discretion to the Member States. 
Infringements of the market abuse rules are administrative irregularities 
and criminal offences, both in Belgium and Luxembourg as well as in 
the Netherlands. Moreover, legal persons can be criminally liable in the 
three countries for these types of offences. However, in Luxembourg no 
action was undertaken at all by the domestic administrative or judicial 
                                                          
8 Directive 6/2003/EC of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse), OJ EU L 96/16. 
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authorities. In the Netherlands, competent administrative enforcement 
authorities opened investigations against the former Fortis Bank 
concerning suspicions of market manipulation and market abuse. In 
Belgium, both the competent administrative as well as judicial 
authorities opened investigations against the former Fortis Bank and 
against the CEOs. This led to concurring and parallel investigations and 
proceedings in Belgium and the Netherlands, but to no investigations at 
all in Luxembourg. 
In February 2012, the Dutch Financial Services Authority (AFM), 
the administrative enforcement agency, was the first to conclude 
proceedings and imposed four fines9 of €144,000 each on the two legal 
persons that constituted the Fortis Bank corporation/holding, They were 
found guilty of market manipulation/market abuse (based on the 
conduct of the same leading persons in the two groups) in two 
situations: 
(1) after the takeover of ABN AMRO, the CEO of Fortis Bank 
organised a press conference in which he insisted on the strong and 
sound financial position of Fortis. By doing so he had been 
misleading the investors; 
(2) the European Commission instructed Fortis Bank to sell off some 
parts of the group. While putting these assets on the market, Fortis 
Bank decided not to publish negative information about the 
financial position of the group and by doing so manipulated the 
trading in its shares on the stock exchange. 
The imposition of the administrative fines by the AFM on the two 
legal persons constituting the holding of Fortis Bank had undoubtedly 
been coordinated with the Dutch judicial authorities. In the 
Netherlands, the legal framework imposes a duty upon the 
administrative and judicial enforcement authorities to choose, at a 
certain stage, one of the two enforcement regimes, in other words to opt 
either for administrative sanctions or criminal prosecution (the so-
                                                          
9 See <www.afm.nl/~/media/files/boete/2010/fortis-besluit-nv.ashx> and <www. 
afm.nl/~/media/files/boete/2010/fortis-besluit-sanv.ashx>, last visited on 25.10.2012. 
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called una via principle)10. However, this does not preclude criminal 
proceedings against the former CEOs. The Dutch Prosecutor’s Office 
has not given formal notice of any ongoing judicial investigation in that 
sphere11. It is not known and it is difficult to guess if the authorities 
took into account the transnational dimension of the case when 
deciding to go for administrative enforcement, rather than the criminal 
law route. However, what is clear is that we can talk about unilateral 
action by the Dutch authorities, without coordinating with the Belgian 
administrative and judicial authorities. 
In June 2012 the Belgian administrative enforcement agency, the 
Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA), found evidence that 
the company had distributed misleading information and the 
administrative auditor imposed fines of €500,000 on the former Fortis 
Bank and fines of €250,000 to 500,000 on three of the CEOs. The 
sanction commission of FSMA followed the auditor in June 2013, but 
maximised the fines against the CEOs to €400,000. Finally, in 2013 the 
Belgian judicial authorities decided to prosecute seven former CEOs for 
misleading information, market abuse, forgery of documents and 
deception, but decided not to prosecute the former Fortis Bank or BNP 
Paribas Fortis (the new owner of the bank). 
Beside these administrative and criminal proceedings, victims 
introduced civil claims against Fortis and its CEOs in several 
jurisdictions and, where possible (as in Belgium), also played an active 
role in triggering criminal proceedings as civil parties in criminal 
proceedings. 
2.2. Libor/Euribor: Interest Rate Rigging Scandal 
The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) is the average interest 
rate estimated by leading banks in London that they would be charged 
                                                          
10 This means that the administrative and criminal enforcement authorities have to 
decide at a certain stage in the investigation to go either for administrative sanctioning 
or for criminal prosecution. 
11 The Dutch Prosecutor’s Office does not, in general, publish communications on 
the opening or not opening of financial judicial investigations or on ongoing financial 
judicial investigations. In Belgium, however, this is current practice. 
CHAPTER 2 
 64 
if borrowing from other banks. It is calculated for ten currencies, 
including the USD and the Euro. Almost 20 world leading banks 
participate in the Libor panels12. Euribor is short for Euro Interbank 
Offered Rate. The Euribor rates are based on the interest rates fixed by 
panels13 of around 40 to 50 European banks. Both Libor rates and 
Euribor rates are the daily reference rates for mortgages, consumer 
lending products, futures, options, swaps and other derivative financial 
instruments and thus have significant effects on consumers and 
financial markets worldwide. 
In 2012 it came to light that the Libor and Euribor panels had been 
deliberately manipulating the interest rates since 1991, in order to 
increase bank profits. Several European banks faced cumulative 
investigations and proceedings, both in the US and in European 
countries. Banks had not only to deal with civil damages claims (mostly 
in the US) but also with proceedings by administrative enforcement 
agencies (financial regulators and competition authorities)14 and 
judicial authorities. 
One of the banks that was active in both Libor and Euribor panels is 
Barclays Bank plc, a financial services corporation with headquarters 
located in London. Barclays Bank plc has banking subsidiaries around 
the world, including in the US. 
In the period 2007-2009, certain Barclays swaps traders requested 
that certain Barclays Libor and Euribor submitters submit Libor and 
Euribor contributions that would benefit the traders’ trading positions, 
rather than rates that complied with the definitions of Libor and 
Euribor. Those swaps traders either proposed a particular Libor or 
Euribor contribution for a particular tenor and currency, or proposed 
that the rate submitter contribute a rate higher, lower, or unchanged for 
a particular tenor and currency. The swaps traders made these requests 
via electronic messages, telephone conversations, and in-person 
conversations. The Libor and Euribor submitters agreed to 
accommodate, and did indeed accommodate, the swaps traders’ 
                                                          
12 http://www.bbalibor.com/disclaimer. 
13 http://www.euribor-rates.eu/panelbanks.asp. 
14 The European Competition Authority and the Swiss Competition Authority 
opened proceedings for cartel behaviour. 
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requests for favourable Libor and Euribor submissions on numerous 
occasions. 
In June 2012 Barclays Bank plc admitted to the US Department of 
Justice misconduct related to submissions for the Libor and the Euribor 
rate and agreed to pay a penalty of $160 million, by which it avoided 
criminal prosecution15. As part of the agreement with the Department of 
Justice16, Barclays admitted and accepted responsibility for its 
misconduct set out in a statement of facts that is incorporated into the 
agreement. The non-prosecution agreement applies only to Barclays 
and not to any employees or officers of Barclays or any other 
individuals. The Justice Department’s criminal investigation into the 
manipulation of Libor and Euribor by other financial institutions and 
individuals is ongoing. It is further understood that this agreement does 
not bind any federal, state, local, or foreign prosecuting authority other 
than the Fraud Section. The Fraud Section will, however, bring the 
cooperation of Barclays to the attention of other prosecuting and 
investigative authorities, if requested by Barclays. 
Moreover, also in June 2012, Barclays was fined $200 million by 
the USA Commodity Futures Trading Commission17 and £59.5 million 
by the UK Financial Services Authority18 for attempted manipulation of 
                                                          
15 http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/pdf/Barclays_2012.pdf. 
16 This agreement is part of the effort being undertaken by President Barack 
Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force. President Obama established the 
interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force to wage an aggressive, 
coordinated and proactive effort to investigate and prosecute financial crimes. The task 
force includes representatives from a broad range of federal agencies, regulatory 
authorities, inspectors general and state and local law enforcement who, working 
together, bring to bear a powerful array of criminal and civil enforcement resources. 
The task force is working to improve efforts across the federal executive branch, and 
with state and local partners, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, 
ensure just and effective punishment for those who perpetrate financial crimes, combat 
discrimination in the lending and financial markets, and recover proceeds for victims of 
financial crimes. See also V. ACHARYA, T. COOLEY, M. RICHARDSON (Eds.), Regulating 
Wall Street. The Dodd Frank Act and the New Architecture of Global Finance, New 
York, 2010. 
17 http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12. 
18 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/070.shtml; http://www.fsa. 
gov.uk/static/pubs/final/barclays-jun12.pdf. 
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the Libor and Euribor rates. On June 2012 the UK Serious Fraud Office 
announced the start of criminal investigations into the Libor scandal, 
including inter alia investigations into the CEOs of Barclays19. 
Like Barclays, several other banks were facing similar cumulative 
enforcement actions. On December 2012, the Swiss bank UBS agreed 
to pay regulators $1.5bn ($1.2bn to the US Department of Justice and 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, £160m to the UK 
Financial Services Authority and 60 million CHF to the Swiss Financial 
Market Supervisory Authority) for its role in the scandal. In mid-2012, 
the Dutch National Bank (DNB) and the Dutch Financial Services 
Authorities started administrative investigations into the Libor and 
Euribor scandal20, but used their confidentiality obligation to refuse 
further information on concrete investigations. The Dutch judicial 
authorities are not willing to confirm any formal judicial investigation 
into the Dutch Rabobank. Meanwhile, Rabobank agreed a settlement 
with regulators such as the US Department of Justice, the US 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority, including the payment of a penalty of €774 million. 
In December 2013 the EU Competition Authority did reach a 
settlement with six banks and an investment fund (Citigroup, Deutsche 
Bank, Royal Bank of Scotland, JP Morgan, Société Générale, Rp 
Martin) for a total amount of €1.71 billion. Barclays and UBS have 
been granted immunity from any fines as they blew the whistle on the 
rate rigging. Some other banks, such as HSBC and Crédit Agricole, did 
not agree to the settlement and will face higher penalties. The 
settlement is the largest combined penalty ever levied by the European 
competition authorities. 
2.3. Analysis 
What can we conclude from these examples? For one thing, even in 
key areas of the internal market and the AFSJ, the triggering of 
                                                          
19 http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/06/serious-fraud-office-libor-in 
vestigation. 
20 http://www.rtlnieuws.nl/economie/dnb-en-afm-onderzoeken-manipulatie-libor-
rente. 
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enforcement jurisdiction and adjudicative jurisdiction remains 
exclusively in the hands of the Member States, as it does when it comes 
to the stability and integrity of the financial system and the functioning 
of the internal market. The only exception is related to the enforcement 
of EU competition rules, where the EU competition authority has 
administrative enforcement powers. Of course, the triggering of those 
national jurisdictions is dependent upon the norms being enforced in 
the legislative framework (prescriptive jurisdiction), but even that is to 
a large extent a product of the sovereignty of the nation states. We must 
not forget that in public enforcement law – and this is very different 
from private law – there is a very strong relationship between the 
applicable law (substantive norms and procedural law) and the 
jurisdiction to investigate and to adjudicate. However, whilst in the 
context of the EU the applicable substantive law on financial markets 
and products is highly harmonised21, the enforcement regime is far 
from harmonised or unified. When it comes to administrative 
enforcement in the field of the financial markets, admittedly, the 
Member States have to comply, in some areas, with substantive and 
procedural enforcement obligations imposed by the EU. This is, for 
instance, the case with administrative enforcement related to market 
abuse22. Yet in the area of the Libor/Euribor benchmark rates, there are 
no EU enforcement obligations in place at all (to date, early April 
2014), and the Member States have left it to self-regulation and 
enforcement by the financial sector23. 
In addition, when it comes to criminal law enforcement there are, as 
yet, no EU obligations at all. Quite a number of Member States have, 
however, specific and or common offences in place that can be applied 
to both market abuse and market rigging. The choice of enforcement 
regime (civil, administrative, and criminal) is thus a mix of minor 
European obligations and major national policy choices. The result is 
that the triggering of enforcement jurisdiction and adjudicative 
                                                          
21 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:096:0016 
:0016:EN:PDF. 
22 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:096:0016 
:0016:EN:PDF. 
23 See C. GOMEZ-JARA DIEZ, Crisis Financiera y Derecho Penal, Lima, 2013, p. 82. 
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jurisdiction is to a large extent dependent upon a fragmented patchwork 
of prescriptive jurisdiction in every single jurisdiction of every Member 
State. Enforcement models have lagged behind financial globalisation 
and the reality of integrated financial markets, inside and outside the 
EU. There is not only a need for an increased enforcement by the EU of 
harmonisation of national enforcement systems, but also a 
supranational enforcement model that can coordinate and eventually 
take individual binding decisions. 
The legal consequences of the exercise of investigative and 
adjudicative jurisdiction by every single Member State in the AFSJ are 
far from clear. The CEO of the former Fortis Bank was quick to claim 
that the Dutch fines would bar further administrative and criminal 
sanctions in other EU Member States, based on the ne bis in idem 
principle24. His strategy did not work; as the former Fortis Bank and 
some CEOs were fined in Belgium and all CEOs face criminal 
proceedings. The legal question remains, however, whether further 
administrative fines and/or criminal punishment in Belgium are 
possible against the same legal persons or if they are barred by the 
Dutch administrative fines. The cross-border dimension is not limited 
to double jeopardy, but extends to the transnational protection of 
fundamental rights, such as the principle of legality, fair trial standards, 
including the right to silence, the privilege against self-incrimination, 
etc.25, as well as in relation to the combination of punitive 
administrative and criminal enforcement. 
All in all, it is obvious, first of all, that the enforcement approach in 
these cases does not reflect a clear coordination of jurisdiction in the 
AFSJ, something that does contrast with the policy in the US26. Who 
                                                          
24 J.A.E. VERVAELE, Ne Bis In Idem: Towards a Transnational Constitutional 
Principle in the EU?, in S. GLESS, J.A.E. VERVAELE (Eds.), Special on Transnational 
Criminal Justice, in Utrecht Law Review, 2013, pp. 211-229 (Chapter 5 of this book). 
25 See the Special Issue of the Utrecht Law Review, Law Should Govern: Aspiring 
General Principles for Transnational Criminal Justice, volume 9, issue 4, September 
2013. 
26 For a critical assessment of the results of that policy, see B.T. BORDEN, 
D.J. REISS, Cleaning up the Financial Crises of 2008: Prosecutorial Discretion or 
Prosecutorial Abdication, Brooklyn Law School Legal Studies, Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper no 331, March 2013. 
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could claim that, in the Fortis case, the Dutch administrative 
enforcement regime was the most appropriate enforcement mechanism? 
If not, why was that regime nevertheless able to impose administrative 
penalties sanctions first? And why could those sanctions possibly bar 
administrative or criminal punishment against the same legal persons 
by other authorities in other Member States? In turn, why weren’t 
Belgian authorities concerned with the interests of the legal and natural 
persons involved, now facing multiple punishments for the same 
offences in different national jurisdictions, although operating in a 
single AFSJ? 
Second, the sanctions imposed on the legal persons seem to be 
rather modest, in relation to the magnitude of the victims (several 
hundreds of thousands), the magnitude of the public interest at stake 
(integrity of the EU financial market) and the key importance of the 
financial markets for the goals of the internal market. Despite EU 
harmonisation of substantive law and partial harmonisation of 
enforcement law, it still seems possible that the enforcement body that 
strikes first is the final regulator, as it could bar further proceedings 
through the ne bis in idem principle. There is no European mechanism 
to give priority based, for instance, on the legal seat of the legal person 
or the major impact of the damage. But even if further proceedings 
were not to be barred by the ne bis in idem principle, it is very 
inefficient to cut the enforcement of common European interest into 
national pieces and to leave it to the full autonomy of the domestic 
enforcement authorities, with the result that in some countries nothing 
happens and in others concurrent proceedings are going on for years. It 
is clear that, currently, we cannot speak of an integrated approach of 
administrative and criminal enforcement, neither in the Member States 
nor within the framework of both the internal market and the AFSJ. 
Finally, from the Libor-Euribor interest rates rigging scandal, we 
can also conclude that enforcement policies and strategies play a very 
important role in achieving the goals of the AFSJ and the internal 
market. The fact that US regulators and enforcers have also been so 
active in relation to European financial institutions, is remarkable, 
particularly in the light of the inactivity of many enforcement agencies 
in European countries. We conclude from the Libor-Euribor example 
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that there seems to be no or very little coherent enforcement strategy 
between the enforcement authorities in the EU. The enforcement 
practice has also shown that, in some countries, no enforcement 
jurisdiction is triggered at all, whilst in others there has been a spate of 
enforcement between several administrative and judicial authorities. 
From the point of view of the overall AFSJ, the result is a patchwork 
with pieces of overactivity and pieces of underactivity or no activity at 
all. Moreover, there is no coherent European strategy towards the US 
proactive stance either. 
In the light of the analysis of our two examples, we can reflect 
further on the relationship between policy goals, regulation, and 
enforcement in the area of financial markets. The goals of the internal 
market include free movement of capital and the protection of the 
integrity of the financial markets (art 26(2) TFEU). The enforcement in 
the area of financial markets is clearly part of the AFSJ (Title V of 
TFEU). This is, for instance, explicitly reflected not only in art. 75 
TFEU but also in the goals of the AFSJ contained in article 67(1-3), 
which include that “the Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of 
security through measures to prevent and combat crime”. The aims of 
the internal market and the AFSJ are also combined in article 3 TEU 
that sets out the main goals of the Union. The link in the Treaties 
between regulation and enforcement is thus assured. How did the Union 
use this competence? Did the EU come up with a strategy to harmonise 
national enforcement? Did the EU establish a supranational 
enforcement regime? Has the EU used its new competences under the 
Lisbon Treaty to prescribe enforcement obligations which learn from 
the failures of the past and which are able to prevent a new meltdown? 
These questions are of particular relevance in the governance of the 
financial crisis and the scandals in the banking world and financial 
markets. We first tackle the questions from a general internal market 
point of view and then apply it to the financial markets. 
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3. Is there an EU Enforcement Policy Model for Regulatory Schemes in 
the Internal Market? 
Since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European 
Commission and particularly DG Justice have taken a proactive stand 
on the topic of a criminal enforcement policy, and in relation to 
administrative enforcement as well. On its website27, DG Justice spells 
out three specific competences for criminal law in the TFEU. First, the 
EU can adopt directives providing for minimum rules regarding the 
definition (constituent elements and criminal sanctions) of ‘euro 
offences’ under article 83(1) TFEU. Article 83(1) TFEU contains a list 
of ten particularly serious areas of crime with a cross-border dimension. 
They comprise terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual 
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms 
trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of 
payment, computer crime, and organised crime. Second, the EU can 
also adopt directives, under article 83(2), providing for minimum rules 
on the definition of offences and criminal sanctions if they are essential 
for ensuring the effectiveness of a harmonised EU policy. Third, DG 
Justice refers to the duty to protect the financial interests of the EU, 
under articles 310(6), 325, 85 and 86 TFEU, which might include, if 
necessary, protection by means of criminal law. 
Moreover, in September 2011 the Commission published a 
Communication entitled “Towards an EU Criminal Policy – ensuring 
the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law”28, 
dealing specifically with the competence under article 83(2) TFEU. In 
Part 1 the Commission elaborates on the scope of EU criminal 
legislation. The Commission underlines that article 83(2) aims at 
strengthening mutual trust, ensuring effective enforcement and 
coherence and consistency in European criminal law itself. Article 
83(2) TFEU does not list specific offences or areas of crime. For that 
reason, the Commission sets out a scheme for the policy choices 
concerning whether or not to use criminal law as an enforcement tool, 
                                                          
27 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-law-policy/index_en.htm. 
28 COM(2011) 573 final http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/act_en.pdf. 
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as well as in relation to other enforcement tools, like the administrative 
one. The Commission also deals with the choice of policy areas where 
EU criminal law might be needed. Criteria are a lack of effective 
enforcement or significant differences among Member States leading to 
inconsistent application of EU rules. Even so, the Commission will then 
still have to assess on a case-by-case basis the specific enforcement 
problems and the choice for administrative and/or criminal 
enforcement. However, the Commission has already indicated in this 
Communication priority fields for criminal law harmonisation under 
article 83(2) TFEU. Three selected areas are mentioned: 
- the financial sector, e.g. concerning market manipulation and insider 
trading29; 
- the fight against fraud affecting the financial interest of the EU; 
- the protection of the euro against counterfeiting. 
The Commission mentions furthermore a set of areas (not an 
exclusive list) in which criminal law enforcement might play a role: 
- illegal economy and financial criminality 
- road transport30 
- data protection31 
- customs rules 
- environmental protection 
- fisheries policy 
- internal market policies (counterfeiting, corruption, public procurement). 
                                                          
29 See ‘Communication on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial sector’, 
COM(2010) 716 final of 08.12. 2010. 
30 See Commission Staff Working Paper SEC (2011) 391 of 28.03. 2011, 
accompanying the White Paper ‘Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – 
Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system’, COM(2011) 144 of 
28.03.2011. 
31 See the Communication ‘A comprehensive approach on personal data protection 
in the European Union’, COM(2010) 609 of 04.11.2010. 
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Since the publication of the policy document the Commission has 
also put its contents into practice. The first initiative under article 83(2) 
TFEU is indeed in one of the three already selected areas in the 
Communication of September 2011, namely the financial sector and 
criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation32. The 
Commission produced a communication on “Reinforcing sanctioning 
regimes in the financial service sector” in 201033, based on comparative 
research by the three Committees of Supervisors (Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), Committee of European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) and 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)) on the 
equivalence of the sanctioning regimes in the financial sector in 
Member States. The Commission also used the policy criteria of the 
Communication of September 2011 for its assessment. The review by 
the Commission in cooperation with the Committees of Supervisors 
spells out substantial divergences and weaknesses in national 
sanctioning regimes: 
- some competent authorities do not have at their disposal important 
types of sanctioning powers for certain violations; 
- levels of administrative pecuniary sanctions vary widely across 
Member States and are too low in some Member States; 
- some competent authorities cannot address administrative sanctions to 
both natural and legal persons; 
- competent authorities do not take into account the same criteria in the 
application of sanctions; 
- divergence exists in the nature (administrative or criminal) of 
sanctions provided for in national legislation; 
- the level of application of sanctions varies across Member States. 
                                                          
32 For the other proposals on the criminal law protection of the financial interest of 
the EU and of the single currency (euro), we refer to J.A.E. VERVAELE, Harmonised 
Policies and the Harmonization of Substantive Criminal Law, in F. GALLI, 
A. WEYEMBERGH (Eds.), Approximation of Substantive Criminal Law in the EU, 
Bruxelles, 2013, pp. 43-72. 
33 COM(2010) 716 final. 
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In the impact assessment of a new regulatory package in the area of 
insider dealing and market manipulation34, another series of problems 
are identified: 
- not all financial products and markets are covered; 
- regulators lack powers to effectively enforce market abuse regulations 
(access to premises, access to telecoms data, seizure powers, data 
sharing, etc.); 
- substantial divergences in sanctioning powers and in sanctions 
imposed; 
- there is no deterrent effect of enforcement regimes; 
- criminal law enforcement does not exist in all Member States. 
The existing divergences in the enforcement of market abuse rules 
may undermine the single market, leave scope for regulatory discretion, 
and undermine cross-border cooperation of law enforcement 
authorities. The Commission therefore introduced two new legislative 
initiatives on market abuse, in October 201135. They are part of a larger 
reform package for the financial sector. The two initiatives consist of a 
proposal for a regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation 
(market abuse) and a proposal for a directive on criminal sanctions for 
insider dealing and market manipulation. The proposed regulation, 
replacing directive 2003/6/EC, provides for the basic regulatory 
framework36. It contains all definitions, obligations, and prohibitions 
and also regulates the applicable administrative enforcement regime, 
including administrative sanctions of a non-punitive and punitive 
character. The proposed directive is the result of the assessment of the 
Commission on the need, proportionality, and subsidiarity of criminal 
law enforcement in the financial sector37. The Commission came to a 
positive assessment as far as serious market abuse offences are 
                                                          
34 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/abuse/SEC_2011_1218_en.pdf. 
35 For the analysis see Section 4 of this article. 
36 For the original proposal, see COM(2011) 651, amended by COM(2012) 421; for 
our analysis, we used the final text of document PE 78 2013 INIT, of 4 April 2014. 
37 For the original proposal, see COM(2011) 654, amended by COM(2012) 420; for 
our analysis, we used the final text of document PE 8 2014 INIT of 4 April 2014. 
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concerned. The proposed directive will therefore introduce an 
obligation for the relevant Member States to introduce criminal law 
sanctions for the most serious violations of market abuse rules. 
Whether these proposals will be able to achieve their goals of, inter 
alia, increasing market integrity and investor protection, as well as of 
ensuring a single European rulebook and level playing field, remains to 
be seen. In the following paragraphs we will make an analysis of both 
proposals, in terms of their proclaimed capacity to set benchmarks for 
national authorities to realise the European dimension of their tasks 
(jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce). 
4. Market Abuse – Analysis of the Proposed Framework 
4.1. General Remarks 
The legislative package on market abuse rules rests on two different 
articles of the Treaty on European Union. The legal basis of the 
regulation will be Article 114 TFEU, whereas the directive will be 
based on Article 83(2) TFEU. This dual basis is surprising because it 
seems to be at odds with the ambition to establish a level playing field 
for market abuse cases. The choice of Article 83(2) TFEU as a legal 
basis for the directive implies that Denmark will not take part in the 
adoption of this directive and that the UK and Ireland have an opting-in 
choice, but no obligation to become part of and to be bound by the 
directive38. In other words, under the chosen legal basis, it is possible 
that criminal enforcement obligations which are considered necessary 
for the effective enforcement of a harmonised EU policy, will not be 
binding in three EU countries, including the main centre of financial 
services in the EU. In this sense the proposal is a step backward, rather 
than forward39. 
                                                          
38 The UK opted out, whereas Ireland opted in. 
39 For a comparative analysis of the enforcement design in the Member states, see 
N. BAENA TOVAR, La regulación del abuso de Mercado en Europa y en Estados 
Unidos, 2002, 
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As a general rule, the material scope of the EU rules on market 
abuse will be defined by the proposed regulation. That instrument 
contains a series of detailed provisions that determine the material 
scope of the EU package. Compared with the existing Directive 
2003/640, the scope of the rules is extended, in terms of the covered 
activities, financial instruments and trading venues. The regulatory 
framework provided by Directive 2003/6 was considered to be out of 
date, due to the rise of new trading platforms, over-the-counter (OTC) 
trading and technologies, such as high frequency trading (HFT). The 
new legislative package will also cover financial instruments related to 
spot commodity contracts, as well as products related to emission 
allowance auctions. As regards the trading venues, the package no 
longer only covers instruments traded on regulated markets, but also on 
multilateral trading facilities (MTFs) and other organised trading 
facilities (OTFs). The regulation will also include any other conduct or 
action which may have an effect on such a financial instrument, 
irrespective of whether it takes place on a trading venue (Art. 2(3) 
proposal). The regulation further specifies that, because trading of 
financial instruments is increasingly automated, abusive strategies that 
are carried out by, inter alia, algorithmic and high frequency trading 
constitute market manipulation. In light of the efforts to keep up with 
developments in the markets and bearing in mind the central goals of 
the regulation, this modernisation of the current market abuse rules 
makes sense. Nevertheless, the original proposals themselves already 
needed adjustment during the course of the legislative process, in order 
to include manipulation with benchmarks (like in the Libor/Euribor 
scandal) in the proposals. 
                                                                                                                               
https://www.cnmv.es/DocPortal/Publicaciones/MONOGRAFIAS/ABUSOMERCADO.
PDF. 
40 OJ EU 2003 L 96/16. 
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4.2. Administrative Law Enforcement 
4.2.1. Prescriptive Jurisdiction 
The widened scope of the regulation means that the scope of the 
body of prohibitions is also wider than the current Directive 3002/6/EC. 
The regulation obliges (legal) persons to refrain from – in brief – 
insider dealing (Art. 8/14) and unlawful disclosure of information 
(Art. 10/14), market manipulation (Art. 12/15), and to introduce 
administrative mechanisms in order to detect and prevent forbidden 
conduct. Certain actors are required to fulfil a series of additional 
requirements, including disclosure duties for issuers of instruments, the 
establishment of insider lists, reporting duties for manager’s 
transactions, and duties with respect to investment recommendations 
(Chapter 3). Once the regulation enters into force, these norms will not 
only be binding on the actors on the financial markets, but Member 
States will also be obliged to enforce these norms through a range of 
punitive and non-punitive measures (Chapters 4/5), including, inter alia, 
the withdrawal or suspension of the authorisation of an investment firm, 
temporary or even permanent bans on exercising management functions 
in investment firms, and considerable pecuniary sanctions up to at least 
€5,000.000 for natural persons and €15,000.000, or 15% of the total 
annual turnover, for legal persons, depending on the type of 
infringement (Art. 30). 
The maximum amount of the pecuniary administrative sanctions that 
must be available according to the regulation led to problems in some 
Member States. Austrian constitutional law, for instance, does not 
allow for administrative pecuniary sanctions of the amount provided for 
in the regulation41. This is why Art. 30(1) stipulates that Member States 
may decide not to introduce administrative sanctions for certain 
infringements, provided that those infringements are already subject to 
criminal sanctions in their national law. The result of that is, as we will 
see, that mechanisms need to be in place in order to ensure effective 
cooperation at the interface of administrative and criminal law. 
                                                          
41 Council document 16512/12 of 10 December 2012. 
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4.2.2. Enforcement Jurisdiction 
Article 2(4) of the regulation stipulates that the prohibitions and 
requirements in this regulation apply to actions concerning the 
instruments to which the regulation is applicable, carried out inside and 
outside the European Union. The regulation therefore does not limit the 
territorial scope of the substantive norms to a particular national 
territory. Yet that does not mean that the authorities that are responsible 
for law enforcement are not bound by borders or have obtained 
transnational competence on the basis of the regulation. Article 22 
stipulates that all Member States designate a single administrative 
competent authority for the purpose of the regulation. Those authorities 
must ensure that the provisions of this regulation are applied in their 
own territory, regarding all actions carried out on that territory and 
certain actions carried out abroad. Transnational cases must be dealt 
with in cooperation with other national authorities and with the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)42. 
In order to be able to operate effectively and to realise a pan-
European level playing field with respect to the enforcement of market 
abuse rules, national authorities must also be given a certain (minimum) 
set of powers, including, inter alia, access to documents and other data, 
the power to acquire information from persons, to carry out on-site 
inspections and the power to refer matters for criminal prosecution. 
These authorities must also be given the power to: 
- enter premises of natural and legal persons in order to seize 
documents and other data in any form, where a reasonable 
suspicion exists that documents and other data related to the 
subject-matter of the inspection or investigation may be relevant to 
prove a case of insider dealing or market manipulation; 
- acquire existing recordings of telephone conversations, electronic 
communications or other data traffic records held by investment 
firms, credit institutions or other financial institutions; 
                                                          
42 Regulation 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority), OJ EU 2010 L 331/84. 
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- acquire existing data traffic records held by a telecommunication 
operator, where there is a reasonable suspicion of a breach and 
where such records may be relevant to the investigation of insider 
dealing or market manipulation in violation of this Regulation; 
- request the freezing and/or sequestration of assets (Art. 23(2)). 
All of these types of measures constitute serious interferences with 
the right to privacy and property; these measures qualify as criminal 
investigative measures in many countries. Member States may therefore 
decide to attribute these powers not directly to the competent 
administrative authorities, but stipulate that these powers are exercised 
in cooperation with or by application to the competent judicial 
authorities (Art. 23(1)). As such, this approach is not new43. Yet it does 
raise questions as to the applicable safeguards that should be in place44. 
The regulation refers back to national law on this point. It is suggested 
in the preamble that ‘[f]or the exercise of those powers, which may 
amount to serious interferences with the right to respect for private and 
family life, home and communications, Member States should have in 
place adequate and effective safeguards against any abuse, for instance, 
where appropriate a requirement to obtain prior authorisation from the 
judicial authorities of a Member State concerned. Member States 
should allow the possibility for competent authorities to exercise such 
intrusive powers to the extent necessary for the proper investigation of 
serious cases where there are no equivalent means for effectively 
achieving the same result’45. 
In addition to the investigatory powers and sanctioning powers of 
the authorities, Article 32 provides for procedures on reporting market 
abuse violations, including provisions on whistle-blower protection. 
Whistle-blowers should, at the very minimum, receive appropriate 
protection against retaliation, discrimination or other types of unfair 
                                                          
43 See also art. 12 of the current Directive 2003/6/EC. 
44 See, for instance, the similar concerns expressed in the Statement by Sweden, 
Austria, Czech Republic and Germany in Council document 11384/13 of 27 June 2013: 
‘Any expansion in the access to traffic data outside judicial procedures would set a 
dangerous precedent for other EU dossiers.’ 
45 Recital 66. See also art. 23(2), second subparagraph. 
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treatment. Member States may also provide for financial incentives to 
persons who offer relevant information about potential breaches of the 
regulation, to be granted in conformity with national law where such 
persons do not have other pre-existing legal or contractual duties to 
report such information, and provided that the information is new, and 
it results in the imposition of an administrative sanction or measure or a 
criminal sanction for a breach of this Regulation. 
The level playing field and supervisory convergence that must be 
achieved necessarily include cases of transnational cooperation. With 
national authorities still bound by national borders, the help of their 
counterparts elsewhere inside (or outside) the EU is needed. The 
designation of a single competent administrative authority in each 
Member State, all with equivalent tasks and powers, helps to prevent 
fragmentation of enforcement structures and facilitates the creation of a 
European network approach. National authorities also work in close 
cooperation with ESMA (Art. 24). That authority fulfils an important 
role in the supervision of the administrative supervisory structure, and 
may on occasion also facilitate the coordination between national 
authorities, or the settlement of conflicts between them (cf. art. 25(7)). 
Furthermore, Article 25 of the regulation requires authorities to 
cooperate closely with their counterparts from other Member States, by 
exchanging information on request or spontaneously, by performing 
acts of investigations, by conducting joint investigations, etc. 
However, the duty to cooperate does not go so far as to require 
authorities to cooperate in those cases where they are also conducting 
investigations or where judicial proceedings have been started in their 
jurisdiction, as that may harm the national investigation (art. 25(1b/c)). 
It means that under the new regulation, authorities are not at all 
encouraged to cooperate in the situations sketched out in Section 0; 
rather to the contrary. It is also in sharp contrast with article 31(2) of 
that same regulation which stipulates that: ‘[i]n the exercise of their 
powers to impose administrative sanctions and other administrative 
measures under Article 30, competent authorities shall cooperate 
closely to ensure that the exercise of their supervisory and investigative 
powers, and the administrative sanctions that they impose, and the other 
administrative measures that they take, are effective and appropriate 
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under this Regulation. They shall coordinate their actions in accordance 
with Article 25 in order to avoid duplication and overlaps when 
exercising their supervisory and investigative powers and when 
imposing administrative sanctions in respect of cross-border cases.’ 
4.3. Criminal Law Enforcement 
As has already been said, the Commission also introduced a 
proposal for a directive on mandatory criminal law enforcement of the 
most severe violations of market abuse rules. According to the 
Commission, the adoption of administrative sanctions by the Member 
States has proven insufficient to ensure compliance with the rules on 
preventing and fighting market abuse46. Different national approaches 
undermine the uniformity of conditions of operation in the internal 
market and may provide an incentive for persons to carry out market 
abuse in Member States which do not provide for criminal sanctions for 
these offences. The introduction of criminal sanctions for, at the very 
least, serious market abuse offences by all Member States is therefore 
essential to ensure the effective implementation of Union policy on 
fighting market abuse, according to the EU legislature47. The proposed 
directive will introduce minimum rules for criminal sanctions for 
insider dealing, unlawful disclosure of inside information and market 
manipulation (arts. 3-5). It will also oblige Member States to 
criminalise the incitement, aiding, abetting, and attempting of the 
prohibited conduct (art. 6). In line with the principle that criminal law 
should be a means of last resort (ultima ratio), only the most serious, 
core provisions of the market abuse rules are to be criminalised. 
Member States, however, remain at liberty to use the criminal law route 
for other violations too (minimum harmonisation)48. 
                                                          
46 Preamble, recital 4. 
47 Preamble, recitals 7-8. For a critical assessment of this presumption, see 
Y. SCHÖNWÄLDER, Grund und Grenzen einer strafrechtlichen Regulierung der 
Marktmanipulation. Analyse unter Besonderer Würdigung der Börsen oder 
Marktpreiseinwirkung, Berlin, 2012. 
48 Preamble, recital 20. 
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The directive is closely related to its sister regulation (see art. 2). 
The implementation of the obligations stemming from it will not mean 
that Member States are now obliged to enforce all serious violations of 
market abuse rules only via the criminal law. Neither will the directive 
create obligations regarding the application of such penalties or any 
other available system of law enforcement, to individual cases. Member 
States are moreover not exempted from the obligation to provide for 
administrative sanctions and measures for the breaches set out in the 
regulation, unless they have decided to lay down only criminal 
sanctions for such breaches in their national law49. The package 
therefore introduces a dual regime (unless a state opts for criminal law 
alone), which leaves the choice for administrative or criminal law 
enforcement to the authorities involved. The principle of ne bis in idem, 
contained in Article 50 CFR, should protect the suspected person 
against double prosecution or punishment50. 
Because the proposed regulation and the proposed directive are a 
regulatory package, the proposed directive refers to the definitions of 
financial instruments and insider information in the proposed 
regulation. The directive obliges Member States to criminalise only the 
serious cases and when committed intentionally51. It thus introduces a 
moral element (mens rea) into the definition of insider dealing and 
market manipulation which is, as far as primary insiders are concerned, 
arguably at odds with the case law of the EU Court of Justice and the 
current practice of those Member States that already enforce market 
abuse rules through criminal law52. The evidential problems that will 
                                                          
49 Preamble, recitals 14 and 22. 
50 Preamble, recital 23. 
51 Tentative descriptions of what could constitute a ‘serious’ infringement are found 
in the Preamble, recitals 11 and 12. 
52 In Spector Photo Group, the EU Court of Justice considered that this is because 
of the specific nature of insider dealing, which enables a presumption of that mental 
element once the constituent elements referred to in that provision are present and 
because of the purpose of Directive 2003/6, which is to ensure the integrity of 
Community financial markets and to enhance investor confidence in those markets. The 
Community legislature, according to the ECJ, opted for a preventative mechanism and 
for administrative sanctions for insider dealing [our italics], the effectiveness of which 
would be weakened if made subject to a systematic analysis of the existence of a mental 
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arise as a result of this are not tackled by the directive and only to a 
limited degree by the regulation53. 
Finally, with respect to the sanctions that need to be in place, the 
original proposal for the directive stipulated that criminal sanctions be 
effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, as far as natural persons are 
concerned. With respect to legal persons, sanctions must be effective, 
proportionate, and dissuasive too, although they need not necessarily be 
of a criminal nature. The Commission thus chose a low profile with 
respect to the harmonisation of penalties. This modest approach is not 
only surprising in the light of the Commission’s 2011 communication 
on criminal policy54, but also in light of the review by the Commission 
in cooperation with the Committees of Supervisors of the enforcement 
of the financial markets that spelled out substantial divergences and 
weaknesses in national criminal sanctioning regimes55. By comparison, 
the Commission proposed a directive on the protection of the euro and 
other currencies against counterfeiting by criminal law which originally 
provided for the harmonisation of the type and level of criminal 
sanctions, including the imposition of a minimum deprivation of liberty 
of six months for serious breaches56. The reasoning of the Commission 
in the preamble to that proposal was that the existing level of sanctions 
is one of the reasons for insufficient deterrence and unequal protection 
across the European Union of its currency. Minimum sanctions 
contribute, in the view of the Commission, to deterrence and to a 
consistent EU-wide system for the protection of the euro. The 
Commission also indicated other advantages in recital 18 of the 
preamble to the counterfeiting proposal: 
                                                                                                                               
element; see Case C-45/08, Spector Photo Group and Van Raemdonck, [2009] ECR I-
12073, paras. 35-38. 
53 Particularly through the investigative techniques that are introduced and the 
provisions on whistle-blowing protection; section 0. Whether the evidence that is found 
this way may be used as evidence in criminal proceedings, and under what conditions, 
is left to national law. 
54 COM(2011) 573 final. 
55 COM(2010) 716 final. 
56 COM(2013) 42 final. This provision, incidentally, has been removed in later 
versions of the proposal, see Council document 14671/13 of Brussels of 11 October 
2013. 
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The minimum penalty of six months helps to ensure that equal priority 
is given by law-enforcement and judicial authorities to the offences of 
counterfeiting of the euro and other currencies and, in turn, facilitates 
cross-border cooperation. It contributes to mitigating the risk of forum-
shopping. Moreover, it allows that sentenced perpetrators can be 
surrendered with the help of a European Arrest Warrant so that the 
custodial sentence or detention order can be executed. 
It was the European Parliament that pushed for further steps in the 
market abuse dossier. On 19 October 2013, the EP Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs (rapporteur Arlene McCarthy) 
amended the proposed directive on market abuse and introduced 
custodial sanctions with maximum terms of imprisonment of at least 
five (now four) and two years respectively for natural persons 
(depending on the type of the offence; see art. 7)57. However, the text 
did not introduce minimum terms of imprisonment and also remained 
silent with respect to the (maximum amount of the) financial penalties 
and to the other criminal law sanctions that could or may be imposed on 
natural persons. When it comes to legal persons, the text was limited to 
liability that is punishable by effective, proportionate, and dissuasive 
sanctions. 
On 7 December 2013 the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council 
reached a general approach to the text. The amendments by the EP 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs relating to mandatory 
minimum levels for the maximum term of imprisonment were 
maintained. The recitals now explicitly refer to the serious cases of 
benchmark manipulation (Euribor and Libor) and to the need for 
common criminal sanction regimes across the Union. Nevertheless, the 
final text still leaves the liability regime for legal persons open to 
criminal or non-criminal liability, although it prescribes that financial 
sanctions must be in place and it contains an optional list of sanctions 
that may be imposed under both regimes (art. 9). This text also does not 
contain any obligation concerning the minimum level of criminal 
sanctions. Although both the Commission (in its policy plans) and the 
                                                          
57 See the Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, A7-
0344/2012. 
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EP made a plea for common criminal sanctions regimes in this area, it 
is thanks to the EP that the type and level of criminal sanctions have 
been harmonised to a certain extent in this directive. 
4.4. A Level Playing Field? Remaining Dissymmetries in Enforcement 
Structures 
It is difficult to assess the effects of a system that is not yet in place. 
Nevertheless, we have already noted that the proposed package does 
not seem to address all the needs put forward by the Commission itself 
(cf. Section 0). A European level playing field among law enforcers is, 
for instance, not helped by diverging national definitions of 
infringements and procedural powers. Enforcement cooperation will 
not be promoted, as long as national authorities are in a position to 
unilaterally protect their own investigations by not cooperating with 
other authorities. Differences in sanctioning levels will remain, even 
after the introduction of mandatory criminal sanctions. And introducing 
moral elements to the definition of criminal offence may perhaps serve 
the ultima ratio principle, but will also imply recourse to, for example, 
certain investigative powers in order to bypass foreseeable evidential 
problems. 
It is our opinion that the plans of the Commission with respect to the 
relationship between regulation and enforcement in the financial sector, 
as well as the EU’s ambitions with respect to criminal law, still do not 
fully take into account what should be the main focal point of EU 
policies in this area. That focal point is how the package contributes to 
the realisation of the goals of the internal market and of the AFSJ. Both 
goals, which are interrelated, strongly promote the free movement of 
individuals and companies, economically active or not, while 
simultaneously stressing a framework for protecting the common good, 
including economic growth and job creation, as well as the prevention 
and detection of crime. In the remainder of this article, we will argue 
that it is difficult to achieve these ambitions as long as attention is not 
being given to three points of interest, which will be further discussed 
in the following (sub-)Sections. 
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4.4.1. Effective Transnational Cooperation and Coordination 
With the EU being an integrated legal order, loyal cooperation 
between the law enforcement authorities – either between different 
national authorities, or between national and EU authorities – is vital. 
The European Union has long since been active in the facilitation of 
these structures. We have seen examples of this above, with respect to 
the transnational cooperation between the competent administrative 
authorities in market abuse cases. These structures also exist in the area 
of criminal law, with respect to, for instance, the surrender of persons 
for the purpose of prosecution or the execution of sanctions58, or the 
gathering and transfer of evidence59. Those structures are not limited to 
market abuse, but concern the whole range of criminal law. 
The existence of an abundance of international and European 
arrangements for cooperation does not mean that smooth cooperation is 
always possible, particularly not at the interface of criminal and 
administrative law. The current system hinges on the organisational 
structure of those authorities, instead of on the tasks they fulfil60. Public 
prosecutors and investigative bodies (and those competent to deal with 
market abuse cases) cooperate via arrangements for mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters (MLA) or instruments of mutual 
recognition (MR); financial supervisory bodies (which have the power 
to impose punitive sanctions or to refer matters to criminal law bodies), 
have their own arrangements (mutual administrative assistance 
(MAA)), as we have seen above. Simultaneously, we have noted that 
the proposed package on market abuse introduces a dual track regime, 
                                                          
58 Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, OJ EU L 190/1. 
59 Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European 
evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in 
proceedings in criminal matters, OJ EU L 350/72. The Evidence warrant will be 
replaced in due course by the so-called European Investigation Order which was 
approved in December 2013 by the EP/LIBE Committee. 
60 J.A.E. VERVAELE, A. KLIP (Eds.), European Cooperation between Tax, Customs, 
and Judicial Authorities, Den Haag, 2002; M.J.J.P. LUCHTMAN, European Cooperation 
between Financial Supervisory Authorities, Tax Authorities and Judicial Authorities, 
Antwerpen-Oxford, 2008, pp. 128-137. 
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or, in certain circumstances and under certain conditions, a criminal law 
regime alone. It may thus occur that in Member State A investigations 
are conducted by financial regulators, whereas in Member State B the 
same – or related facts – will attract the attention of the police and the 
public prosecutor. In those types of situations, the involved authorities 
will have difficulty in cooperating, now that they are not mutually 
recognised as ‘competent authorities’ under the respective MLA/MR 
and MAA regimes. Particularly in cases of market abuse which involve 
multiple Member States and different national authorities, those 
authorities will not be in a position to cooperate with each other 
directly. Judicial authorities seeking information or assistance from a 
financial supervisor elsewhere in the European Union, will either have 
to approach their national financial supervisor and ask her to ask the 
supervisor of another Member State to cooperate, or ask its judicial 
counterpart in the other state to approach her national supervisor, and 
then transfer the acquired data back to her. This is not only time-
consuming; it is also problematic in terms of accountability and 
circumvention of legal safeguards, certainly in cases where required 
assistance involves interferences with the fundamental rights of the 
persons concerned. 
The joint regulatory package of the regulation and directive is silent 
on this issue. There are no provisions that specifically deal with these 
problems, with the exception of the situation where a particular 
Member State has opted for criminal law enforcement alone. In that 
situation, that Member State has to ensure that ‘appropriate measures 
are in place so that competent authorities have all the necessary powers 
to liaise with judicial authorities within their jurisdiction to receive 
specific information related to criminal investigations or proceedings 
commenced for possible violations of this regulation and provide the 
same to other competent authorities and ESMA to fulfil their obligation 
to cooperate with each other and ESMA for the purposes of this 
Regulation [our italics]’ (art. 19(1)). Why this provision lacks systems 
that use a dual track regime is unclear. 
It is also unclear how this system, which regards transnational 
cooperation between criminal law authorities and administrative 
authorities as two separate tracks, relates to the principle of ne bis in 
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idem. That principle after all bars a second prosecution for the same 
offence, provided that the first and the second procedures are both 
punitive in nature, and concern the same (alleged) offender. Although 
Article 50 CFR applies to the European Union as a whole, and although 
the principle also covers combinations of criminal law and 
administrative law sanctions in the national context61, it is as yet 
unclear whether the principle also covers combinations of criminal law 
and administrative law sanctions in a transnational context62. The 
preamble of the proposed directive seems to confirm the latter 
interpretation, stipulating that EU Member States should ensure that the 
imposition of criminal sanctions on the basis of offences foreseen by 
the directive and of administrative sanctions in accordance with the 
regulation must not lead to a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem63. 
This interpretation also makes sense in light of the previously 
mentioned goals of the European Union and in light of the principle of 
loyal cooperation. After all, a failure to cooperate between 
administrative and criminal law authorities should not come at the 
expense of those actors who are doing precisely what the EU tries to 
stimulate, i.e. using their rights of free movement to promote further 
                                                          
61 See ECtHR 10 February 2009, Zolotukhin v Russia; ECJ 28 February 2013, Case 
C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson; J.A.E. VERVAELE, The Application of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and its Ne bis in idem Principle in the 
Member States of the EU, in Review of European Administrative Law, Vol. 6, 2013-1, 
pp. 113-134 (Chapter 6 of this book). 
62 M. LUCHTMAN, Transnational Law Enforcement in the European Union and the 
Ne Bis In Idem Principle, in Realaw, 2011; J.A.E. VERVAELE, Ne Bis In Idem: Towards 
a Transnational Constitutional Principle in the EU?, in S. GLESS, J.A.E. VERVAELE 
(Eds.), Special on Transnational Criminal Justice, in Utrecht Law Review, 2013, 
pp. 211-229 (Chapter 5 of this book). 
63 Preamble, recital 15b. The Presidency of the Council also wrote that the Working 
Party on Substantive Criminal Law (DROIPEN) indicated that “the ne bis in idem 
principle could present itself if the competent authorities of one (or more) Member 
States applied to the same conduct of a person both the criminal sanctions provided for 
under their national law for that criminal offence and administrative sanctions provided 
by MAR (…). It should be noted, in this context, that the ne bis in idem principle 
applies across the borders of the EU” (italics added), Council document 14598/12 of 17 
October 2012. 
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European integration (and thereby inducing the competences of 
multiple national authorities). 
The potential organisational consequences of such a transnational 
interpretation of the principle should not be overlooked. A truly 
transnational ne bis in idem principle requires structures to avoid case 
allocation on an arbitrary ‘first come, first served’ basis and forum 
shopping by defendants or authorities. It will strengthen the relationship 
between criminal law and administrative law and require, at the very 
least, the possibility of effective coordination of the efforts of all 
authorities entrusted with tasks in the field of market abuse rules, 
regardless of their institutional structure. Those rules are currently 
lacking, as we have already noted. By its very definition, this seems to 
be a task for the European legislature64. 
4.4.2. Integrated Supervision 
Law enforcement in an integrated legal order not only implies a 
system for swift and efficient cooperation between all national bodies 
involved, but also the existence of a mechanism or body that keeps 
watch over the system as a whole, particularly with respect to 
operational affairs. It is not hard to imagine that different national 
authorities may have different interests in the performance of their 
tasks, as the Fortis case demonstrates. This, for instance, leads to 
situations where requests for cooperation are not executed because the 
requested authority is also conducting an investigation, or where there 
is no competent national authority willing to take up an investigation. 
We can also think of situations where investigations are cut down to 
specific actors or facts that directly concern national interests. In all of 
these situations, the question is who keeps an eye on the goals of the 
regulatory package as a whole and on how the current legislative 
                                                          
64 Council document 14598/12 of 17 October 2012, pp. 4-5, reveals that it was left 
to the national authorities to avoid a situation in which, in accordance with the rules of 
their legal system, the simultaneous application of different types of sanctions violates 
the right of the person not to be tried twice for the same offence in a concrete case. This 
interpretation is only correct, when the principle is limited to national cases alone. That 
same document, however, suggests that this is not the case, supra note 63. 
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package deals with positive and negative conflicts of jurisdiction 
between national authorities. 
It must be noted that substantial improvements have been made in 
this respect with the coming into existence of ESMA. That agency not 
only has powers of coordination among national supervisory 
authorities, but can also impose binding individual decisions in 
situations that may seriously jeopardise the orderly functioning and 
integrity of the financial systems in the EU. The market abuse 
regulation, too, entrusts ESMA with the task of collecting information 
on all administrative measures, sanctions and fines imposed, and other 
relevant data (art. 33(1)). Where Member States have chosen to enforce 
through criminal law alone, then they too have certain reporting duties 
(art. 33(2)). In addition, ESMA will be given a role in the settlement of 
conflicts that may emerge between the competent administrative 
authorities. ESMA is given powers of coordination under the regulation 
in cases of potential or actual conflicts of interest between national 
supervisors (cf. art. 25(6) and (7)). Where the competent authorities 
concerned fail to reach agreement, it may even take a decision requiring 
them to take specific action or to refrain from action in order to settle 
the matter in compliance with EU law. 
Nevertheless, the administrative-criminal law divide is once again 
reason for concern. The problem is, first of all, that ESMA’s powers of 
direct intervention apply only to the ‘competent authorities’, as defined 
by the regulation. Those authorities are the financial supervisors, 
mentioned in Article 22 (‘competent authorities’), to be established 
under administrative law (see above Section 0). ESMA has no powers 
with respect to judicial or police authorities. The second, related 
concern is that there is no counterpart on the criminal law side that 
performs similar tasks to ESMA, let alone any consultation or 
coordination between that counterpart and ESMA. Eurojust could play 
a role in coordinating national investigations and in coordinating the 
most appropriate choice of adjudicative jurisdiction, but market abuse 
cases do not belong to the competence of Eurojust yet. Even though 
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they are included in the recent reform proposal of Eurojust65, that EU 
agency will not be in a position to issue binding decisions to national 
authorities in cases of conflict of jurisdiction. Eurojust’s strength lies in 
the ‘peer pressure’ it can assert on national judicial bodies66, but, 
ultimately, national judicial authorities will decide on whether they will 
commence criminal investigations or not. 
The overall picture that emerges is, once again, that the national 
choices for administrative and/or criminal law have a direct bearing on 
the functioning of the system as a whole, and that arrangements for 
enforcement via the criminal law lag behind those established for 
administrative law in the area of market abuse. Should conflicts arise, 
then neither ESMA, nor Eurojust is competent to solve conflicts of 
jurisdiction at the interface of criminal and administrative law. The 
result is not only that there still is no mechanism to avoid a 
multiplication of the burden of prosecution and sanctioning for the 
individual concerned, but that there is also a potential waste and 
inefficient use of resources. 
4.4.3. The Protection of Fundamental Rights 
The regulatory package, the regulation in particular, indicates the 
powers that should be available to the competent administrative 
authorities, possibly in cooperation with other national bodies such as 
judicial authorities. We have already noted that some of these powers 
are very intrusive in terms of their capacity to interfere with the rights 
and liberties of citizens and legal persons, whether they are suspects or 
not. Nevertheless, the regulation itself is almost silent on the safeguards 
                                                          
65 COM(2013) 535, containing a proposal for a regulation on the European Union 
Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust). Insider dealing and financial 
market manipulation are included in the lists in Annex 1 that fills in the substantive 
competence as defined under article 3 of the proposal. 
66 Cf. H.-H. HERRNFELD, Die Rolle von Eurojust bei der Beilegung von 
Jurisdiktionskonflikte, in A. SINN (Ed.), Jurisdiktionskonflikte bei 
grenzüberschreitender Kriminalität - Ein Rechtsvergleich zum Internationalen 
Strafrecht, Göttingen-Osnabrück, 2012, pp. 147, 149, 155-156; V. MITSILEGAS, EU 
Criminal Law, Oxford-Portland-Oregon, 2009, p. 153-154; M. GROENLEER, The 
Autonomy of European Union Agencies, Delf, 2009, pp. 319-320. 
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which should apply in order to prevent arbitrary and unlawful 
interference with the position of (natural or legal) persons. Those 
safeguards are left to national law, for which article 23 of the regulation 
provides the basis, stipulating that powers are to be available, but must 
also be in accordance with national law. The only safeguard one finds 
in the regulation itself is that for certain powers of investigation a 
reasonable suspicion must exist that the results of the exercise of these 
powers can be relevant to prove the case or for the investigation. 
Whether or not an authorisation by a judicial authority is needed, is left 
to national law (cf. art. 27(2), second subparagraph). The preamble also 
states that while the regulation ‘specifies a minimum set of powers 
competent authorities should have, those powers are to be exercised 
within a complete system of national law which guarantees the respect 
for fundamental rights, including the right to privacy. For the exercise 
of those powers, which may amount to serious interferences with the 
right to respect for private and family life, home and communications, 
Member States should have in place adequate and effective safeguards 
against any abuse, for instance, where appropriate a requirement to 
obtain prior authorisation from the judicial authorities of a Member 
State concerned. Member States should allow the possibility for 
competent authorities to exercise such intrusive powers to the extent 
necessary for the proper investigation of serious cases where there are 
no equivalent means for effectively achieving the same result’ (our 
italics)67. 
Once again, the focus of the European legislator is primarily on the 
application of these rules in the national context. Whether or not 
adequate safeguards exist and what those safeguards comprise (judicial 
approval, purpose limitation, the existence of prima facie evidence, 
etc.) is left to national law. Each of those systems in itself may indeed 
be fully compatible with the requirements of the European Convention 
on Human Rights or the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. Yet that 
does not mean that these safeguards will also function properly in cases 
of transnational cooperation. For instance, the authority of one EU 
Member State may need prior judicial authorisation in order to obtain 
                                                          
67 Recital 66. 
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certain traffic data in its own legal order, whereas another authority 
may not need this because there are other safeguards in place, for 
instance strict purpose limitation of the data obtained. In cases where 
the latter authority requests the former to gather and provide traffic 
data, what will be the role of the authorising judicial authority in the 
requested state? Will that authority perform an in-depth test of the 
proportionality and subsidiarity of the foreign request, as it does in 
national cases, or will it assume – in accordance with the principle of 
inter-state mutual trust – that such a test has already been performed in 
the requesting state, although not by a judicial body68? Is it even able to 
perform such an in-depth test, taking into account the limited 
information that it has on the case itself, which is conducted abroad? 
And if the authority grants the authorisation and the data are 
consequently collected and transferred, what about the situation where 
those data could not have originally been obtained in the requesting 
state due to its purpose limitation restrictions? Can such a purpose 
limitation requirement set aside the relevant rules in the regulation that 
such information must be available for transnational cooperation too? 
In cases like these, therefore, there is a real risk that the requested 
authority, assuming that the requesting state respects fundamental 
rights, will not check whether the conditions and safeguards that are in 
place in the requesting state are comparable with its own standards. The 
result is that interferences with the right to privacy are checked by the 
requesting and the requested state (‘overprotection’) or not at all 
(‘underprotection’)69. 
                                                          
68 Situations like these have come up in competition law, where the ECJ developed 
a model for a ‘division of labour’ between national courts and the ECJ for checking 
coercive measures; see Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères, [2002] ECR I-9011. Such a 
model is lacking in other areas. 
69 M.J.J.P. LUCHTMAN, European Cooperation between Financial Supervisory 
Authorities, Tax Authorities and Judicial Authorities, Antwerp-Oxford, 2008, pp. 162-
169. 
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5. Conclusions: From a Nation-State Towards a European Perspective 
The foregoing analysis of the proposed plans with respect to the 
enforcement of market abuse rules reveals that there is a tendency by 
which the European legislature no longer only focuses on a single 
European rule book with norms for actors on the financial markets, but 
also on supervisory convergence. This development goes hand in hand 
with increasing European legislative powers in the area of law 
enforcement in general, including criminal law. In order to realise a 
proper functioning internal market and an AFSJ, the proposed package 
of market abuse rules not only defines the norms for actors on the 
financial markets, but also introduces the obligation to enforce these 
rules through (punitive) administrative and criminal law. In order to 
achieve this, organisational structures for network building and 
cooperation, investigative powers and sanctions are prescribed at 
European level. 
Although good progress has been made with these proposals, it is 
our opinion that these proposals still do not sufficiently take account of 
the fact that highly integrated financial markets also need highly 
integrated law enforcement structures and powers, regardless of the 
organisational statute of the national authorities involved (criminal or 
administrative). In light of the ambitions put forward in the Treaties – 
particularly those with respect to the creation of a common area of 
justice for all European citizens – and the principle of loyal 
cooperation, we are of the opinion that the European legislature should 
put in place regulations that not only facilitate effective and swift 
cooperation between national and European authorities, regardless of 
their administrative or criminal law statutes, but should also make sure 
that fundamental rights are effectively protected in transnational cases. 
Our analysis reveals that there are still several flaws in the proposed 
system for the enforcement of market abuse. First, we have noted that 
the common definitions of the substantive and procedural norms that 
define ‘the rules of the game’ and, thereby, the operational reach of the 
national authorities still show discrepancies. That means that one can 
only wait for situations where diverging interpretations of rules hamper 
the underlying goal of a level playing field for economic actors and law 
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enforcers. Second, the criminal law aspects of the European 
enforcement regime, in particular, remain underdeveloped, with respect 
to both the investigatory powers available, as well as the possibilities 
for transnational cooperation and, particularly, coordination and 
oversight. Third, there are hardly any provisions that deal with the 
relationship between administrative and criminal law measures; this is 
particularly so in transnational cases70. That means that there is no body 
ultimately responsible for the system as a whole. Finally, there is no 
attention whatsoever for the development of fundamental rights beyond 
the context of the nation-state, with the exception perhaps of the ne bis 
in idem principle, which already comprises combinations of criminal 
and administrative law punitive sanctions and applies in the EU as a 
whole. 
Should the occasion arise and a court – probably the Court of Justice 
of the European Union – rule that Article 50 CFR (ne bis in idem) does 
apply to these types of combinations, then this will probably lead to 
new legislative instruments that aim to prevent case allocation on the 
basis of ‘first come, first served.’ We have seen a similar development 
in the area of criminal law, where the Court’s landmark rulings on 
Article 54-58 CISA (ne bis in idem)71, were an important impetus for a 
new Framework decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on 
prevention and settlement of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in 
criminal proceedings72. It would, however, be a missed opportunity to 
limit the issue of fundamental rights protection to the ne bis in idem 
principle alone. On the eve of a new multi-annual policy programme 
for criminal justice (the successor of the Stockholm programme), we 
think it is time for the European legislature to deal with the 
enforcement of market abuse rules as a matter that not only requires an 
integrated approach by all law enforcement bodies at national level, but 
also the legislative bodies involved and not one where the outcome is 
largely determined by organisational barriers within the Commission 
and Council. 
                                                          
70 For suggestions on this, see supra note 60. 
71 That case law started with Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gözütok and 
Brügge [2003] ECR I-1345. 
72 OJ EU L 328/42. 
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Finally, the enforcement design of the interests that need protection 
in the internal market and in the AFSJ do not have only an internal EU 
dimension, but also an external EU dimension. From the Libor/Euribor 
example there seems to be a pattern of outsourcing the enforcement of a 
single market issue to US authorities. The EC/EU Competition 
authority came in with strong penalties, but somewhat on the late side 
and only related to market distortion. The national authorities either did 
not play any role or mostly played for a domestic agenda. There seems 
not to be a common strategy either when it comes to the external 
dimension of the enforcement of the financial markets. This is 
remarkable in the light of the existence of such strategies in the area of 
competition law, where an agreement73 has been devised to provide for 
regular bilateral meetings to share information on current enforcement 
activities and priorities, to discuss policy changes, and to discuss 
matters of mutual interest relating to the application of competition 
laws. 
 
                                                          
73 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Commission of the European Communities regarding the application of their 
competition laws - Exchange of interpretative letters with the Government of the United 
States of America, OJ EU L 095, 27.04.1995, p. 47. 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
GATHERING AND USE OF EVIDENCE IN THE AREA 
OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE, WITH 
SPECIAL REGARD TO EU-FRAUD AND OLAF-
INVESTIGATIONS1 
1. Introduction 
In the process of harmonisation and integration the Union has been 
very active with “institution building”2 and the elaboration of the EU 
into a “regulatory state”3. However, the possession of common 
standards and rules is a necessary, but nevertheless still not a sufficient 
condition for the functioning of the customs union, the internal market 
with its four freedoms, the monetary union and the area of freedom, 
security and justice. The compliance with the substantive policies 
constitutes an inherent part of their effectiveness4. In order to realise 
compliance by the operators, it is essential that inspection is carried out 
and that in the case of non-compliance measures are taken either to 
compel compliance or to sanction for non-compliance. The whole body 
of rules and acts which are connected to compliance with substantial 
norms (control, measures, and sanctions) I would define as 
enforcement. This is, however, a much generalised category which 
needs to be broken down further. Occupying a central position in Union 
policies is compliance by the addressees of the norms, in most cases 
                                                          
1 This article has been published in C. NOWAK (Ed.), Evidence in EU Fraud Cases, 
Warszawa, 2014, pp. 21-56. 
2 T. DAINTITH, Implementing EC Law in the UK. Structures for Indirect Rule, 
Wiley, 1995. 
3 G. MAJONE, Regulating Europe, London-New York, 1996. 
4 F. SNYDER, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, 
Processes, Tools and Techniques, in MLR, 1993, p. 19. 
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citizens and enterprises5. Everything which is connected with 
compliance by them, I would define as first-line enforcement6. Second-
line enforcement consists of enforcement obligations that serve the 
enforcement system itself, as for instance duties to cooperate. Within 
the framework of this article I will focus on one link in the enforcement 
chain, namely the control phase, which is also designated by the terms 
research, verification, supervision and investigation. Henceforth, I will 
make use of the neutral term control because Union law makes no 
systematic differentiation between administrative law supervision and 
criminal law investigation. The control phase has several aims: 
- verifying compliance with the substantive norms; 
 defining the exact amount of debt (tax, customs) or the due amount of 
subsidy; 
 verifying infringements of administrative irregularities; 
 verifying infringement of criminal offences (pre-stage). 
Only in the last two situations we can speak of investigations with 
the aim to find evidence in punitive proceedings, which is the core-
interest of our contribution. As it stands foremost of these 
investigations are done by the authorities of the Member States with the 
aim to enforce Union policies (indirect enforcement). Only in a 
minority of situations we can speak about direct enforcement by the 
Union. 
                                                          
5 See for the sanctions phase: J.A.E. VERVAELE, Administrative Sanctioning Powers 
of and in the Community. Towards a System of European Administrative Sanctions?, in 
J.A.E. VERVAELE (Ed.), Administrative Law Application and Enforcement of 
Community Law in the Netherlands, Deventer-Boston, 1994, pp. 161-202. 
6 See C. HARDING, European Community Investigations and Sanctions. The 
Supranational Control of Business Delinquency, London-New York, 1993; J.-C. RIVAL, 
Les entreprises face aux pouvoirs d’enquête de la Commission des Communautés 
Européennes, Paris, 1991; J.M. LELOUP, Droit de la defense et droits de la Commission 
dans le droit communautaire de la concurrence, Bruxelles, 1994; G. DANNECKER, 
J. FISCHER- FRITSCH, Das EG-Kartellrecht in der Busslgeldpraxis, Köln, 1989. 
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2. Indirect and Direct Enforcement of Union Policies 
The fact that compliance with the regulations of the Union Policies 
has as a natural consequence that the Union is very dependent – not 
only as regards implementation but also enforcement – on national 
regulations as well as national implementation and enforcement 
structures7. This does not mean, however, that the Union must wait 
powerlessly on the side lines in order to determine whether its policy 
regulations have been given effect. After all, the Union has legal 
possibilities at its disposal by which it can influence national 
competence as regards enforcement. Furthermore, it also has at its 
disposal powers by which to regulate national enforcement. In the 
Union’s independent legal order, consisting of both Union and national 
components, this does not have to come as a surprise. The Union’s 
competence to regulate national enforcement is double-tracked, which 
is binding on all the authorities of the national trias politica (the 
legislative and implementing authorities as well as those charged with 
the administration of justice). On the one hand, we could speak of 
regulation by means of the case-law of the European Court of Justice. 
The Court has transposed the competence regarding enforcement into 
an obligation which is furthermore subjected to quality requirements 
(effectiveness, proportionality and assimilation)? The Member States’ 
competence regarding enforcement has been – from a Community law 
point of view – regulated in an objective-oriented enforcement 
obligation which must be given actual effect by means of national 
regulations and their application8. On the other hand, we could also 
speak of a legislative regulation by means of Union Regulations and 
Directives. By means of a large body of secondary Union legislation, 
Member States are obliged to adhere to detailed control and sanction 
obligations. These obligations are not limited to the legislative 
framework, but are also concerned with enforcement practice and in a 
number of cases they not only contain obligations to perform to the best 
                                                          
7 M. ZULEEG, Enforcement of Community Law: Administrative and Criminal 
Sanctions in a European Setting, in J.A.E. VERVAELE et al. (Eds.), Compliance and 
Enforcement of European Community Law, Deventer-Boston, 1999, pp. 349-360. 
8 See f.i., part on Inspection in the Fisheries Regulations 1224/2009 and 404/2011. 
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of one’s abilities but also obligations to guarantee that certain results 
are attained. From all this it would seem that the principle of indirect 
enforcement of Community law by the Member States is not absolute. 
To an increasing extent, by means of legislation and, one can speak of a 
direct regulation of enforcement by the Union9, which consists of a 
Union law harmonization of decentralised enforcement. By means of 
normative programming the EC is penetrating the institutional and legal 
aspects of national enforcement systems, which in turn leads to 
interlocking. This does not detract from the fact that it is in principle 
the legislative, implementing and judicial authorities of the Member 
States which give flesh and blood to the enforcement of Union 
legislation. In this respect the Member States in principle have a 
freedom of choice and can call upon civil law, self-enforcement, 
disciplinary law, criminal law or combinations thereof, with specific 
interpretations as regards organisation, instruments, legal protection, 
etc. The only limiting condition is that the institution of the particular 
national enforcement system and the resulting application thereof must 
adhere to Union requirements of legislative and jurisprudential nature. 
To put it succinctly, economic operators are confronted with national 
enforcement regulations, national enforcement authorities, national 
control practices and decisions on sanctions, but their function and 
practice is to a large extent filled in by Union obligations. 
The exceptions to the rule of indirect enforcement are the areas in 
which the European Commission itself has enforcement powers. In the 
competition area the EC has investigative and sanctioning powers. 
Outside of the competition area we have though several interesting 
developments. I will limit myself to two illustrative examples. In 1995 
the EC dispatched an inspection team to Japan in order to supervise the 
production and processing of fish products from the point of view of 
hygiene and risks to public health. Because an acute danger to public 
health was determined, the Commission decided, by order, on an 
immediate ban on the import of fish products emanating from Japan. 
For a number of companies, among which was the Dutch “Affish BV”, 
                                                          
9 J.A.E. VERVAELE, Harmonised Union Policies and Harmonisation of Substantive 
Criminal Law, in F. GALLI, A. WEYEMBERGH (Eds.), Approximation of Substantive 
Criminal Law in the EU: The Way Forward, Brussels, 2013, pp. 43-72. 
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this meant the complete collapse of their major activity. Their litigation 
procedures have led to interesting legal developments, wherein the 
phenomenon of Euro-control has come under discussion10. For those 
who are of the opinion that this example is not associated with 
enforcement, but is instead a feature of regulating entry into the market 
because it concerns the relationship between third countries and the 
internal market, here is a second example. The complete trade embargo 
on British beef brought into force by the EC because of the mad cow 
disease in the UK, required considerable efforts in order to ensure that 
the embargo was enforced. In 1997 it became obvious that this embargo 
was not water-tight when considerable amounts of beef intended for the 
Russian market were seized at a Dutch port because there were 
indications that the meat had not originated from Belgian producers, as 
was claimed, but in reality from producers in the UK. Investigation did 
indeed reveal that a Belgian meat-processing plant had illegally 
imported meat from the UK in order for it then to replace Belgian meat 
by means of forging labels and health certificates. The extraordinary 
feature of this investigation was that it was carried out with the 
cooperation of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture’s General Inspection 
Service (an administrative inspection and judicial investigation 
authority) and a European inspection team from UCLAF (the 
predecessor of OLAF) at that time. UCLAF’s investigation proceedings 
were essential because it had emerged from this investigation that not 
only was the implicated company already responsible for the meat 
fraud, but that the Belgian Ministry of Health had also granted an 
export certificate to this company while the company in question had 
not adhered to various regulations, and that certain inspectors from the 
Belgian Institute for Veterinary Inspection (Belgisch Instituut voor de 
Veterinaire Keuring - IVK) had been involved in the fraud. 
These two examples therefore make it clear that over the years the 
Union has not only developed the competence to regulate national 
enforcement, but also a direct operational power to enforce as far as it 
is concerned. Economic operators are therefore not only confronted 
                                                          
10 See case C-183/95, Affish BV en Rijksdienst voor de Keuring van Vee en Vlees, 
ECJ 7 July 1997. 
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with national enforcement rules and practice, but also, and increasingly 
so, with Union enforcement rules and practice. 
2. Problem Setting 
2.1. Indirect Enforcement Design and Horizontal Cooperation 
The competent authorities for the evidence gathering related to these 
punitive proceedings are multiple and are of very different legal nature. 
In the Member States the design of the enforcement architecture does 
vary a lot, but they do have also some common features. Let us start 
with the latter. Generally spoken competent specialized administrative 
authorities, as tax and customs authorities or administrative agencies in 
the economic field, are competent authorities for their enforcement of 
their respective administrative regulations. As a rule they do have 
punitive sanctioning powers and can carry out investigative powers to 
gather evidence, using some coercive powers (as access to the premises 
and the business records and freezing or seizure). As a rule they cannot 
use special investigative techniques or very coercive powers, as search. 
When dealing with enforcement of the EU financial interest, (PIF) the 
administrative enforcement design in each Member State is very 
fragmented, because of the different areas involved (VAT, customs, 
agricultural subsidies, structural funds contributions, etc.). When it 
comes to criminal law enforcement of these administrative regulations, 
competent judicial authorities have the lead. The traditional judicial 
authorities are the prosecutors, police with judicial powers and 
investigative magistrates. 
In reality we can define the enforcement as being dominated by 
multidisciplinary investigations, meaning: 
- investigations in which various types of administrative authorities are 
involved, with different scope of competence (e.g. different 
specialized administrative agencies like tax, customs, etc.) and 
- investigations in which both judicial and administrative authorities are 
involved (e.g. tax authority and prosecution service). The main 
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differences relate to the powers of the administrative investigators 
in the judicial setting and the use of evidence obtained during in the 
administrative investigation in the judicial follow-up. In some 
countries administrative investigators have a double function 
(double head) and can switch to their judicial function if they 
discover that the suspicion of and administrative irregularity turn 
into the suspicion of a criminal offence (for instance because they 
find evidence during the administrative investigation). When 
switching from function, they switch also from applicable law 
(from administrative to criminal procedure) and from responsible 
(mostly from a Ministry to a prosecutor). In other countries the 
administrative investigators have to transfer the file to the 
prosecutor for the judicial follow up. When it comes to the status of 
the evidence gathered by the administrative investigators this is 
admissible evidence in criminal proceedings, as long as no judicial 
procedural guarantees have been circumvented. In other countries 
however these evidence is not admissible at all or reduced to 
starting information for the triggering of judicial investigations or 
judicial coercive measures. Finally, when it comes to transnational 
cooperation at a horizontal level between the different competent 
national enforcement authorities, we also have some common 
features, severe difficulties and loopholes. As a rule administrative 
enforcement agencies use the instruments of mutual administrative 
assistance and judicial authorities use the instruments of mutual 
legal assistance in criminal matters (MLA) or mutual recognition 
instruments (MR). However, as administrative punitive 
enforcement has been increasing some MLA and MR instruments 
do accept some administrative enforcement agencies as competent 
authorities. Member States do also have different rules as to if and 
under which conditions mutual legal assistance can be used when a 
case is under judicial investigation (thus circumventing MLA and 
MR). The multidisciplinary character of PIF-investigations is also 
reflected in the transnational setting, because the various types of 
administrative authorities that are involved, with different scope of 
competence (e.g. different specialized administrative agencies like 
tax, customs, etc.). do use specific instruments of mutual 
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administrative assistance or do not have them at all (like for the 
structural funds); 
- the mix of judicial and administrative authorities that are involved 
(e.g. tax authority and prosecution service) results in a complex 
cooperation regime under MLA and MR. 
2.2. Supranational Enforcement Design and Judicial Follow-Up 
At first sight this part is easier as we have, as it stands, no 
supranational judicial investigation at all at EU level. As it stands there 
is no European law enforcement agency that is empowered with 
supranational criminal investigation. Article 85(a) TFEU provides 
however that the initiation of criminal investigation may become part of 
the tasks of Eurojust. The legal basis for a full supranational system of 
criminal investigation is however laid down in Article 86 TFEU 
(European public prosecutor). Neither Europol, nor Eurojust do have 
actually investigative judicial powers. They do not gather criminal 
evidence as such. However, both the European competition authority 
and OLAF do have wide investigative administrative powers (including 
some coercive powers). The administrative evidence gathering by the 
European competition authority is mainly aimed at European punitive 
sanctioning proceedings: fines imposed by the EU at the economic 
operators. However, OLAF does not have sanctioning powers and its 
enforcement field is strongly interconnected with criminal law in the 
Member States. This means that the (judicial) follow-up of OLAF 
investigations and OLAF-evidence in national (judicial) punitive 
proceedings is of main interest. Also here we see substantial differences 
in the legal order of the Member States. Some of them deny any 
evidential standard to OLAF-evidence. Some of them just apply their 
national rules applicable to national administrative agencies and a 
minority has introduced special features to OLAF and accepts also that 
OLAF can figure as testimony or victim-testimony in the criminal trial. 
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3. Indirect and Direct Enforcement of the Union’s Financial Interests 
The points of departure of this analysis are the enforcement 
obligations of the addressees to whom norms are addressed by Union 
law, as well as the enforcement competences of the particular 
enforcement authority. They are indeed decisive in the gathering of 
evidence. It seems to me to be useful to employ an analytical chart. In 
the chart the methods of coercion which apply to natural persons 
(arrest, pre-trial detention, etc.) are not included because these 
enforcement methods fall exclusively within the domain of the law of 
criminal procedure11 and the chart therefore concerns the regulation of 
enforcement competences and enforcement obligations as regards 
business records, business premises means of transport, etc. and which 
in national law are regulated not only by the law of administrative 
procedure (supervision) but also by the (economic) criminal law and 
criminal procedure. 
Enforcement body Economic 
 
operators/those to 
whom standards are 
addressed 
primary enforcement 
powers compliance 
prohibitions, orders and 
duties 
 
secondary enforcement powers 
 
duty of administration and/or 
registration 
 
active duty to report or provide 
information 
                                                          
11 Although under Lisbon treaty some aspects have been harmonized in the 
framework of the mutual recognition cooperation instruments. 
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Information powers 
 
- production orders 
 
to demand inspection of business
details and records 
Passive duty of information 
Technical powers 
 
- to enter premises 
 
- to investigate cases 
 
- to investigate means of transport 
and loads 
 
- to take samples 
 
-seizure 
 
- to search places 
 
- exceptionally: the power to search
homes 
 
- to demand cooperation in the exercise
of these powers 
 
- the power to accompany certain
designated persons (e.g. Euro-
inspectors) 
Duty to cooperate 
With this definition of the forms of enforcement control and the 
description of the enforcement powers and obligations we are now able 
to analyse how the indirect and direct enforcement control is organised 
with regard to the EU’s financial interests. It is a logical step first of all 
to look at the regulation of indirect enforcement, considering that this 
forms the backbone of the enforcement of EU policies. Then I will 
analyse to what extent and how the Union has provided for direct 
enforcement with operational competences for the European 
Commission. 
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3.1. Union Regulation of Indirect Enforcement by the Member States 
By means of Union regulation enforcement obligations are created 
or strengthened for Member States as well as private addressees. A 
number of provisions are directly connected with the objectives of 
enforcement (primary enforcement obligations); a number are 
connected with supportive obligations (secondary enforcement 
obligations). 
3.1.1. Union Regulation of the Secondary Enforcement Obligations 
In many regulations, and also sometimes in directives, obligations 
are imposed on addressees which can facilitate primary enforcement. 
Economic operators are confronted with far-reaching duties of 
administration and registration, have all kinds of duties to report and to 
provide information and must lend their cooperation in the case of 
inspection. These secondary enforcement obligations are in a number of 
cases very detailed and strict. It is indeed conspicuous that Union law 
only sporadically prescribes sanctions in the case of the non-observance 
of these obligations. This usually concerns a duty to observe which 
must be enforced by the Member States by means of suitable measures 
(reporting duties). The non-observance thereof is mostly sanctioned by 
the Member States by making use of administrative law or criminal law 
sanctions (withdrawal of a permit, administrative law fines, and 
exclusion from the provision of a subsidy, criminal law fines, and light 
custodial sentences). 
Nevertheless, Union regulation of secondary enforcement 
obligations is not limited to private addressees, mostly economic 
operators. Member States themselves are subjected to equivalent 
obligations: administration, reporting/providing information and 
cooperation. These secondary obligations are concerned with providing 
an insight into the implementation and enforcement route and are 
thereby, among other things, supported by the administrative control 
which is exercised by the Commission. Member States should thereby 
disclose their regulations and implementation and enforcement 
structure to Brussels. The secondary obligations are not only limited to 
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the “law in the books”, but are also concerned with the “law in action” 
(disclosure of enforcement information). There are therefore 
regulations which are very detailed in describing how national efforts in 
the field of enforcement must be administered and registered, and of 
which efforts and results Brussels has to be informed. These 
notifications may concern enforcement efforts undertaken by the 
authorities of the Member States regarding control systems, judicial 
proceedings and sanctions (an enforcement scenario, the amount of 
control, the number of refund procedures which have been commenced, 
punitive sanctions handed out, etc.), but also regarding the conduct of 
the economic operators (mala fide enterprises). Also the duty to 
cooperate is concretely elaborated in many regulations. This 
cooperation may be owed to diverse Community institutions, but also to 
other Member States. 
Conspicuous in these regulations is that compliance with these 
secondary enforcement regulations is not dependent on the enforcement 
organisation and enforcement systems within the Member States. 
Information which is connected to this judicial route (the investigation 
itself, the criminal court) is also included in this field of application. 
Secondly, an obvious chronological evolution is discernible. In a first 
phase the obligations were only concerned with “law in the books”. In a 
second phase they were extended to “law in action”. In a further third 
phase obligations were then added as regards certain individual 
enforcement cases. Thereby, in the agricultural control regulation 
concerning fraud in the agricultural industry12 it became compulsory for 
Member States every three months to send an overview to the 
Commission containing a list of irregularities whereby a preliminary 
administrative or judicial report had been compiled. In this list 
information should be included on infringements, the extent of fraud, 
the modus operandi of the fraud, etc., as well as the identity of the 
natural and legal persons involved, so far as this is necessary for 
combating fraud. That the Union norms are increasingly concerned 
with aspects of operational enforcement in individual cases is also 
apparent from the blacklist regulation which has as its objective the 
                                                          
12 Art. 2 of Regulation 595/91, OJ 1991, L 67. 
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ensuring of the economic operators’ integrity as regards the European 
agricultural subsidies13. In relation to the economic operators which, 
within the framework of registration, export refunds and the sale of 
intervention products against a lower price, have received subsidies 
from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) and as regards reliability and risk formation, certain 
enforcement obligations are imposed on the Member States. These 
“unreliable” economic operators are divided into two categories. 
Category A consists of economic operators which, as natural or as legal 
persons, have had a final decision of an administrative or judicial 
authority rendered against them in which it has been determined that 
they have intentionally, or by means of gross negligence, committed an 
irregularity and, as a result of which, have received an unlawful 
financial advantage or have attempted to do so (“finally and 
conclusively found to be fraudsters”). Category B concerns the same 
situation, but here only a preliminary administrative or judicial report 
has been compiled. Article 1 of the implementing regulation moves this 
reporting phase forward by determining that “preliminary 
administrative or judicial report” should also be understood to mean the 
preliminary, also purely internal, written evaluation by the competent 
administrative or judicial authority, wherein it has been concluded that 
as regards certain facts, it would seem that an irregularity has been 
committed either intentionally or by gross negligence, this being 
without prejudice to any later amendment (“suspected fraudsters”). It is 
obligatory for Member States to report category A and B economic 
operators to the Commission and to take appropriate measures. In 
relation to category A and B economic operators payments should be 
deferred and the control systems sharpened. In relation to category A 
economic operators, furthermore, they must be definitively excluded 
from the system of subsidies for a certain period of time. 
In principle, the Member State’s detailed reporting obligations as 
regards national enforcement in individual records also apply to judicial 
information concerning investigation. “In principle”, that is, because 
                                                          
13 Council Regulation 1469/95 of 22 June 1995 on measures to be taken with regard 
to certain beneficiaries of operations financed by the Guarantee Section of the EAGGF, 
OJ 1995, L 145 and Commission Regulation 745/96, OJ 1996, L 102. 
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Art. 4 of the blacklist regulation and certain recent regulations 
determine that if national provisions provide for the confidentiality of 
the investigation, then for the purpose of sending the details provided 
under this blacklist regulation, the consent of the competent judicial 
authority is here necessary14. Being in possession of such a procedure 
and its institution is left to the national legal system in question. The 
competent administrative authorities, however, do have an obligation to 
try and obtain this consent. 
3.1.2. Union Regulation of the Primary Enforcement Obligations of 
Economic Operators and Member States 
The fact that Union regulates the primary enforcement obligations 
of economic operators is not unusual and neither is it new. Since the 
beginning of European integration, Union law (both primary and 
secondary) has contained provisions as prohibitions and, due diligence 
obligations which, in combination with national law, form the actus 
reus of national administrative irregularities and/or criminal offences. 
The prohibition of insider trading or money laundering in directives or 
due diligence clauses in EU regulations regarding the trade in 
hazardous waste are classic examples. 
Since the 1980s, sectoral regulations have also contained primary 
enforcement obligations as far as the Member States are concerned. I 
would like to differentiate between 1) Gathering of evidence by 
enforcement control upon request; 2) Gathering of evidence by 
imposing qualitative and quantitative enforcement standards and 3) The 
use of evidence obtained and its probative value. 
                                                          
14 See, for example, Art. 3 of Regulation 1681/94 of 11 July 1994 concerning 
irregularities and the recovery of sums wrongly paid in connection with the financing of 
the structural policies and the organisation of an information system in this field, OJ 
1994, L 178 and Art. 4 of Regulation 1469/95. 
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Gathering of Evidence by Enforcement Control upon Request 
As far as own resources15 are concerned, as well as agricultural 
subsidies16 and payments from the structural funds17 of the EC, the 
Commission may instruct the Member States to implement 
supplementary controls. This system has already existed since the early 
1970s18, but has now been elaborated in more detail in the newer 
regulations. An example of this is Art. 6 of the agricultural control 
regulation (595/91), which contains an obligation to institute an 
investigation upon the request of the Commission. Furthermore, the 
concept of inquiry or investigation is explicitly defined as follows: 
Inquiry shall be taken to mean any inspection, verification or action 
carried out by officials of the national administration with a view to 
establishing whether there has been an irregularity, with the exception 
of action carried out at the request or under the direct authority of a 
court. 
To put it succinctly, this concerns a request to carry out an 
administrative law investigation (which is inquisitorial, but is not a 
judicial function), which is negatively defined. Which investigative 
activities are to be excluded from the investigation at the request of the 
Commission are, to a large degree, dependent on the national law of 
criminal procedure. This law will in any case determine when an 
activity can be carried out at the request of the judicial authorities or 
under their direct authority. In any event, what a judicial authority 
actually is depends on the national law. There are thereby Member 
States in which the Public Prosecutions Department is not deemed to be 
part of “the judicial authorities”. In some common law countries the 
criminal law investigation will also be in the hands of the police. 
Furthermore, there is still the question of what exactly is meant by the 
                                                          
15 Regulation 1026/1999, OJ 1999, L 126 and Proposal for a COUNCIL 
REGULATION laying down implementing measures for the system of own resources 
of the European Union /* COM/2011/0511 final - 2011/0184. 
16 Regulation 595/91, OJ 1991, L 67. 
17 Art. 23 of Regulation 4253/88, OJ 1988, L 374. 
18 See J.A.E. VERVAELE, Fraud Against the Community. The Need for European 
Fraud Legislation, Deventer, 1992. 
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term direct authority. Many national supervisory authorities also have 
at their disposal the specific competence to carry out such an 
investigation. This differentiation is also not always clear-cut in 
national law and many investigative operations are carried out under 
the authority of the Public Prosecutions Department, but not always 
under the direct authority thereof. This negative definition consequently 
leaves room for an extensive interpretation of the concept of 
investigation. 
Gathering of Evidence by Imposing Qualitative and Quantitative 
Enforcement Standards 
It thereby also occurs that the Community imposes obligations on 
the controlling efforts of the Member States. Many regulations oblige 
the Member States to draw up control programs with detailed 
information on the control criteria, the establishments which must be 
visited, the frequency of the controls, etc.19. A certain number of 
regulations set out mathematically the frequency upon which the 
control should take place by, for example, determining that at least 5 % 
of all subsidised export and agricultural products must be the subject of 
physical control20. A readjustment is later permitted also by means of 
more specific risk analysis21. 
Also in the case of investigative powers, the Union has remained at 
the forefront. Article 5 of the regulation concerning controls in the 
viniculture sector22 for example, determines the minimum competences 
of the national inspectors: access to vineyards, company premises, 
warehouses and means of transport, access to administrative 
                                                          
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 485/2008 of 26 May 2008 on scrutiny by Member 
States of transactions forming part of the system of financing by the European 
Agricultural Guarantee Fund (a-posteriori documentary control). 
20 See Regulations 386/90, OJ 1990, L 42 and 2030/90, OJ 1990, L 186, replaced 
by Regulation 14/2008 of 17 December 2007. 
21 Commission Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 of 2 March 2001 laying down 
detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 as 
regards the management and control systems for assistance granted under the Structural 
Funds. 
22 Regulation 2048/89, OJ 1989, L 202, replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No 
1493/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in wine. 
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documents, the right to make copies of such documents, and the 
possibility of attachment and/or seizure of property before final 
judgment. The regulation concerning a-posteriori control of trade 
documents23 contains the compulsory authority to seize trade 
documents (Art. 6), but there it is immediately added that this is not to 
the detriment of national regulations contained in the law of criminal 
procedure. 
The Use of Evidence Obtained and its Probative Value 
During the 1980s the first summary provisions concerning the 
application of obtained evidence appeared in the sectoral regulations. 
The first regulation concerning controls in the viniculture sector thereby 
contained in Article 14(2) a specific provision on the use of obtained 
evidence in national judicial proceedings probative value: 
This Regulation shall not prevent the use, in the course of court 
proceedings or prosecutions started subsequently for failure to comply 
with agricultural or financial requirements, of information obtained 
pursuant to this Regulation24. 
The blacklist regulation, in its Article 4(3), also specifically 
regulates the relationship between the criminal law autonomy of the 
Member States and the use of the obtained information as evidence in 
criminal proceedings: 
The provisions of this Regulation shall not affect the application in the 
Member States of rules governing criminal proceedings and mutual 
assistance in criminal matters between Member States. They shall not 
prevent the use, in the context of judicial proceedings or of proceedings 
brought subsequently for incompliance with agricultural regulations, of 
information obtained pursuant to this Regulation. In latter case the 
                                                          
23 Council Regulation (EC) No 485/2008 of 26 May 2008 on scrutiny by Member 
States of transactions forming part of the system of financing by the European 
Agricultural Guarantee Fund (Codified version). 
24 Regulation 2048/89, OJ 1989, L 202, meanwhile repealed by Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1493/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the market in 
wine. 
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competent authority of the Member State which provided such 
information shall be notified of such use25. 
These evidence provisions have been established in order to apply 
the obtained evidence transprocedurally within the framework of 
Community-regulated enforcement investigation. This means that the 
information obtained can be used as evidence in other proceedings (of a 
civil, disciplinary, administrative law or criminal law nature). As can be 
acknowledged these regulations do contain provisions on the 
admissibility of the obtained evidence in administrative enforcement of 
Union regulations in the frame of judicial proceedings, but not on the 
probative value of the evidence. This aspect is left to of national 
procedural law. These rules of evidence gathering and use of evidence 
contained in Union regulations concerning EC fraud may be explained 
by the fact that when it has been determined that EC fraud has taken 
place, this will lead to diverse judicial procedures, including criminal 
law prosecutions or punitive administrative law procedures against the 
perpetrators. 
Finally, Union customs law should be mentioned. Substantive 
customs law, which is the exclusive authority of the Community, has 
been harmonised in the Community Customs Code26 which contains 
rules covering customs tariffs, the origin of certain goods, customs 
value, etc. Customs enforcement law, however, remains a national 
concern, but Community customs law does contain many regulations in 
the field of procedural law27, with not only implications for 
implementation practices, but also for enforcement practices. It is 
thereby described in detail which requirements should be met as 
regards the various notification procedures, as regards recognition and 
control over customs warehouses and customs transportation, for 
example. These basic requirements are also of direct importance to the 
                                                          
25 Regulation 1469/95, OJ 1995, L 145. 
26 Regulation 2913/92 concerning the enactment of the Community Customs Code, 
OJ 1992, L 302 and Regulation 2454/93 containing the implementation provisions, OJ 
1993, L 253. 
27 I refer, for example, to Arts. 243-246 of Regulation 2913/92 concerning the right 
of appeal against customs decisions. 
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issue of evidence. From cases heard before the Court of Justice it would 
seem that there is no question of a system of unrestricted evidence, but 
rather a Community system of strictly prescribed legal evidence, which 
may not be set aside by evidence attained by the actions of national 
enforcement agencies, not even when supported by an official report 
from the investigative authority. This means that, for example, except 
for specially provided exceptions28, goods of a Union character may 
only be supplied together with a Union-prescribed notification 
document. Not having a notification document at hand will lead to an 
irrefutable suspicion, iuris et de iure, that the goods in question are not 
Union goods29. We are therefore here concerned with far-reaching 
harmonisation of evidentiary material, which can also work its way into 
criminal law. The far-reaching harmonisation of material customs law, 
however, has not yet led to the harmonisation of the enforcement of 
customs law per se, neither as regards investigative authority, nor the 
competence to impose sanctions. 
3.1.3. Increasing the Union Dimension of National Enforcement 
Agencies 
Union law either implicitly or explicitly defines the enforcement 
tasks of national enforcement agencies. It is only rarely that these 
national enforcement agencies are mentioned by name. The actual 
choice and allocation is left to the Member State. Sometimes, however, 
regulation does require that the Member State should allocate one 
contact agency or competent authority. This permits the enforcement 
organisation in Europe to streamline its operations and to work with a 
European enforcement network. Nevertheless, Brussels is conscious of 
the fact that regulating national enforcement does not mean that in 
practice the enforcement bodies realise that they have been charged 
with Union tasks. For this reason the Union has, in the past, already 
taken steps to also realise this Union dimension in practice. After much 
                                                          
28 For specific rules see Arts. 378-380 of Regulation 2454/93. 
29 For examples see case C-97/95, Pascoal & Filhos Ltd. and Fazenda Publica, ECJ 
17 July1997; case C-237/96, E. Amelynck et al. and Transport Amelynck BVBA, ECJ 
25 September 1997. 
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criticism from the Member States that they had to pick up the bill for 
enforcement, the Union has had to fork out from the European budget. 
Now, Member States are not only able to retain I 0 % of the recovery 
costs, but in many cases also 20 % of the reclaimed amounts of 
subsidies which have been wrongly paid out, provided, of course, that 
there is no question of the government itself being responsible for the 
incorrect payment of the subsidy. Should the Member States decide, 
upon the explicit request of the Commission, to initiate or continue 
judicial proceedings in order to reclaim subsidies which have been 
wrongly paid out, then there are possibilities to recover the legal aid 
and procedural costs from the Union budget30. It is also increasingly the 
case that the Community co-finances personnel and infrastructural 
improvements in the enforcement system. An example is the regulation 
on a-posteriori documentation control which has provided considerable 
personnel and initial financing over a five-year period31. 
3.1.4. Setting up Specialised Enforcement Agencies in the Member 
States 
In a number of policy sectors the Union was confronted with so 
much fraud that it felt itself obliged to compel Member States to set up 
specialised enforcement agencies. This is namely the case in the olive 
oil and tobacco sectors32. These agencies function under the national 
sovereignty of the Member States, but are jointly financed by the 
Commission and are, to a large extent, streamlined in the Union 
direction. The tasks of these enforcement agencies are determined by 
the regulations. In the second part of Art. 1 of both regulations, the 
retaining of statistical surveys and unannounced inspections of 
companies are included, among other things. In the tobacco regulation, 
                                                          
30 Regulation 4045/89 and Implementing Regulation 1863/90, OJ 1990, L 170. 
31 For other examples see Regulations 307/91, OJ 1991, L 37 and 967/91, OJ 1991, 
L 100 (co-financing control regarding the export of agricultural products) and the cited 
control regulations concerning wine and olive oil. 
32 See Regulation 2262/84, OJ 1984, L 208, and 593/92, OJ 1992, L 64 for olive oil, 
replaced by regulation 2292/2001 of 20 November 2001 and Regulation 85/93, OJ 
1993, L 12 for tobacco. 
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moreover, the sharing of eventual administrative law or criminal law 
procedures, the acceptances of effective investigative competences, as 
well as the taking of samples, are all included. The agency in question 
must set up working programs, compile reports and admit Commission 
officials to staff meetings. 
3.1.5. Instruments for Transnational and European Enforcement 
Cooperation 
In specific areas Community law provides instruments for 
cooperation in the field of enforcement, dealing with mutual 
administrative assistance between administrative enforcement 
agencies33. For the internal market and for the customs union, however, 
it is of primary importance that a framework regulation should exist for 
the purposes of mutual administrative assistance between Member 
States themselves (horizontal) and between Member States and the 
Commission (vertical) with a view to the enforcement of the customs 
and agricultural regulations. The basic regulation from 198134, after 
long negotiations, has been replaced by the new Regulation 515/9735. 
This regulation offers far-reaching possibilities for the exchange of 
enforcement information, for allowing special supervision to take place, 
for allowing investigation operations to be carried out and for 
coordinated investigation, etc. The basic principle is assistance between 
administrative authorities, upon request or spontaneously. In the 
regulation there is no definition of the concept of administrative 
authority, neither organic, nor functional. The criterion is the indication 
which is provided by the Member State. In this regulation, however, the 
European Commission, and also OLAF therefore, is defined as an 
administrative authority (Title III). With regard to the gathering of 
evidence and investigation, various provisions are of importance. 
Article 1 defines administrative investigation as all operations on the 
part of the indicated investigative authorities, with the exception of 
                                                          
33 See, for example, Regulation 218/92, OJ 1992, L 24 in the field of VAT, replaced 
by Regulation 904/2010, OJ 2010, L 268/1. 
34 Regulation 1468/81, OJ 1981, L 144. 
35 Regulation 515/97, OJ 1997, L 82/1. 
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operations which are carried out upon the request or under the direct 
authority of a judicial authority; a definition which has been adopted 
from Agricultural Control Regulation 595/91 (see supra). Art. 3 
determines that it is not only data which have been obtained in the 
course of an administrative investigation that are communicated to the 
requesting authority, but also the essential data obtained during a 
judicial or investigative inquiry which can necessarily put an end to a 
particular fraud. If the national law determines that it is obligatory, then 
the preceding approval of the judicial authority will first have to be 
acquired. This is obviously an exception to the general principle 
formulated in Art. 51, namely that the regulation should leave 
unimpeded the application in the Member States of regulations 
concerning criminal proceedings and mutual judicial assistance in 
criminal cases (MLA), including the rules concerning the 
confidentiality of the investigation. Whenever an administrative 
investigation is sought in a Member State, for example by the European 
Commission, by way of mutual administrative assistance, then certain 
rules are applicable (Art. 9) which also run parallel to the rules 
provided under Agricultural Control Regulation 595/91, which means 
that the Euro-inspectors are allowed to be present and operate under the 
authority of the national enforcement authorities. This formulation 
allows the European Commission and OLAF, way of mutual 
administrative assistance, to implement or jointly to implement 
transnationally coordinated enforcement investigations. Moreover, it is 
obligatory for Member States, within the framework of horizontal by 
mutual administrative assistance, to partake in far-reaching reporting 
obligations to the Commission. Within the framework of economic 
relations with third countries the Commission has at its disposal the 
independent competence to carry out an enforcement investigation in 
third countries (Title IV). These Community enforcement missions are 
carried out by the Commission itself or by the enforcement authorities 
of the Member States under the Commission’s authority. Finally, the 
Commission can make use of the Community part of the central data 
bank, the CIS - Customs Information System (Arts. 24-41), which has 
as its objective preventing, investigating and combating infringements 
of the customs and agriculture legislation. The regulation does not only 
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limit itself to defining the powers of investigation and therefore the 
possibilities for the gathering of evidence, but also contains provisions 
concerning the use of evidence. The data obtained (assessments, 
findings, information, documentation, etc.) from assistance upon 
request, from voluntary assistance as well as from the Community 
missions, may be used as evidence by the competent authorities of the 
Member States (Arts. 12, 16, and 21(2)). This opens up possibilities for 
the transprocedural and transnational use of the evidence obtained. This 
is also apparent from Art. 45(3) which determines that the 
confidentiality of the exchanged, and in the CIS input, data must not 
form an obstacle to the use of the data in judicial procedures or 
proceedings subsequently instigated due to the non-observance of the 
customs and agricultural regulations. The provisions concerning the use 
of evidence are formulated relatively vaguely. The provisions speak of 
“may” and there is not a single reference to the force to be attached to 
such evidence. 
To put it briefly, this framework regulation concerning mutual 
administrative assistance offers very appropriate instruments for the 
coordination of transnational enforcement investigation. On the other 
hand, the force to be attached to the evidence obtained is completely 
left to the national rules of procedure. 
3.2. Direct Enforcement by the Commission 
3.2.1 From Policy Evaluation to Enforcement 
The Commission has a general supervisory function as regards 
compliance with Union law both by and in the Member States in 
question. Within that framework the Commission is often charged in 
secondary Union legislation with evaluating implementation and 
enforcement in the various policy areas. This program evaluation can 
be concerned with aspects of legislation, implementation and 
enforcement. The Commission thereby issues, for example, reports on 
the application of the control measures in the Community’s fisheries 
policy, the anti-money-laundering policy, the anti-fraud policy, etc. 
This type of evaluation research draws on information not only from 
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the reporting obligations of the Member States and their various bodies 
but also from research in the Member States themselves as to the 
services in question and, if it should be the case, as to economic 
operators, so that an insight may be gained into the effectiveness of the 
system. 
It is obvious that this evaluation research is not directed towards 
observance or the imposition of sanctions for the infringement of 
certain norms by economic operators. Nevertheless, this research can, 
to the extent that it is directed towards the enforcement part of the 
policy in question, take the form of second-line enforcement control, 
namely control as regards the national enforcement agencies. It also 
occurs that these kinds of control can form the point of departure for 
further enforcement control which can also lead to sanctions in relation 
to the Member State. For example, in the agricultural sector whenever it 
appears that the enforcement agencies demonstrate structural 
shortcomings, with substantial consequences for the quality of 
enforcement, then the Commission can impose fixed cut-backs on 
agricultural subsidies within the framework of the yearly clearance of 
accounts procedure36, which has as its consequence that the subsidies, 
because of a lack of enforcement, will have to be charged to the 
national budget. A good example is Regulation 2064/97 on structural 
funds which itself, in its Art. 3, standardises the evidence which the 
Member States can employ so as to demonstrate that they have dealt 
with an irregularity in the right way37. 
                                                          
36 See R. BARENTS, The Agricultural Law of the EC, Deventer-Boston, 1994; 
R. MOGELE, Die Behandlung fehlerhafter Ausgaben im Finanzierungssystem der 
gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik, München, 1997. 
37 Commission Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 of 2 March 2001 laying down 
detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 as 
regards the management and control systems for assistance granted under the Structural 
Funds. 
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3.2.2. Enforcement by the European Commission: Investigative Powers 
for Euro-Inspectors38 
The independent competences relating to enforcement which Euro-
inspectors possess with regard to competition and atomic energy have 
their legal basis in primary Union law39. Within the framework of our 
analysis concerning the financial interests of the EU the question arises 
whether Euro-inspection can also be provided without an explicit basis 
therefore in the EU Treaty, and also when it is not directed at the 
imposition of sanctions on the Community level. For the time being the 
necessary competence can be derived from the general supervisory 
authority which the Commission possesses with regard to the 
observance of Community law, such as that provided in Art. 17 TEU. 
In practice, however, this has not occurred, but rather these Euro-
control powers, taken as supervisory competences, have been read into 
the specific bases for Union Community policy, such as, for example, 
in Arts. 38-44 TFEU (agriculture). 
The competence to implement financial enforcement control as 
regards EU revenue and expenditure has been a settled part of the 
applicable secondary Union law since the 1970s. The competence to 
exercise controls in the Member States is attributed to EC officials; 
such control being applicable to various services in the Member States 
(second line) and to economic operators (first line). These control 
measures are therefore a combination of second-line and first-line 
control. The control measures vary from sector to sector and what is 
thereby conspicuous is the fact that the Commission was initially 
ascribed with more possibilities as regards the expenditure aspect 
(especially agricultural expenditure) than it was as regards the income 
aspect. The first-line control possibilities have also increased with the 
                                                          
38 J.A.E. VERVAELE, Community Regulation and Operational Application of 
Investigative Powers, in J.A.E. VERVAELE (Ed.), Transnational Enforcement of the 
Financial Interests of the European Union, Antwerpen-Groningen, 1999. 
J.A.E. VERVAELE, Transnational Cooperation and Enforcement of European 
Community Law, The Hague -London, 1999. 
39 This here concerns Community powers of control and sanctions contained in 
Art. 105 TFEU. 
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passage of time. In 1970 the basic regulation concerning expenditure 
within the framework of the EAGGF40 already provided, in its Art. 9, 
the possibility of on the spot inspections of companies by Euro-
inspectors. In Art. 8 the preventive and repressive enforcement 
obligations of the Member States were determined. Also, Art. 8 
contained a re-claim obligation which was imposed on Member States 
in the case of subsidies which had been wrongly paid out, as well as a 
regulation on financial liability between the Community and the 
Member States. Article 8(3) determined that this and that would be 
further elaborated by the Council by means of an implementing 
regulation, and this occurred in Regulation 283/72. In this regulation 
the reporting duties of the Member States were specified, by which a 
Member State could be requested to initiate an administrative 
investigation, as a part of which Commission personnel could 
participate (Art. 6(1)). In the case of an affirmative result, the Member 
States were indeed obliged to initiate administrative or judicial 
proceedings so as to reach a formal finding on the irregularity or 
negligence (Art. 6(3)). In 1991 Implementation Regulation 283/72 was 
replaced by Regulation 595/9141. This regulation also contains 
extensive reporting duties for the Member States (see supra), which 
should enable the Commission to determine the question of financial 
liability (of the Community or the Member State in question). 
Alongside this, enforcement competences are also provided for the 
Commission. Here also, the Commission has the authority to request 
the Member State to instigate an investigation (see supra). If the Euro-
inspectors should decide to participate in an investigation, then Art. 
6(3) determines that the Member States, in principle, should be made 
aware of the essential elements of the investigation at least one week 
beforehand, although in urgent cases this requirement can be dispensed 
with. Furthermore, in Art. 6(4) it is explicitly determined that the Euro-
inspection should take place with the cooperation of the national 
inspectors and under their authority. In principle, the Euro-inspectors 
                                                          
40 Regulation 729170, OJ 1970, L 94. 
41 OJ 1991, L 67. This regulation is concerned with all irregularities and reclaims in 
the framework of subsidies obtained from the Guarantees section of the EAGGF. The 
Guidance section falls under the regulation of structural funds subsidies. 
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have the same competences as the national inspectors, except that: 
1) the investigation is to be led by national officials; 2) the Euro-
officials must not, upon their own initiative, transgress upon the control 
competences of the national inspectors; and 3) certain control activities 
are to be reserved for national inspectors. The Euro-inspectors cannot 
therefore independently and autonomously gain access to company 
premises, for example. That they can only do in cooperation with the 
national inspectors. The latter will also always lead the investigation. 
Furthermore, the Euro-inspectors cannot transgress upon the powers of 
control which have been specifically granted to the national inspectors; 
but they do indeed have access to the same locations and to the same 
documents as the national inspectors. The regulation also contains 
provisions relating to criminal law competences. What is here striking 
is the fact that the Euro-inspectors are not excluded from all the 
investigation activities. They cannot participate in certain activities 
which are deemed by national criminal law provisions to be reserved by 
national law for specifically indicated officials. This applies expressis 
verbis to the search of premises or the formal interviewing of persons. 
A number of provisions relating to criminal proceedings, and this is 
also the case in the Netherlands, provide the possibility for the 
investigating authorities to be accompanied by experts, and these 
experts can therefore theoretically be foreign experts or Euro-
inspectors. Moreover, they have access to all the information, including 
access to that which has been obtained on the basis of activities in 
which they are not allowed to participate. Furthermore, it has not here 
been determined that the confidentiality of the investigation should 
require that the flow of information should be dependent upon the 
consent of the competent judicial authorities. 
For payments of subsidies out of the structural funds the basic 
regulation for Euro-control is contained in Art. 23 Coordinating 
Regulation 4253/8842. Article 23 also contains the authority to conduct 
an enforcement investigation in the Member States, but this provision is 
much vaguer than that contained in Agricultural Regulation 595/91. 
Implementation Regulation 1681/9445 does describe in detail the 
                                                          
42 Regulation 4253/88, OJ 1988, L 374. 
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enforcement obligations of the Member States, but does not further 
elaborate upon the Euro-control aspect. To put it succinctly, the 
standardisation within structural funds’ subsidies, when compared to 
agricultural standardisation, can only be considered as rudimentary. 
As far as the revenue aspect is concerned, in 1970 the system of 
financial contributions by the Member States (the donation system) was 
replaced by a system of the Community’s own resources43. From this 
date the Community has henceforth received customs duties, 
agricultural levies and a part of VAT as its own income. These 
resources are collected by the national authorities. The Member States 
are naturally obliged to exercise control as regards the determination of 
own resources as well as having them placed at the Community’s 
disposal. In this regulation the competences and obligations of 
Commission officials who are involved in national control are 
regulated. It is a first tentative step, because for every control 
assignment emanating from the European Commission preceding 
consultation is first necessary as regards the necessary conditions 
therefore and the control is strictly limited to second-line control, 
namely to the administration of the government. Only in Regulation 
165/7444, an implementation regulation concerning control over the 
collection of the Community’s own resources, were the first steps taken 
towards first-line control. It was only in 1989, however, that the 
discrepancies on this point between the agricultural sector and own 
resources were removed. This occurred in Art. 18(3) Regulation 
1552/8945 and the principle was also extended to VAT control in Art. 
11 Regulation 1553/8946. At this moment in time the competences 
relating to Euro-control are identical as regards both the income and 
expenditure aspects. In practice the Euro-inspectors work at the 
competent Directorates-General, such as agriculture and taxation and 
customs union (Taxud). Within the particular Directorate-General the 
Euro-inspectors form an anti-fraud cell. 
                                                          
43 Regulation 2171/2005, OJ 1971, L 3. 
44 Regulation 165/74, L 20. 
45 Regulation 1552/89, OJ 1989, L 155; amended by Regulation 1335/96, OJ 1996, 
L 175/3. 
46 Ibid. 
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This overall framework, however, does not provide a complete 
picture because these regulations do not stand in the way of specific 
control regulations for certain market sectors. Namely in the 
agricultural sector there is a veritable patchwork quilt of far-reaching 
control regulations which also provide the Commission with 
competences as far as control is concerned. A special feature of these 
control regulations is that their line of approach is not geared towards 
the protection of the EU’s financial interests, but rather towards the 
enforcement of substantial norms (classical enforcement control), such 
as the observance of the wine or fisheries norms, or the veterinary or 
public health norms47. Nevertheless, there is also a question of a 
gradual process of exclusive control over national control (second line) 
also becoming first-line control. In view of the Euro-control in the 
fisheries sector, this development can be nicely illustrated. One of the 
first provisions for classic enforcement inspections crept into the 
fisheries legislation in 1982. I say “crept into” because there was no 
question of a Community inspection as such, merely that Commission 
officials could participate in a national investigation. The norms 
concerning the various tasks and competences remained vague. This 
inspection unit belonging to the Directorate-General for Fisheries (DG 
XIV) has been active since 1983 and has developed into an outstanding 
source of information for the European Commission. In 1986 The 
Netherlands was thereby confronted with a critical control report 
concerning fisheries enforcement, wherein it seemed that the 
Community inspection had gathered irrefutable evidence concerning 
over-fishing – for some species of fish even up to 200 %, concerning 
insufficient data having been supplied to Brussels and concerning the 
late closure of fishing. In 1993 a new fisheries control regulation 
entered into effect48. Alongside regulations concerning national 
inspection, this regulation contains extensive provisions concerning 
Euro-control. As a matter of fact, in Title VII (Arts. 29-30) aspects of 
                                                          
47 Observing these norms often involves financial implications. For example, meat 
which has not been able to come up to veterinary norms can be exported with EC 
refunds (export subsidies). 
48 Regulation 2847/93, OJ 1989, L 261, replaced by Fisheries Regulations 1224/ 
2009 and 404/2011. 
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first-line as well as second-line control have been incorporated. As far 
as the second line is concerned the regulation provides for independent 
control visits by the Commission. Furthermore, the Commission can 
demand that national inspection programs be set up and can check 
whether and how these are implemented in practice. Alongside this the 
regulation does provide first-line control by means of Euro-controllers. 
The provision which has here been utilized has been borrowed from the 
Agriculture Regulation 595/91, with the difference being that here the 
investigation is designated as an “administrative investigation” instead 
of merely an “investigation”, without any further definition, and that 
the data obtained by means of the investigation, and also data obtained 
in criminal investigations by national investigation authorities (when 
premises have been searched or during formal interviews), are subject 
to the confidentiality principle which pertains to judicial procedures. 
The possibility of the Commission nevertheless obtaining this 
information on the basis of a judicial authorization is also not provided 
for. To put it succinctly, various aspects could still be internally 
streamlined in the Community regulation. The experiences gained in 
the fisheries sector have been transposed to other sectors and have been 
further elaborated upon. In a regulation relating to viniculture52 it is 
explicitly laid down that – in consideration of the extensive fraud which 
has been perpetrated in this sector – obligatory Community inspection 
is essential with a view to the uniform application of legislation in the 
Member States. The regulation also sets out a Community control 
structure and elaborates rules for mutual cooperation between the 
control structures in the Member States and between these and the 
Community inspection bodies. 
3.2.3. Horizontal Legislation and the Creation of a Community Euro-
Inspectorate for the Protection of EC Financial Interests 
The European Commission and especially the Directorates-General 
responsible for the various policy sectors have strategic enforcement 
information at their disposal. On the one hand, they have an inflow of 
information which concerns not only the enforcement schemes and 
systems of the Member States, but also concerning individual files. On 
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the other hand, the Commission has at its disposal independent Euro-
control competences which it can call upon for financial and for classic 
enforcement control, both with regard to the Member States as well as 
with regard to economic operators. Because of this the European 
Commission is well placed in order to harmonise the national 
enforcement systems and efforts with each other. Harmonisation can be 
a necessity for two reasons. Because in the first place enforcement is 
the responsibility of the Member States, it is not beyond comprehension 
that this national enforcement can vary greatly from country to country. 
It is up to the Community to indicate, by means of legislation, what the 
minimum standard should be in order to realise the European 
dimension of national enforcement. National control authorities which 
do not have a right of access to companies or which are not able to take 
any provisional measures are fairly powerless. 
The question, however, is whether this minimum limit is only 
concerned with effectiveness, or also with legal protection. In a certain 
number of regulations attention is therefore also devoted to, for 
example, the rights of the defence (the right to be heard, the right to 
have decisions substantiated, etc.). This aspect of harmonisation falls 
under the notion of Community standardisation of the enforcement 
obligations of the Member States. 
A second point concerns enforcement cooperation in the 
Community area (the internal market, the customs union). As far as 
border-crossing enforcement is concerned, the Commission is in a 
strong position because of the information which it has at its disposal 
and because it can coordinate the necessary enforcement. In many 
instances this leads to the formation of networks between national 
enforcement authorities which have a coordinating role as far as the 
European Commission is concerned. This does not always mean that a 
start is made on the formation of Community enforcement authorities, 
because in certain policy areas there are already national enforcement 
authorities in existence, which have a tradition of cooperation. The fact 
that their tasks are to a large extent those of a Community nature, such 
as customs services, does not therefore mean that within the foreseeable 
future a Community customs service will come into existence, let alone 
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a Community customs service possessing supervisory, investigative and 
administrative sanction powers, such as those provided nationally. 
Nevertheless, some aspects, especially in the field of the 
enforcement of the EU financial interests, should be differentiated. For 
the time being the European Community has a direct interest in these 
protected rights. For this reason it does not seem strange that the 
Commission possesses extensive powers of control in this field. 
Traditionally, national departments have also had powers of supervision 
over their policy areas. In the second place, the Member States have no 
tradition with respect to the interests of Community enforcement. 
Overall the enforcement practice of the national authorities is 
essentially national in character. It is precisely in order to render the 
EC’s financial interests secure from transnational fraud that efforts have 
been made on the Community level to achieve a more decisive Euro-
control system with transnational competences in the internal market 
and in third countries. The powers of financial enforcement, such as 
those contained in the sectorial regulations concerning EC income and 
EC expenditure, seem insufficient to be able to conform to this 
necessity. It is for this reason that during the 1990s horizontal 
framework regulation has been chosen for the protection of the EU’s 
financial interests. With “horizontal” is meant that the regulation 
applies to all policy areas of the Union whenever there is a case of EC 
revenue or EC expenditure. In this way the sectorial approach is 
supplemented by a horizontal approach. On the one hand, a specific 
choice has been made to standardise the administrative law and 
criminal law control of EC fraud by the Member States by means of 
horizontal regulation. Recently, and namely in the field of sanctions, 
far-reaching horizontal instruments have been brought into effect, such 
as a regulation on administrative sanctions49 and a criminal law 
                                                          
49 Regulation 2988/95, OJ 1995, L 31. It should here be noted that the Community 
regulation does not concern VAT constructions. The Member States have as far as the 
concept of “collecting own resources” is concerned, narrowly interpreted this term in a 
Council Declaration in the Community’s favour, whereby VAT is seen as a source of 
income which is collected by the Member States and partly transferred to the EC 
Treasury. The Member States do not therefore view it as collecting Community funds, a 
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sanctions convention under the third pillar, with protocols50. On the 
other hand, it has been chosen to elaborate an integrated approach as far 
as the Euro-control powers are concerned. This final process has been 
reached in two steps. 
Setting up Community Euro-Inspection with Regard to EC Fraud 
The Euro-control powers were, up until recently, solely regulated in 
the previously analysed sectorial regulations. The consequence of this 
was that per Directorate-General there were Euro-inspectors and/or 
anti-fraud units active and they had diverse powers. An integrated 
approach was completely lacking. Also under pressure from the 
European Parliament and public opinion, the European Commission 
reached the view that it could not go any further with regard to the 
financial interests of the Community. In 1987 the European 
Commission published a 42-point report concerning a more intensive 
combating of fraud51 and in 1988 it set up the special anti-fraud unit 
called UCLAF within the Secretariat-General. In 1995 the anti-fraud 
units belonging to agriculture (DG VI) and customs (DG XXI) were 
integrated into UCLAF. The Euro-inspectors who were not charged 
with financial enforcement control, but rather with classic enforcement 
control such as fisheries inspection and veterinary inspection, have 
indeed remained at their respective Directorates-General. In other 
words, in the cases of combating fraud and financial enforcement 
control one could speak of an integrated approach which has led to one 
central anti-fraud unit, UCLAF. UCLAF’s mandate, however, does not 
contain any authority to impose sanctions, but does include control 
powers. In order to answer the question of the range of the control 
powers we have to differentiate between the situation up to the end of 
1996 and thereafter. Up to the end of 1996 UCLAF functioned and 
exercised competences on the basis of the various sectorial control 
regulations. With the integration of the agriculture, customs and 
                                                                                                                               
standpoint which, in my view, is evidence of the renationalisation of Community 
competences. 
50 Convention, OJ 1995, C 316; First Protocol, OJ 1996, C 313; Second Protocol, 
OJ 1997, c 221. 
51 COM(87) Final. 
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structural funds anti-fraud units, various competences belonging to the 
sectoral control regulations (see supra) have also been brought within 
the fold. The control powers can therefore be summarised as follows: 
1) enforcement support; 2) enforcement coordination; and 3) financial 
enforcement control. Enforcement support has a legislative as well as 
an operational component. Forming part of the Commission, UCLAF is 
directly concerned with the preparation of the Commission’s legislative 
proposals in the field of the protection of financial interests. In cases of 
serious and/or border-crossing EC fraud, UCLAF coordinates the 
efforts of the national enforcement authorities. 
On 31 May 1999, the legislation replacing UCLAF with OLAF was 
published in the OJ52. In regulations 1073/1999 (EC) and 1074 
(Euratom) the competences of OLAF are defined. In the Commission’s 
Decision 1999/3 of 28 April 1999, OLAF was set up as an office within 
the Commission. Finally, in the Inter-institutional Agreement of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the European Commission, a 
framework model is provided in relation to the necessary conditions 
and provisions for internal inquiries. It can be stated that all UCLAF 
competences have been transferred to OLAF. OLAF remains an 
integral part of the EC, but is independent in its power to conduct 
internal and external investigations. For that reason the position of the 
Director has been strengthened and a Supervisory Committee has been 
established53. 
In 2012 a proposal has been submitted for a Regulation amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 concerning investigations conducted by 
the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation 
(EURATOM) No 1074/199954 with the aim to further strengthen the 
independence of the OLAF-investigations and to increase the guarantee 
the procedural safeguards during the OLAF-investigation. 
                                                          
52 OJ 1999, L 136. 
53 J.A.E. VERVAELE, Towards an Independent European Agency to Fight Fraud and 
Corruption in the EU?, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice, 1999, pp. 331-346. 
54 COM(2011) 135 final + SEC(2011) 343 final. 
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Horizontal Legislation for Euro-Control 
At the end of 1996 the step towards a horizontal Euro-control 
regulation was nevertheless taken. This Regulation 2185/9655 forms a 
part of the horizontal approach concerning the combating of fraud and 
is a concrete supplementation to the general Euro-control provisions 
(Art. 8) from the Administrative Sanctions Regulation (2988/95)56. The 
regulation also bases the vertical cooperation between the Commission 
and the Member States as regards the implementation of controls on the 
concept of Community loyalty contained at that time in Art. 5 ECT, 
today the Union loyalty under Article 4(3) TEU. The Regulation 
provides minimum horizontal regulation. “Horizontal” means that the 
provisions apply to all EC policy areas, in as far as there are points of 
departure with EC finances57. “Minimum” means that specific 
provisions from sectoral regulations which go further than this 
minimum regulation remain in force and may be applied. This Euro-
control regulation is pre-eminently an instrument of financial 
enforcement control, and not one by which to evaluate implementation 
and enforcement. The objective is to reach a homogenous approach as 
regards enforcement in the Member States, as well as on the levels of 
control, refunds/additional assessments and punitive sanctions. Article 
2 Regulation 2185/96 describes the Commission’s control mandate. 
The Commission may carry out on-the-spot checks and inspections: 
for the detection of serious or transnational irregularities or 
irregularities that may involve economic operators acting in several 
Member States; or, where, for the detection of irregularities, the 
situation in a Member State requires on-the-spot checks and inspections 
to be strengthened in a particular case in order to improve the 
effectiveness of the protection of financial interests and so to ensure an 
equivalent level of protection within the Community; or at the request 
of the Member State concerned. 
                                                          
55 Regulation 2185/96, OJ 1996, L 292. 
56 OJ 1995, L 312. 
57 With the linkage to the Administrative Sanctions Regulation the VAT-limited 
funds mentioned in note 55 also apply. 
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From the description it would seem that the competence criteria 
have been broadly defined. This concerns not only cases of 
transnational fraud, but also serious fraud and the Commission can, in 
exceptional cases, make use of Euro-controls in order to rectify a lack 
of enforcement in a Member State (the pro-active assimilation 
principle). 
Who can exercise this control mandate? Article 6 determines that 
the control function can be implemented by authorized officials from 
the European Commission, who for the first time are also referred to as 
Commission inspectors. Moreover, detached national experts who have 
been placed at the Commission’s disposal are also authorized to attend 
to such controls. They therefore increasingly function as experts under 
the direction of Commission officials. The Commission can also, with 
the approval of the Member State concerned, call upon the services of 
officials (inspectors) from other Member States. The Euro-controls are 
expressis verbis described in Art. 7 as first-line controls: applicable to 
economic operators upon which the measures or the Community 
administrative sanctions within the capacity of Art. 7 Regulation 
2988/95 may be employed, and to third-parties, if these have relevant 
information at their disposal. This is a broad description due to the fact 
that the Administrative Sanctions Regulation does not only concern 
itself with fraud, 67 but also with unintentional irregularities, such as 
those defined in Art. 1(2) Sanctions Regulation. 
Moreover, there is a substantial difference as regards financial 
enforcement control, such as has been discussed in the various sectoral 
regulations. An important innovation in this regulation is indeed the 
fact that for the purposes of this horizontal mandate the powers of 
enforcement are exercised under the authority and the responsibility of 
the Commission itself (Art. 6). For the first time we are therefore 
confronted with independent powers of enforcement on the part of the 
Euro-inspectors, which may be compared with those provided at the 
level of competition in Regulation 17/62.68 This form of Euro-control 
therefore goes considerably further than the classic and financial 
enforcement controls within the sectoral regulations. This does not 
detract from the fact that the Commission must inform the Member 
State, in a timely manner, of the subject, the objective and the legal 
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basis of the control. What is precisely meant by “timely” is indeed for 
the Commission to determine? In the case of an extreme emergency this 
may be just before the commencement of the control itself. In any case, 
the Member States are made aware of the results and of every fact or 
every suspicion which points to irregularities as far as EC funds are 
concerned (Art. 8.2). 
This extraordinary form of financial enforcement control is 
governed by the applicable Community regulations and is 
supplemented by “the rules of procedure of the legislation of the 
member state”. This is how Art. 7 regulate the powers of the Euro-
inspectors and thereby also the resources for the gathering of evidence. 
As a basic principle the Euro-inspectors have the same powers as the 
national administrative inspectors (the principle of assimilation), which 
they may exercise according to the applicable national law. The 
regulation subsequently determines that the powers of control may 
concern namely the administration of an enterprise, computer data, 
merchandise, the taking of samples, etc. Should any attachment or 
seizure of property before final judgment be resorted to, then this will 
occur by means of the national authorities upon the request of the 
Commission. The Member States must also render necessary assistance 
to the Commission (in terms of policing) whenever an economic 
operator resists the Euro-control (Art. 9). With these provisions, 
however, the preliminary phase of the proceedings, namely the problem 
of the transition from supervision to investigation, is not adequately 
regulated, and this is also true as to Art. 1 of the regulation which 
explicitly determines that the competence of the Member States as to 
criminal proceedings and the provisions concerning judicial assistance 
between the Member States in criminal cases must remain unimpeded. 
Why should this be so? The regulation contains few Community rules 
relating to this preliminary phase and compels one to resort to a further 
reading in combination with the relevant national law. The regulation 
speaks of assimilation with administrative inspectors. According to 
Dutch law, for instance, this means administrative supervision, such as 
that is regulated under the General Administrative Law Act or in other 
particular Acts of Parliament. In concreto this results in a competence 
which is more limited than those contained in Regulation 595/91 
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relating to financial enforcement supervision within the framework of 
agricultural fraud. In this latter regulation it is indeed determined in Art. 
6 how the Euro-inspectors – in the case of further enforcement when 
the supervision, due to a suspicion that a punishable act has been 
committed, has turned into an investigation – can still operate in 
cooperation with the national inspectors. Also as regards access to 
information the principle of assimilation with the administrative 
supervisors should be followed. This means that the Euro-inspectors 
have access to the same information, and this also applies to judicial 
information, as that available to the national supervisors. To put it 
succinctly, the horizontal control regulation offers the Commission 
more limited possibilities for investigation than does Regulation 595/91 
in that it excludes certain investigative operations, but it does offer the 
advantage that the Commission can operate independently and under its 
own authority. Because of the lack of Community rules relating to the 
preliminary phase, supplementation is extremely dependent on national 
law and as far as a homogenous approach is concerned, this could only 
occur to the extent that a Community tradition should exist as regards 
the administrative-investigative relationship, and that is certainly not 
the case. One could envisage that the UCLAF, in combating 
transnational fraud, is rendered, as it were, a prisoner of national 
procedural rules. Its competences are prescribed on a Community basis, 
but not the procedural rules which apply to the exercise of these 
powers. It would indeed be a wise step to elaborate uniform and 
Community procedural rules within the framework of transnational 
European enforcement cooperation. 
Also of importance is the fact that Art. 8(3) regulate the use of 
evidence obtained during the course of the investigation: 
Commission inspectors shall ensure that in drawing up their reports 
account is taken of the procedural requirements laid down in the 
national law of the Member State concerned. The material and 
supporting documents as referred to in Article 7 shall be annexed to the 
said reports. The reports thus prepared shall constitute admissible 
evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings of the Member State 
in which their use proves necessary, in the same way and under the 
same conditions as administrative reports drawn up by national 
administrative inspectors. They shall be subject to the same evaluation 
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rules as those applicable to administrative reports drawn up by national 
administrative inspectors and shall be of identical value to such reports. 
Where an inspection is carried out jointly, pursuant to the second sub-
paragraph of Article 4, the national inspectors who took part in the 
operation shall be asked to countersign the report drawn up by the 
Commission inspectors. 
In contrast to the regulation of the national control systems and 
especially the gathering of evidence and the evidentiary force attached 
thereto (see supra), Art. 8(3) limits itself to the principle of 
assimilation. Here also there is, to a great extent, dependence on 
national law in order to determine which powers the Euro-inspectors 
may exercise and whether their reports may be used as evidence in 
judicial proceedings and the subsequent evidentiary force to be attached 
thereto. An answer should be sought in the national administrative law 
and criminal procedure systems and one is also aware of the fact that 
these systems greatly differ from Member State to Member State. This 
legal mosaic or “hotchpotch” has implications for effectiveness as well 
as for legal protection. 
This regulation goes much further in its definition of mandate, 
competences and legal consequences than do the sectoral regulations. 
Nonetheless, many aspects remain unregulated and are left to the 
procedural rules of the legislation of the Member States (Art. 6(1)). The 
problem here is that the national rules of procedure on the 
administrative law and criminal law levels are not yet prepared for 
Community situations, let alone for the investigative powers of the 
Euro-inspectors. To summarise, it can be concluded that UCLAF could 
be considered as a Community enforcement authority with a multi-
agency-like construction. In actual fact UCLAF, because of its 
specialisation (as an anti-fraud unit), is to all intents and purposes a task 
force. 
4. Conclusion 
The very strength of the integration is the teamwork which exists 
between the Community and national components within the integrated 
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Community legal order. And there is no difference as far as the 
enforcement of Community law is concerned. This means that also in 
the future a dual-track policy will have to be employed, consisting of 
Community-regulated competences relating to indirect enforcement by 
the Member States and to direct operational competences as far as the 
Community is concerned. 
On the other hand, the horizontal framework rules remain vague at 
the procedural level, or otherwise they refer back to the applicable 
national law. What should further be investigated is the question of to 
what extent does the European integration process compel 
harmonisation as far as the procedural enforcement regulations of the 
Member States are concerned. The necessary steps have already been 
taken within the framework of mutual recognition of implementation 
operations in the internal market and customs union, but as far as 
enforcement operations are concerned, there is still a long way to go. 
The doctrine of evidence is thereby a very good example. Even in the 
fields falling within exclusive Community authority, such as fisheries, 
nothing is regulated concerning evidence or the probative value to be 
attached to the reports of, for example, fisheries inspectors. 
Nevertheless, fisheries activities are very mobile and we are therefore 
preeminently confronted with a transnational area of enforcement. A 
Spanish fisherman can thereby be confronted with criminal proceedings 
in Ireland in the event of a serious infringement within Irish waters (or 
indeed the proceedings may be transferred to Spain), as well as Spanish 
administrative proceedings relating to the issue of his permit. The items 
of evidence may originate from Irish fisheries inspectors and/or from 
Community inspection. The lack of Community regulations in this 
respect can lead to the inspection reports of the enforcement authorities 
of another country not being accepted as evidence. 
Direct enforcement by the Community with the assistance of Euro-
inspections is and will remain a supplementary instrument. 
Nonetheless, the importance of this instrument must not be 
underestimated because it can fulfill an important role within the 
framework of extending enforcement networks on a European scale. It 
is for these reasons that it is important that the Euro-control system 
should become independent, certainly in the area of the protection of 
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the financial interests of the EC. The basic condition is indeed that it is 
completely recognised that the Euro-control powers are in actual fact 
enforcement competences with legal consequences as far as the citizen 
is concerned. This includes of course that during the investigation 
procedural safeguards are applied in such a way that the evidence can 
be used in the judicial follow-up in the Member States. It also includes 
that the information obtained in the Member States is admissible 
evidence in the legal order of the Member States, also in criminal 
proceedings. The admissibility should not depend on the status of 
administrative evidence in criminal proceedings, as this status is very 
different from Member State to Member State. In that sense the 
proposal for a Regulation amending No 1073/1999 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF) 
and repealing Regulation (EURATOM) No 1074/199958 sticks to a 
non-solution in Article 9(2): 
Reports drawn up on that basis shall constitute admissible evidence in 
administrative or judicial proceedings of the Member State in which 
their use proves necessary, in the same way and under the same 
conditions as administrative reports drawn up by national 
administrative inspectors. They shall be subject to the same evaluation 
rules as those applicable to administrative reports drawn up by national 
administrative inspectors and shall have the same evidentiary value as 
such reports. 
OLAF-evidence should be admissible evidence, independent of the 
national criminal procedure and this should be laid down in the EU 
regulation and in national criminal procedure. 
The Community regulation of the rights and obligations of the Euro-
inspectors does not exclude national regulation; in fact it is quite the 
reverse. Many aspects will and indeed should be left to national 
procedural autonomy. This is not different as far as the Euro-control 
powers regarding competition are concerned. In the first place 
competences should be created for national enforcement agencies, 
which should then provide assistance, deploy the national police, 
impose conservation measures or use investigative powers to find an 
                                                          
58 COM(2011) 135 final + SEC(2011) 343 final. 
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protect evidence. Furthermore, the Euro-inspectors, as regards rights 
and obligations, should be equated with national inspecting officials. I 
am thinking of making punishable the refusal to cooperate, punishing 
assault and willful injury, etc. On the other hand, the Euro-inspectors 
themselves could also commit punishable acts, such as violations of 
professional secrecy or acts of active or passive corruption. There are 
many who advocate this in order that all these aspects could be 
regulated in one national implementing act, so that a consistent entirety 
would exist whereby effectiveness and legal protection could be 
interweaved with each other. It is only in this way that we could be in a 
position to be able to intertwine the Community powers of investigation 
as regards the enforcement of Community Jaw with our enforcement 
systems and thereby also to be able to provide substance to the 
principles of subsidiarity and shared government. In that sense the EU 
regulations with investigative powers should be elaborated in national 
legislation giving visibility to the EU investigative powers. A good, but 
recent example is the Dutch law on assistance to be given for on-the-
spot-checks based on Regulation 2185/9659. 
The problems analysed will not be solved by the setting up of a 
European Public Prosecutor’s office60. In fact, whatever institutional 
design is chosen for the EPPO it will need assistance by European law 
enforcement agencies. The status of their investigative powers and the 
evidentiary status of their findings will have to be used in national 
criminal proceedings. 
                                                          
59 Wet van 27 september 2012 op de verlening van bijstand aan de Europese 
Commissie bij controles en verificaties ter plaatse (Law on assistance to the European 
Commission in case of on-the-checks and verifications in loco), Staatsblad, 2012, 
p. 467. 
60 J.A.E. VERVAELE, The Shaping and Reshaping of Eurojust and OLAF. 
Investigative Judicial Powers in the European Judicial Area, EUCRIME, 2008, pp. 80-
85. The Commission has submitted a proposal on the establishing of a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in July 2013. See COM (2013) 534 final, http://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0534:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 
TO CONTROL (TRANSNATIONAL) CRIMINALITY1 
1. Concepts and Terminology 
Mutual legal assistance (MLA) in criminal matters deals with the 
mechanisms for legal assistance in the gathering of criminal evidence2 
abroad, that is in other jurisdictions than the jurisdiction where the 
investigation, prosecution or adjudication has been triggered 
(investigative or forum jurisdiction). These mechanisms refer not only 
to processes and timelines but also to competent authorities and 
jurisdictional scope (offences, territories). In civil law countries MLA is 
mostly defined as judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This 
terminology indicates that MLA is about cooperation between judicial 
authorities, being the authorities that have competence to investigate, 
prosecute and adjudicate in criminal matters. It does not, in principle, 
include mutual assistance between administrative authorities, even if 
they are dealing with administrative enforcement. The competent 
judicial authorities for dealing with incoming or outgoing MLA 
requests are as a rule defined at national level, in line with the design of 
the domestic administration of justice. This means that the competent 
authorities can be, for example in the UK, police authorities, while 
these are excluded in most civil law countries. Competent authorities 
include authorities competent for criminal investigation and 
prosecution. Courts can be the competent authority to authorize a 
                                                          
1 The article will be published in N. BOISTER, R. CURRIE (Eds.), Handbook of 
Transnational Criminal Law, London, 2014. 
2 The service of process in criminal matters is mostly done through administrative 
or police cooperation. 
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coercive measure, and in some domestic regimes courts can also order 
additional investigative measures, even during trial. 
MLA is necessary because judicial authorities cannot execute 
investigative measures outside their State territory, unless provided by 
international treaties or ad-hoc agreements. In civil law countries 
investigative authorities need a clear legal basis in order to be 
competent to exercise investigation. In common law countries they 
have the competence to act, even abroad, but their scope of action is 
limited to the sphere of action of every ordinary private citizen. They 
can interview people, but they cannot take investigative action that 
infringes privacy or that has a coercive or intrusive character (for 
instance secret surveillance). MLA can be needed in cases of 
transnational crime, but also in domestic cases with a cross border 
dimension. The latter is the case when witnesses or suspects are abroad, 
when the evidence is not located in the territory of the forum state or 
when criminal assets have been transferred to foreign territory. 
The tools of evidence gathering abroad vary from non-coercive, 
such as the exchange of judicial information or voluntary interrogation 
of experts and witnesses, to very intrusive measures, such as search and 
seizure, tapping, controlled delivery and undercover surveillance of 
criminal organisations. 
In this contribution I will examine the developments of MLA and 
highlight the challenges that the system is facing. 
2. MLA: State Sovereignty and International Obligations (Fora and 
Sources) 
Based on a rule of customary international law, foreign judicial 
authorities cannot execute investigative acts in the territory of a foreign 
state, as this would be an infringement of its sovereignty3. This means 
that States have to agree to afford each other assistance for cross-border 
gathering of evidence in criminal matters. This can be done on the basis 
of letters rogatory, which can be executed solely on the basis of 
                                                          
3 PCIJ, SS Lotus Case, 1927. 
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comity, or through MLA treaties (MLATs) that contain a duty to 
cooperate. There is, however, no public international law obligation to 
subscribe to MLATs. The decisions to establish formal or informal 
MLATs are based on national sovereignty, although there are legal and 
political exceptions. The G7/ G20 and its related Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) have imposed, via non-binding recommendations4, a 
political obligation to sign up to MLATs and implement them. The 
Security Council has also legally obliged States through Security 
Resolutions under chapter VII of the UN Charter to comply with all the 
UN counterterrorism conventions, independent from status of signature 
or ratification. MLA obligations can also be derived from positive 
duties under international human rights law, certainly when it comes to 
the duty to investigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and punish core 
international crimes. 
Nation-states have concluded bilateral agreements on extradition 
since the end of the 19th century. A similar set of bilateral MLATs do 
not exist, but some of the older bilateral extradition treaties include 
provisions on MLA, though these are limited to the seizure of goods 
and objects linked to the detention of the person. After WWII there was 
an increasing national, regional and global interest in the gathering of 
evidence abroad. At the domestic level States began to recognize the 
increasing importance of MLA. For example in 1986 in the UK a 
interdepartmental working group recommended that the Home 
Secretary engage in legislative reform in order to provide the UK with 
easier access to foreign evidence, which resulted in enactment of the 
1990 Criminal Justice International Cooperation Act5. Regional 
organizations, such as the Council of Europe, Organization of 
American States, European Union, MERCOSUR and ECOWAS, have 
elaborated specific MLATs. They do have a multilateral character and 
lay down a specific enhanced regime for MLA in that region. Besides 
                                                          
4 For the most recent set of Recommendation see FATF, <http://www.fatf-gafi.org 
/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/internationalstandardsoncombatingmoneylaun 
deringandthefinancingofterrorismproliferation-thefatfrecommendations.html> accessed 
5 February 2014. 
5 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/5/contents. 
CHAPTER 4 
 142 
these regional regimes, states of that region still subscribe to new 
generation bilateral MLA regimes with third countries. 
At the global level, the UN’s increasing involvement in crime 
prevention and criminal justice, especially in the area of drugs 
trafficking, trafficking in human beings, organized crime, terrorism and 
related money laundering or financing of terrorism has resulted in 
topical conventions that also include MLA obligations. The 2000 UN 
Convention on Transnational Crime6 is a good example thereof. Even 
though there are no specific binding conventions on MLA at UN level, 
both the UN and other global and regional organizations have 
elaborated Model Treaties on MLA, such as the UN Model Treaty on 
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters7 or Legislative Schemes, such 
as the Scheme relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within 
the Commonwealth (Harare Scheme)8. Moreover, the UN, sometimes 
in combination with the IMF, has elaborated specific model provisions 
for specific areas of crime, which take account of the differences 
between the common law and civil law legal systems9. Finally, the UN, 
the IMF and the G20 have been very active in the elaboration of 
international standards of best practices related to specific investigative 
measures, for instance the freezing and seizure of criminal assets 
abroad. 
                                                          
6 The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 
November 2000, 2225 UNTS 209, in force 29 September 2003. 
7 Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 45/117, subsequently amended by 
General Assembly resolution 53/112, 1990 and amended in 1998, A/RES/53/112. 
8 Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the 
Commonwealth (Harare Scheme) 1 August 1986, 12 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 
(1986) 1118 (as amended in 1990, 2002 and 2005). 
9 2009, Model Provisions on Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, Preventive 
Measures and Proceeds of Crime for Common Law Legal Systems, http://www.imolin. 
org/pdf/imolin/Model_Provisions_Final.pdf. 
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3. Global Approach to MLA 
3.1. MLA and Tackling Illicit Drugs Trade: The Vienna Convention 
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988 or Vienna Convention)10 has 
been a precursor in what I have called a topical convention dealing with 
MLA, as it is dealing with all aspects of control of the illicit narcotics 
traffic. It contains, beside substantive obligations (offences and 
sanctions), not only obligations concerning jurisdiction but also on 
extradition, transfer of proceedings and MLA. MLA provisions are not 
aimed at affecting the existing MLA obligations under any other treaty, 
but are prescribing minimum obligations related to drugs trafficking 
offences. Article 7(1) on MLA imposes upon the signatories the duty to 
afford one another the widest measure of cooperation. MLA includes 
taking evidence or statements of persons, search and seizure, 
production orders and assets identification. It does not include Special 
Investigation techniques (SITS) such as interception of 
telecommunications, secret surveillance or covert investigations. 
However, it leaves open other forms of MLA that are allowed by the 
domestic law of the requested party. 
MLA is based on state to state cooperation between the central 
authorities of the executive power. The judicial authorities have no 
specific role and the subjects (persons concerned) have no rights at all 
under the Convention. In terms of Article 7(12) a request shall be 
executed in accordance with the domestic law of the requested State 
(lex loci), but the law of the requesting State (lex forum) can be taken 
into account to the extent not contrary to the domestic law of the 
requested state. The requesting state is also obliged to respect the 
specialty principle, meaning that the requesting state shall not transmit 
nor use information or evidence furnished by the requested state for 
investigations, prosecutions or proceedings other than those stated in 
the request without the prior consent of the requested Party. The 
Convention also provides for grounds for refusal, based either on 
                                                          
10 Vienna, 20 December 1988, 1582 UNTS 95; in force 11 November 1990. 
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formal issues or on substance. The request may be refused if it is likely 
to prejudice the sovereignty, security, ordre public or other essential 
interest of the requested state. It may also be refused if the requested 
investigative measure is not available under the domestic law of the 
requested state with regard to any similar offence or if it would be 
contrary to the legal system of the requested state. The request can 
however not be refused for reasons of protection of banking secrecy or 
lack of double incrimination. All refusal grounds are optional; a 
requested state can always grant MLA if the grounds have not been 
transposed as mandatory grounds under domestic law. 
Article 9 prescribes a list of obligations under the qualification 
‘other forms of cooperation’. States are obliged, but only in appropriate 
cases and if not contrary to domestic law, to establish joint 
investigation teams. These teams can only act under the authority of the 
territory of the State concerned and with full respect for its sovereignty. 
The Convention does not prescribe, however, the regime of applicable 
law for the joint investigation team. Article 9 also promotes the 
exchange of personnel and experts between countries and the posting of 
liaison officers. Finally, Article 11 deals with controlled delivery. 
However, the obligations are conditional: on the basis of mutual 
agreements or arrangements and if permitted by the basic principles of 
the respective domestic legal systems. 
3.2. MLA and Tackling Illicit Drugs Trade: Model Laws and Model 
Treaties 
UN model laws were elaborated to assist governments in translating 
their obligations under international treaties into national legislative 
provisions. In relation to MLA they have been elaborated by the 
UNODC and the UNDCP, i.e. in the frame of policy on drugs and 
crime. In 1990 the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Model 
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance11. It consists of a quite simple 
framework, derived from the international experience, which can be 
                                                          
11 Annexed to GA Res 45/117 (1990), 14 December 1990, as amended by GA Res 
53/112 (1999), 9 December 1998. 
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used as a guide for states negotiating bilateral and multilateral MLATs, 
in particular when they have to deal with different legal systems and 
traditions. The framework is based on state-to-state cooperation 
between central authorities and encourages the widest possible MLA 
cooperation. The investigative acts requested are limited to the classic 
ones (taking evidence from persons, search and seizure, production 
orders, etc.) and do not include SITs, such as electronic surveillance, 
controlled delivery and undercover surveillance of criminal 
organisations. The additional protocol deals specifically with proceeds 
of crime. It imposes upon states obligations to locate and trace, to 
establish specific financial investigative measures in order to recover 
them and to foresee forfeiture. However, the obligations are stipulated 
in very general terms and only binding if permitted by domestic law. 
The UNDCP updated the MLA Model Bill several times. Although the 
commentary on the 2000 version of the Model Bill12 states clearly that 
one of the aims is to reconcile and accommodate the differences 
between legal systems, the Model Bill is clearly geared for common 
law systems. A similar Model Bill for civil law traditions has not been 
elaborated. 
The 2000 Model Bill contains very detailed provisions both on the 
MLA procedures and on freezing and confiscation of proceeds of 
crime. It is of interest that both the evidence-gathering order and search 
warrant have to be based on a court decision and justified on the basis 
of proportionality13. The court order can also provide for the way in 
which the evidence is to be obtained in order to give proper effect to the 
foreign request. However, if this would infringe the law of the 
requested State, the latter will take precedence and cannot be 
overridden by the terms of the foreign request14. It is also of interest 
that the bill provides that a person named in the evidence-gathering 
order may refuse to answer questions or to produce documents or things 
                                                          
12 UNDCP Model Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Bill, 2000, available at 
<http://www.unodc.org/pdf/lap_mutual-assistance_2000.pdf>; Commentary available 
at <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/lap_mutual-assistance_commentary.pdf> (last accessed 7 
February 2014). 
13 Clause 8(2) and (3). 
14 Clause 8(4). 
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where the refusal is based on a law currently in force in the requested 
state, on a privilege recognized by that law or if the production of 
evidence would result in committing an offence in the jurisdiction of 
the requested state15. Foreign states can be requested to produce a 
written declaration to confirm the state of the law in their jurisdiction 
and such declarations are admissible in the evidence-gathering 
proceedings. The Model Bill also contains detailed clauses on the 
privilege for foreign documents (restricted disclosure) in order to 
preserve the confidentiality and secrecy of documents16 and on the 
application of the specialty rule17. Astonishingly, the Model Bill does 
not include grounds for refusal of a request. 
The 2000 UN Model Bill on MLA ties in with another UN Model 
Bill: the 2000 UNDCP Model Foreign Evidence Bill18. The latter aims 
to provide for the admissibility in the forum state of evidence that has 
been obtained through MLA. It deals mostly with requirements for 
testimony and with the type of foreign material evidence that may be 
adduced as evidence in court in the forum state. It includes provisions 
on exclusion of evidence in case of prejudice to the rights of the 
defence or to the interest of justice. 
3.3. From Drugs to Transnational Crime: UNTOC 
The UNTOC consolidates the renewal of MLA in the last decades. It 
does not replace the existing or future bilateral or multilateral treaties, 
but complements them. Besides harmonization of substantive criminal 
law, it contains far-reaching obligations on investigative acts, including 
SITs. In regard to MLA, it imposes the widest MLA obligations in 
relation to investigation and prosecution of transnational offences and 
the related freezing, seizure and confiscation of criminal proceeds, 
elaborated in the 29 paragraphs of Article 20. MLA remains based on 
                                                          
15 Clause 8(5). 
16 Clause 17. 
17 Clause 18. 
18 Available at UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/lap_foreign-evidence_2000.pdf; 
for commentary see http://www.unodc.org/pdf/lap_foreign-evidence_2000.pdf (last 
accessed 5 February 2014). 
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the classic inter-state approach and is dealt with by the central 
authorities at the executive level. Requests are executed in accordance 
with the lex loci, but may apply specific rules of the lex fori, if not 
contrary to the domestic law of the requested State. MLA must also be 
afforded in the case where the requests relate to legal persons that are 
criminally liable in the requesting state only. Article 18(3) lists the 
investigative acts and purposes for which MLA may be requested under 
the duty to cooperate. This list is a classic one, going from effecting 
service of judicial documents, taking evidence or statement from 
persons to identifying and tracing of object, assets, etc. for evidentiary 
purposes. The classic coercive measures, such as search and seizure, 
and the SITs are not mentioned. Article 18(3)(i) mentions however ‘any 
other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law of the 
requested State Party’. If the requested state duly implements Article 20 
it should have the SITs included in its domestic criminal procedure. 
The UNTOC also includes the spontaneous exchange of information in 
Article 18(4). MLA must respect the specialty rule and the secrecy of 
certain information. Certain classic grounds for refusal are excluded, 
for instance banking secrecy or fiscal matters. UNTOC does however 
include established grounds for refusal such as sovereignty, security, 
ordre public or other essential interests; double incrimination; 
investigative action would be excluded in requesting state for similar 
offences; it would infringe national domestic law. These remain very 
wide and very much based on the architecture of the domestic legal 
regime of the requested state. They are all, however, optional. The 
UNTOC also deals with joint investigations in Article 19, but the text is 
limited to a ‘shall consider’ and thus does not contain formal 
obligations. 
In 2001 the UNODC elaborated an extensive report on MLA 
assistance casework and best practices19. It contains very detailed 
recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of MLA, dealing with 
the central authorities, the procedures, the time delay, digitalization, 
etc. It is however striking that it does not deal with SITs. The document 
                                                          
19 UNODC, Report, Informal Expert Working Group on Mutual Legal Assistance 
Casework and Best practice, Vienna, 2001, available at <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/lap 
_mlaeg_report_final.pdf > last accessed 5 February 2014. 
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has also been elaborated by experts coming solely from the executive 
bodies and the law enforcement community. This is perhaps the reason 
why the document completely avoids aspects of data protection, the 
speciality rule, defence rights and the standing of suspects and victims 
under MLA regimes. 
3.4. From Drugs to Transnational Crime: The 2007 Model Law on 
MLA 
This model law was elaborated by the UNODC Division for Treaty 
Affairs, Treaty Affairs and Legal branch and takes account of UNTOC 
and the older UN model treaties on MLA. The MLA model remains 
based on state-to-state cooperation and thus on cooperation between 
central authorities. However, the model law clearly provides for the 
possibility of spontaneous transmission of information20. Although the 
applicable law is the law of the executing state, the model law contains 
a very wide lex fori principle, as all procedures specified in the request 
of the forum state will be applied, unless such execution would be 
contrary to the fundamental principles of the law of that state. In regard 
to grounds for refusal, the model law provides for two options. The first 
one is that there is no need to list them as their use is optional and 
leaves thus much discretion to the executing state. The second one is in 
line with international treaties on control of crime and sets out the 
classic grounds for refusal dealing with sovereignty, security, ordre 
public, etc. Banking secrecy is however excluded as such a ground. The 
model law deals with confidential requests and court orders to limit 
disclosure of MLA requests or related content or decisions. Persons that 
illegally disclose such requests, content of the requests or related 
decisions in case of confidential requests may be punished. The model 
law deals extensively with freezing, seizure and confiscation orders 
related to criminal assets. It contains also a special section (Part 4) on 
MLA in relation to computers, computer systems and computer data, 
dealing with expedited preservation, productions and search and seizure 
                                                          
20 Clause 6. 
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of computer data. It does not, however, deal with SITs or joint 
investigation teams (JITs). 
4. The Regional European Approach to MLA: The Shift from MLA to 
Mutual Recognition (MR) 
4.1. From Council of Europe (CoE) MLA to European Union (EU) 
MLA 
Until the 1999 EU Amsterdam Treaty and the establishment of an 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), the regime for MLA in 
the European region was laid down in multilateral mother conventions 
of the CoE. EU member states were thus using regional international 
public law conventions to gather criminal evidence in the EU. The 
historic starting point is without any doubt the 1959 CoE mother 
Convention on MLA (ratified by all EU Member States)21, and the 
related 1978 Additional Protocol (ratified by near all EU Member 
States)22 and the 2001 second Additional Protocol (with a modest 
ratification rate by EU Member States)23. The 1959 CoE Convention is 
the mother convention because it introduced on a multilateral level the 
MLA duty to cooperate and laid down a model for this cooperation. 
The 1959 CoE Convention was a worldwide unicum and not an obvious 
development at that stage, as the whole tradition of enforcing criminal 
law was based on sovereignty and bilateral treaties. The obligation to 
cooperate is an interstate obligation (comity between states) and the 
Convention can thus be qualified as an international convention of an 
administrative-executive nature, but dealing with a judicial matter. It 
must be added that the main obligation to cooperate is not always 
absolute. There are two reasons for this. First of all, many States have 
formulated at the moment of signature and/or ratification reservations 
and declarations, which results in a complex patchwork. Secondly, the 
1959 CoE Convention itself contains far-reaching grounds for refusal, 
                                                          
21 Strasbourg, 20 April 1959, ETS No. 30; in force 12 June 1962. 
22 17 March 1978, ETS 99; in force 12 April 1982. 
23 8 November 2001, ETS182; in force 1 February 2004. 
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linked to political, military and tax offences, but also to sovereignty and 
public order. Finally, as the Convention is based on interstate 
cooperation there is a double track procedure, both in the requesting 
and in the requested state. That means that a request from a judicial 
authority must be channeled through the central authorities of the 
Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs both in the requesting and 
requested countries (diplomatic channel) before arriving on the desk of 
a judicial colleague in the requested state. In other words these central 
authorities play a key role and the judicial authorities are only 
triggering and executing the request. 
With the deepening of the European integration it became clear that 
there was an increasing need for a proper MLA regime in the EU. Due 
to lack of political agreement, Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
Germany and France signed the 1985 Schengen Agreement, which was 
followed by the Schengen Implementing Convention in 1990, 
containing provisions (beside migration law, visa policy and police 
cooperation) on MLA and intended to supplement the 1959 CoE 
Convention24. The Schengen Conventions substantially renewed MLA. 
They replaced the diplomatic channel by direct cooperation between 
judicial authorities, which did become competent for deciding, sending, 
executing and resending. Gradually other EU Member States and non 
EU Member States acceded to these agreements and they were 
integrated into the Amsterdam EU Treaty in 1999. 
In 1993 it became possible to include MLA in the EU Maastricht 
Treaty. However, it ended up in the so-called third pillar, with a strong 
intergovernmental character. Within that framework CoE Conventions 
were gradually replaced by EU conventions: the 1997 Naples II 
Convention on Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between Customs 
Administrations25 and the 2000 EU Convention on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters26. The importance of the 2000 MLA 
                                                          
24 Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common 
Borders, 14 June 1985, (1991) 30 ILM 68; Convention Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985, signed 19 June 1990, [2000] OJ L 239/19; in force 1 
September 1993. 
25 23 January 1998, OJ C 24/2. 
26 12 July 2000, OJ C 197/3. 
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Convention cannot be underestimated. The Convention, inspired by the 
Schengen Conventions, is conceptually based on direct cooperation 
between judicial authorities. Direct cooperation between judicial 
authorities in the EU does not mean that a request from a requesting 
authority automatically has legal value in the territory of the requested 
authority. As a rule, these warrants must be converted into a national 
decision in the requested State through exequatur proceedings, against 
which legal remedies can be used. 
The 2000 MLA Convention is also very innovative as far as the 
investigative tools themselves are concerned. Requests can be sent out 
to obtain the gathering of evidence through the use of SITs. Article 13 
of the 2000 Convention provides the legal basis the setting up of JITs, 
composed of judicial, police and/or customs officials of the member 
States and even of Europol. The JITs were later developed in a specific 
framework decision27. Finally, requesting authorities can request 
authorities to apply provisions of their domestic law with the aim of 
obtaining admissible evidence before the courts of the requesting state. 
Requested authorities can apply this lex fori rule instead of the lex loci 
rule, if it does not contravene the fundamental rules of their legal order. 
This can be very useful to deal with differences in procedural 
safeguards and rights of the defence (assistance of a lawyer, judicial 
authorization, etc.) and thus with transnational use of evidence in the 
EU. It is a way to streamline, within the existing legal frameworks, 
gathering of evidence and use of evidence, as long as the fundamental 
rules of the legal regimes allow it. 
The 2000 MLA Convention was further enriched in 2001 with an 
Additional Protocol28 aiming at further improving MLA in the financial 
sector. It sets aside bank secrecy and introduces obligations to facilitate 
the transfer of information on bank accounts and banking operations. 
                                                          
27 Council FD of 13th of June 2002, OJ L 162/1. 
28 Protocol established by the Council in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty 
on European Union to the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 
between the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2001 L 326/2. 
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4.2. The Strengthening of MLA in Practice 
The EU has not only focused on the drafting of new EU 
conventions, but also invested in practical improvements: the 
establishment of liaison magistrates and the creation of a European 
Judicial Network. However, only a minority of the EU Member States 
have established liaison magistrates. They have no operational powers 
and cannot investigate, but are facilitators. Thanks to their knowledge 
of both systems and their contacts, they know what has to be done 
legally and practically to prepare and execute MLA requests. On the 
other hand the European Judicial network in MLA29 has been very 
successful in establishing a horizontal network between judicial 
authorities responsible for MLA in the EU member states and to 
elaborate good practices, judicial guides, etc. 
4.3. From MLA to Mutual Recognition in the EU 
4.3.1. The EU Amsterdam Treaty and the Special Tampere European 
Council 
In 1999 the European Council organized a special meeting on the 
AFSJ in Tampere. In the Tampere conclusions mutual recognition 
(MR) became a cornerstone of judicial cooperation and the aim was to 
replace all MLA conventions by proper EU MR Instruments30. The MR 
concept had been applied by the community legislator in many 
substantive fields of the internal market with the aim of avoiding 
                                                          
29 There are several similar regional networks: the Judicial Regional Platforms of 
Sahel and Indian Ocean Commission Countries, the Commonwealth Network of 
Contact Persons, the Hemispheric Information Exchange Network for Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters and Extradition of the Organization of American States, 
and the Ibero-American Legal Assistance Network (IberRed). 
30 See Presidency conclusion no. 33 of the Tampere special European Council. For 
in depth analysis, see J. OUWERKERK, Quid Pro Quo? A Comparative Law Perspective 
on the Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in Criminal Matters, Cambridge, 
2011; A. SUOMINEN, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters: A Study of the Principle in Four Framework Decisions and in the 
Implementation Legislation in the Nordic Member States, Cambridge, 2011. 
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detailed harmonization. However, the possibility of extrapolating it to 
judicial decisions was not that self-evident, as harmonization in the area 
of criminal procedure and applicable safeguards was minimal or non-
existent. In 2000 the Commission published its Communication on 
Mutual Recognition of Final Decisions in Criminal Matters31. MR 
would apply to both court decisions and pre-trial decisions, as well as 
orders or warrants to gather evidence or to arrest and surrender 
suspects. 
To what extent is MR different from MLA? The basic idea was that, 
despite the differences between the procedural regimes in the member 
states, they were all party to the European Convention of Human Rights 
and could thus trust each other. Mutual trust was presupposed and 
considered sufficient grounds to apply MR, even with little or no 
harmonization in the field. This means that MR orders or warrants 
coming from an issuing member state have legal value in the AFSJ and 
could thus automatically be executed without an exequatur procedure. 
Legal doubts about the order or warrant, linked to for instance the 
legality of the evidence that served to justify the order or warrant, could 
only be challenged in the issuing member state. 
In 2002 the Council of Ministers adopted the first MR instrument: 
the European arrest warrant (EAW)32, replacing the extradition 
conventions. The EAW was adopted under a fast track procedure, after 
the 9/11 events and did not include harmonization of investigative acts 
or procedural safeguards. An EAW, whether meant to bring a suspect to 
trial or to execute the trial sentence, is based on mutual trust and must 
thus be recognized and executed, unless mandatory or optional grounds 
of non-recognition apply. However, the grounds are strongly restricted, 
compared to the refusal grounds under the MLA extradition treaty, and 
do not contain grounds that are based directly on a human rights clause. 
                                                          
31 COM(2000) 495 final, available at <http://eur-ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=COM:2000:0495:FIN:EN:PDF>. 
32 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant 
and Surrender Procedure between Member States of 13 June 2002, OJ 2002 L 190, 
p. 1. The decision has been amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 
26 February 2009, OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24. 
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4.3.2. Mutual Recognition and Gathering of Evidence: Free Flow of 
Evidence? 
After the introduction of the EAW it was time to deal with the 
replacement of MLA by MR in the area of evidence. In 2003 the 
European Commission submitted a proposal for a European Evidence 
Warrant (EEW)33 that was finally adopted in 200834 after difficult 
negotiations. The EEW was limited to existing evidence and thus 
interrogations, interception of telecommunications and body searches 
were excluded from its scope of application. The EEW applies to orders 
issued by judicial authorities and to certain extents also by 
administrative law enforcement agencies. In order to issue an EEW the 
issuing authority must comply with the proportionality principle (using 
the least intrusive means available) and reciprocity. The latter means 
that the objects, documents or data can be obtained under the law of the 
issuing State in a comparable case if they were available on the territory 
of the issuing State, even though different procedural measures might 
be used. The EEW also contains complex provisions on double 
criminality. Germany negotiated a stand-alone position permitting it to 
make execution subject to verification of double criminality in the case 
of the offences relating to terrorism, computer-related crime, racism 
and xenophobia, sabotage, racketeering and extortion and swindling. 
These were offences for which no double criminality requirement exists 
in the EAW. Moreover, some of them have been harmonised by EU 
law. Also when coercive measures such as search and seizure are 
ordered, Member States can impose double criminality requirements 
that go beyond the ones foreseen in the EAW. 
The execution of an EEW should, to the widest extent possible and 
without prejudice to fundamental guarantees under national law, be 
carried out in accordance with the formalities and procedures expressly 
                                                          
33 See J.A.E. VERVAELE (Ed.), European Evidence Warrant: Transnational Judicial 
Inquiries in the EU, Antwerp-Oxford, 2005. 
34 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the 
European Evidence Warrant for the Purpose of Obtaining Objects, Documents and 
Data for Use in Proceedings in Criminal Matters, 2008, OJ L 350/72, available at 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008F0978:EN:NOT>. 
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indicated by the issuing State. This means that an enlarged concept of 
lex fori is applied. However, Member States are wary of the differences 
in criminal procedure between themselves and try to protect against 
dissymmetry between their systems of criminal procedure and legal 
safeguards. Moreover, the list of grounds of non-recognition or non-
execution in Article 13 is very long and all of them are optional. 
Although the EEW was adopted in 2008, Member States have not 
implemented it or don’t use it The most common reason was that both 
practitioners and Member States were not that convinced of its utility. 
The EEW does not deal with all evidence and leads in practice to very 
complex procedures. The EEW could be used for freezing existing 
evidence, but for the execution of it MLA requests were again needed. 
Practitioners also complain about an overly fragmented and complex 
regulatory frame. 
In the 2009 Stockholm program, the European Council decided that 
the setting up of a comprehensive system for obtaining evidence in 
cases with a cross-border dimension, based on MR, should be further 
pursued. The European Council indicated that the existing instruments 
in this area constitute a fragmentary regime and that a new approach 
was needed, based on MR, but also taking into account the flexibility of 
the traditional system of MLA. It called for a comprehensive system to 
replace all the existing instruments, including the EEW, covering as far 
as possible all types of evidence and containing deadlines for 
enforcement and limiting as far as possible the grounds for refusal. 
4.3.3. Draft European Investigation Order (EIO) 
Frustrated with the EEW, seven Member States submitted in 2010 a 
proposal for a directive for a European Investigation Order (EIO)35. A 
political agreement was reached in the Council36 and in December 2013 
an amended text was approved by the LIBE-Commission of the 
European Parliament (EP)37. The EIO has a horizontal scope and 
                                                          
35 Proposal of April 29th 2010 (COPEN 15), initiative of Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Spain, Austria, Slovenia and Sweden. 
36 General approach, 21.12.2012, 18918/11, COPEN 369. 
37 The text is awaiting approval by the General Assembly of the EP. 
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therefore applies to all investigative measures aimed at gathering 
evidence. The proposed EIO also recognizes that this single regime for 
obtaining evidence will have to be completed by additional rules for 
some types of investigative measures, such as the temporary transfer of 
persons held in custody, hearing by video or telephone conference, 
obtaining of information related to bank accounts or banking 
transactions, controlled deliveries or covert investigations. The MR 
regime of the EIO is certainly not the automatic one envisaged at 
Tampere. Indeed, something akin to ‘double procedurality’ or ‘double 
lock’ has been introduced. The MR regime does not lead to automatic 
execution, as Article 2(b) stipulates that the execution must not only be 
in accordance with the EEW but also with the procedures applicable in 
a similar domestic case. Issuing authorities may assist in the execution 
of the EIO (as in the MLA regime), but assistance is also conditional on 
respect for fundamental principles of the law of the executing state and 
essential national security interests. Lex fori principles do apply (Article 
8(2)) unless contrary to the fundamental principles of the law of the 
executing state. The EIO has a quite complex system of grounds for 
non-recognition and non-execution. The executing authority should, 
wherever possible, use another type of measure if the requested 
measure does not exist under its national law or would not be available 
in a similar domestic case (referral to an equivalent measure under 
domestic law) and should always apply the least intrusive measure 
(proportionality principle). The issuing authority should therefore 
ascertain whether the evidence sought is necessary and proportionate 
for the purpose of proceedings, whether the measure chosen is 
necessary and proportionate for the gathering of this evidence, and 
whether, by means of issuing the EIO, another MS should be involved 
in the gathering of this evidence. It is interesting that LIBE/EP has 
obtained the inclusion of a human rights clause in the substantive 
provisions38. Article 2a underlines the duty to comply with Article 6 
TEU39 and insists that it include the rights of defence of persons subject 
                                                          
38 Earlier MR instruments referred only to human rights in the preamble. 
39 Article 6 TEU imposes the EUCFR as a binding instrument and lays down the 
legal basis for the application of derived human standards from the European 
Convention of Human Rights of the Council of Europe and of derived constitutional 
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to criminal proceedings. However when it comes to the grounds of non-
recognition or non-execution in Article 10, both in case there would be 
substantial grounds to believe that the execution of the investigative 
measure contained in the EIO would be incompatible with the 
executing Member State’s obligations under Article 6 TEU and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) or the execution would 
infringe the ne bis in idem principle, the recognition or execution of the 
EIO may be refused. However, these grounds for non-recognition of 
non-execution are, like all the others, optional and dependent upon the 
implementing legislation. The Member States may transform them into 
mandatory grounds, but may also leave it to the discretion of the 
judicial authorities. 
It is of interest that the EIO may also be requested by a suspected or 
accused person, within the framework of applicable defence rights and 
in conformity with national criminal procedure. This option (Article 2a 
in the EP draft) is thus very dependent upon domestic law and can lead 
to very different situations from one Member State to another. Legal 
remedies available against an EIO should be at least equal to those 
available in the domestic case against the investigative measure 
concerned, including the same time limits. However, substantive 
reasons for issuing the EIO may only be challenged in the issuing State. 
Transfer of evidence may be suspended pending the decision about the 
legal remedy. 
4.3.4. Bilateral MLATs between EU and Third States 
The EU has negotiated a set of bilateral MLATs with third States. In 
2010 it signed an MLAT with Japan40 and then with the US41. These 
                                                                                                                               
standards of the common constitutional traditions of the Member States as general 
principles of EU law. 
40 Agreement between the European Union and Japan on Mutual Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters, OJ L 39/20, 12.02.2010, available at http://eur-<lex.europa.eu/Lex 
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:039:0020:0035:en:PDF>. The agreement 
entered into force, after ratification by all EU Member States, in 2010. 
41 Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance between the European Union and the 
United States of America, OJ L 181/34, 19.07.2003, available at <http://eur-lex.europa. 
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MLATs only supplement existing bilateral MLATs between the US and 
EU member states. In the case of Japan there were not that many 
bilateral MLATs, so the added value is high, but even in case of the US 
the added value is high as these MLATs contain modern techniques of 
evidence gathering including video-conferencing, JITs and financial 
evidence gathering (identification of bank accounts, financial 
monitoring, etc.). Moreover the scope includes MLA with 
administrative law enforcement agencies. Further MLATs with other 
third states will be concluded in the future. 
4.3.5. The Setting Up of a Vertical Framework for MLA: Eurojust & the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 
At the Tampere Council it was also decided to set up Eurojust, in 
which prosecutors from every Member State (national members) form a 
College. In 2002 the legal framework for its mission and empowerment 
was adopted and reflected a strong intergovernmental approach. 
Eurojust’s aims include promoting and improving MLA between the 
competent national authorities and providing general support to 
increase the effectiveness of their investigations42. Eurojust acts 
through its national members or through the College. Even if the 
powers of a national member are limited to its jurisdiction, they cannot 
be considered as a requesting authority or less an operational judicial 
authority. They remain mainly a liaison-officer. The powers of the 
College have been put into stronger terms, but even then it is legally 
unclear if they can send out binding MLA requests to the competent 
authorities of the Member States. Eurojust is mostly involved in 
coordination of investigative and prosecutorial action and in organizing 
and sustaining the JITs. In 2009 the Eurojust Decision was amended43 
                                                                                                                               
eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:181:0034:0042:en:PDF>. The agreement 
entered into force, after ratification by all EU Member States, in 2010. 
42 Article 3(1). 
43 Council Decision 2009/426/JHA of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of 
Eurojust and amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to 
reinforcing the fight against serious crime. 
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in order to achieve greater equivalence powers for the national 
members in their national legal orders. 
Overall the 2009 reform has been very minimal and mostly limited 
to access to law enforcement data and has not resulted in a common set 
of powers for the national members, even when dealing with MLA or 
MR in their own legal orders. Moreover very few Member States have 
enacted legislation in order to insert the powers for their national 
member into the national legal order. Many member states are opposed 
to the idea of delegated competences for national members, even if they 
can only act in their own jurisdiction. They are afraid of a body with 
supranational competences and have put forward constitutional 
reservations. 
The Lisbon Treaty laid down in Article 85 TFEU a new legal basis 
by which Eurojust becomes a European Agency in the AFSJ and gains 
a new mission. It will remain competent for serious cross border crime 
but should also deal with serious crime requiring prosecution on a 
common basis. Eurojust may also initiate investigations, but it is clear 
from the text that Eurojust cannot become a supranational or federal 
investigative and prosecutorial office, as all procedural acts must be 
carried out by competent national authorities. In 2013 the European 
Commission submitted a proposal for a regulation on the European 
Union Agency for Criminal Justice (Eurojust)44. Beside reforms in 
Eurojust’s organizational structure, the proposal also includes new 
definitions of the operational powers. However, it has not proposed that 
the powers of Eurojust College become operational or executive, nor 
can they be considered as binding requests or orders. It is interesting, 
however, that it proposes that the national member should be 
empowered to issue and execute MLA requests or MR orders in his 
national jurisdiction. Second, in cases of urgency, the national member 
will also be able to order all types of investigative measures, including 
coercive ones. It remains to be seen if these extensions of the powers of 
the national members will survive the negotiations. This proposal 
suggests that Eurojust has become an EU agency, but that the 
                                                          
44 COM(2013) 535 final, <http://eur-ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
COM:2013:0535:FIN:EN:PDF>. 
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Commission has not made full use of the potentialities of the legal basis 
in the Lisbon Treaty, as its autonomous powers to start investigations 
and to send out MLA requests and MR orders in the AFSJ are poorly 
elaborated. Eurojust will remain, as it stands, mainly an agency that 
coordinates the cross-border activities of the law enforcement agencies 
of the Member States. So the only real vertical dimension for MLA is 
the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). 
After long discussions, going back to the Corpus Juris project45 and the 
EU Green paper46, the EU Lisbon Treaty included in Article 86 TFEU a 
legal basis to establish the EPPO. It will be an independent EU body 
with the authority to investigate and prosecute offences affecting the 
Union’s financial interests (EU subsidy fraud, EU corruption, EU fraud 
with custom duties, etc.). This material competence could be extended 
to other serious transnational offences. Adjudication of these criminal 
cases does however remain the exclusive competence of the Member 
States. In other words, the EPPO will prosecute these cases before 
national courts of the Member States. 
In the summer of 2013 the Commission submitted a draft regulation 
for the EPPO47. The Commission financed an academic study with the 
aim of elaborating Model Rules48 for the criminal procedure of the 
EPPO. These Model Rules strived to establish a fair balance between 
European-wide powers of the EPPO and the rights of the suspect. In the 
Commission’s draft regulation the EPPO is a Union body with a 
decentralized structure of delegate prosecutors in the Member States. 
Its task is to direct and supervise investigations, and carry out acts of 
prosecution. As a rule, the investigations of the EPPO should be carried 
out by ‘European Delegated Prosecutors’ in the Member States. In 
                                                          
45 See M. DELMAS-MARTY, J.A.E. VERVAELE (Eds.), Implementation of the Corpus 
Juris in the Member States, Vol I-IV, Antwerp-Groningen-Oxford, 2000-2001. 
46 COM(2001) 715 final, available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/anti_fraud/livre_ 
vert/document/en.htm>. 
47 COM(2013) 534 final, available at <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=COM:2013:0534:FIN:EN:PDF>. 
48 See, http://www.eppo-project.eu/index.php/EU-model-rules; K. LIGETI (Ed.), 
Toward a Prosecutor for the European Union. A comparative analysis, Volume 1, 
Oxford, 2012; K. LIGETI (Ed.), Toward a Prosecutor for the European Union. Draft 
Rules of Procedure, Volume 2, Oxford, 2013. 
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cases involving several Member States or cases which are of particular 
complexity, efficient investigation and prosecution may require that the 
European Public Prosecutor also exercise his powers by instructing 
national law enforcement authorities directly. Although the recitals 
refer to uniform investigative powers throughout the Union and the 
proposal states that ‘for the purpose of investigations and prosecutions 
conducted by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the territory of 
the Union’s Member States shall be considered a single legal area in 
which the European Public Prosecutor’s Office may exercise its 
competence’49, it is clear from an overall reading of the text that these 
powers are fully dependent upon national law and territory50. Moreover 
the text underlines that all coercive measures that can be ordered or 
requested by the EPPO as investigative measures are subject to 
authorization by the competent judicial authority of the MS where they 
are to be carried out51. If we examine the EPPO proposal, it is doubtful 
whether the content is in line with the aim of Article 86 TFEU, as it 
seems that the content could have been achieved by upgrading Eurojust 
under Article 85 TFEU. The proprio motu investigative and 
prosecutorial powers, for which he/she would not need to rely on MLA 
or MR, are absent from the proposal. Moreover the whole concept of 
European territoriality, as a common jurisdiction to investigate and 
prosecute, has been watered down in the proposal to a fragmented 
panoply of national jurisdictions. 
The negotiations have just started and it remains to be seen if this 
proposal will proceed and which amendments will be introduced to the 
text. 
5. Conclusion 
Thanks to the increasing efforts of the international community to 
control transnational crime MLA has become a pivotal issue of global 
governance and part of transnational criminal justice. This is clearly 
                                                          
49 Article 25(1). 
50 For instance Article 18(6). 
51 Article 26(4). 
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reflected in the evolution from the Vienna Convention towards 
UNTOC. Model laws and model bills have contributed to the 
standardization of national MLA legislative design and practice. 
Nevertheless, there are clearly loopholes and weaknesses that can be 
identified. Most of the efforts are linked up with the paradigm of drug 
trafficking, organized crime and terrorism and do not cover all forms of 
serious crimes for which MLA might be needed. Although the UN 
conventions are global, the reach and effective implementation is 
certainly not as global as it could be. When it comes to the substance of 
the Conventions and the model law and bills there are some striking 
features. MLA remains a model of Sovereign state-to-state cooperation 
based on the executive model of central authorities. In some countries 
these central authorities have delegated autonomous powers, but in 
many this is not the case. The MLATs are highly dominated by the 
interests of the executive and of the prosecutors. The grounds for 
refusal are mostly widely defined and reflect the same interest. This is 
the reason why in most cases they are optional, and thus depend on the 
discretionary power of the executive. Defence rights or fair trial rights, 
and human rights issues of flagrant denial of justice, do not seem to 
belong in the vocabulary of MLA and are not included as mandatory 
grounds of refusal in any case. When it comes to the MLA tools there is 
no clear substantive line of division between police cooperation, 
administrative assistance and MLA. MLA also deals with information 
exchange and can sometimes include assistance for administrative 
enforcement agencies. The MLA conventions remain very cautious 
when it comes to coercive measures and SITs and condition these upon 
stringent rules and procedures of the domestic law of the executing 
state. Application of lex forum provisions is sometimes submitted to 
conditions of conformity with domestic law, sometimes only to 
fundamental principles. Finally, the new digital techniques of 
investigation, like digital surveillance or remote computer searches, are 
absent in MLA instruments, with exception of the 2007 Model Law. 
The UN executive approach to MLA means also that the persons 
concerned (suspects and victims in particular) remain objects of MLA 
and cannot derive from the MLA scheme rights to gather evidence. If 
they have any rights it derives from applicable national law. It remains 
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also unclear for the persons concerned to if and to which extent they 
can derive rights from the UN human rights instruments in the area of 
MLA. In other words, there is a lot to be done at UN level in order to 
elaborate a modern MLA scheme that updates operational tools and 
includes human rights protection. 
In the EU there has been a very substantive paradigm shift from 
MLA to MR. The emphasis is on direct cooperation between judicial 
authorities and the grounds for refusal have been reduced. However, the 
lack of equivalent procedural investigative acts and related procedural 
safeguards in the Member States has led to distrust. The efforts under 
the Lisbon Treaty to harmonise basic fair trial rights through the 
directive on right to translation and interpretation52, the directive on the 
right to information in criminal proceedings and the directive on right 
to access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings53, are only first steps and 
do not resolve all the issues of fairness of the proceedings that might 
arise when executing MR evidence orders, such as access to the 
file/disclosure or remedies against the execution of the investigative act 
or against the transfer of the obtained evidence. The very recent second 
draft legislative package of the European Commission on procedural 
safeguards does not tackle these aspects at all54. 
From the negotiations on the EEW and draft EIO we can conclude 
that the EU Member States are not aiming at a common approach for 
the AFSJ. They try as much as possible to reduce transnational 
gathering of evidence to their own territory, their own applicable law 
and to as far as possible build in requirements from their domestic legal 
orders. The AFSJ remains to a large extent a patchwork of sovereign 
jurisdictions that have difficulty in accepting new tools for the 
gathering of criminal evidence in an integrated territory. When it comes 
                                                          
52 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right to 
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, 2010, OJ L 280/1. 
53 Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and on the 
right to communicate upon arrest, 2013, OJ L 294/1. 
54 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be 
present at trial in criminal proceedings, COM(2013) 0821, available at < http://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52013PC0821:en:NOT>. 
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to the supranational law enforcement agencies in the AFSJ (Eurojust 
and EPPO) it is quite clear that the existing law enforcement agencies 
and the future EPPO are neither designed as operational judicial 
authorities nor as competent MLA or MR authorities. They remain 
mostly mediators between national authorities and to the extent that 
they get investigative powers, these are inserted into the applicable law 
of the domestic jurisdictions. 
To wind up, in order to control transnational crime and to provide 
effective law enforcement that respects the rule of law and applicable 
human rights standards there is need for an innovative approach both at 
UN and European regional level. At the global level instruments must 
be updated and have to take into account the digital dimension of our 
societies. The optional grounds for refusal linked to sovereignty should 
be reduced and mandatory grounds linked to human rights standards 
included. The MLA regimes also should take into account the 
dimension of the defence as a legal subject with rights and remedies in 
the proceedings. 
At the regional EU level there is a need for further harmonisation of 
the investigative tools and procedural safeguards in the Member States, 
so that MR can function in the common territory of the AFSJ. The 
regional level should be able to deepen cooperation on MLA, integrate 
it with human rights protection, and make it less dependent upon 
national sovereignty. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
NE BIS IN IDEM: TOWARDS A TRANSNATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE IN THE EU?1 
1. Introduction 
Many areas of regulation and enforcement have been substantially 
affected by the increasing European integration process in the last few 
decades. The result is not only visible through the implementation, 
application and enforcement of EU policies in every Member State (the 
vertical dimension of integration), but also in the creation of common 
areas such as the customs union, the internal market and the area of 
freedom, security and justice (the horizontal dimension of integration). 
Thanks to the four freedoms of the internal market citizens can enjoy a 
whole set of basic economic and non-economic freedoms. Thanks to 
the Lisbon Treaty citizens can expect that the Union will offer them 
free movement, in conjunction with appropriate measures to prevent 
and combat crime (Article 3(2) TEU) and to offer security in a common 
area of freedom, security and justice. Both the vertical and horizontal 
dimension of European integration are part of a EU legal order (with 
European and national components) in which the rule of law and human 
rights standards do apply. The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened this in 
Article 6 TEU by recognizing the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(CFREU) as a source of binding primary EU law. 
When it comes to the enforcement of EU policies in the Member 
States (the vertical dimension) or the enforcement of EU policies in a 
transnational setting (the horizontal dimension) there is a double EU 
                                                          
1 This article was published as J.A.E. VERVAELE, Ne Bis In Idem: Towards a 
Transnational Constitutional Principle in the EU?, in S. GLESS, J.A.E. VERVAELE 
(Eds.), Special on Transnational Criminal Justice, in Utrecht Law Review, 2013, 
pp. 211-229. 
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interest at stake: effective enforcement and compliance with the EU 
human rights standards. 
With the growing impact of EU regulations at the domestic level 
and the increasing mobility of goods, persons, services and capital in 
the EU and the related increasing transnational dimension of domestic 
criminal justice activities, there is an increasing risk that a person might 
suffer double jeopardy or be prosecuted and/or be punished twice, at 
the national level (when enforcing EU policies) or at the EU level by 
several EU Member States or even by an EU Member State and the 
Commission, in a field like competition, where the Commission has 
punitive adjudicative jurisdiction. 
In a setting of an integrated internal market and a common area of 
freedom, security and justice citizens and legal persons might expect 
equivalent human rights protection between the Member States of the 
EU and at the European level. They might also expect that this 
protection complies at least with the common binding standards of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Today, in the EU, do 
we have an equivalent transnational protection of ne bis idem that 
applies both in the vertical and horizontal dimension of European 
integration? Is the domestic regulation of ne bis in idem in each EU 
Member State or is the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in public 
international law (human rights law) able to offer this equivalent 
protection? Or do we need a proper transnational ne bis idem principle 
in the EU? If so, what are the modalities of this transnational principle 
in order to comply with equivalent protection for citizens and legal 
persons? 
2. The Rationale and Scope of the Domestic Ne Bis In Idem Principle 
The ne bis in idem principle is a general principle of (criminal) law 
in many national legal orders, sometimes even codified as a 
constitutional right such as the clause relating to ne bis in idem 
(prohibiting dual punishment – double jeopardy) of the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America or 
Article 103 of the German Constitution. Historically the ne bis in idem 
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principle only applies nationally and is limited to criminal justice; this 
means precluding application to punitive administrative enforcement. 
Recently, some states have widened the scope to punitive proceedings 
and penalties. 
The rationale of the ne bis in idem principle is manifold. 
Traditionally it was very much linked to the sovereignty and legitimacy 
of the state and its legal system, as well as respect for the res judicata 
(pro veritate habitur) of final judgments. The link with res judicata and 
the international recognition of criminal verdicts could of course also 
give international effect to the ne bis in idem principle. However, few 
countries recognize the validity of a foreign judgment in criminal 
matters for execution or enforcement in their national legal systems 
without this being founded on a treaty. Even the recognition of res 
judicata in respect of a foreign criminal judgment is problematic, 
certainly when it concerns territorial offences. The recognition of 
foreign res judicata means that the prospect of a new prosecution or 
punishment is no longer possible (the negative effect) or that the 
decision has to be taken into account in the context of judgements 
pending in other cases (the positive effect). The majority of common 
law legal systems do actually recognize the res judicata effect of 
foreign judgments. In civil law systems, the Netherlands has the most 
far-reaching and liberal provisions. The Dutch Criminal Code contains 
a general ne bis in idem provision that is applicable to both domestic 
and foreign judgements, regardless of where the offence was 
committed2. However, even the Netherlands excludes punitive 
administrative penalties from the scope of application. 
In every single Member State the ne bis in idem principle raises 
many questions concerning both the idem and bis element of the 
principle. In order to consider the meaning of the same/idem, it may be 
asked whether the legal definition of the offences should be considered 
as the basis of the definition of the term the same (idem), or should it be 
the set of facts (idem factum)? Does it depend on the judicial rights 
protected by the legal provisions and their scope? Are natural and legal 
                                                          
2 For a commentary on the Dutch ne bis in idem in Art. 68 of the Criminal Code, 
see P. BAAUW, ‘Ne bis in idem’, in B. SWART, A. KLIP (Eds.), International Criminal 
Law in the Netherlands, Freiburg i.Br., 1997, pp. 75-84. 
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persons different with regard to the application of the principle? Is the 
reach of the principle limited to double punishment under criminal law 
or does it include other punitive sanctions that may be imposed under 
private law or administrative law? What is a firm and final sentence? 
Does it include settlements with the public prosecutor or with other 
judicial authorities? Must the sentence have been enforced or executed? 
In other words, there is no common and equivalent standard of ne bis in 
idem between the EU Member States. This can create a lack of 
equivalent protection for the citizen or legal person when it comes to 
the enforcement of EU law in the domestic legal order. Why would a 
EU citizen or legal person be punished twice with a punitive 
administrative fine and a criminal penalty for EU subsidy fraud in one 
EU Member State while he is protected against that type of double 
punishment in another EU Member State? Second, the domestic ne bis 
in idem principles only has domestic effect and cannot cover 
transnational situations in the EU. Third, very few EU Member States 
have a system in place by which to recognize the validity of foreign 
judgments in punitive matters so that it would bar double punishment. 
It thus becomes clear that the non-harmonised domestic ne bis in idem 
principle is not able to offer adequate and equivalent protection for 
citizens and legal persons, either at home, or in the horizontal internal 
market or the common area of freedom, security and justice. 
In the last few centuries the ne bis in idem principle also mainly 
became a principle by which to offer judicial protection for the citizen 
against the ius puniendi of the state and, as such, it forms part of the 
principles of due process and a fair trial, in other words it was 
converted into a fundamental right protecting against cumulative 
criminal punishment3. This not only resulted in the elaboration of 
domestic constitutional ne bis in idem principles, but also in ne bis in 
idem provisions in public international law/human rights law (IHRL). 
Besides, nation states have been increasingly subscribing to bilateral 
and multilateral conventions on mutual legal assistance (MLA) in 
                                                          
3 See the excellent PhD thesis by J. LELIEUR-FISCHER, La règle ne bis in idem. Du 
principe de l’autorité de la chose jugée au principe d’unicité d’action répressive, 
Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris I), Paris, 2005 (not published). 
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criminal matters. Can these human rights and MLA conventions offer 
adequate and equivalent protection for citizens and legal persons? 
3. Public International Law and Ne Bis In Idem 
As a starting point we must underline that there is no general rule of 
international law that imposes an international obligation to comply 
with ne bis in idem4. Its application is conventional and thus depends 
solely on the content of international treaties. We can find public 
international law treaty-based ne bis in idem provisions in three 
sources: international human rights law (IHRL), the law regulating 
international criminal tribunals and multilateral treaties dealing with 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, also called mutual legal 
assistance (MLA). 
3.1. IHRL and Ne Bis In Idem 
The conversion of ne bis in idem into a domestic fundamental right 
protecting the citizen against the cumulative use of the ius puniendi by 
the state also found its way into IHRL after World War II. The ne bis in 
idem principle has been enshrined as an individual right in international 
human rights treaties, such as in Article 14(7) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 19 December 19665. We must 
however take into account that some states formulated reservations to 
the principle6. 
                                                          
4 Also underlined by the German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BVerfG 15 
December 2011, 2 BvR148/11, Para. 31. 
5 Art. 14(7) ICCPR: ‘No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an 
offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with 
the law and penal procedure of each country’. 
6 The Netherlands, for example, has formulated the following reservation: ‘The 
Kingdom of the Netherlands accepts this provision only insofar as no obligations arise 
from it further to those set out in Article 68 of the Criminal Code of the Netherlands 
and Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Netherlands Antilles as they now apply. 
They read: Except in cases where court decisions are eligible for review, no person may 
be prosecuted again for an offence in respect of which a court in the Netherlands or the 
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The ECHR does not contain such a provision and the former 
European Commission of Human Rights7 denied the existence of the 
principle as such under Article 6 of the ECHR, without however 
precluding in absolute terms that certain double prosecutions might 
violate the fair trial rights under Article 6 ECHR. The provision has 
meanwhile been elaborated in Article 4 of the 7th Protocol to the 
ECHR8, but it is not a binding instrument for all EU Member States. 
Neither the Netherlands nor Germany has ratified this Protocol. The 
UK is the only member of the Council of Europe that did not even sign 
it. Moreover, countries like France and Luxembourg have formulated 
reservations when ratifying. Many EU countries also deposited limiting 
declarations at the moment of signature. It is clear that several EU 
countries9, like Austria, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, 
have limited the scope of application of the principle by precluding its 
application to punitive penalties outside of the criminal code. Germany, 
for instance, has done this in line with Article 103 of its Constitution. 
The ne bis in idem principle has also been laid down in the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights in Article 8(4).110. 
                                                                                                                               
Netherlands Antilles has delivered an irrevocable judgment. If the judgment has been 
delivered by some other court, the same person may not be prosecuted for the same 
offence in the case of (I) acquittal or withdrawal of proceedings or (II) conviction 
followed by complete execution, remission or lapse of the sentence’. 
7 European Commission of Human Rights, 13 July 1970, appl. no. 4212/69, CDR 
35, 151. 
8 ‘1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings 
under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been 
finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that 
State. 2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of 
the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there 
is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect 
in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. 3. No 
derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention’. 
9 See the overview of declarations and reservations at <http://www.conventions. 
coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=117&CM=8&DF=11/01/2013&CL 
=ENG&VL=1> (last visited 11 January 2013). 
10 ‘An accused person acquitted by a non appealable judgment shall not be 
subjected to a new trial for the same cause’. 
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What can we derive from the case law of both regional human right 
courts and from the UN Human Rights Committee? To start with the 
latter, the Human Rights Committee has11 made it clear in its case law 
that Article 14(7) does not apply to foreign res judicata, in other words 
the UN ne bis in idem principle only has effect in the domestic legal 
order of each Member State. Also the regional human rights courts are 
in line with the IHRL jurisdiction and have given domestic legal effect 
to the IHRL ne bis in idem principles. That means that the persons 
concerned cannot claim the international or transnational effect of the 
principle under IHRL. 
From the case law of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights it 
has also become clear that the ne bis in idem principle is not an absolute 
human right. The positive duty to investigate, prosecute and punish 
serious violations of human rights (that include core international 
crimes) can result in setting aside fraudulent res judicata in criminal 
matters, because of the symbolic punishment, or because of the way in 
which evidence was gathered during the investigation and presented in 
the indictment, or because of the way in which the trial court came to 
its verdict12. This is very much in line with the approach under the law 
regulating international criminal courts. Although Article 10 of the 
ICTY Statute and Article 20 of the Rome Statute of the ICC recognize 
that the ne bis in idem principle should apply in the combined 
jurisdiction of national and international criminal courts, both 
international criminal courts can activate their jurisdiction, even in the 
case of final national judgments, if the national court proceedings were 
not impartial or independent, were designed to shield the accused from 
                                                          
11 The Human Rights Committee ruled that Article 14(7) does not apply to foreign 
res judicata, see UN Human Rights Committee 2 November 1987. See also its General 
Comment on Article 14 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights in 2007 at point 57: ‘This guarantee applies to criminal offences only and not to 
disciplinary measures that do not amount to a sanction for a criminal offence within the 
meaning of Article 14 of the Covenant. Furthermore, it does not guarantee ne bis in 
idem with respect to the national jurisdictions of two or more States. This 
understanding should not, however, undermine efforts by States to prevent retrial for 
the same criminal offence through international conventions’. 
12 Loayza-Tamayo v Peru, 17 September 1997; Almonacid-Arellano v Chile, 26 
September 2006, Para. 154 and La Cantuta v Peru, 29 November 2006, Para. 153. 
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international criminal responsibility or the case was not diligently 
prosecuted. 
This analysis has made clear that the IHRL ne bis in idem principle 
is unable to offer international or transnational protection for the 
principle. Has it possibly been able to harmonise, in a praetorian way, 
the domestic application of the principle? The case law of the Human 
Rights Committee on ne bis in idem is so limited that we can exclude 
this from the outset. From the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) we can deduce that it has not been easy for the 
Court to define in a clear way the rationale and the scope of the ne bis 
in idem principle. The Court has been asked in the majority of cases to 
deal with the definition of idem. After some contradictory judgements 
on the application of Article 4 of the Seventh Protocol, based either on 
idem factum in Gradinger v Austria or on the concept that the same 
conduct may constitute several offences in Oliviera v Switzerland13, in 
the case of Franz Fischer v Austria14 the ECtHR elaborated an idem 
factum concept based on the ‘essential elements’ of the two offences, 
although in the case of Götktan v France15 the Court once again seemed 
to place its trust in the legal idem. In recent years the Court has again 
relied on the idem factum concept based on the ‘essential elements’ of 
the offences, such as in the Bachmaier v Austria case16, the Hauser-
Sporn v Austria case17 and the Garretta v France case18. Very recently, 
in the case of Zolutukhin v Russia, the Grand Chamber19 admitted that 
its case law lacked legal certainty and guidance and accepted the 
necessity of a harmonised interpretation. In Zolutukhin v Russia the 
                                                          
13 Gradinger v Austria, 23 October 1995, Series A no. 328-C and Oliveira v 
Switzerland, 30 July 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-V, p. 1990. See 
<http://www.echr.coe.int> for these decisions. 
14 Franz Fischer v Austria, 29 May 2001, Series A no. 312 (C), confirmed in W.F. v 
Austria, 30 May 2002 and Sailer v Austria, 6 June 2002. The same approach was 
applied in Sailer v Austria, 6 June 2002. 
15 Göktan v France, 2 July 2002. The same approach was applied in Gauthier v 
France, 24 June 2003 and Ongun v Turkey, October 2006. 
16 Bachmaier v Austria, 2 September 2004. 
17 Hauser-Sporn v Austria, 7 December 2006. 
18 Garretta v France, 4 March 2008. 
19 Zolotukhin v Russia, 10 February 2009. 
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ECtHR also confirmed its case law on the bis element of the principle. 
The Court defines the bis element as the commencement of a new 
prosecution, where a prior acquittal or conviction has already acquired 
the force of res judicata20. This means that the element of bis also 
includes the combination of two criminal charges in the sense of Article 
6, for instance the imposition of a criminal punitive sanction and an 
administrative punitive sanction21. In the case of Zolotukhin v Russia 
the Court qualified the first administrative offence, by using the Engel 
criteria, as penal for the purposes of Article 4 of Protocol 7, mostly due 
to the nature of the offence and the severity of the penalty imposed. 
On the harmonising effect at the domestic level the conclusion is 
thus mitigated. First, not all Member States of the EU have ratified the 
Protocol. Second, some have formulated reservations. This means from 
the very start that the effect is unequal between the Member States. 
Third, the case law of the ECtHR has not been abundant and is not, as 
is recognized by the Court itself, a scholarly example of clarity and 
guidance. However, the ECtHR has opted for a harmonising 
interpretation in its recent case law. The problem remains that this 
harmonising effect is legally not binding on all EU Member States. 
To conclude, we can underline that the binding effect of the IHRL is 
limited to every single jurisdiction and that the effect of the IHRL ne 
bis in idem principles cannot be qualified as offering equivalent 
protection in the EU. 
3.2. Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) and EU Mutual Recognition (MR) 
in Criminal Matters 
Within the framework of the Council of Europe efforts have been 
made since the 1950s to introduce a regional international ne bis in 
                                                          
20 Zolotukhin v Russia, 10 February 2009, Para. 83. 
21 The double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment is not limited to criminal 
law, but includes civil and administrative punitive sanctions. However, the leading 
case, United States v Halper, 490 US 435 (1989), has once again recently been 
restricted in Hudson v U.S., 522 US 93 (1997). See also J.A.E. VERVAELE, La saisie et 
la confiscation à la suite d’atteintes punissables au droit aux Etats-Unis, in Revue de 
Droit Pénal et de Criminologie, 2002, pp. 974-1003. 
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idem principle when it comes to MLA. This means that ne bis in idem 
can play a role when it comes to the extradition of a person or to the 
gathering of evidence abroad through coercive measures. However, in 
this cooperation framework the ne bis in idem principle only applies 
inter partes, which means that it can be or must be applied between the 
Contracting States in case of a concrete request. It is not considered to 
be an individual right erga omnes. 
In the MLA conventional instruments the ne bis in idem principle is 
an important mandatory or optional ground for refusal. The ne bis in 
idem principle was included in the milestone multilateral Extradition 
Convention of the Council of Europe of 13 December 1957. Article 9 
provided not only for the classic formulation of the ne bis in idem 
principle dealing with final judgments (res judicata), but also included 
final decisions of a procedural character. The former ground for refusal 
is mandatory, however, whereas the latter is only optional: 
Extradition shall not be granted if a final judgment has been passed by 
the competent authorities of the requested Party upon the person 
claimed in respect of the offence or offences for which extradition is 
requested. Extradition may be refused if the competent authorities of 
the requested Party have decided either not to institute or to terminate 
proceedings in respect of the same offence or offences. 
Article 8 also provides an optional ground for a ne bis in idem 
refusal in the case of lis pendens: 
The requested Party may refuse to extradite the person claimed if the 
competent authorities of such Party are proceeding against him in 
respect of the offence or offences for which extradition is requested. 
The Extradition Convention deals with ne bis in idem in a classic 
intergovernmental setting between the requesting and requested state, 
but the Additional Protocol of 15 October 1975 supplements Article 9 
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of the Convention with Paragraphs 2 and 3 which also cover other 
Contracting Parties22. 
In the 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, dealing with the gathering of evidence, there is no ne 
bis in idem provision included, either in the Additional Protocol of 
1978 or that of 2001. Neither is this the case in the EU Convention of 
2000 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal matters or its Additional 
Protocol of 2001. In other words European states are willing to accept 
ne bis in idem as a ground of refusal in the MLA when it comes to 
extradition (including the deprivation of liberty), but not for other 
investigative coercive measures. 
Ne bis in idem is a mandatory ground of refusal under the 1970 
Convention of the Council of Europe on the International Validity of 
Criminal Judgements (Articles 53-57) and under the 1972 Convention 
on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (Articles 35-37). 
However, both conventions have a rather low ratification rate and 
contain quite a number of exceptions to the ne bis in idem principle. In 
the 1990 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation 
of the Proceeds from Crime (Article 18, Paragraph 1e), which has been 
more widely ratified, it is optional, but some Contracting States have 
                                                          
22 ‘2. The extradition of a person against whom a final judgment has been rendered 
in a third State, Contracting Party to the Convention, for the offence or offences, in 
respect of which the claim was made, shall not be granted: 
a) if the afore-mentioned judgment resulted in his acquittal; 
b) the term of imprisonment or other measure to which he was sentenced: 
I) has been completely enforced; 
II) has been wholly, or with respect to the part not enforced, the subject of a 
pardon or an amnesty; 
c) if the court convicted the offender without imposing a sanction. 
3. This mandatory refusal ground can however be set aside (optional) by calling in 
exceptions based on territoriality principle, vital interest in jeopardy or the implication 
of own civil servants: 
a) if the offence in respect of which judgment has been rendered was committed against 
a person, an institution or anything having public status in the requesting State; if 
the person on whom judgment was passed had himself a public status in the 
requesting State; 
b) if the offence in respect of which judgment was passed was committed completely or 
partly in the territory of the requesting State or in a place treated as its territory’. 
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included it in their ratification declaration as a ground for the refusal of 
cooperation requests. 
With the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on the 
European Union in 1998 the European Council introduced an ambitious 
mutual recognition programme with the aim of replacing the Council of 
Europe MLA instruments with proper MR instruments of the EU. The 
first flagship was the European arrest warrant (EAW), replacing the 
extradition regime. In the EAW a mandatory non-execution in case of 
ne bis in idem is included in Article 3(2): 
If the executing judicial authority is informed that the requested person 
has been finally judged by a Member State in respect of the same acts 
provided that, where there has been sentence, the sentence has been 
served or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under 
the law of the sentencing Member State. 
However, when there is no final judgment, but only prosecution or 
where the final judgment is from a third state, the ne bis in idem 
provision is optional in Article 4: 
2. where the person who is the subject of the European arrest warrant is 
being prosecuted in the executing Member State for the same act as 
that on which the European arrest warrant is based (…). 
5. if the executing judicial authority is informed that the requested 
person has been finally judged by a third State in respect of the 
same acts provided that, where there has been sentence, the 
sentence has been served or is currently being served or may no 
longer be executed under the law of the sentencing country. 
In the European evidence warrant (EEW), the mutual recognition 
regime which has replaced the mutual assistance system, a ne bis in 
idem provision has been introduced in Article 13(1)(a), but as an 
optional ground for non-execution. In the European Investigation Order 
(EIO)23 in criminal matters, which is currently being negotiated and 
which should replace the EEW, it remains an optional ground for non-
execution in Article 10(1)(e). 
                                                          
23 <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st11/st11735.en11.pdf> (last visited 
30 May 2013). 
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What can we conclude from this overview from MLA to MR in 
criminal matters when it comes to the application of ne bis in idem? 
First of all, it is clear that the principle only comes into play when 
competent authorities (states or judicial authorities) request MLA or 
order MR. In other words it is not a person’s right but a ground of 
refusal (MLA) or a ground for non-execution (MR) between states 
(MLA) or between judicial authorities (MR). It bars cooperation 
between the parties involved and does not give a right to the subject. 
Second, only in a couple of situations is ne bis in idem a mandatory bar 
to cooperation; in quite a few situations it is optional or is even not 
foreseen. Third, the MLA-MR regime does not cover the whole field of 
punitive penalties. Most instruments do not include punitive penalties 
under administrative law enforcement. We can conclude that the 
regional cooperation framework in criminal matters, be it MLA or MR, 
does not provide for a transnational ne bis in idem application in the 
territories of the Council of Europe Member States or in the territories 
of the EU Member States in the sense that citizens or legal persons can 
derive a protective right not to be punished or prosecuted twice. 
Overall it has also become clear that the so-called international ne 
bis in idem does not offer an international or transnational protection 
for the subject in question. De facto public international law only 
imposes obligations in the domestic legal order or conditions the 
cooperation between the domestic legal orders, without introducing a 
transnational regional or global right to ne bis in idem protection. This 
protection against double jeopardy has no international reach or 
transnational reach for the subject. 
Does the process of European integration under the former 
European Community (EC) and the actual European Union (EU) offer 
us another panorama of needs and solutions? 
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4. European Integration and Ne Bis In Idem 
4.1. Ne Bis In Idem in Community Law 
It comes as no surprise that the EC stumbled upon the issue of the 
transnational application of the ne bis in idem principle before the 
coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the justice and home 
affairs policy. In the field of competition policy both the European 
Commission and the national competition authorities were competent 
authorities to impose punitive administrative sanctions24. In some 
countries the criminal courts also had jurisdiction in competition cases. 
The risk of double punitive penalties was thus more than real for the 
legal persons concerned. In 1969 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
already had an occasion to address the issue of ne bis in idem in the 
field of competition. The ECJ held in Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt25 
that double prosecution, once by the Commission and once by the 
national authorities, was in line with Regulation 17/6226 and did not 
violate the ne bis in idem principle, given the fact that the scope of the 
European rules and the national rules differed. However, if this would 
result in the imposition of two consecutive sanctions, a general 
requirement of natural justice demands that any previous punitive 
decisions be taken into account in determining any sanction which is to 
be imposed (Anrechnungsprinzip). In the meantime it has become 
settled ECJ case law to confirm the ne bis in idem principle as a general 
principle of Community law27 which means that it is not limited to 
                                                          
24 W. WILS, The principle of ne bis in idem in EC Antitrust Enforcement: a Legal 
and Economic Analysis, in World Competition, 2003, no. 2. 
25 Judgment of 13 February 1969, [1969] ECR 3. 
26 Regulation no. 17/62, OJ P 013, 21.02.1962. 
27 See for instance Case 7-72, Judgment of 14 December 1972, Boehringer 
Mannheim v Commission (Rec. 1972, p. 1281) (DK1972/00323 GR1972-1973/00313 P 
1972/00447 ES1972/00261 SVII/00061 FIII/00059) and Judgment of the Court of 15 
October 2002, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij nV (lVM) (C-238/99 P), DSM NV and 
DSM Kunststoffen BV (C-244/99 P), Montedison SpA (C-245/99 P), Elf Atochem SA (C-
247/99 P), Degussa AG (C-250/99 P), Enichem SpA (C-251/99 P), Wacker-Chemie 
GmbH and Hoechst AG (C-252/99 P) and Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) (C-
254/99 P) v Commission of the European Communities. 
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criminal sanctions, but that it also applies in competition matters. 
However, in Cement28 the ECJ made the application of the general 
principle of ne bis in idem in the area of EC competition law subject to 
a ‘threefold condition’ of the ‘identity of the facts, the unity of the 
offender and the unity of the legal interest protected’. This means that 
the threefold condition of the ECJ to define the idem element is not in 
line with the idem factum definition of the ECtHR as established 
recently in the Zolutukhin case29. The fact that the ECJ seems to limit 
the ne bis in idem principle to double punishment and still accepts the 
accounting principle instead of barring the second punishment is 
another point of conflict with the ECtHR case law. These problems 
have not been solved by the actual competition Regulation 1/2003 
either30. This Regulation provides that, besides the European 
Commission, national competition authorities will also apply European 
competition rules, including the rules concerning enforcement (Article 
35). The European Commission and the national authorities will form a 
network based on close cooperation. In practice, conflicts of 
jurisdiction and problems regarding ne bis in idem should be avoided 
through best practices of cooperation, after which competition 
authorities can suspend or terminate their proceedings (Article 13). 
There is however no obligation, which means that double prosecution is 
not excluded as such. 
In the field of competition we cannot speak of a fully elaborated 
transnational ne bis in idem principle either. The legislator remained 
silent and the ECJ has been limiting the rationale of the principle, both 
when it comes to the definition of idem and the definition of double 
punishment. There has been no legislative action on the harmonization 
of the application of ne bis in idem in the domestic application and 
enforcement of EU law, such as for instance in areas of EU policies in 
which punitive penalties have been prescribed, like for instance in the 
area of common agricultural and fisheries policies. 
                                                          
28 Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and 
C-219/00 P, Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission, [2004] ECR I-123 (Cement). 
29 See Section 3.1 supra. 
30 Regulation no. 1/2003, OJ L 001, 04.01.2003. 
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4.2. The First Basis for a Regional Transnational Criminal Ne Bis In 
Idem Principle: The Schengen Space31 
Things started to change with the increasing integration in the field 
of justice and home affairs after the coming into force of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Ne bis in idem clauses were included in several instruments, 
imposing upon Member States the duty to respect the principle within 
their national jurisdiction when dealing with aspects of justice and 
home affairs. The Convention on the protection of the European 
Communities’ financial interests and its several protocols contain 
various provisions on ne bis in idem32 as does the Convention on the 
fight against corruption involving officials of the European 
Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union33. 
These clauses aim at respect for ne bis in idem in every single 
jurisdiction of the EU Member States and do not aim at any 
transnational regulation of the principle. 
In the 1980s, however, the European Justice Ministers of the former 
European Community (EC) were already fully aware that the deepening 
and widening of European integration would lead to an increase in 
cross-border crime and a need for transnational justice in Europe, going 
beyond the classic concepts of national jurisdiction. Within the 
framework of the European Political Cooperation34, before the coming 
into force of the Maastricht Treaty’s third pillar on justice and home 
affairs, the 1987 Convention on double jeopardy was elaborated 
between the Member States of the EC. This Convention dealt with the 
ne bis in idem principle in a transnational setting in the EC. The 
Convention has however been poorly ratified35, but its substance has 
                                                          
31 A. WEYEMBERGH, Le principe ne bis in idem: pierre d’achoppement de l’espace 
pénal européen?, in Cahiers de droit européen, 2004, pp. 337-375. 
32 OJ C 313, 23.10.1996, Art. 7. 
33 OJ C 195, 25.06.1997, Art. 10. 
34 J.A.E. VERVAELE, Fraud against the Community. The Need for European Fraud 
Legislation, Deventer-Boston, 1992, p. 345 and J.A.E. VERVAELE, A. KLIP (Eds.), 
European Cooperation between Tax, Customs and Judicial Authorities, The Hague, 
2002. 
35 The ne bis in idem Convention has been ratified by Denmark, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal and is provisionally applied between them. 
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been integrated into Chapter 3 (Articles 54-58) of the 
intergovernmental 1990 Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 1985 (CISA). These Schengen agreements were the 
conventional legal basis for enhanced cooperation in the fields of 
justice and home affairs. 
However, they had been elaborated by a minority of the EC states 
and outside of the legal framework of the EC. Nevertheless, The CISA 
Convention can be qualified as the first multilateral convention that 
establishes an international ne bis in idem principle as an individual 
right erga omnes, be it limited to the regional Schengen area. 
The ne bis in idem principle is laid down in Article 54 CISA as 
follows: 
A person whose trial has been finally disposed of in one Contracting 
Party may not be prosecuted in another Contracting Party for the same 
acts provided that, if a penalty has been imposed, it has been enforced, 
is actually in the process of being enforced or can no longer be enforced 
under the laws of the sentencing Contracting Party. 
From this reading it becomes clear that the application of ne bis in 
idem depends on an enforcement clause that refers to the effective 
application of the penalty in order to avoid impunity. 
Article 55 further limits the reach of Article 54 by introducing the 
possibility for Schengen States to include reservations at the moment of 
approval or ratification. Reservations can be made in relation to cases 
(a) where the acts to which the foreign judgment relates took place in 
whole or in part in its own territory; in the latter case, however, this 
exception shall not apply if the acts took place in part in the 
territory of the Contracting Party where the judgment was 
delivered; 
(b) where the acts to which the foreign judgment relates constitute an 
offence against national security or other equally essential interests 
of that Contracting Party; 
(c) where the acts to which the foreign judgment relates were 
committed by officials of that Contracting Party in violation of the 
duties of their office. 
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It is also clear that the Schengen ne bis in idem does not stand in the 
way of broader national protection, as Article 58 CISA provides that: 
The above provisions shall not preclude the application of broader 
national provisions on the ne bis in idem principle with regard to 
judicial decisions taken abroad. 
The transnational Schengen ne bis in idem principle is an important 
improvement and clearly shows that the increasing justice integration 
cannot be based solely and decisively on effective enforcement 
considerations. However, CISA is an intergovernmental scheme 
without judicial supervision and is limited to the common territory of 
the Schengen States and the Schengen States can use, and and indeed 
have used, Article 55 to limit the scope of the principle by introducing 
national territoriality clauses or broad interpretations of the essential 
interests of the national jurisdiction. Not all Schengen States were 
convinced that CISA was providing rights to citizens, as some of them 
refused to publish the text as a public source of legislation. 
4.3. From a Transnational Schengen Principle to a Transnational 
Union Principle and a EU Fundamental Right 
What was politically still impossible at the intergovernmental 
conference leading to the Maastricht Treaty became finally a reality 
with the coming into force in 1999 of the Amsterdam Treaty, albeit that 
it took until the last meeting of the Heads of State in Amsterdam to 
push it through. The Schengen intergovernmental agreements of 1985 
and 1990 and the related Schengen acquis were incorporated into EU 
Law through Protocol 19 annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam on 
European Union (TEU)36. Neither the Protocol, nor the Council 
Decision on the integration of the Schengen acquis37 refer to the 
reservations made under Article 55 CISA. The result was that the 
Schengen ne bis in idem of Chapter 3 CISA became a transnational ne 
                                                          
36 <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/borders-and- 
visas/schengen-agreements/index_en.htm> (last visited 31 May 2013). 
37 Council Decision of 20 May 1999 (1999/436/EC). 
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bis in idem principle for the Union in the area of justice and home 
affairs (third pillar), being part of the area of freedom, security and 
justice. Second, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU) also 
became a binding text, which means that the ne bis in idem provision of 
Article 50 CFREU became a binding fundamental right with a 
transnational reach in the EU. From the Amsterdam Treaty on the ECJ 
the ECJ was also entrusted with (limited) jurisdiction in the area. 
Article 50 CFREU stipulates: 
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally 
acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law. 
Although the wording of the article is very classic and seems to refer 
only to criminal offences, it is clear that the text has to be interpreted in 
the light of the case law of the ECtHR. Article 52(3) CFREU states 
clearly that the meaning and the scope of the Charter rights will be the 
same as the corresponding rights in the Convention. This means in 
concreto that the application of the Article 6 ECHR criminal charge 
concept, and the related Engel criteria, to the definition of ne bis in 
idem results in an Article 50 CFREU ne bis in idem principle that does 
apply to double punishment stemming from punitive administrative 
penalties and criminal penalties. The fact that the ECHR ne bis in idem 
has a domestic application only, and Article 50 CFREU an application 
within the scope of EU law (which can be domestic, transnational 
and/or at the European level) does not mean that we do not have a 
similar right with a similar function. Moreover, under Article 52(3) the 
EU can provide more extensive protection. That means that the ECJ 
case law providing for a wider protection than the ECtHR is perfectly 
compatible with Article 50 CFREU. This means that ECJ case law 
giving broader protection is fully in line with the Charter. 
At the moment of the integration of the Schengen ne bis in idem into 
the Union, the EU and its Member States were not only convinced of 
the need for a transnational ne bis in idem principle in the area of 
freedom, security and justice, given the diversity of the principle in 
each jurisdiction of the Member States and its domestic reach, but 
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stressed also the need for further legislation on the matter. In fact in the 
Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to 
implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of 
freedom, security and justice38 it is stated that measures will be 
established within five years of the entry into force of the Treaty ‘for 
the coordination of criminal investigations and prosecutions in progress 
in the Member States with the aim of preventing duplication and 
contradictory rulings, taking account of better use of the ne bis in idem 
principle’. In the Draft programme of measures for implementation of 
the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in civil and commercial 
matters39, the ne bis in idem principle is included among the immediate 
priorities of the EU. However, the EU Member States have been 
struggling and are still struggling until today with both aspects of the 
problem: What should be the rationale for and the reach of the ne bis in 
idem principle and what system should be put in place in order to settle 
conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal matters or to provide for 
mechanisms or criteria on which to make a deliberate choice of 
jurisdiction?40 In 2003 Greece came up with a proposal for a framework 
decision on ne bis in idem41 that had the aim of replacing Articles 54-58 
of the CISA by new EU legal rules in order to ensure uniformity in both 
the interpretation of those rules and their practical implementation. First 
of all, it is surprising that the proposal aims at codifying in EU law the 
Schengen reservation exceptions as general exceptions to the principle. 
Second, the drafters of the proposal have opted for an approach to the 
bis element of the principle that is not in line with the case law42 of the 
ECtHR. In fact, the proposal defines criminal offences as offences 
sensu stricto, thereby distinguishing them from administrative offences 
or breaches punished with an administrative fine on condition that they 
                                                          
38 OJ C 19, 23.01.1999, point 49(e). 
39 OJ C 12, 15.01.2001. 
40 S. GLESS, Beiweisrechtsgrundsätze einer grenzüberschreitenden Strafverfolgung, 
Baden-Baden, 2006. 
41 Initiative of the Hellenic Republic with a view to adopting a Council Framework 
Decision concerning the application of the ne bis in idem. 
42 M. LUCHTMAN, Choice of Forum in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in 
Utrecht Law Review, 2011, vol. 7 no. 1, pp. 74-101. 
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may be appealed before a criminal court. The proposal does prefer the 
German tradition of administrative criminal law 
(Ordnungswidrigkeiten) instead of applying the Article 6 Engel criteria 
on punitive sanctions. The initiative was discussed in the Council of 
Ministers, but the multitude of divergent opinions between Member 
States rapidly brought to light the unviability of this legislative solution. 
No new legislative initiatives, neither from the Commission nor from 
the Member States, have been submitted to the Council. Concerning the 
avoidance of ne bis in idem problems by settling, in due time, conflicts 
of jurisdiction, in 2005 the European Commission drafted a Green 
Paper on conflicts of jurisdiction and the principle of ne bis in idem in 
criminal proceedings43, preparing the way for a framework decision on 
the matter. Finally the Commission did not come up with a proposal. In 
2009 the Czech Presidency submitted a proposal for a framework 
decision on the prevention and settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction in 
criminal proceedings44. However, the content of the approved 
framework decision45 does not really contain any prioritisation of 
jurisdiction or stringent criteria for centralised prosecutions. It is very 
much concentrated on information exchange and mediation between 
Member States concerning jurisdiction issues. 
Once again, it fell to the European Court of Justice to assume its 
praetorian role and to fill the legal vacuum concerning many relevant 
legal points, related to the rationale and the scope of the principle, but 
also the transition from Schengen to the EU. In fact, at the very moment 
of the integration of Schengen into Union law several Schengen States 
had reservations in place. Finally, the relationship between the Charter 
                                                          
43 COM(2005) 696 final and Commission Staff working document SEC(2005) 
1767. See M. WASMEIER, N. THWAITES, The Development of Ne Bis In Idem into a 
Transnational Fundamental Right in EU Law: Comments on Recent Developments, in 
European Law Review, 2006, pp. 565-578. 
44 Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on prevention and settlement of 
conflicts of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings, Council Document 5208/09, 20 
January 2009 (hereinafter: original proposal on conflicts of jurisdiction). For the 
Explanatory Report, see Council Document 5208/09, ADD 2, Brussels, 20 January 
2009, 5208/09, Copen 7. 
45 Council Framework Decision of 30 November 2009 on prevention and settlement 
of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings (2009/948/JHA). 
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ne bis in idem clause of Article 50 and the Schengen ne bis in idem 
clauses have to be clarified. 
4.4. The Rationale and the Scope of the Transnational Ne Bis In Idem 
Principle Based on Article 54 CISA46 
From the joined cases of Gözütok and Brügge47 onwards the national 
courts have referred constantly to the ECJ for preliminary rulings under 
Article 35 TEU on the interpretation of Article 54 of the CISA, raising 
interesting questions48 on the rationale and scope of the bis element 
(Gözütok and Brügge, Miraglia49, Van Straaten50, Turansky51) and the 
related enforcement clause (Klaus Bourquain52 and Kretzinger53) and 
on the rationale and scope of the idem element (Van Esbroeck54, Van 
Straaten55, Gasparini56, Kretzinger57, Kraaijenbrink58 and Gasparini59). 
Due to the extensive case law of the ECJ we can deduce that the 
ECJ has given an autonomous interpretation to the principle, setting 
aside the rationale of the Schengen legislator. The new EU context has 
changed the rationale, scope and function of the ne bis in idem principle 
                                                          
46 A. WEYEMBERGH, Le Principe Non Bis In Idem: Une Contribution Essentielle De 
La CJUE, in COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Ed.), The Court of Justice 
and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on Sixty Years of Case-
Law, Den Haag, 2013, pp. 539-561. 
47 Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 (Request for a preliminary ruling from 
Oberlandesgericht Köln and Rechtbank Van Eerste Aanleg Te Veurne); Case C-187/01 
Hüseyin Gözütok and Case C-385/01 Klaus Brügge, [2003] ECHR I-5689. 
48 K. LIGETI, Rules on the Application of Ne Bis In Idem in the EU, in Eucrim, 2009, 
vol. no 1-2, pp. 37-43. 
49 Case C-469/03, 10 March 2005. 
50 Case C-150/05, 28 September 2006. 
51 Case C-491/07, 22 December 2008. 
52 Case C-297/07, 11 December 2008. 
53 Case C-288/05, 18 July 2007. 
54 Case C-436/04, 9 March 2006. 
55 Case C-150/05, 28 September 2006. 
56 Case C-467/04, 28 September 2006. 
57 Case C-288/05, 18 July 2007. 
58 Case C-367/05, 18 July 2007. 
59 Case C-467/04, 28 September 2006. 
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as it became part of the scheme of mutual trust in the EU area of 
freedom, security and justice. Due to this case law we can speak of a 
real transnational principle, as its application did not depend on further 
legislation or substantive harmonisation. Following this approach the 
ECJ has opted for an extensive application of the principle by not 
limiting the bis situation to final judgments but including out of court 
settlements on the merits of the case and by opting for a factual idem 
interpretation and not limiting the idem to de iure definitions of of legal 
qualifications or res judicata. However, the ECJ has elaborated its 
principle within the area of freedom, security and justice only and has 
not attempted to elaborate a harmonised approach with the ne bis in 
idem principle in the internal market/competition policy. This means 
that we cannot speak of a transnational ne bis in idem principle of the 
Union for all policy areas, but that we still have to make a distinction 
between the area of freedom, security and justice on the one side and 
the internal market/competition policy on the other. 
Nevertheless, the ECJ’s case law has had a harmonising impact 
beyond the EU, as it did inspire the ECtHR on some modalities of the 
principle. The most striking example can be found in the case 
Zolutuhkin v Russia, in which the Grand Chamber60 has referred very 
extensively to relevant comparative international law sources, including 
the ECJ case law on ne bis in idem in the field of competition law and 
in the field of justice and home affairs as well as the case law of the US 
Supreme Court on double jeopardy. The Court also admits that: ‘(…) 
the body of case-law that has been accumulated throughout the history 
of application of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 by the Court demonstrates 
the existence of several approaches to the question whether the offences 
for which an applicant was prosecuted were the same’61. The Court 
underlines the necessity of a harmonised interpretation of the idem 
element of the ne bis in idem principle, in the light of the variety of 
approaches in the case law of the Court in order to guarantee legal 
certainty, foreseeability and equality. The Court expressly opted for the 
idem factum approach: ‘Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood 
                                                          
60 Zolotukhin v Russia, 10 February 2009. 
61 Zolotukhin v Russia, 10 February 2009, Para. 70. 
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as prohibiting the prosecution or trial of a second “offence” in so far as 
it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same 
(…). The Court’s inquiry should therefore focus on those facts which 
constitute a set of concrete factual circumstances involving the same 
defendant and inextricably linked together in time and space, the 
existence of which must be demonstrated in order to secure a 
conviction or institute criminal proceedings’62. The harmonised concept 
of idem by the ECtHR is fully inspired by the idem definition of the 
ECJ, as elaborated in the area of freedom, security and justice in the 
EU. 
Thanks to the case law of the ECJ the ne bis in idem principle has 
become a living instrument of transnational protection in the common 
area of freedom, security and justice. However, due to the lack of 
binding criteria of choice of jurisdiction in criminal matters, the 
principle has also been converted into an improper mechanism for a 
preference of jurisdiction. The first jurisdiction that comes to a decision 
on the merit bars any further prosecution and punishment in the same 
case for the same person. As it stands there is no guarantee at all that 
the first jurisdiction is also the best placed jurisdiction, not only from 
the point of view of effective justice, but also from the point of view of 
the protection of the victim and even from the point of view of the 
suspect. In other words, the ne bis in idem principle cannot function 
properly in a common area without the coordination of jurisdiction and 
binding criteria on choice of jurisdiction and a proper allocation of 
cases in the common justice area. 
Finally, the ECJ has not been able to clarify all the legal aspects of 
the principle and there remain some striking differences with the case 
law of the ECtHR. From the case law of the ECtHR, also confirmed in 
the case Zolotukhin v Russia, we can deduce that the ECtHR defines the 
bis element as the commencement of a new prosecution, where a prior 
acquittal or conviction has already acquired the force of res judicata63. 
In other words, in the Strasbourg case law the ne bis in idem principle is 
not limited to double punishment, but also includes double prosecution. 
                                                          
62 Zolotukhin v Russia, 10 February 2009, Paras. 82 & 84. 
63 Zolotukhin v Russia, 10 February 2009, Para. 83. 
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In addition, the element of bis also includes the combination of two 
criminal charges in the sense of Article 6, for instance the imposition of 
a criminal punitive sanction and an administrative punitive sanction. In 
the case Zolotukhin v Russia64 the ECtHR qualified the first 
administrative offence, by using the Engel criteria, as penal for the 
purposes of Article 4 of Protocol 7, mostly due to the nature of the 
offence and the severity of the penalty imposed. We have already 
underlined that the case law of the ECJ, by accepting the accounting 
principle as compensation for double punishment65, is not in line with 
the case law of the ECtHR. There are however signs that the ECJ is 
aware of the problems and is willing to apply the ECtHR reasoning. 
Recently the ECJ has followed the ECtHR’s reasoning in the Bonda 
case66, dealing with the accumulation of a criminal sanction and the 
administrative exclusion of a subsidy in the field of the common 
agricultural policy. The ECJ applied the Engel criteria to the ne bis in 
idem principle of Article 4 of Protocol 7 and came to the conclusion 
that the exclusion of a subsidy is not criminal/punitive in nature and 
does not therefore trigger the ne bis in idem principle in this case. This 
means, however, that in the future the ECJ could come to the 
conclusion that some punitive administrative sanctions cannot be 
cumulated with criminal sanctions in EU law as a result of the 
prohibition of double penalties, an interpretation that would be fully in 
line with that adopted by the ECtHR. 
4.5. The EU Fundamental Right to Ne Bis In Idem in Article 50 
CFREU: Rationale, Limitations and Exceptions 
4.5.1. Applicability of Article 50 CFREU 
Due to Article 51(1) CRFREU the Charter applies to the institutions 
and bodies of the EU and to the Member States only when they are 
implementing EU law. Due to Article 6 TEU, the Charter has become 
binding as a primary source of EU law. However, the exact meaning of 
                                                          
64 Zolotukhin v Russia, 10 February 2009, Paras. 52-57. 
65 See Section 4.1, supra. 
66 Case C-489/10, Lukasz Marcin Bonda, 5 June 2012. 
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‘when they are implementing EU law’ and thus of the scope of 
application of the Charter ratione materiae in the Member States 
remains open, as the ECJ has not yet expressed a definitive opinion on 
the matter67. In their interventions in cases before the ECJ, however, 
some Member States are advocating a narrow interpretation, by which 
‘a connection with EU law, acting in the scope of EU law or in the field 
of application of EU law’, the actual criterion for the application of 
general principles of EU law, would not be enough to trigger the 
application of the Charter. 
The discussion is important for our topic, as it affects the scope of 
application of Article 50 CFREU. Some interesting cases dealing with 
the enforcement of EU policies in the domestic legal order of the 
Member States and ne bis in idem issues have been submitted to the 
ECJ since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
In Case C-617/10, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, one of the 
legal points of interest is exactly the field of the material application of 
the CFREU. The Swedish tax authorities had accused Mr Fransson of 
VAT irregularities and a related failure to comply with information 
obligations and in 2007 they had fined him with administrative tax 
penalties. In 2009 Mr Fransson was prosecuted for the same facts and 
faced punishment of up to six years’ imprisonment. The case was 
submitted by the Haparanda District Court to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling. In his opinion of 12 June 2012 Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón68 elaborated upon the interpretation of Article 51(1) CFREU. 
What does it mean when it is stated that the Member States are bound 
by the provisions of the Charter ‘only when they are implementing 
Union law?’ The AG pointed rather to continuity with the existing case 
law on the application of general principles of Community/Union law, 
which means ‘in the field of application of Union law’. This brought 
him to the following triad: scope-field of application-implementation. 
In his view, the competence of the Union to assume responsibility for 
                                                          
67 See also J. KOKOTT, CH. SOBOTTA, Die Charta der Grundrechte der 
Europäischen Union nach dem Inkrafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon, in Europäische 
Grundrechte Zeitschrift, 2010, pp. 265-271. 
68 Case C-617/10, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, 12 June 2012. 
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guaranteeing the fundamental rights vis-à-vis the exercise of a public 
authority by the Member States, when they are implementing Union 
law, must be explained by reference to a specific interest of the Union 
in ensuring that the exercise of public authority accords with the 
interpretation of fundamental rights by the Union69. However, he is of 
the opinion that the mere fact that such an exercise of public authority, 
expressly the power of the State to impose penalties in this particular 
case, if ultimately based on a provision of Union law, is not, in itself, 
sufficient for a finding that there is a situation involving the 
implementation of Union law. The result of his reasoning is that the 
link is not sufficient to transfer the review of any constitutional 
guarantees applicable to the exercise of that power from the sphere of 
the responsibility of the Member States to that of the Union70. The 
premise for finding that the Union has an interest in assuming 
responsibility for guaranteeing the fundamental right concerned in this 
case is the degree of connection between Union law, which is in 
principle being implemented, and the exercise of the public authority of 
the State. He considered the VAT Directive71 to be an extremely weak 
link and not, in any event, a sufficient basis for a clearly identifiable 
interest on the part of the Union in assuming responsibility for 
guaranteeing that specific fundamental right vis-à-vis the Union72. 
It is interesting to compare the opinion of Advocate General Cruz 
Villalón with the one of Advocate General Kokott in the similar Bonda 
case73. In this Polish case Bonda, accused of an incorrect declaration 
under the EU agricultural subsidy scheme, was excluded by the 
administrative Agricultural Restructuring and Modernisation Agency 
from receiving a EU subsidy for several years and was subsequently 
                                                          
69 Case C-617/10, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, 12 June 2012, point 40. 
70 Case C-617/10, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, 12 June 2012, points 40 & 54. 
71 Council Directive 2006/112/EC, OJ L 347, 28.11.2006. 
72 Case C-617/10, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, 12 June 2012, point 57. 
73 Case C-489/10, Lukasz Marcin Bonda, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 15 
December 2011, point 16. 
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convicted and given a suspended custodial sentence by the criminal 
district court. The appeal court decided, however, that the criminal 
proceedings against Bonda were inadmissible because of the ne bis in 
idem principle. After an appeal to the Supreme Court in the interest of 
the law, the Supreme Court referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. 
In my view the ne bis in idem problem is quite similar in the Bonda 
case and Fransson case, as in both cases there is a risk of double 
punitive penalties (administrative and criminal) in one jurisdiction. Is 
there a different degree of connection with the implementation of EU 
law? In the case of Bonda, there is a Commission regulation that 
explicitly imposes the exclusion of subsidies as an administrative 
sanction. However, criminal enforcement is not specifically prescribed 
by Union law and is thus only imposed under the general enforcement 
obligations of the ECJ (effet utile and effective, proportionate and 
deterrent sanctions)74. In the case of Fransson there is no explicit 
provision in the VAT Directive, but only a reference thereto in Article 
273: 
Member States may impose other obligations which they deem 
necessary to ensure the correct collection of VAT and to prevent 
evasion (…). 
In the case of VAT the Member States have in any case the duty to 
comply with the same enforcement obligations imposed by the ECJ, 
which means that this ‘may’ become a must and can include 
administrative and criminal penalties. 
In the Bonda case AG Kokott clearly underlined that the ne bis in 
idem principle enjoys the status of a fundamental right of the EU under 
Article 50 CFREU and that this case is within the scope of the 
Charter75, whatever interpretation – restrictive or not – may be given to 
the material scope of the Charter. Despite several references by AG 
Kokott to Article 50 CFREU as an applicable human right, the ECJ 
completely neglected Article 50 CFREU in its analysis and reasoning. 
                                                          
74 Case 68/88, Commission v Greece, 21 September 1989. 
75 Case C-489/10, Lukasz Marcin Bonda, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 15 
December 2011, points 13 & 16. 
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This is more than striking, as in both cases there is a substantial degree 
of connection with Union law. The scope and the interest are similar: an 
effective application and enforcement of the common agricultural 
policy and the common VAT regime. In case of the ineffective 
application of both, they potentially affect the budget of the Union. In 
other words, there is a direct link with the protection of the financial 
interest of the Union, which is one of the core interests of the Union, as 
laid down in Article 235 of the TFEU. 
From the point of view of the alleged party, in both cases his 
fundamental right to ne bis in idem protection is at stake not only as 
part of an enforcement policy of a sovereign state, but also as the 
consequence of the policy and enforcement choices of a Member State 
in applying and enforcing EU obligations. In other words we are not 
speaking here of a purely internal case falling outside the scope of the 
application of EU law. When we are aiming at the effective and 
equivalent protection of the financial interests of the Union, it is logical 
that we are aiming at equivalent human rights protection at the same 
time, as provided for by and under the Charter. This is a sufficient 
reason to trigger the material application of the Charter and to trigger 
the jurisdiction of the Court to ensure uniform application through 
preliminary rulings. 
In its judgment of 28 February 2013 in the Aklagaren v Hans 
Akerberg Fransson case the ECJ has excluded from the very start that 
Member States can act within the scope of EU law, but excluding the 
application of the Charter: 
21. Since the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must 
therefore be complied with where national legislation falls within the 
scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are covered 
in that way by European Union law without those fundamental rights 
being applicable. The applicability of European Union law entails 
applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter76. 
                                                          
76 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0617: 
EN:HTML> (last visited 31 May 2013). 
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It is clear to the Court that that tax penalties and criminal 
proceedings for tax evasion, such as those to which the defendant in the 
main proceedings has been or is subject because the information 
concerning VAT that was provided was false, constitute the 
implementation of EU directives and of Article 325 TFEU and, 
therefore, of EU law. The mere fact that the national legislation was not 
formally enacted to transpose the directive is not an argument as it 
enforces an EU obligation: imposing effective penalties for conduct 
prejudicial to the financial interest of the EU. 
Applied to the concrete case, the ECJ has underlined that the Charter 
does not preclude a Member State from imposing, for the same acts of 
non-compliance with declaration obligations in the field of VAT, a 
combination of tax penalties and criminal penalties. To assess whether 
tax penalties are criminal in nature the Engel criteria of the ECtHR, also 
clearly used in the Bonda case, are applicable. In this case, contrary to 
the case of Bonda77, the ECJ considered that it is for the referring court 
to determine, in the light of those criteria, whether the combining of tax 
penalties are punitive in character. When it is considered punitive, 
however, double punishment is barred by Article 50 CFREU. 
With its judgment in the Akerberg Fransson case the ECJ has 
confirmed the autonomous interpretation of Article 50 CFREU, its 
application to the national enforcement of EU legislation and its 
applicability to all punitive sanctioning in line with the Engel criteria on 
punitive sanctions. In other words Member States that do limit ne bis in 
idem, when implementing and enforcing EU law, to criminal law sensu 
stricto, will have to widen their scope of protection in order to include 
punitive administrative sanctioning. 
The Akerberg Fransson case is a national case of ne bis in idem 
application, but Article 50 CFREU has transnational effect. This means 
that Member States will have to face the transnational application of ne 
bis in idem for all punitive sanctioning in the EU when implementing 
and enforcing EU law. 
                                                          
77 In the Bonda case the administrative sanction was prescribed by the EU 
regulation and the referring court did ask for a ruling on the legal character of the 
sanction. 
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4.5.2. Limitations and Exceptions to the Ne Bis In Idem Principle: 
Claw-Back Clauses of National Sovereignty? 
Although Article 50 CFREU is a primary source of Union law, it 
does co-exist with Article 54 CISA, ne bis in idem clauses in the MLA 
and MR regimes, and Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR. Although these 
multiplicity of ne bis in idem clauses have different functions, they do 
not contribute to a comprehensive constitutional legal principle in the 
Union. Moreover, many of the ne bis in idem clauses outside of Article 
50 CFREU have a restricted application because of certain exceptions, 
derogations or reservations. In the MLA and MR regimes the ne bis in 
idem clause cannot only be optional, but is also limited by exceptions if 
it is mandatory. The same exceptions are also derogations or 
reservations to Protocol 7 ECHR or Article 54 CISA. In practice some 
Member States have formulated restricted or no application at all of ne 
bis in idem in the following situations: offences that have been 
committed on national territory (territoriality clause); the preclusion of 
punitive administrative sanctions from the scope of application; the 
interests of national security or other related interests and/or offences 
committed by national civil servants. 
Several national criminal courts have been obliged to deal with this 
legal patchwork, including the relationship between Article 50 CFREU 
and Article 54 CISA. In an interesting Italian case the judge of 
preliminary investigations of the Tribunal of Milan ruled on this 
matter78. In this case he had to decide on a committal procedure against 
two German suspects of a murder in Italy in 1989, for which they had 
already been sentenced to 5 years and 6 months imprisonment in 
Germany. After having served these German sentences and having used 
their EU right of freedom of movement, they were arrested and charged 
by the Italian prosecutorial authorities for the same facts. At the 
moment of ratifying the CISA provisions, Italy had used its prerogative 
to make a reservation79 under Article 55 CISA, in order to bar the 
application of Article 54 CISA when the acts to which the foreign 
                                                          
78 Tribunale di Milano, Ufficio del Giudice per le indagini preliminari, N. 12396/92 
RG N.R-N. 3351/94 RG G.I.P., 6 July 2011. 
79 Laid down in Article 7 of the Italian Legge n. 388/1993. 
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judgment relates took place in whole or in part in its own territory (the 
territoriality clause)80. 
The point of departure of the Italian judge was the Union interest in 
the freedom of movement within the area of freedom, security and 
justice. In his view Article 50 CFREU and Article 6 TEU that do not 
contain exceptions to the fundamental right and have direct and 
immediate application in the legal order of the Member States are de 
iure abrogated by the Schengen derogations. By applying his reasoning 
to the ne bis in idem principle of Article 50 CFREU and Article 6 TEU, 
he decided not to commit both suspects to trial81. 
It is a pity that the Italian judge did not submit his questions to the 
ECJ for a preliminary ruling, at least concerning the validity of the 
CISA reservations after the integration of the Schengen acquis in the 
Union (given the fact that they were not mentioned in the Schengen 
Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty and in the Council Decision on the 
Schengen integration), the applicability of Article 50 CFREU to the 
limitation on the freedom of movement and the consequences for the 
relationship with the CISA provisions on ne bis in idem. This can be 
seen as a missed opportunity to receive uniform answers from the ECJ. 
The Greek Supreme Court82 has ruled in the same sense as the 
Italian Milan Court judge. Greece had filed a reservation83 according to 
                                                          
80 Article 55(a) CISA. 
81 See C. AMALFITANO, Il principio del ne bis in idem tra Cass. e Carta dei Diritti 
fondamentali dell’unione Europea, in Cassazione Penale, 2012, 11. 
82 The Greek Supreme Court (Areopag) sitting as a full bench, Judgment 
No. 1/2011 of 9 June 2011. 
83 Ratification Statute No. 2514/1997, OG Α 140, ‘The Hellenic Republic declares, 
in accordance with Article 55 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen 
Agreement, that it shall not be bound by Article 54 of the Convention in the following 
cases: 1. where the acts to which the foreign judgment relates took place in whole or in 
part in Greek territory. This exception shall not apply if the acts took place in part in the 
territory of the Contracting Party where the judgment was delivered; 2. where the acts 
to which the foreign judgment relates were committed by officials of Greece in 
violation of the duties of their office; 3. where the acts to which the foreign judgment 
relates constitute one of the following offenses under Greek law: a. offenses against the 
State (Articles 134-137quinquies CC); b. acts of treason (Articles 138-152 CC); 
c. offenses against political institutions and the Government (Articles 157-160 CC); 
d. offenses against the President of the Republic (Article 168 CC); e. offenses against 
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Article 55 CISA to exempt inter alia drug trafficking offences from the 
application of the ne bis in idem rule. The Hellenic Supreme Court 
linked the ne bis in idem protection to the principle of the mutual 
recognition of court judgments and orders. The Court considered 
Article 50 CFREU to be a directly applicable provision that does not 
need further harmonisation to be triggered and it came to the conclusion 
that the reservations by Greece under Article 55 CISA had been 
repealed by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
CFREU. 
The German criminal courts have had to deal with cases in which a 
penalty had been imposed against a person, but not enforced or was in 
the process of being enforced. The enforcement clause is a substantial 
part of Article 54 CISA, but is not mentioned in Article 50 CFREU. 
The German District Court of Aachen84 and the German Federal Court 
of Justice85 decided that due to Article 52(1) CFREU the rights 
enshrined in the Charter can be restricted by laws that respect the 
essence of the Charter. In their view Article 54 CISA represents such a 
restriction, by which Article 50 CFREU only applies in accordance 
with Article 54 CISA. This interpretation has been confirmed by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court86. None of these courts have 
submitted a preliminary ruling to the ECJ, however. 
The interpretation by the Hellenic Supreme Court and the Milan 
district court aim at the effective protection of the ne bis in idem right 
in a common area of freedom, security and justice, without any 
restrictions stemming from the intergovernmental cooperation regime 
                                                                                                                               
military service and conscription (Articles 202-206 CC); f. acts of piracy (Article 215 
of the Maritime Code); g. offenses against currency (Articles 207-215 CC); h. illicit 
trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; i. offenses against antiquities 
and Greek cultural heritage; 4. where the acts to which the foreign judgment relates fall 
under international conventions signed and ratified by the Greek State’. 
84 52 Ks 9/08-‘Boere’, Decision of 8 December 2010. See C. BURCHARD, 
D. BRODOWSKI, The Post-Lisbon Principle of Transnational Ne Bis In Idem: On the 
Relationship between Article 50 Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 54 
Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement, in New Journal of European 
Criminal Law, 2010, 1, no. 3, pp. 310-327. 
85 Decision of 25 October 2010 (BGH-1 StR 57/10). 
86 1 BVerfG 15 December 2011, 2 BvR 148/11 Para. No. 43. 
CHAPTER 5 
 200 
under Schengen. They have opted for an autonomous application and 
interpretation of Article 50 CFREU. However, they have not dealt with 
the material scope of the Charter, as defined under Article 51(1) 
CFREU. What does it mean when Member States are only bound by the 
Charter when implementing EU law? Is the fact that restrictions to the 
ne bis in idem right affect the freedom of movement within the EU 
enough to trigger the application of the Charter?87 At least the question 
should have been tackled and answered or should have been submitted 
to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. 
It think that they are right, however, when they consider that the 
reservations under the CISA, being reservations of sovereign states, and 
not restrictions decided by EU Member States, make little sense in the 
common area of freedom, security and justice and should be set aside. 
The interpretation by the German Courts is problematic from other 
points of view, however. First of all, the restrictions on the rights have 
been made in an intergovernmental context, not in a common context of 
the area of freedom, security and justice. To which extent does the 
enforcement clause make sense in the area of freedom, security and 
justice? The clause is also not included in Article 4 of Protocol 7 
ECHR. In any case restrictions to the right are only acceptable under 
Article 52(1) if they comply with four conditions: legality, respect for 
the essence of the right protected, necessity and proportionality88. 
Second, the interpretation by the German Courts limits the scope of 
Article 50 CFREU for the area of freedom, security and justice through 
Article 54 CISA. This means that the limitation is of no value for other 
EU areas, such as in the field of the internal market and competition 
policy. The result is a diverging application of Article 50 CFREU. 
Although Article 4 of Protocol 7 ECHR has no transnational 
application as is the case with Article 50 CFREU, it can lead to 
conflicting situations for Member States, as Article 50 CFREU can also 
apply in domestic situations only. What happens if Member States have 
not ratified Protocol 7 ECHR or have formulated a reservation as to its 
application and are not willing to accept the application of the ne bis in 
                                                          
87 See for instance, Case C-256/11, Murat Dereci, 15 November 2011. 
88 A. WEYEMBERGH, supra note 31, point 3.1. 
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idem principle to the bis combination of punitive administrative and 
criminal penalties? This is however how the principle has been filled in 
by the ECtHR and is thus the basic line of Article 50 CFREU. In my 
opinion Article 50 CFREU de facto sets aside the non-ratification of 
declarations or reservations, as long as the Charter applies in a domestic 
situation of the ne bis in idem right. In such a case all Member States 
should apply the substance of Article 50 CFREU, in line with Article 4 
of Protocol 7 ECHR. It would be a strange situation that in a common 
area of freedom, security and justice national reservations could still 
prevail as a claw-back clause concerning a fundamental right of 
primary law89. 
5. Conclusion 
In the EU do we today have an equivalent transnational protection 
of ne bis idem that applies both in the vertical and horizontal dimension 
of European integration? We have come to the conclusion that neither 
the domestic ne bis in idem principle, nor the public international law 
equivalent in human rights conventions or in MLA conventions can 
offer this protection. 
Within the proper EU context we have a multiple set of ne bis in 
idem with a transnational character: a general principle of EU law in 
competition law; Article 54 CISA in the area of freedom, security and 
justice; provisions in MLA and MR instruments; and Article 50 
CFREU. The ECJ has elaborated Article 54 CISA into a real 
transnational human rights principle. However, Article 54 CISA does 
not apply in all fields of EU policy and law, as it is limited to the area 
of freedom, security and justice and it remains unclear even in that area 
if the derogations and reservations of the former Schengen States are 
still of any legal value. 
It would be logical if the ne bis in idem principle of primary EU law, 
Article 50 CFREU, would become the overall transnational ne bis idem 
                                                          
89 A contrario, Case C-617/10, Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of 
AG Cruz Villalón, 12 June 2012. 
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principle for all EU policies, both at the EU level and in the States, 
when acting within the scope or field of application of EU law. 
However, it remains unclear, as it stands, whether the ECJ is willing to 
follow this interpretation and to use the Charter as an autonomous 
standard of applicable human rights in the Member States, when acting 
within the scope of Union law. It also remains unclear whether the ECJ 
is willing to elaborate a unified and comprehensive ne bis in idem 
principle at the EU level for all EU policies and law. The ECJ should 
follow the reasoning of AG Sharpston in the Zambrano case90 by which 
she advocates applying the Charter in all fields of competence that have 
been conferred upon the EU (exclusive or shared). The applicability of 
EU fundamental rights would neither be dependent on the direct 
applicability of a specific Treaty provision nor on the adoption and 
implementation of EU secondary law91. 
The divergent rationale and scope of the principle in the area of 
competition policy and criminal justice has been upheld by the ECJ. 
One may wonder if this is compatible with Article 50 CFREU. Does ne 
bis in idem have another function when enforcing competition rules in 
the internal market than in the area of freedom, security and justice? I 
doubt it. Moreover, in both situations ne bis in idem and choice of 
jurisdiction (allocation of cases) are intertwined. In both situations the 
EU legislator has competence to regulate on conflicts of jurisdiction. 
However, the ECJ has shown that it is aware of the need for 
consistency, at least in the area of justice and home affairs. 
Traditionally, as we have seen under 2.3, ne bis in idem can be a 
(mandatory or optional) ground of refusal or a ground for non-
execution within the framework of MLA requests or MR orders. Article 
54 CISA does not deal as such with MLA or MR, as the material scope 
of its application is not dependent on requests or orders. Recently, in 
the Mantello case92, the ECJ has clearly opted for a converging 
                                                          
90 Case C-34/09, Zambrano, 8 March 2011. 
91 See E. MUIR, A.P. VAN DER MEI, The “EU Citizenship Dimension” of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, in M. LUCHTMAN (Ed.), Choice of Forum in 
Cooperation against Eu Financial Crime, Utrecht, 2013, pp. 123-142. 
92 Case C-261/09, Gaetano Mantello, 6 November 2010. See for comments on the 
case J. OUWERKERK, Case C-261/09, Criminal Proceedings against Gaetano Mantello, 
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approach, linked to shared objectives in the area of freedom, security 
and justice: 
In view of the shared objective of Article 54 of the CISA and Article 
3(2) of the Framework decision, which is to ensure that a person is not 
prosecuted or tried more than once in respect of the same acts, it must 
be accepted that an interpretation of that concept given in the context of 
the CISA is equally valid for the purposes of the Framework 
Decision93. 
The result is in concreto that the idem definition based on idem 
factum is now the standard not only for CISA cases but also for MLA 
and MR cases and has also become the standard under Article 4 of 
Protocol 7 ECHR. It is thus clear that Article 50 CFREU can here rely 
on a common approach in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
However, the problem remains that this standard does not yet apply to 
Union policies outside of the area of freedom, security and justice such 
as the internal market and competition policy. 
We do not only have a problem with the scope of application in the 
EU, but also with the rationale of the principle. In sovereign state 
interests it seems that in the area of freedom security still prevails over 
the fundamental rights of citizens and legal persons. 
The legal battle on the status and legal value of reservations to the 
CISA ne bis in idem and to Article 4 Protocol 7 ECHR in relation to 
Article 50 CFREU is a good example. Member States have to accept 
that the intergovernmental state-orientated approach, excluding the 
individual as a subject of rights, is no longer compatible with the basic 
concepts of the area of freedom, security and justice. The model of 
international cooperation between states in criminal matters has been 
replaced by a shared policy between the EU and Member States in 
dealing with transnational criminal justice. The individual has become a 
subject with rights and obligations in relation to transnational criminal 
                                                                                                                               
Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 16 November 2010, in CMLR, 
2011, 48, no. 5, pp. 1687-1701. 
93 Point 40. 
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justice in the area of freedom, security and justice94. The Article 54 
CISA and Article 50 CFREU ne bis in idem principles do not depend 
on the harmonization of substantive procedural criminal law or on 
applicable schemes of MLA or MR cooperation. It is a fundamental 
right that is no longer connected to the respective jurisdictions of each 
Member State and thus creates subjective rights for EU citizens and 
legal persons in the Union. In transnational cases there is always a clear 
link with the freedom of movement of persons. That freedom can be 
restricted for proportionate and justified reasons in concrete cases. It is 
however unacceptable under EU law that a restrictive interpretation of 
the material scope of Article 50 CFREU would result in a structural 
limitation on the freedom of movement because of the risk of double 
jeopardy. The right to ne bis in idem can no longer depend in a single 
area of freedom, security and justice on sovereign claims of national 
jurisdiction based on national territoriality clauses. Claw-back 
provisions inspired by national sovereignty are undermining the basics 
of a common area. 
The fundamental right to ne bis in idem is of course not absolute and 
can be restricted. The restrictions must however be clearly foreseeable 
and serve a legitimate aim in the area of freedom, security and justice in 
the EU. It is not enough that they serve that aim in the single 
jurisdiction of one Member State. For this reason the EU Member 
States must be compelled to set aside the reservations and to elaborate a 
common European scheme, and/or the ECJ has to clarify the legal 
situation from the common EU perspective. 
The legal framework of the Treaties (TEU and TFEU) offers a good 
opportunity to elaborate a transnational constitutional ne bis in idem 
principle that can protect citizens and legal persons at the EU level and 
in Member States (both in the vertical and horizontal dimension). Given 
the increasing impact of EU regulation both in the jurisdictions of the 
Member States and in the transnational EU setting, there is a real need 
for such a transnational application. 
                                                          
94 A. ESER ET AL. (Eds.), The Individual as Subject of International Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters. A Comparative Study, Baden-Baden, 2002. 
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We must however be aware of the fact that the rationale of a 
transnational ne bis in idem principle is not to prevent and settle 
conflicts of jurisdiction95, nor to allocate prosecution and adjudication 
in punitive proceedings in the EU. A proper EU system of prevention 
and choice of jurisdiction is necessary in the interest of justice, but also 
in the interest of citizens and legal persons, as it can avoid many 
problems of double prosecution and punishment. 
Finally, the EU has embarked on the task of providing real 
transnational ne bis in idem protection within the common territory. 
When it comes to ne bis in idem problems between EU countries and 
third countries or outside the EU we fall back on the provisions in MLA 
treaties or in specific agreements (like in the competition field). In other 
words ne bis in idem protection is regionalizing in the EU, but not 
globalizing and so it is not yet a general principle of transnational 
criminal justice. 
                                                          
95 M. LUCHTMAN, Transnational Law Enforcement in the European Union and the 
Ne Bis In Idem Principle, in Review of European Administrative law, 2011, 4, pp. 5-29 
and M. LUCHTMAN (Ed.), Choice of Forum in Cooperation against EU Financial 
Crime, Utrecht, 2013. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
THE APPLICATION OF THE EU CHARTER 
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (CFR) 
AND ITS NE BIS IN IDEM PRINCIPLE 
IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EU1 
1. Introduction 
With the growing impact of EU regulation and enforcement in the 
Member States, the increased mobility of persons, goods, services and 
capital and the related judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the 
EU, there is an increasing risk that a (legal) person might suffer double 
jeopardy or be prosecuted and/or be punished twice. This can happen at 
the national level when enforcing EU policies, at the transnational level 
when several EU Member States use their jurisdiction or at the vertical 
level, when jurisdiction is triggered both by a Member State and the 
European Commission (such as punitive competition proceedings). 
The ne bis in idem principle is a general principle of (criminal) law 
in many national legal orders, sometimes even codified as a 
constitutional right, such as in Article 103 of the German Constitution. 
Historically the ne bis in idem principle only applies nationally and is 
limited to criminal justice, this means precluding application to punitive 
administrative enforcement. There is also no general rule of 
international law that imposes an obligation to comply with ne bis in 
idem2. It has a conventional source, thus depends solely on the content 
of the international treaties. In recent decades the ne bis in idem 
                                                          
1 This article has been published as J.A.E. VERVAELE, The Application of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and its Ne bis in idem Principle in the Member 
States of the EU, in Review of European Administrative Law, 2013-1, Vol. 6, pp. 113-
134. 
2 Also underlined by German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BVerfG 15 December 
2011, 2 BvR148/11, par. no. 31. 
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principle has become an important principle of judicial protection for 
the citizen against the ius puniendi of the state and as such forms part of 
the principles of due process and a fair trial. The protective scope of the 
principle was widened from a principle to guarantee legal certainty into 
a fundamental right protecting against cumulative criminal 
punishment3. 
We do find international public law treaty-based ne bis in idem 
provisions in three sources: (1) international human rights law (IHRL) 
and the EU CFR; (2) international criminal tribunal law and 
(3) multilateral treaties dealing with judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, also called mutual legal assistance (MLA) and EU instruments 
of mutual recognition (MR) in criminal matters4. 
The ECHR did not contain a ne bis in idem provision, but it has 
been elaborated in Article 4 of the 7th Protocol to the ECHR5: 
1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence 
for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in 
accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State. 
2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the 
reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of the State concerned, if there is evidence of new or 
newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect in 
the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the 
case (…). 
                                                          
3 See the excellent Phd of J. LELIEUR-FISCHER, La règle ne bis in idem. Du principe 
de l’autorité de la chose jugée au principe d’unicité d’action répressive, Paris, 2005 
Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris I) (not published). 
4 I will not deal with the MLA or MR ne bis in idem provisions, as they only apply 
to criminal matters and are only triggered when MLA requests or MR orders have been 
issued. 
5 “1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings 
under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been 
finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that 
State. 2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the reopening of 
the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the State concerned, if there 
is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been a fundamental defect 
in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the case. 3. No 
derogation from this Article shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention”. 
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The ECtHR has widened the scope of the ne bis in idem principle to 
punitive proceedings and penalties, in fact by applying the Engel-
criteria6 for the qualification of (double) punitive proceedings. 
However, the protocol is not binding for all EU Member States. 
Neither the Netherlands nor Germany has ratified this Protocol. The 
UK is the only member of the Council of Europe that did not even sign 
it. Moreover, countries like France and Luxembourg have formulated 
reservations when ratifying. Many EU countries have also deposited 
limiting declarations at the time of signature. It is clear that several EU 
countries7, like Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands 
have limited the scope of application of the principle by precluding its 
application to punitive penalties outside of the area of criminal law. 
Germany for instance has done this in line with Article 103 of its 
Constitution. Moreover, the ECHR ne bis in idem provision does only 
apply in the jurisdiction of every single State, excluding transnational 
effect. 
Might citizens and legal persons expect to be protected against ne 
bis in idem in a setting of an integrated internal market and a common 
area of freedom, security and justice and if so, does the standard of 
protection also apply in the legal order of one Member State, when EU 
regulation and enforcement is in play? 
It comes as no surprise that the European Community stumbled over 
the issue of the (transnational) application of the ne bis in idem 
principle before the coming into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and 
the justice and home affairs policy when dealing with enforcement of 
community policies. In the field of competition policy we do have a 
system of direct enforcement by the European Commission, but one 
that can be combined with indirect enforcement by national competition 
authorities. Both can impose punitive administrative sanctions8. In 
                                                          
6 Engel v the Netherlands, Judgment ECtHR, 8 June 1976 & Öztürk v Germany, 
Judgment ECtHR, 21 February 1984. 
7 See the overview of declarations and reservations at http://www.conventions.coe. 
int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=117&CM=8&DF=11/01/2013&CL=EN 
G&VL=1, status 11.01.2013. 
8 W. WILS, The Principle of ‘Ne Bis In Idem’ in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal 
and Economic Analysis, in World Competition, 2003/2. 
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some countries criminal courts have jurisdiction in competition cases as 
well. The risk of double punitive penalties is thus more than real for the 
legal persons concerned. Meanwhile, the CJEU s case law is clear in 
confirming the ne bis in idem principle as a general principle of 
Community law9, which means that it is not limited to criminal 
sanctions but also applies to punitive administrative proceedings, such 
as the ones in the competition policy. However, the CJEU has its own 
interpretation of the principle, as it does not exclude double 
prosecution, nor the imposition of double punishment. In cases of 
imposition of two consecutive sanctions, any previous punitive decision 
has to be taken into account in determining any sanction which it to be 
imposed (Anrechnungsprinzip)10. Moreover the CJEU has avoided 
applying the Engel-criteria to competition sanctions. Furthermore, in 
Cement11, the CJEU made the application of the general principle of ne 
bis in idem to the area of EC competition law subject to a ‘threefold 
condition’ of ‘identity of the facts, unity of offender and unity of the 
legal interest protected. This CJEU definition of the idem element is not 
in line either with the idem factum definition of the ECtHR as 
established recently in the Zolotukhin case12. In other words, we cannot 
speak of a fully elaborated ne bis in idem principle in the area of 
competition that is in line with the ECtHR case law. Apart from 
competition cases indirect enforcement by the Member States is the 
basic rule. In some of these areas, such as the common agricultural and 
fisheries policies, the EU has not only prescribed detailed regulation but 
also enforcement obligations, including detailed punitive penalties. 
                                                          
9 See for instance Judgment of 14.12.1972, Boehringer Mannheim/Commission 
(Rec. 1972, p. 1281) (DK1972/00323 GR1972-1973/00313 P 1972/00447 ES1972/ 
00261 SVII/00061 FIII/00059) and Judgment of the Court of 15 October 2002. 
Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij NV (LVM) (C-238/99 P), DSM NV and DSM 
Kunststoffen BV (C-244/99 P), Montedison SpA (C-245/99 P), Elf Atochem SA (C-
247/99 P), Degussa AG (C-250/99 P), Enichem SpA (C-251/99 P), Wacker-Chemie 
GmbH and Hoechst AG (C-252/99 P) and Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) (C-
254/99 P) v Commission of the European Communities. 
10 Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt, Judgment of 13 February 1969, [1969] ECR 3. 
11 Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and 
C-219/00 P Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission [2004] ECR I-123 (Cement). 
12 Zolotukhin v Russia, Judgment ECtHR, 10 February 2009. 
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There has been no EU legislative action to harmonise the application of 
ne bis in idem when it comes to national enforcement of these EU 
policies. In some exceptional cases the EU legislator has regulated the 
interaction between administrative and criminal prosecution13. 
The ne bis in idem principle in the EU became clearly visible with 
the CJEU ’s new case law in relation to Articles 54-58 of the 1990 
intergovernmental Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement 
of 1985 (CISA), as integrated by the Amsterdam Treaty in the third 
pillar. The relevance of the case law of the CJEU14, is limited to the 
area of freedom, security and justice and is dealing with the 
transnational ne bis in idem in criminal matters, as elaborated in Article 
54 of the CISA. It does thus not deal as such with the ne bis in idem 
application related to the enforcement of harmonised EU policies (the 
former first pillar) into one jurisdiction. 
We had to wait for the Lisbon Treaty in order to have a binding ne 
bis in idem principle for all enforcement of EU law, be it direct or 
indirect, in a single jurisdiction or a transnational one. This principle 
has been provided for in Article 50 CFR. Pursuant to Srticle 6 TEU, the 
Charter is now binding as a primary source of EU law. Article 50 
CFREU stipulates: 
No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings for an offence for which he or she has already been finally 
acquitted or convicted within the Union in accordance with the law. 
This provision triggers two main questions. Who are the addressees 
of the provision and what is exactly the content. Concerning the 
addressees there is little doubt about the actors of direct enforcement at 
the EU level, as due to Article 51(1) CFR the Charter applies to the 
institutions and bodies of the EU. The problem, however, arises when it 
comes to the application of the CFR and its ne bis in idem principle in a 
                                                          
13 Council Regulation 2988/95 of 18th December 1995 on the protection of the 
European Communities financial interest, Article 6, OJ L 312, p. 1-4. 
14 J.A.E. VERVAELE, The Transnational Ne Bis In Idem Principle in the EU. Mutual 
Recognition and Equivalent Protection of Human Rights, 5th European Jurist’s Forum 
Budapest, 2010, p. 117-139. 
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frame of indirect enforcement and thus to domestic enforcement actors, 
as Article 51(1) CFR stipulates that the Charter only applies to Member 
States when they are implementing EU law. However, the exact 
meaning of ‘when they are implementing EU law’ and thus of the the 
scope of application of the Charter ratione materiae in the Member 
States is not further defined and leaves room for different 
interpretations. 
Concerning the content of the principle, it seems from a first reading 
that the wording of the Article is a traditional one, as it refers only to 
criminal offences. It is however, clear that the text must be interpreted 
in the light of the case law of the ECtHR, as Article 52(3) CFR states 
clearly that the meaning and the scope of the Charter rights will be the 
same as corresponding rights in the Convention. This means that the 
content of Article 50 CFR has to be interpreted in line with the scope 
and meaning of Article 4 of the 7th Protocol to the ECHR, as 
elaborated under the ECtHR case law. In concreto, does it mean that 
the scope of Article 50 CFREU includes, thanks to the Article 6 ECHR 
‘criminal charge concept’ and the related Engel-criteria, all punitive 
proceedings and sanctions and has thus to be applied to double 
punishment stemming from punitive administrative penalties and 
criminal penalties for instance? 
Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, deals exactly 
with these two main questions, and is the reason why the importance of 
the case goes far beyond the technicalities of the area and can thus be 
qualified as a landmark CJEU case and reason why the Advocate 
General states that “behind the apparent simplicity of the case – 
punishment of a fisherman operating in the Gulf of Bothnia for failure 
to comply with tax obligations – the present reference for a preliminary 
ruling raises two particularly tricky issues for the Court and a rather 
perplexing situation”15. 
                                                          
15 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, delivered on 12 June 2012, point 1. 
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2. The Facts of the Case and Proceedings before the National Courts 
Mr Fransson is a self-employed worker whose main activities are 
fishing and the sale of white fish. The Swedish tax authorities 
(Skatteverket) accused Mr Fransson of failing to comply with the 
obligation to provide tax information in the fiscal years 2004 and 2005, 
inter alia concerning VAT taxes. As regards the VAT assessment, the 
Swedish tax authorities calculated that the information provided by Mr 
Fransson entailed a loss of revenue to the tax authorities totaling SEK 
60,000 in the fiscal year 2004 and SEK 87,550 in the fiscal year 2005. 
In 2007 the Swedish tax authorities imposed a fine on Mr Fransson for 
tax offences committed in the fiscal year 2004, of which SEK 4,872 
relates to the VAT offence. As concerns the fiscal year 2005, they 
determined a different fine, of which SEK 3,255 relates to the VAT 
offence. No appeal was lodged against either the penalty for 2004 or the 
penalty for 2005 and those penalties became final in 2010 and 2011, 
respectively. 
In 2009 Mr. Fransson was summoned to appear before the 
Haparanda District Court (Haparanda tingsrätt) on charges of serious 
tax offences, including the VAT tax offences for 2004 and 2005, for 
which he had been fined by the Swedish Tax authorities. In accordance 
with the law on tax offences (Skattebrottslagen), the offence with which 
Mr Fransson is charged is punishable by up to six years imprisonment. 
Before the criminal court the question arises as to whether the charges 
brought against Mr Fransson must be dismissed on the ground that he 
has already been punished for the same acts in other proceedings, as the 
prohibition on being punished twice laid down by Article 4 of Protocol 
No 7 to the ECHR and Article 50 of the Charter would be infringed. 
The Haparanda District Court stayed the criminal proceedings brought 
against Mr Fransson, finding that there was a link with Union law, 
specifically Article 50 of the Charter which enshrines the fundamental 
right of ne bis in idem. The preliminary questions referred by the 
Haparanda District Court are worded as follows: 
(1) Under Swedish law there must be clear support in the European 
Convention of 4 November 1950 for the Protection of Human 
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) or the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights for a national court to be able to 
disapply national provisions which may be suspected of infringing 
the ne bis in idem principle under Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the 
ECHR and may also therefore be suspected of infringing Article 50 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 
December 2000 (“the Charter”). Is such a condition under national 
law for disapplying national provisions compatible with European 
Union law and in particular its general principles, including the 
primacy and direct effect of European Union law? 
(2) Does the admissibility of a charge of tax offences come under the ne 
bis in idem principle under Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to the ECHR 
and Article 50 of the Charter where a certain financial penalty (tax 
surcharge) was previously imposed on the defendant in 
administrative proceedings by reason of the same act of providing 
false information? 
(3) Is the answer to Question 2 affected by the fact that there must be 
coordination of these sanctions in such a way that ordinary courts 
are able to reduce the penalty in the criminal proceedings because a 
tax surcharge has also been imposed on the defendant by reason of 
the same act of providing false information? 
(4) Under certain circumstances it may be permitted, within the scope 
of the ne bis in idem principle mentioned in Question 2, to order 
further sanctions in fresh proceedings in respect of the same 
conduct which was examined and led to a decision to impose 
sanctions on the individual. If Question 2 is answered in the 
affirmative, are the conditions under the ne bis in idem principle 
for the imposition of several sanctions in separate proceedings 
satisfied where in the later proceedings there is an examination of 
the circumstances of the case which is fresh and independent of the 
earlier proceedings? 
(5) The Swedish system of imposing tax surcharges and examining 
liability for tax offences in separate proceedings is motivated by a 
number of reasons of general interest, which are described in 
greater detail below. If Question 2 is answered in the affirmative, is 
a system like the Swedish one compatible with the ne bis in idem 
principle when it would be possible to establish a system which 
would not come under the ne bis in idem principle without it being 
necessary to refrain from either imposing tax surcharges or ruling 
on liability for tax offences by, if liability for tax offences is 
relevant, transferring the decision on the imposition of tax 
surcharges from the Skatteverket and, where appropriate, 
administrative courts to ordinary courts in connection with their 
examination of the charge of tax offences? 
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Given the importance of the case, written observations were 
submitted by Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, the Czech Republic, 
the Republic of Austria, Ireland and the European Commission and at 
the hearing before the Court the agents of the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, France, the Netherlands and the 
Commission intervened. 
3. The Advocate General’s Opinion 
3.1. Jurisdiction and Applicability of the CFR 
Advocate General (AG) Cruz Villalón first deals with the question 
of the jurisdiction of the Court linked to the question of applicability of 
the CFR in this case. The AG is aware of the fact that the Court is again 
faced with the request for clear criteria to determine the scope of CFR 
in the Member States, related to the expression ‘implementation of 
Union law by the Member States’ and that several other AG’s have 
expressed diverging views on the matter16. He also takes into account 
that several Member States and the European Commission defended in 
their interventions the non-applicability of the Charter in this domestic 
case. Problems arise further concerning the fact that the wording of the 
Charter (‘implementation’) is different from the wording of the CJEU 
case law (‘field of application’ or ‘scope’) and that all of these 
wordings have an open meaning. The AG points rather to continuity 
with the existing case law on the application of general principles of 
Community/Union law, which means ‘in the field of application of 
Union law’. 
This brought him to the following triad: scope-field of application-
implementation. In his view, the competence of the Union to assume 
responsibility for guaranteeing the fundamental rights vis-à-vis the 
                                                          
16 See, for example, the Opinion of Advocate General Bot in Case C-108/10 
Scattolon [2011] ECR I-0000; the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Case C-
34/09 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] ECR I-0000; the Opinion of Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro in Case C-380/05 Centro Europa 7 [2008] ECR I-349; and the Opinion of 
Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659. 
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exercise of a public authority by the Member States, when they are 
implementing Union law, must be explained by reference to a specific 
interest of the Union in ensuring that the exercise of public authority 
conforms to the interpretation of fundamental rights by the Union17. 
The AG elaborates reasoning in abstracto and reasoning in concreto. 
Under the former he concludes that there is a fundamental right of the 
Charter at stake. He also agrees that the power to impose penalties, as 
the exercise of public authority, must be exercised with respect for the 
general principles of Union law, including the CFR. However, he is of 
the opinion that the mere fact that such an exercise of public authority, 
expressly the power of the State to impose penalties in this particular 
case, if ultimately based on a provision of Union law, is not, in itself, 
sufficient for finding that there is a situation involving the 
implementation of Union law. The result of his reasoning is that the 
link is not sufficient to transfer the review of any constitutional 
guarantees applicable to the exercise of that power from the sphere of 
the responsibility of the Member States to that of the Union18. In 
concreto19 the fundamental question, in his view, is to analyse in the 
present proceedings the connection between Union law and the national 
law. Directive 2006/112 on the common system of VAT does not 
prescribe concrete administrative sanctions. There is only a requirement 
for effectiveness in the collection of VAT. On the other hand, the 
provision of false information to the tax authorities by taxable persons 
is punished in a general way, as an essential prerequisite of that system 
of penalties. It is that part of the Swedish tax system which is used for 
the purposes of collecting VAT. In his view there is no relationship of 
immediate or mediate causa between the directive and the Swedish tax 
penalties. He believes that a distinction must be made between the 
causa, whether immediate or not, and the simple occasio and the 
question is whether, as a result of this occasio, the Union judicature 
                                                          
17 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, 12 June 2012, point 40. 
18 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, 12 June 2012, point 40 and point 54. 
19 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, 12 June 2012, points 56-64. 
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must interpret the scope of the ne bis in idem principle in Swedish law, 
an interpretation which must take priority over the one which is derived 
from Sweden’s constitutional structure and international obligations. 
His view is clearly that it would be disproportionate to infer from this 
occasio a shift in the division of responsibility for guaranteeing the 
fundamental rights between the Union and the Member States and that 
the reference for a preliminary ruling from the referring court must not 
be regarded as a situation involving the implementation of Union law 
within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. The result of his 
reasoning is that the link is not sufficient to transfer the review of any 
constitutional guarantees applicable to the exercise of that power from 
the sphere of the responsibility of the Member States to that of the 
Union20. The premise for finding that the Union has an interest in 
assuming responsibility for guaranteeing the fundamental right 
concerned in this case is the degree of connection between Union law, 
which is in principle being implemented, and the exercise of the public 
authority of the State. He considered the VAT directive to be an 
extremely weak link and not, in any event, a sufficient basis for a 
clearly identifiable interest on the part of the Union in assuming 
responsibility for guaranteeing that specific fundamental right vis-à-vis 
the Union21. 
Accordingly, he proposes that the Court should declare that it lacks 
jurisdiction to give a ruling in these proceedings. 
3.2. Scope of Ne Bis In Idem Protection 
The AG sets aside the fifth question as a hypothetical one and 
regroups the remaining questions. Questions 2,3 and 4 all concern the 
content of the ne bis in idem principle. He first analyses the imposition 
of both administrative and criminal penalties in respect of the same 
facts in the light of Article 4 ECHR-PR 7. The AG refers to the Engel-
criteria and comes to the conclusion that they have been applied to tax 
                                                          
20 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, 12 June 2012, point 40 and point 54. 
21 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, 12 June 2012, point 57. 
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surcharges, including the surcharge provided for in Swedish law at 
issue in these proceedings22 and that the ECtHR has confirmed that this 
type of measure comes under the heading of a criminal penalty within 
the meaning of Articles 6 and 7 of the ECHR and, by extension, of 
Article 4 ECHR-PR 7. He also stresses that under the ECtHR case law, 
once it has been established that a penalty has been imposed in respect 
of the same acts, all new proceedings are prohibited provided that the 
first penalty has become final. It is irrelevant if the first penalty has 
been discounted from the second in order to mitigate the double 
punishment23. 
In summary, he comes to the conclusion that Article 4 ECHR-PR 7 
precludes measures for the imposition of both administrative and 
criminal penalties in respect of the same acts, thereby preventing the 
commencement of a second set of proceedings, whether administrative 
or criminal, when the first penalty has become final. He then analyses 
Article 50 CFR in the light of Article 4 ECHR-PR 7. Article 52(3) of 
the Charter provides that where the rights laid down in the Charter 
correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR ‘the meaning and scope 
of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention’. Given the fact that Article 4 is not or not fully applicable 
in all EU Member States and that many Member States do accept the 
double imposition of punitive administrative and criminal penalties in 
their legal order, it is his view that the proclamation in Article 52(3) of 
the Charter acquires its own definition when it is applied to the ne bis in 
idem principle and thus an autonomous interpretation. He concludes24 
that Article 50 of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that it 
does not preclude the Member States from bringing criminal 
proceedings relating to facts in respect of which a final penalty has 
already been imposed in administrative proceedings relating to the 
same conduct, provided that the criminal court is in a position to take 
                                                          
22 See Västberga Taxi Aktiebolag and Vulic v Sweden, Judgment of 23 July 2002, 
no. 36985/97, and Janosevic v Sweden, Judgment of 23 July 2002, ECHR 2002-VII. 
23 Tomasovic v Croatia, Judgment of 18 October 2011, no. 53785/09. 
24 Case C-617/10 Aklagaren v Hans Akerberg Fransson, Opinion of AG Cruz 
Villalón, 12 June 2012, point 96. 
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into account the prior existence of an administrative penalty for the 
purposes of mitigating the punishment to be imposed by it. 
The first question of the District Court concerns the compatibility 
with Union law of a criterion laid down in Swedish law, specifically in 
the case law of the Swedish Supreme Court, pursuant to which a 
Swedish provision which is contrary to the rights laid down in the 
Charter and the ECHR can only be set aside if there is a clear support in 
the provisions of the Charter and the ECHR and in the related case law. 
The AG makes a clear distinction between compatibility with the 
ECHR and with the Charter. The first is the compatibility with Union 
law of a criterion for the application of the ECHR in so far as it is an 
international agreement containing rights, which constitute general 
principles of the European Union legal system (Article 6(3) TEU). 
Secondly, the referring court asks about the compatibility of that 
criterion when it is extended to the application of the Charter and, 
therefore, to Union law. The referring District Court seems to be 
inspired by the different wording of Article 6(3) TEU and old Article 
6(2) EU. Article 6(2) EU stated that the Union: 
‘[S]hall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR, 
whereas the current wording provides that fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the ECHR ‘shall constitute general principles of the 
Union’s law’. 
Concerning the compatibility with the ECHR, the AG refers to the 
judgment of the CJEU in Kambera25, where the CJEU underlines the 
fact that Article 6(3) TEU simply reflects the Court’s settled case law 
and that the new wording of the provision does not alter the status of 
the ECHR in Union law and, therefore, nor does it do so in the legal 
systems of the Member States. For that reason the CJEU cannot carry 
out an assessment of the ‘clear support’ criterion, as applied by the 
Swedish Supreme Court to situations relating exclusively to the 
interpretation and application of the ECHR. 
Concerning the Charter, the AG believes that EU law must be 
interpreted as meaning that it does not preclude a national court from 
                                                          
25 Case C-571/10 [2012] ECR I-0000. 
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assessing, prior to setting aside a national provision, whether a 
provision of the Charter is ‘clear’, provided that that requirement does 
not hinder the national courts in exercising the powers of interpretation 
and disapplication assigned to them under Union law. 
4. The Court of Justice’s Ruling 
4.1. Jurisdiction and Applicability of the CFR 
The CJEU makes it clear from the very beginning that it is not 
willing to make a difference between “implementing EU law” under 
Article 51(1) CFR and the Court’s case law26 concerning the extent to 
which actions of the Member States must comply with the requirements 
flowing from the fundamental rights, including general EU principles, 
guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union27. The requirement 
to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the Union is 
therefore only binding on the Member States when they act in the scope 
of the Union. It is essential to the CJEU that applicability of Union law 
and applicability of fundamental rights go hand in hand: the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore be 
complied with where national legislation falls within the scope of 
European Union law; situations cannot exist which are covered in that 
way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being 
applicable. The applicability of EU law entails the applicability of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter28. 
The CJEU has no doubt about the applicability of EU law in the 
concrete case. The tax penalties and criminal proceedings to which Mr 
Fransson has been or is subject to are connected in part to breaches of 
his obligations to declare VAT and this VAT declarations are not only 
linked to the VAT directive 2006/112, but also to specific Treaty 
obligations. The CJEU refers to the Union loyalty under Article 4(3) 
                                                          
26 Case 5/88 (Wachauf), Jur. 1989, p. 2609 and case C-260/89 (ERT). Jur. 1991, 
p. I-2925. 
27 Point 18. 
28 Point 21. 
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TEU, by which every Member State is under an obligation to take all 
legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring the 
collection of all the VAT due on its territory and for preventing 
evasion29. The CJEU refers to Article 325 TFEU that obliges the 
Member States to counter illegal activities affecting the financial 
interests of the European Union through effective deterrent measures 
and, in particular, obliges them to take the same measures to counter 
fraud affecting the financial interests of the European Union as they 
take to counter fraud affecting their own interests. The CJEU leaves no 
doubt as to the application of Article 325 to the VAT-area. According 
to the CJEU, VAT revenue is part of the European Union’s own 
resources30 and there is a direct link between the collection of VAT 
revenue in compliance with the European Union law applicable and the 
availability to the European Union budget of the corresponding VAT 
resources, since any lacuna in the collection of the first potentially 
causes a reduction in the second31. For all these reasons the CJEU 
considers tax penalties and criminal proceedings for tax evasion, such 
as those which the defendant in the main proceedings has been or is 
subject to because the information concerning VAT that was provided 
was false, constitute implementation of the VAT directive and of 
Article 325 TFEU and, therefore, of European Union law, for the 
purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter. The fact that the national 
legislation upon which those tax penalties and criminal proceedings are 
based has not been explicitly adopted to transpose the VAT Directive 
cannot, in the CJEU ’s opinion, lead to another conclusion, since its 
application aims to implement and enforce the VAT Directive and the 
obligations imposed on the Member States by the Treaty to impose 
effective penalties for conduct prejudicial to the financial interests of 
the European Union. 
The CJEU concludes its analysis by stating that Member States 
remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental 
rights in cases where action of a Member State is not entirely 
                                                          
29 Case C-132/06 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-5457, paragraphs 37 and 46. 
30 Article 2(1-b) of Council Decision 2007/436/EC, Euratom of 7 June 2007 on the 
system of the European Communities’ own resources (OJ 2007 L 163). 
31 Case C-539/09 Commission v Germany [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 72. 
CHAPTER 6 
 222 
determined by European Union law. However, the CJEU clearly states 
that in any event the national standards of protection of fundamental 
rights must not only be in line with the level of protection provided for 
by the Charter, as interpreted by the CJEU, but also comply with the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of the EU (par. 60 Case C-399/11-
Melloni). 
Accordingly, the CJEU comes to the conclusion that it has 
jurisdiction to give a ruling in these proceedings. 
4.2. Scope of the Ne Bis In Idem Protection 
The CJEU follows the AG in relation to the fifth question and 
declares it inadmissible thanks to its hypothetical character. It also 
follows the regrouping of the other questions as proposed by the AG. 
The essence of question 2, 3 and 4 are, according to the CJEU, whether 
or not the ne bis in idem principle laid down in Article 50 CFR should 
be interpreted as precluding criminal proceedings for tax evasion from 
being brought against a defendant where a tax penalty has already been 
imposed upon him for the same acts of providing false information. 
The CJEU starts by emphasising that Article 50 CFR does not 
preclude a Member State from imposing, for the same acts of non-
compliance with declaration obligations in the field of VAT, a 
combination of tax and criminal penalties. It is only if the tax penalty is 
criminal in nature for the purposes of Article 50 CFR and has become 
final that that provision precludes criminal proceedings in respect of the 
same acts from being brought against the same person. Next, the CJEU 
applies without further delay the Engel-criteria of the ECtHR, criteria 
that is has recently made its own in the Bonda-case32: the legal 
classification of the offence under national law, the very nature of the 
offence and the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the 
person concerned is liable to incur. The assessment of the first tax 
penalty is criminal in nature in relation with the Bonda-criteria is left 
by the CJEU to the referring court, be it however with guidance. The 
                                                          
32 Case C-489/10 Bonda [2012] ECR I-0000, paragraph 37. 
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CJEU states33 that the referring court has to apply the Bonda-criteria to 
the national penalties and the relevant national standards and may come 
to the conclusion that double prosecution and punishment would violate 
the ne bis in idem principle, provided that the remaining penalties are 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive34. 
Concerning the first question, the CJEU follows the AG on the 
conflict between provisions of domestic law with the ECHR but is 
much more straightforward than the AG when it comes to a conflict 
between provisions of domestic law and rights guaranteed by the 
Charter. According to the CJEU, it is settled case law that a national 
court which is called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to 
apply provisions of European Union law is under a duty to give full 
effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to 
apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted 
subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await 
the prior setting aside of such a provision by legislative or other 
constitutional means35. The CJEU states furthermore that any provision 
of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial 
practice which might impair the effectiveness of European Union law, 
by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to apply 
such law, the power to do everything necessary at the time of its 
application to set aside national legislative provisions which might 
prevent European Union rules from having full force and effect are 
incompatible with those requirements, which are the very essence of 
European Union law36. The CJEU concludes that EU law precludes 
judicial practice which makes the obligation for a national court to set 
                                                          
33 Point 36. 
34 And the CJEU refers here to the classic effect utile notion in relation to 
enforcement (see, to this effect, inter alia Commission v Greece, paragraph 24; Case C-
326/88 Hansen [1990] ECR I-2911, paragraph 17; Case C-167/01 Inspire Art [2003] 
ECR I-10155, paragraph 62; Case C-230/01 Penycoed [2004] ECR I-937, paragraph 
36; and Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02 and C-403/02 Berlusconi and Others [2005] 
ECR I-3565 paragraph 65). 
35 Point 45 (Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629, paragraphs 21 and 24; Case 
C-314/08 Filipiak [2009] ECR I-11049, paragraph 81; and Joined Cases C-188/10 and 
C-189/10 Melki and Abdeli [2010] ECR I-5667, paragraph 43). 
36 Point 46. 
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aside any provision contrary to a fundamental right guaranteed by the 
Charter conditional upon that infringement being clear from the text of 
the Charter or the case law relating to it, since it withholds from the 
national court the power to assess fully, with, as the case may be, the 
cooperation of the Court of Justice, whether that provision is 
compatible with the Charter37. 
5. Case Commentary 
5.1. Applicability of the CFR 
It is obvious from the judgment that the CJEU insists on a line of 
continuity between its case law on application of general principles of 
EU law in the domestic legal order and the Charter. Member States 
must comply with the requirements flowing from the fundamental 
rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union and it does 
not matter if these rights are enshrined in the Charter or in general 
principles of EU law. Indeed, the CJEU wants further to exclude the 
possibility of EU law applying without the applicability of the 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. In its judgment the CJEU 
has fully set aside the reasoning of the AG Cruz Villalón. 
It is interesting to compare the reasoning of AG Cruz Villalón with 
the one of AG Kokott in the similar Bonda-case38. In this Polish Bonda-
case, accused of an incorrect declaration under the EU agricultural 
subsidy scheme, was excluded by the administrative Agricultural 
Restructuring and Modernisation Agency from receiving a EU subsidy 
for several years and was subsequently convicted and given a 
suspended custodial sentence by the criminal district court. The appeal 
court decided, however, that the criminal proceedings against Bonda 
were inadmissible because of the ne bis in idem principle. After an 
appeal to the Supreme Court in the interest of the law, the Supreme 
Court referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
                                                          
37 Point 48. 
38 Case C-489/10, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 15 December 2011, point 
16. 
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In my view the ne bis in idem problem is quite similar in the Bonda-
case and Fransson-case, as in both cases there is a risk of double 
punitive penalties (administrative and criminal) in one jurisdiction. Is 
there a different degree of connection with the implementation of EU 
law? In the case of Bonda, there is a Commission regulation that 
explicitly states the exclusion of subsidies as an administrative 
sanction. However, criminal enforcement is not specifically prescribed 
by Union law and is thus only imposed under the general enforcement 
obligations of the CJEU (effet utile and effective, proportionate and 
deterrent sanctions)39. In the case of Fransson there is no explicit 
provision in the VAT directive, but only a reference thereto in Article 
273: 
Member States may impose other obligations which they deem 
necessary to ensure the correct collection of VAT and to prevent 
evasion (…). 
In the case of VAT there is a duty for the member states to comply 
with the same enforcement obligations imposed by the CJEU, which 
means that this “may” becomes a must and can include administrative 
and criminal penalties. In the Bonda-case AG Kokott clearly stated that 
the ne bis in idem principle enjoys the status of a fundamental right of 
the EU under Article 50 CFR and that this case is within the scope of 
the Charter40, whatever interpretation – restrictive or not – may be 
given to the material scope of the Charter. AG Kokott comes thus to the 
opposite conclusion to that of Cruz Villalón. 
However, despite several references by AG Kokott to Article 50 
CFR as an applicable human right, in the Bonda-case the CJEU 
completely neglected Article 50 CFR in its analysis and reasoning. This 
is more than striking, as in both cases there is a substantial connection 
to Union law. The scope and the interest are similar: an effective 
application and enforcement of the common agricultural policy and the 
common VAT regime. In case of the ineffective application of both, 
                                                          
39 Case 68/88, Commission v Greece, Judgment of 21 September 1989. 
40 Case C-489/10, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 15 December 2011, points 
13 & 16. 
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they potentially affect the budget of the Union. In other words, there is 
a direct link to the protection of the financial interest of the Union, 
which is one of the core interests of the Union, as laid down in Article 
235 TFEU. The only reason that I can imagine for the exclusion of 
Article 50 CFR is that the referring Supreme Court did not ask it at 
all41, but that is of course a formal and unconvincing argument. With 
the ruling in the Fransson-case the CJEU has set aside any doubts that 
might exist: no application of EU law in the member states without the 
application of the Charter. This means that when enforcement of EU 
law is at stake the rights and guarantees of the Charter come into play. 
The applicability of Union law does not depend on the way by which 
Member States comply with their EU obligations. If they have to 
comply with EU enforcement obligations, be it even based on Union 
loyalty under Article 4(3) TEU and the related case law42 of the CJEU, 
they act within the scope of Union law, even if they apply enforcement 
mechanism that have not been specifically prescribed by Union law or 
have not been specifically designed by the Member State to enforce 
Union law. In my view this is a very wise choice, as otherwise the 
applicability of Union law and the CFR would depend on national 
legislative and practical choices and undermine the equivalent 
protection of the Charter in the EU. 
Several Member States have intervened in order to avoid this result. 
Their aim was to limit the Charter’s impact at the domestic level as 
much as possible as well as avoiding the impact of EU law in tax 
matters, which is one of the remaining jealously guarded competences. 
Meanwhile, concerning the latter there is clear-cut case law43 of the 
                                                          
41 The only question was: “What is the legal nature of the penalty provided for in 
Article 138 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1973/2004 of 29 October 2004 laying 
down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 as 
regards the support schemes provided for in Titles IV and IVa of that Regulation and 
the use of land set aside for the production of raw materials (OJ 2004 L 345, p. 1) 
which consists in refusing a farmer direct payments in the years following the year in 
which he submitted an incorrect statement as to the size of the area forming the basis 
for direct payments?”. 
42 Case C-68/88, Greek maize, Jur. 1989, p. 2965. 
43 Case C-539/09 Commission v Germany [2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 72. 
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CJEU that VAT is fully part of the EU’s resources44 and Member States 
should let go of this tired idea. 
Concerning the impact of the Charter, it seems that these Member 
States are not particularly in favour of an evolution by which deepening 
integration goes hand in hand with equivalent protection of 
fundamental rights, be it in the domestic legal order or in a 
transnational setting in the EU. Moreover, several Member States are 
not willing to comply with the ECHR case law on ne bis in idem when 
it comes to multiple punishments by combining punitive administrative 
sanctions and criminal sanctions. This is why they maintain their 
reservations or are not willing to sign or ratify the ECHR-PR 7. 
This was also reflected in the 2003 Greek proposal for a framework 
decision on ne bis in idem45 with the the aim of replacing Articles 54-58 
of the CISA with new EU legal rules in order to ensure uniformity in 
both the interpretation of those rules and their practical implementation. 
The proposal was not in line with the case law of the ECtHR on the 
applicability of the Engel-criteria to the ne bis in idem principle. One of 
the reasons the proposal failed to be adopted was that the Member 
States disagreed on the applicability of the criminal charge Engel-
criteria to the ne bis in idem principle Seen this context it is quite clear 
that there is a great need for equivalent application of the ne bis in idem 
principle when implementing and enforcing EU law. This equivalent 
application will not come from the legislator as it stands, but as a result 
of the praetorian role of the CJEU. At the same time the CJEU has to 
guarantee that its standards comply with the minimum standards of the 
ECtHR. 
More astonishing is the position of the European Commission and 
its legal service on the point of the application of the Charter to the 
Member States. In the Fransson-case they defended the same position 
taken by the minimalist Member States. As the opinion of the legal 
service of the European Commission is not public, it is difficult to point 
out what the exact reasons were. It is however clear that the 
                                                          
44 Article 2(1-b) of Council Decision 2007/436/EC, Euratom of 7 June 2007 on the 
system of the European Communities’ own resources (OJ 2007 L 163). 
45 Initiative of the Hellenic Republic with a view to adopting a Council Framework 
Decision concerning the application of the ne bis in idem principle, OJ C 2003 100/4. 
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Commission and its legal service have recently taken an increasingly 
cautious approach when it comes to the procedural autonomy of the 
Member States. The fact that the VAT Directive does not prescribe 
expressis verbis the sanctions to be imposed might explain this attitude. 
Fortunately, the CJEU has not followed this approach, as this would 
undermine the applicability of Charter rights when enforcing EU law in 
case of non-explicit enforcement obligations in EU directives or 
regulations. 
From the point of view of the party accused, in both cases his 
fundamental right to ne bis in idem protection is at stake not only as 
part of a sovereign state’s enforcement policy, but also as the 
consequence of the policy and enforcement choices of a Member State 
in applying and enforcing EU obligations. In other words, we are not 
speaking here of a purely internal case falling outside the scope of the 
application of EU law. When we aim for the effective and equivalent 
protection of the financial interests of the Union, it is logical that we 
aim for equivalent human rights protection at the same time, as 
provided under the Charter. This is sufficient reason to trigger the 
material application of the Charter and to trigger the jurisdiction of the 
Court to ensure uniform application through preliminary rulings. 
The principal decision in the Fransson-case will have substantial 
consequences for the enforcement regimes in the Member States that go 
far beyond the ne bis in idem principle of the CFR. The right to an 
effective remedy and fair trial (Article 47 CFR), presumption of 
innocence and defence rights (Article 48 CFR), the principle of legality 
and the proportionality of criminal offences and penalties (Article 49 
CFR) are all CFR rights that apply to national provisions when used to 
enforce EU law. 
5.2. The Autonomous Character of the Charter and National Standards 
of Fundamental Rights 
The AG made a plea for an autonomous interpretation of the Charter 
and of its ne bis in idem principle. However, he used this reasoning to 
argue for a lower standard than that of the ECHR, given the fact that 
not all Member States are bound or fully bound by the ECHR’s ne bis 
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in idem standard and given their practice of combining punitive 
administrative and criminal law enforcement regimes. He did plea for a 
ne bis in idem principle, as applied by the CJEU in competition cases. 
In the case of the imposition of two consecutive punitive sanctions, any 
previous punitive decision has to be taken into account in determining 
the level of the second sanction which is to be imposed 
(Anrechnungsprinzip) in order to be in line with the Charter. The 
opinion of the AG is clearly incompatible with the case law of the 
ECtHR. 
It is important to emphasise that the CJEU has avoided any 
reference to the limiting binding force of the ECHR ne bis in idem 
principle for some Member States. This is wise, as these problems do 
not concern the EU legal order as such. Making the application of EU 
Charter rights dependent upon reservation clauses under public 
international law leads to the danger of “Charter à la carte”. The CJEU 
has clearly stated that Member States may apply their proper 
assessment of fundamental rights under national standards, but that the 
outcome must comply with the standard imposed by the Charter. The 
Charter is thus a minimum threshold that cannot be put aside, neither by 
arguments under national law, nor arguments derived from reservations 
or declarations to public international law, including the ECHR. 
The autonomous character of the Charter also gives the CJEU 
leeway for developing fundamental rights of the EU beyond the 
minimum requirements of the ECHR case law, as foreseen under 
Article 52(3) CFR. In my view, this is also the real added value of the 
Charter. In an integration model the need to protect fundamental rights 
might need specific answers for creation of a level of equivalent 
protection and/or when dealing with issues of transnational justice in 
the single legal area. The fact that the ECHR ne bis in idem has a 
domestic application only and Article 50 CFREU an application within 
the scope of EU law (which can be domestic, transnational and/or at the 
European level) does not mean that we do not have a similar right with 
a similar function. Moreover, under Article 52(3) the EU can provide 
more extensive protection. That means that the CJEU case law 
providing a wider protection than the ECtHR is perfectly compatible 
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with Article 50 CFREU. This means that CJEU case law giving broader 
protection is fully in line with the Charter. 
Last but not least, remains the question of to what extent Member 
States may suggest national human rights standards when dealing 
within the scope of Union law. The CJEU deals with this point very 
briefly in paragraph 29: 
(…) where a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether 
fundamental rights are complied with by a national provision or 
measure which, in a situation where action of the Member States is not 
entirely determined by European Union law, implements the latter for 
the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter, national authorities and 
courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of 
fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by 
the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby compromised (see, 
in relation to the latter aspect, Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] ECR I-
0000, paragraph 60). 
The CJEU seems to leave some room for application of national 
human right standards in situations such as the one in the Fransson-
case, but only as long as the level of protection offered by the Charter, 
as interpreted by the Court, is guaranteed and as long as the primacy, 
unity and effectiveness of European Union law are thereby not 
compromised. Member States must in any case apply the Charter, 
which is a mandatory minimum standard. They can go beyond it as this 
does not prejudice primacy, unity and effectiveness. In other words 
these concepts constitute a maximum ceiling. The Member States have 
a playing field between this minimum threshold and maximum ceiling. 
Primacy certainly plays an important role in fields of exclusive 
competence and/or in fields of fully harmonised or unified EU law such 
as in the case of the European arrest warrant46 or in the Bonda-case. 
Unity and effectiveness can play a role in the other cases in order to 
guarantee that Union-loyalty is complied with when enforcing EU law 
(effective, proportionate and dissuasive enforcement regimes). To 
summarise, the CJEU leaves room for application of national human 
                                                          
46 Case C-399/11 Melloni [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 60. 
THE APPLICATION OF THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND ITS NE BIS IN IDEM 
 231 
rights standards but within the boundaries imposed by classic general 
principles of EU law. This means that for the alleged party a higher 
national human right standard can only apply in cases within the scope 
of EU law, when in conformity with the Charter and not infringing 
upon primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law. 
5.3. The CFR Ne Bis In Idem Principle: Content and Consequences 
Under EU Law 
When does an imposed administrative tax penalty bar a second 
prosecution under criminal law in the light of the ne bis in idem 
principle? What are the criteria and consequences? 
In the Fransson-case both the AG and the CJEU fully applied, for 
the first time, the Engel-Bonda criteria to assess the criminal nature of 
the administrative penalty within the frame of a Charter right, a novelty 
in CJEU case law. Applied to the case, the CJEU emphasised that the 
Charter does not preclude a Member State from imposing, for the same 
acts of non-compliance with declaration obligations in the field of 
VAT, a combination of tax and criminal penalties. To assess whether 
tax penalties are criminal in nature the Engel criteria of the ECHR, also 
clearly used in the Bonda-case, are applicable. In this case, contrary to 
the case of Bonda47, the CJEU considered that it is for the referring 
court to determine, in the light of those criteria, whether the combining 
of tax penalties are punitive in character. When it is considered 
punitive, however, double punishment is barred by Article 50 CFREU. 
It is surprising that the CJEU leaves the final answer to the referring 
court instead of ruling on this matter, as it did in the Bonda-case. 
Although it is true that the VAT Directive does not contain the type and 
level of sanctions to enforce the EU law, it is quite clear from ECHR 
case law that this type of administrative fiscal penalties are punitive in 
Sweden and do have a criminal nature under the Engel-criteria and are 
thus a criminal charge under Article 6 ECHR48. In other words, there 
                                                          
47 In the Bonda-case the administrative sanction was prescribed by the EU 
regulation and the referring court did ask for a ruling on the legal character of the 
sanction. 
48 Application no. 34619/97 (Janosevic), ECtHR 2002/88. 
CHAPTER 6 
 232 
can only be one answer and there seems to be no room for other 
interpretations or for other national human rights standards, as 
suggested by the CJEU in paragraph 36 of the ruling. In the light of this 
legal findings it is clear that the ne bis in idem principle of the Charter 
will bar double punishment. It would have been better if the CJEU 
would have concluded it instead of suggesting room for other 
interpretation at national level. 
The consequences for the Member States are substantial when 
implementing and enforcing EU law. They can no longer limit the ne 
bis in idem principle to criminal law sensu stricto and will have to 
widen their scope of protection in order to include punitive 
administrative sanctioning. Moreover, the reach of Article 50 CFR is 
not limited to the jurisdiction of every single Member States, as it is the 
case with Article 4 ECHR-PR 7. This means that Article 50 CFR has 
also transnational effect in the integrated legal order of the EU. This 
means that Member States will have to face the transnational 
application of ne bis in idem for all punitive sanctioning in the EU 
when implementing and enforcing EU law. The consequence will be 
that there will be an increasing need to decide about case allocation in 
the EU when it comes to investigations and punishment under 
administrative and criminal law. In other words, the ne bis in idem 
principle cannot function properly in a common area without the 
coordination of jurisdiction and binding criteria on choice of 
jurisdiction and a proper allocation of cases in the common justice area. 
5.4. Upcoming Legal Points 
With this landmark decision the CJEU has not solved all the 
problems, nor could it have done. Although Article 50 CFR is a 
primary source of Union law, it does co-exist alongside Article 54 
CISA, ne bis in idem clauses in the MLA and MR regimes, and Article 
4 ECHR-PR 7. Although the multiplicity of ne bis in idem clauses have 
different functions, they do not contribute to a comprehensive 
constitutional legal principle in the Union. 
Moreover, many of the ne bis in idem clauses outside of Article 50 
CFREU have a restricted application because of certain exceptions, 
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derogations or reservations. In the MLA and MR regimes the ne bis in 
idem clause cannot just be an option but is also limited by exceptions if 
necessary. The same exceptions are also derogations or reservations to 
ECHR-PR 7 or Article 54 CISA. In practice, some Member States have 
formulated restricted or no application at all of ne bis in idem in the 
following situations: offences that have been committed on national 
territory (territoriality clause); the preclusion of punitive administrative 
sanctions from the scope of application; the interests of national 
security or other related interests and/or offences committed by national 
civil servants. Several national criminal courts have been obliged to 
deal with this legal patchwork, including the relationship between 
Article 50 CFR and Article 54 CISA49. Until now, none of them have, 
unfortunately, referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. 
In the Fransson-case the CJEU has avoided tackling the relationship 
between Article 4 ECHR-PR 7 and Article 50 CFR. Although the 
former has no transnational application, as is the case with Article 50 
CFREU, it can lead to conflicting situations for Member States, as 
Article 50 CFREU can also apply in domestic situations. What happens 
if Member States have not ratified ECHR-PR 7 or have formulated a 
reservation to its application and are not willing to accept the 
application of the ne bis in idem principle to the bis combination of 
punitive administrative and criminal penalties? In my opinion, Article 
50 CFR de facto sets aside the non-ratification of declarations or 
reservations, as long as the Charter applies in a domestic situation of 
the ne bis in idem right. In such a case all Member States should apply 
the substance of Article 50 CFR, in line with Article 4 ECHR-PR 7. It 
would be a strange situation that in a common area of freedom, security 
and justice national reservations could still prevail as a claw-back 
clause concerning a fundamental right of primary law. 
Finally, the CJEU ’s elaboration of a common ne bis in idem 
principle for all policy areas is long overdue, as there are still 
substantial differences between the ne bis in idem of the area of 
freedom, security and justice and the internal market/competition policy 
                                                          
49 See J.A.E.VERVAELE, Ne Bis In Idem: Towards a Transnational Constitutional 
Principle in the EU?, in Utrecht Law Review, 2013, Autumn Special on Transnational 
Criminal Justice (to be published). 
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area. If member states have to comply with the Engel-Bonda criteria, I 
do not see any reason why these criteria should not be applicable to the 
enforcement of the competition rules. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT 
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS 
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EU1 
1. Introduction: The Shift from Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) to 
Mutual Recognition (MR) 
Until the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the 
establishment of an area of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) the 
regime for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, also called mutual 
legal assistance (MLA), was laid down in multilateral mother 
conventions of the Council of Europe. It meant that Member States of 
the EU had to use regional international public law conventions to 
gather criminal evidence, to obtain extradition or to execute sanctions 
such as confiscations or prison penalties. Under the Treaty of 
Maastricht, Council of Europe Conventions were gradually replaced by 
proper EU Conventions. These were based on direct cooperation 
between judicial authorities, instead of the cooperation between 
governments in the mother conventions. Direct cooperation between 
judicial authorities in the EU does not mean that an extradition warrant 
from a requesting State automatically has legal value in the Member 
State that receives the request. As a rule, these warrants must be 
converted into a national decision in the requested State through 
exequatur proceedings against which legal remedies can be used. 
Already at the Cardiff European Council in 1998 the Council of 
Ministers was asked to identify the scope for greater mutual recognition 
of judicial decisions of the Member States’ courts2. The concept of 
                                                          
1 This article has been published as J.A.E. VERVAELE, The European Arrest 
Warrant and Applicable Standards of Fundamental Rights in the EU, in Review of 
European Administrative Law, 2013-2, vol. 6, pp. 37-54. 
2 Presidency conclusion no. 39. 
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mutual recognition was well-known in community law since the 
landmark decision of the ECJ in the Cassis de Dijon case and has also 
be applied by the community legislator in many substantive fields of 
the internal market with the aim of avoiding in detail harmonisation. 
However, extrapolating it to judicial decisions in criminal matters was 
not self-evident, as the harmonisation in the area of criminal procedure 
and applicable safeguards was very minimal or non-existent. 
With the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
European Council organised a special meeting on the area of FSJ in 
Tampere in 1999. In the Tampere conclusions mutual recognition (a 
concept that was not mentioned in the Treaty) had become a 
cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and the aim was 
to replace all MLA conventions of the Council of Europe by proper EU 
MR instruments3. More specifically, the Council of Ministers and the 
Commission were asked to adopt, by December 2000, a raft of 
measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition. In 2000 the 
Commission published its Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament: Mutual recognition of final decisions in criminal 
matters4. MR would apply to both court decisions and pre-trial 
decisions, as well as orders or warrants to gather evidence or to arrest 
and hand over suspects. The basic idea was that, despite the differences 
between the procedural regimes in the member states, they were all 
party to the ECHR and could thus trust each other. Mutual trust was 
presupposed and considered a sufficient ground to apply MR, even with 
little or no harmonisation. This means that MR orders were warrants 
from an issuing member state which had legal value in the area of FSJ 
and could thus be automatically executed without an exequatur 
procedure. Legal doubts concerning the order or warrant, linked to for 
instance, the legality of the evidence that served to justify the order or 
                                                          
3 See Presidency conclusion no. 33 of the Tampere special European Council. For 
in depth analysis, see J. OUWERKERK, Quid Pro Quo? A Comparative Law Perspective 
on the Mutual Recognition of Judicial Decisions in Criminal Matters, Antewrp-Oxford-
Portland, 2011 and A. SUOMINEN, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters: a Study of the Principle in Four Framework Decisions and in the 
Implementation Legislation in the Nordic Member States, Cambridge, 2011. 
4 COM(2000) 495 final. 
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warrant could only be challenged in the issuing member state. Were 
individual rights completely ignored? Not as such, in point no. 33 of the 
Tampere Conclusions, the European Council expressed the opinion that 
enhanced mutual recognition would also facilitate the judicial 
protection of individual rights. It must therefore need to be ensured that 
the treatment of suspects and the rights of the defence, would not only 
not suffer from the implementation of the principle, but that the 
safeguards could even be improved through the process. The idea was 
that the Commission and the Council of Ministers should elaborate 
common minimum standards of procedural law that are considered 
necessary in order to facilitate the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition, respecting the fundamental legal principles of the member 
states. 
In 2002 the Council of Ministers adopted the first mutual 
recognition instrument in criminal matters: the Framework Decision 
(FD) on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between 
member states (EAW)5. This instrument was adopted under a fast track 
procedure following the events of 9/11 in New York and Washington 
DC, and was not accompanied by proposals on minimum procedural 
standards or the approximation of procedural safeguards. A European 
arrest warrant, be it to bring the suspect to trial or to execute the trial 
sentence, is based on mutual trust and must thus be recognised and 
executed, unless mandatory or optional grounds of non-recognition 
apply. The grounds have been strongly restricted in contrast to the 
refusal grounds under the MLA extradition treaty, and do not contain 
grounds that are based directly on a human rights clause. Only in the 
recitals can we find reference to fundamental rights: 
12) This Framework Decision respects fundamental rights and observes 
the principles recognised by Article 6 of the Treaty on European 
Union and reflected in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (7), in particular Chapter VI thereof. Nothing in 
this Framework Decision may be interpreted as prohibiting refusal 
                                                          
5 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and 
surrender procedure between Member States of 13 June 2002, OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1. The 
decision has been amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 
February 2009, OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24. 
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to surrender a person for whom a European arrest warrant has been 
issued when there are reasons to believe, on the basis of objective 
elements, that the said arrest warrant has been issued for the 
purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the grounds of his 
or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, 
political opinions or sexual orientation, or that that person’s 
position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons. 
This Framework Decision does not prevent a Member State from 
applying its constitutional rules relating to due process, freedom of 
association, freedom of the press and freedom of expression in 
other media. 
(13) No person should be removed, expelled or extradited to a State 
where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to 
the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment. 
The Commission was of the opinion that member states that 
implemented grounds of non-recognition in their national legislation 
that went beyond the ones foreseen in the articles were violating EU 
law. Non-recognition of EAW’s based on a fair trial or due process 
reason were considered as not being in line with EU duties under the 
EAW FD6. Practice showed however that differences in member states’ 
procedural regimes could lead to serious problems with EAW warrants, 
for instance when it comes to the execution of convictions in absentia, 
an area in which legal traditions of member states can significantly 
differ. What for one is constitutionally barred and thus ordre public is 
for another current practice. In 2009 the EAW FD was amended and a 
new article 4a was introduced, with the aim of strengthening mutual 
trust and to bring the practice in line with case law of the ECHR7. 
Article 4a precludes a refusal to execute the EAW issued for the 
purpose of executing a custodial sentence or a detention order if the 
                                                          
6 Report from the Commission based on Article 34 of the Council Framework 
Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States (SEC(2005) 267) - COM/2005/0063 final, point 2.2.1. 
7 Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 amending 
Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA 
and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering 
the application of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the 
absence of the person concerned at the trial, 2009, OJ L 81/24. 
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person did not appear in person at the trial resulting in the decision 
where the person concerned, being aware of the scheduled trial, had 
given a mandate to a legal counselor, who was either appointed by him 
or by the State to defend him or her at the trial, and was indeed 
defended by that counselor at the trial. Practice and negotiation on new 
MR instruments, as the European Evidence Warrant (EEW)8 showed 
that blind mutual trust let to a lack of confidence between judicial 
authorities and that minimal standards were indeed necessary. In the 
second FSJ programme (the Hague programme) legislative action was 
required in order to elaborate on the minimum approximation of 
procedural safeguards. Member states failed however in agreeing upon 
the draft framework decision9 and it was not until the Lisbon Treaty 
that the first results were seen. In the Lisbon Treaty the mutual 
recognition principle was codified in article 67(3) and article 82(1) 
TFEU. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be 
based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial 
decisions and is a tool for achieving the aim of ensuring security (crime 
prevention and combating of crime) in the area of FSJ. Article 82(2) 
also links the MR tool to the harmonisation of minimum rules 
concerning mutual admissibility of evidence and rights of individuals in 
criminal procedure. MR and article 82(2) were used as legal basis for 
the first binding directives on procedural safeguards in criminal 
matters: the directive on right to translation and interpretation10, the 
directive on letters of rights11 and a draft directive on right to access to 
a lawyer in criminal proceedings12. These results are of course only a 
first step and do not resolve all the human rights protection issues that 
                                                          
8 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data 
for use in proceedings in criminal matters, 2008, OJ L 350/72. 
9 T. SPRONKEN, G. VERMEULEN, EU Procedural Rights in Criminal Proceedings, 
Antewrp-Oxford-Portland, 2009. 
10 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right to 
interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, 2010, OJ L 280/1. 
11 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2012 on the right to information in criminal proceedings, 2012, OJ L 142/1. 
12 Proposal for a Directive on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings 
and on the right to communicate upon arrest, COM(2011) 326 final. 
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might arise when issuing and executing EAW’s, for instance when it 
comes to deprivation of liberty, access to the file/disclosure or right to a 
trial within a reasonable time. 
2. The Facts of the Melloni Case and Proceedings before the National 
Courts 
In 1996, the Criminal Division of the High Court (Audiencia 
Nacional) of Spain authorised the extradition of Mr. Melloni to stand 
trial in Italy for suspicion of bankruptcy fraud. While awaiting 
extradition he was released on bail and fled justice. The prosecution in 
Italy continued and Mr. Melloni appointed two bar lawyers for his 
defence. In first instance (Ferrara in 2000) and in appeal (Bologna in 
2003) he was sentenced in absentia to 10 years imprisonment. In 2004, 
the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal in 
cassation. In 2004, the Prosecutor’s Office in Bologna issued an EAW 
for the execution of the sentence of 10 years imprisonment. Following 
his arrest in 2008, the Central Investigating Court referred the execution 
of the EAW to the Audiencia Nacional, which decided in the warrant’s 
favour. The Audiencia Nacional ordered the execution of the EAW and 
was of the opinion that his rights of defence had been respected, since 
he had been aware from the outset of the forthcoming trial, deliberately 
absented himself and appointed two lawyers to represent and defend 
him in that capacity, at first instance, and in the appeal and cassation 
proceedings. Mr. Melloni filed a constitutional petition (recurso de 
amparo) against the order of the Audiencia Nacional claiming that his 
fair trial rights under article 24(2) of the Spanish Constitution has been 
infringed and that the surrender to Italy would violate Spanish 
Constitutional case law that makes extradition or surrendering for 
executions of convictions in absentia conditional upon the re-trial of 
the case. By order of September 2008, the Constitutional Court of Spain 
declared the petition admissible and suspended enforcement of the 
EAW. Concerning the merits the Constitutional Court came to the 
conclusion that a decision of the Spanish judicial authorities to consent 
to extradition or surrender to countries which, in cases of very serious 
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offences, allow convictions in absentia without making the extradition 
conditional upon the convicted party being able to challenge the same 
in order to safeguard his rights of defence, gives rise to an “indirect” 
infringement of the requirements deriving from the right to a fair trial, 
in that such a decision undermines the essence of a fair trial in a way 
which affects human dignity. In the view of the Constitutional Court it 
is of no importance that FD 2009/29 does not apply, ratione temporis, 
to the main proceedings. The object of the main constitutional 
proceedings is to determine not whether the EAW of 2008 violated the 
Framework Decision of 2009, but whether it indirectly infringed the 
right to a fair trial protected by article 24(2) of the Spanish 
Constitution. FD 2009/299 must therefore, in the view of the 
Constitutional Court, be taken into account for determining what part of 
that right has “external” effects. At the time of the assessment of 
constitutionality the FD was applicable law and national law is to be 
interpreted in conformity with FD’s. In 2011 the Constitutional Court 
suspended the proceedings and referred to the ECJ the following 
questions for preliminary ruling: 
1. Must Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 20022/584/ JHA, as 
inserted by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA, be 
interpreted as precluding national judicial authorities, in the 
circumstances specified in that provision, from making the 
execution of a European arrest warrant conditional upon the 
conviction in question being open to review, in order to guarantee 
the rights of defence of the person requested under the warrant? 
2. In the event of the first question being answered in the affirmative, is 
Article 4a(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA compatible 
with the requirements deriving from the right to an effective 
judicial remedy and to a fair trial, provided for in Article 47 of the 
Charter…, and from the rights of defence guaranteed under Article 
48(2) of the Charter? 
3. In the event of the second question being answered in the affirmative, 
does Article 53 of the Charter, interpreted schematically in 
conjunction with the rights recognised under Articles 47 and 48 of 
the Charter, allow a Member State to make the surrender of a 
person convicted in absentia conditional upon the conviction being 
open to review in the requesting State, thus affording those rights a 
greater level of protection than that deriving from Union law, in 
order to avoid an interpretation which restricts or adversely affects 
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a fundamental right recognised by the Constitution of the first-
mentioned Member State? 
3. The Advocate General’s Opinion 
Advocate General (AG) Bot first deals with the question of 
admissibility of the reference as the Spanish Prosecution Service, 
several member states (Belgium, Germany and the UK) and the Council 
have maintained that the reference should be considered inadmissible. 
Their arguments are twofold: the inapplicability, ratione temporis, of 
FD 2009/299 and the Italian deferral under article 8(3) of FD 2009/299, 
by which the FD is only applicable from January 2014, make the raised 
questions hypothetical. The AG does not subscribe to those arguments. 
He considers article 4a a procedural rule that applies to the surrender 
procedure at issue in the main proceedings, which are ongoing. Article 
4a is not a substantive rule and can be applied to situations existing 
before its entry into force. Concerning the Italian time deferral, the AG 
is not convinced that it makes the ECJ’s reply, for the purpose of 
resolving the main proceedings, pointless. He moreover indicates that 
January 2014 is a final deadline. Therefore, a reply from the ECJ will 
be useful to enable the Constitutional Court and the executing judicial 
authority to rule on the surrender procedure. In addition, he underlines 
the particular nature of the constitutional petition and review and is of 
the opinion that in these circumstances the ECJ would probably agree 
to reply even if the time limit for transposition of that FD had not yet 
expired. 
On the first question related to the compatibility between the 
Spanish regime, making extradition/surrender conditional upon retrial 
in case of in absentia proceedings, and article 4a(1)(a) and (b) of the 
FD, the AG does not share the referring Constitutional Court’s doubts. 
In the AG’s view article 4a is clear. There is an optional ground for 
non-execution of an EAW in case of in absentia proceedings, but this is 
accompanied by four exceptions in which the executing judicial 
authority may not refuse to execute the EAW in question. The situation 
of Melloni falls within these exceptions as he has been summoned and 
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presented by a counselor in trial. In this scenario Melloni must be 
regarded as having waived his right to appear at the trial and can 
therefore not invoke a right to a retrial. To allow the executing judicial 
authority to make the surrender of the person concerned conditional 
upon the possibility of retrial would be tantamount to adding a ground 
for non-recognition of the EAW. In the view of the AG that would go 
against the EU legislature’s stated intention to provide an exhaustive 
list, for reasons of legal certainty, of circumstances in which it must be 
considered that the procedural rights of a person who has not appeared 
in person at his trial have not been infringed and that the EAW must 
therefore be executed. 
By its second question, the Spanish Constitutional Court asks the 
ECJ to rule on whether article 4a(1) of the FD is compatible with the 
requirements deriving from the second paragraph of article 47 and 
article 48(2) of the CFR, corresponding respectively to article 6(2) and 
article 6(3) ECHR. By applying article 52 of the CFR, the AG refers to 
the synthesis of general principles concerning judgments rendered in 
absentia that can be found in the ECtHR cases Sejdovic v Italy, 
Haralampiev v Bulgaria and Idalov v Russia. Proceedings held in the 
absence of the accused are not always incompatible with the ECHR. 
The ECtHR has elaborated several general principles by which absence 
of the accused can nevertheless lead to the fairness of the proceedings 
as a whole (presence of defence lawyer or retrial on the merits in 
appeal, etc.). The AG considers that article 4a(1) is a codification of 
these general standards. The ECJ cannot rely on the constitutional 
traditions common to the member states to apply a higher level of 
protection, as FD 2009/299 is the result of an initiative of seven 
member states and has been adopted by all the member states, by which 
it can be presumed that a large majority of the Member States does not 
share the view taken by the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional in its case 
law. He comes to the conclusion that the validity of article 4a(1) FD is 
not called into question by the second paragraph of article 47 CFR (fair 
trial) and article 48(2) CFR (rights of the defence). 
The third question is by far the most interesting one, as the 
Constitutional court asks the ECJ, in essence, to rule on whether article 
53 CFR allows an executing judicial authority, in accordance with its 
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national constitutional law, to make the execution of an EAW subject to 
the condition that the person who is subject of the warrant is entitled to 
a retrial in the issuing member state, even though the application of 
such a condition is not authorised by article 4a(1) FD. The 
Constitutional Court refers itself to three possible interpretations of 
article 53 CFR. The first is one is qualifying article 53 as a minimum 
standards of human rights (as in international human rights law), 
allowing Member States to apply a higher standard. The second one is 
that article 53 CFR aims to define the scope of the CFR, by indicating 
in accordance with article 51 CFR that where EU law applies the CFR 
applies and that where EU law does not apply a higher or lower 
standard than the CFR can be applied. The third one would be a 
variation on the first and second one depending on the specific problem 
and context. The AG strongly rejects the first interpretation, as it 
infringes the principle of the primacy of EU law. It is settled case law 
that recourse to provisions of national law, even of a constitutional 
order, to limit the scope of EU law would have the effect of impairing 
the unity and efficacy of that law13 and thus prejudice the uniform and 
effective application of EU law within the member states as well as 
undermining the principle of legal certainty. Finally, the interpretation 
also deviates from the long-standing tradition of protecting of 
fundamental rights within the EU, which must be ensured within the 
framework of the structure and objectives of the EU, including the area 
of freedom, security and justice. Human rights protection must be 
adjusted to its context. The necessary uniformity of application of EU 
law and the construction of the area of freedom, security and justice are 
specific contextual interests that cannot be taken into account by 
national constitutional standards and can legitimise adjustments to the 
level of human rights protection, depending on the different interests at 
stake. In its view the EAW FD has laid down a uniform mechanism of 
MR, including procedural guarantees, in the cross-border dimension of 
the area of freedom, security and justice. The AG subscribes to the 
second interpretation given by the Constitutional Court and proposes 
                                                          
13 See, inter alia, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, 
paragraph 3; Case C-473/93 Commission v Luxembourg [1996] ECR I-3207, paragraph 
38; and Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten [2010] ECR I-8015, paragraph 61. 
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that the ECJ answer the question in the negative. In AG’s view this 
answer would not infringe article 4(2) TEU, by which the EU is 
required to respect the national identities of the Member States, 
inherent in their fundamental structures. Fair trial rights and rights of 
defence of judgments rendered in absentia are not covered, in the AG’s 
opinion, by the concept of the national identity of the Kingdom of 
Spain. 
4. The Court of Justice’s Ruling 
As to the admissibility of the referral for a preliminary ruling, the 
ECJ recalls its standing case law, by which the Court is in principle 
bound to give a ruling and can only set aside the request exceptionally: 
the interpretation sought by the national court bears no relation to the 
actual facts of the main action or its purpose or where the problem is 
hypothetical. This does not apply, according to the ECJ, to this referral. 
The very wording of article 8(2) of FD 2009/299 makes it clear that, as 
from 28 March 2011, that decision shall apply without any distinction 
prior or subsequently to that date. The ECJ also refers to its settled case 
law, according to which procedural rules, as with those applicable in 
Melloni, are generally held to apply to all proceedings pending at the 
time they enter into force, whereas substantive rules are usually 
interpreted as not applying to situations existing before their entry into 
force14. Finally, the mere fact that the Italian state decided that the FD 
would enter into force on a later date does not make the request for a 
preliminary ruling inadmissible, as the national court wished to take 
into consideration the relevant provisions of EU law to determine the 
substantive content of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by article 24(2) 
of the Spanish Constitution. Following all this considerations the ECJ 
declares the preliminary ruling from the Spanish Tribunal 
Constitucional admissible. 
                                                          
14 Joined cases 212/80 to 217/80 Meridionale Industria Salumi and others, 1981, 
ECR 2735, par. 9; case C-467/05 Dell’Orto, 2007, ECR I-5557, par. 48 and case C-
296/08 PPU, Santesteban Goicoechea, par. 80. 
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On the first question related to the compatibility between the 
Spanish regime, making extradition/surrender conditional upon retrial 
in case of in absentia proceedings, and article 4a(1)(a) and (b) of the 
FD, the ECJ recalls the purpose of the replacement of MLA by MR and 
refers extensively to its interpretation of MR and EAW in its judgment 
in case C-396/11, Ciprian Vasile Radu15. The EAW FD seeks, by the 
establishment of a new simplified and more effective system for the 
surrender of persons convicted or suspected of a crime, to enhance 
judicial cooperation with a view to achieving the objectives of the area 
of FSJ, by basing itself on a high degree of confidence and trust which 
should exist between the member states. Under article 1(2) of the EAW 
FD member states are in principle obliged to execute an EAW, unless 
exceptions are provided as mandatory or optional grounds for non-
executions in articles 3, 4 and 4a. Moreover, the execution of an EAW 
can be made subject solely to the conditions set out in article 5 FD 
EAW. In order to determine the scope of article 4a(1) the ECJ is 
examines its wording, scheme and purpose. Concerning the wording, 
the ECJ fully follows the opinion of the AG and also confirms this 
through the analysis of the purpose of the provision, the aim of which is 
the execution of the EAW in absentia cases provided certain conditions 
are fulfilled to guarantee fair trial and defence rights. Finally, the ECJ 
finds that the objectives pursued by the EU legislature, as expressed in 
the recitals 2-4 FD EAW also confirm the AG’s opinion. The ECJ 
concludes that the FD EAW solution in relation to in absentia decisions 
does not infringe the rights of the defence. The FD EAW must be 
interpreted as precluding the executing judicial authorities from making 
the execution of an EAW, for the purpose of executing a sentence, 
conditional upon the conviction rendered in absentia being open to 
review in the issuing Member State. 
By its second question, the Spanish Constitutional Court asks the 
ECJ to rule on whether article 4a(1) of the FD is compatible with the 
requirements deriving from the right to an effective judicial remedy and 
to a fair trial, provided for in articles 47 and 48(2) CFR, corresponding 
respectively to article 6(2) and article 6(3) ECHR. The ECJ underlines 
                                                          
15 C-396/11, Ciprian Vasile Radu, Judgment of 29th January 2013. 
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that the right of the accused to appear in person at his trial is an 
essential component of the right to a fair trial, but that that right is not 
absolute. In case the accused did not appear in person, but was 
informed of the date and place of trial or was defended by a legal 
counselor to whom he had given a mandate to do so, there is no 
violation of the right to a fair trial in EU law and that interpretation is in 
line with case law of the ECHR. The very objective of the FD EAW 
was to enhance the procedural rights of persons subject to criminal 
proceedings whilst improving mutual recognition of judicial decisions 
between Member States and this has been laid down in article 4a(1)(a) 
and (b) of the FD EAW. It follows from the reasoning that article 4a(1) 
is compatible with the requirements under Articles 47 and 48(2) CFR. 
As to the third question the ECJ rephrases it slightly, but without 
changing the content or narrowing it down: 
The national court asks, in essence, whether Article 53 of the Charter 
must be interpreted as allowing the executing Member State to make 
the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon the 
conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State, in order 
to avoid an adverse effect on the right to a fair trial and the rights of the 
defence guaranteed by its constitution16. 
The ECJ summarises first the interpretation envisaged of article 53 
by the Spanish Constitutional Court: article 53 would give general 
authorisation to a Member State to apply the standard of protection of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by its constitution when that standard is 
higher than that deriving from the Charter and, where necessary, to give 
it priority over the application of provisions of EU law. This would in 
casu make it possible to apply higher constitutional standards to the 
EAW than the ones foreseen in article 4a(1) FD EAW and thus to 
widen the grounds of non-recognition or to impose new requirements 
for the execution of the EAW. The ECJ rejects this interpretation 
categorically: 
That interpretation of Article 53 of the Charter would undermine the 
principle of primacy of EU law inasmuch as it would allow a Member 
                                                          
16 Point 55. 
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State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully in compliance with the 
Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights by that State’s 
constitution17. 
The ECJ underlines that it is settled case-law that, by virtue of the 
principle of primacy, which is an essential feature of the EU legal 
order, rules of national law, even of a constitutional order, cannot be 
allowed to undermine the effectiveness of EU law on the territory of a 
Member State. When it comes to the interpretation of article 53 CFR 
the ECJ recognises that national authorities and courts remain free to 
apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights. However 
the ECJ restricts this freedom very clearly, as the level of protection 
provided by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, 
unity and effectiveness of EU law cannot be thereby comprised. The 
ECJ underlines that the adoption of FD 2009/299 was intended to 
remedy the difficulties associated with the mutual recognition of 
decisions rendered in absence of accused, arising from the differences 
in fundamental rights protection in the Member States. The FD 
2009/299 effect a harmonization of the conditions of execution of a 
EAW in the event of a conviction rendered in absentia, which reflects 
the consensus reached by all the Member States regarding the scope to 
be given under EU law to the procedural rights enjoyed by persons 
convicted in absentia who are the subject of a EAW. In casu, if the 
Spanish Constitutional Court would apply a higher standard of 
protection it would cast doubt on the uniformity of the standard of 
protection of fundamental rights as defined in the FD, undermine the 
principles of mutual trust and recognition and therefore comprise the 
efficacy of the FD EAW. The ECJ comes thus to the conclusion that 
article 53 CFR must be interpreted as not allowing a Member State to 
make the surrender of a person convicted in absentia conditional upon 
the conviction being open to review in the issuing Member State. In 
other words the FD EAW and article 4a(1) in particular contains an 
exhaustive and harmonised system of non-recognition grounds and 
requirements that has strike a balance between due process and judicial 
efficiency. 
                                                          
17 Point 58. 
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5. Case Commentary 
In the first two questions the ECJ deals with the compatibility of the 
in absentia requirements under the FD EAW. In line with the AG’s 
reasoning the ECJ comes to the convincing conclusion that the 
provisions contained in art 4a(1) are fully compatible with the 
requirements of effective judicial remedy and fair trial under articles 
6(2) and 6(3) ECHR and articles 47 and 48(2) CFR. The ECJ refers to 
relevant decisions of the ECtHR, as ECtHR, Medenica v Switzerland, 
no. 20491/92, § 56 to 59, ECHR 2001-VI; Sejdovic v Italy [GC], no. 
56581/00, § 84, 86 and 98, ECHR 2006-II; and Haralampiev v 
Bulgaria, no. 29648/03, § 32 and 33, 24 April 2012. 
This first step is a very important one, as the FD EAW aims achieve 
mutual trust and confidence between the judicial authorities not only in 
order to enhance effective judicial cooperation, but also to enhance the 
procedural safeguards of suspects involved. The in absentia 
requirements of the FD EAW are a harmonised compromise that aims 
to combine crime control and due process. That the ECJ considers it in 
line with the requirements of the case-law of the ECtHR comes as no 
surprise given that the content of the amended FD EAW in 2008 is a 
codified version of the ECtHR case-law to the related subject. The ECJ 
sees no necessity to go beyond the minimum requirements of the 
ECtHR. That the ECJ finds the solution is a reasonable balance 
between judicial efficiency and human rights comes also as no surprise, 
as the FD EAW was deliberately amended in 2008 for that purpose. 
Significantly more complicated and of a more fundamental nature is 
the third question related to article 53 CFR, certainly taking into 
account that the EAW has been the object of constitutional review and 
clashes in several Member States in the past18. Article 53 CFR 
stipulates that: 
Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in 
their respective fields of application, by Union law and international 
                                                          
18 J. KOMARÉK, European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant: 
Contrapunctual Principles in Disharmony, in 44 CML Rev, 2007, pp. 9-40. 
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law and by international agreements to which the Union, the 
Community or all the Member States are party, including the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions. 
Such a reference is a classic one in international human rights 
treaties. Article 53 ECHR for instance stipulates: 
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating 
from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be 
ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any 
other agreement to which it is a Party. 
The aim of article 53 ECHR is clearly to establish a mandatory 
minimum standard, which means that existing or new higher standards 
of Contracting Parties are allowed. The main interpretation of the 
Spanish Constitutional Court did in fact follow this reasoning, but 
applied to article 53 CFR. This would mean that the Spanish 
Constitutional Court could apply its more protective human rights 
protection, which goes beyond the minimum standard of the ECHR and 
of the equivalent standard under the CFR. This interpretation made by 
the Spanish Constitutional Court is fully in line with its opinion of 
200419 on the relationship between the ECHR/CFR and national 
constitutional law. In its opinion, at the request of the Spanish 
Government, the Spanish Constitutional Court declared the draft 
Constitutional Treaty in line with the Spanish Constitution and did not 
see great difficulties with the CFR as it contained, in its opinion, only 
minimum standards in the same way as the ECHR20. 
                                                          
19 Declaración del Pleno del Tribunal Constitucional 1/2004, de 13 de diciembre de 
2004. Requerimiento 6603-2004. http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2005/01/04/pdfs/T00005-
00021.pdf, punto 6. For comments see A. RODRIGUEZ, ¿Quién debe ser el defensor de 
la Constitución española? Comentario a la DTC 1/2004, de 13 de diciembre, in Revista 
de derecho constitucional europea, 2005, nr. 3, http://www.ugr.es/~redce/ReDCE3/18 
angelrodriguez.htm; A.L. CASTILLO, A.S. ARNAIZ, V.F. COMELLA, Constitución 
Española y Constitución Europea, Análisis de la Declaración del Tribunal 
Constitucional ((DTC 1/2004, de 13 de diciembre), Madrid, 2005. 
20 Idem, point 6: “Significa, sencillamente, que el Tratado asume como propia la 
jurisprudencia de un Tribunal cuya doctrina ya está integrada en nuestro Ordenamiento 
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The ECJ rejects firmly this interpretation of article 53 CFR. In fact, 
although the function of article 53 CFR can be compared to the 
function of article 53 ECHR, it does function in another context. That is 
also why, in my opinion, article 53 CFR refers to the “respective field 
of application” of inter alia Union law. This point has been extensively 
elaborated by the AG, who underlines that the CFR is not to be 
regarded as a clause designed to regulate a conflict between, on the one 
hand, a provision of secondary law which, interpreted in the light of the 
Charter, sets a given level of protection for a fundamental right and, on 
the other hand, a provision drawn from a national constitution which 
provides a higher level of protection for the same fundamental right. It 
is also in his opinion that it is by no means apparent from the wording 
of article 53 of the Charter that it is to be considered as establishing an 
exception to the principle of the primacy of European Union law. The 
words ‘in their respective fields of application’ were chosen by the 
drafters of the Charter in order not to infringe the principle of primacy, 
which was explicitly confirmed in declaration 17 to the Treaty of 
Lisbon signed on 13 December 200721. From the historical analysis of 
                                                                                                                               
por la vía del art. 10.2 CE, de manera que no son de advertir nuevas ni mayores 
dificultades para la articulación ordenada de nuestro sistema de derechos. Y las que 
resulten, según se ha dicho, sólo podrán aprehenderse y solventarse con ocasión de los 
procesos constitucionales de que podamos conocer. Por lo demás no puede dejar de 
subrayarse que el artículo II-113 del Tratado establece que ninguna de las disposiciones 
de la Carta «podrá interpretarse como limitativa o lesiva de los derechos humanos y 
libertades fundamentales reconocidos, en su respectivo ámbito de aplicación, por el 
Derecho de la Unión, el Derecho internacional y los convenios internacionales de los 
que son parte la Unión o todos los Estados miembros, y en particular el Convenio 
Europeo para la Protección de los Derechos Humanos y de las Libertades 
Fundamentales, así como por las Constituciones de los Estados miembros», con lo que, 
además de la fundamentación de la Carta de derechos fundamentales en una comunidad 
de valores con las constituciones de los Estados miembros, claramente se advierte que 
la Carta se concibe, en todo caso, como una garantía de mínimos, sobre los cuales 
puede desarrollarse el contenido de cada derecho y libertad hasta alcanzar la densidad 
de contenido asegurada en cada caso por el Derecho interno”. 
21 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12007L/htm/C2007306EN.01025602.htm; 
by declaration 17 the content of article I-6 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty was kept 
on board: “The Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of the Union in 
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the drafting22 of article 53 CFR it becomes clear that the wording “in 
their respective fields of application” have been deliberately inserted at 
the demand of the European Commission with the aim to uphold 
primacy. The ECJ does not analyse the wording “in their respective 
fields of application” but jumps directly and in firm wording to the 
importance of primacy in this respect. The ECJ clearly accepts that 
member states can, when applying Union law, offer a higher protection 
than that provided for by the ECHR/CFR. However, this higher level of 
protection cannot comprise the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU 
law. This reasoning can of course only be applied when the EU itself 
does apply with the minimum standards of the ECHR/CFR (as in the 
case of Melloni). In other words, higher standards are only allowed 
when compatible with the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law, 
a reasoning that was also used in the ruling of the same day in the case 
Åkerberg Fransson23. The question arises how this interpretation should 
be read in the light of primary and secondary Union law that refers to 
constitutional traditions. 
First of all, article 4(2) TEU stipulates: 
The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State 
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, 
maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In 
particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each 
Member State. 
                                                                                                                               
exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of the Member 
States”. 
22 J. BERING LIISBERG, Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the 
Supremacy of Community Law? – Article 53 of the Charter: a Fountain of Law or just 
an Inkblot?, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 4/01. 
23 Case C-617/10 (Grand Chamber), Judgment of 26th February 2013, see J.A.E. VER-
VAELE, The Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) and its Ne Bis 
In Idem Principle in the Member States of the EU, in Review of European 
Administrative Law, 2013, vol. 6, nr. 1, pp. 113-134 (Chapter 6 of this book). 
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This article does however not apply in the case Melloni. Neither the 
AG nor Spain qualify the procedural requirement on in absentia 
sentencing as affecting the national identity of the Kingdom of Spain, 
which is the reason why the ECJ does not deal with article 4 TEU at all 
in its ruling. In future, the ECJ will however have to face cases in 
which member states are of the opinion that EU law is infringing upon 
their national identity. We can thus conclude that not all fundamental 
rights are covered by the notion of national identity. 
The TFEU also deals with constitutional standards in the framework 
of the Area of FSJ. Article 67 TFEU states clearly: 
The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with 
respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and 
traditions of the Member States. 
Article 82 TFEU, dealing with mutual recognition and 
harmonisation of criminal procedure, also underlines that the 
harmonised minimum rules shall take into account the differences 
between the legal traditions and systems of the member states. Finally, 
Recital 12 of FD EAW contains an explicit reference to national 
constitutional rules: 
This Framework Decision does not prevent a Member State from 
applying its constitutional rules relating to due process, freedom of 
association, freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other 
media. 
The AG dealt with these concerns in his opinion24, but considers 
them taken into account by the amended FD EAW when introducing 
the harmonised article 4a(1). Under the third pillar regime approval of 
every member state was indeed necessary. The ECJ did not deal at all 
with the articles mentioned and could do so because they do not impose 
any hierarchy in applicable fundamental rights and are of no direct use 
for the interpretation. However, given the complexity of the area of 
conflicting standards of fundamental rights, the ECJ has been quite 
straightforward in its wording. Some authors qualify the ruling as one 
                                                          
24 Point 144. 
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that sacrifices the highest level of fundamental rights protection for the 
benefit of the primacy and effet utile scope of Union law and imposes 
the supremacy of the CFR25. Others are afraid that constitutional 
plurality will suffer or that the national constitutional courts will rebel 
and trigger the Solange-clause26. 
I do believe that is it too early to derive these conclusions from the 
Melloni ruling. First of all, as also stated by the AG, article 53 is not an 
isolated article, but has to be read in the light of articles 51 and 52 CFR, 
which refer to the existence of the plurality of sources of protection for 
fundamental rights binding the member states. Art 52(3) makes the 
ECHR a minimum standard and minimum threshold, as the EU can 
provide more extensive protection. Article 53 supplements the 
principles stated in article 51 and 52. The Charter is thus not intended 
to become the exclusive instrument for protecting those rights. 
Second, the ruling of the ECJ in Melloni is not particularly 
surprising when it comes to the relationship between primacy and 
national law. The ECJ has settled case-law on primacy, including of 
primacy on rules of national constitutional law. The ECJ refers in 
Melloni to primacy as an essential feature of the EU legal order, by 
which national rules, even of a constitutional order, cannot be allowed 
to undermine the effectiveness of EU law on the territory of that State27. 
Third, the Melloni case is a very specific one, in which all member 
states have agreed upon balanced harmonisation that does not infringe, 
neither the ECHR, nor the CFR and in which one Constitutional Court 
does want to apply higher constitutional standards that risk severely 
                                                          
25 N. LAVRANOS, The ECJ’s Judgments in Melloni and Åkerberg Fransson: Une 
ménage à trois difficultés, in European Law Reporter, April 2013, no. 4, pp. 133-141. 
26 J.H. REESTMAN, L.F.M. BESSELINK, Editorial after Åkerberg Fransson and 
Melloni, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2013, pp. 1-5 and L.F.M. BESSELINK, 
Fide 2012 “General report”, The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon: The 
Interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and National Constitutions, available at 
www.fide2012.eu; L.F.M. BESSELINK, Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On 
Fundamental Rights, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the EU, in 5 CML Rev., 1998, pp. 
629-680. 
27 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, par. 3, and 
Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten [2010] ECR I-8015, par. 61. 
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undermining the concepts of mutual trust and recognition, being Treaty 
based principles in the area of FSJ. This is the reason why Melloni 
cannot be compared to the Omega case28, where national constitutional 
standards (in casu human dignity) could be used to fill in the exceptions 
to the freedom of services and goods. It concerns the content of 
derogations that already existed under EU law. 
Fourth, the way in which the ECJ accepts or excludes a margin in 
the application of national fundamental rights within the EU legal order 
has not completely changed. Also in relation to other general principles 
of EU law, such as the principle of effective enforcement or the 
protection of legitimate expectations, the ECJ has used primacy as an 
essential feature of Union law and combined it with notions of 
effectiveness, assimilation and unity. It is surprising that the ECJ does 
not elaborate on this in the specific framework of the area of FSJ. The 
AG has rightly underlined that the construction of the area of FSJ is a 
specific context in which interest are at stake that cannot be taken into 
account by national constitutional standards and can legitimise 
adjustments to the level of human rights protection, depending on the 
different interest at stake29. In other words there are situations in which 
European interests legitimise a proper balance for the common area of 
FSJ. Unfortunately, the ECJ did not elaborate this and did not take into 
account either the sensitivity of the issues at stake. The Spanish 
Constitutional Court, when advising the Government on the draft 
Constitution Treaty, gave poor legal advice by considering the CFR in 
all situations as a minimum standard30. There can be situations where 
the CFR is the maximum standard, only of course when in line with the 
ECHR. It is important for national constitutional Courts to know if and 
                                                          
28 Case C-36/02, Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v 
Oberbürgemeísterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, [2004] ECR I-9609. 
29 Point 112. 
30 T. PÉREZ, Constitutional Dialogue on the European Arrest Warrant: The Spanish 
Constitutional Court Knocking on Luxembourg’s Door; Spanish Constitutional Court, 
Order of 9 June 2011, ATC 86/2011, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2012, 
pp. 105 ss.; M.P. MANZANO, The Spanish Constitutional Court and the Multilevel 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe; Matters Relating to ATC 86/2011, of 6 
June, in European Criminal Law Review, 2013, pp. 79 ss. 
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to which extent their constitutional standards can play a role in the EU 
legal order. It is important to underline that under the Lisbon Treaty the 
unanimity voting in criminal matters has been replaced by qualified 
majority voting. This means that member states can end up with a 
binding solution to which they did not agree. However, member states 
have the possibility of using an emergency break (referral to European 
Council) when they believe that the adoption of a directive with 
criminal (procedural) law content would affect fundamental aspects of 
its criminal justice system. What if they do not use this political tool? 
Does it mean that they cannot claim any respect under the Treaties for 
their constitutional traditions? The ECJ will undoubtedly have 
opportunities to elaborate on this point in future case-law and will have 
to deal with article 4(2) TEU and let’s hope that the ECJ will give us 
more insight in its reasoning. 
As it stands the mutual recognition programme in criminal matters 
and the EAW will continue to be at the forefront of case-law of the 
national Constitutional Courts, the ECJ and the ECHR, as the mutual 
trust is still to a large extent based on confidence and not on 
harmonisation of applicable procedural safeguards. In that sense 
Melloni was an exception to the rule, as it dealt with a harmonised 
system of in absentia requirements. Member States are negotiating for 
instance a new mutual recognition instrument on the transnational 
gathering of evidence, the so called European Investigation order31 that 
should replace the unsuccessful European evidence warrant32. The text 
that is currently being negotiated in the trilogue at the European 
Parliament contains no substantial harmonisation of procedural 
safeguards and will, once adopted, be one of the MR instruments that 
will constantly challenge the interaction between the ECHR, the CFR 
                                                          
31 Initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of 
Estonia, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Slovenia and 
the Kingdom of Sweden for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters, Brussels 29 April 2010 
Inter-institutional File: 2010/0817 (COD) 9145/10. 
32 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the 
European evidence warrant for the purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data 
for use in proceedings in criminal matters, 2008, OJ L 350/72. 
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and the national constitutions, as it deals with coercive measures and 
rights and liberties of citizens and legal persons. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
THE MATERIAL SCOPE OF COMPETENCE OF THE 
EUROPEAN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE: 
A HARMONISED NATIONAL PATCHWORK?1 
1. Introduction 
In any rule of law-based criminal justice system, it is of key 
importance that state powers to investigate, prosecute, and punish (ius 
puniendi) are not only granted by law, but also subject to command and 
control by law. This control-restraint is the very essence of the rule of 
law and the “Rechtstaat”, as the nation state has to guarantee both the 
liberty and the security of citizens. This has not only consequences for 
the way in which substantive criminal law is enacted, following the 
maxim of Beccaria, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege2, but also for 
the bridge between substantive criminal law and empowering the use of 
investigative and prosecutorial powers by judicial authorities, such as 
prosecutors. A suspect has to know for which offences he can be held 
criminal liable and which penalties can be applied (substantive 
legality). These offences and penalties must be laid down in clear, 
specific and definite terms (lex certa) and be foreseeable before the 
commission of the acts (lex praevia). 
Moreover, the suspect has to know for which offences and under 
which legal requirement judicial authorities can use their investigative 
and prosecutorial powers (procedural legality). Coercive measures, 
such as search or telecommunication surveillance, cannot be used 
without procedural thresholds and references to terms of substantive 
                                                          
1 This is an actualized version of J.A.E. VERVAELE, The Material Scope of 
Competence of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office: Lex uncerta and unpraevia, in 
ERA Forum Journal of the Academy of European Law, nr. 2/2014, pp. 1-17. 
2 C. BECCARIA, Dei delitti e delle pene, 1764, https://archive.org/details/deidelittie 
delle00becc or Beccaria [2]; Krey [5]. 
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law (offences and penalties), as these infringe the right of privacy of 
persons. The material scope of competence of a prosecutor is thus not a 
left-over issue. It is an essential part of the design of the criminal justice 
system, as it triggers the procedural competence of the judicial 
authorities and the related procedural guarantees for the persons 
involved in criminal proceedings. 
These key requirements, derived from the rule of law, were 
recognised as human rights and are laid down in Article 7 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (substantive legality) 
and in Article 8 of the ECHR (procedural legality) and in their 
counterpart under EU law, in Article 49 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (substantive legality) and in Article 52(1) 
of the Charter (procedural legality). 
This reasoning is mandatory not only for the use of ius puniendi at 
the level of the Member States, but also when investigative or 
prosecutorial functions are vested within a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Even if the outcome of the debate on the 
proposal for an EPPO were that the model mainly or exclusively 
functioned through the EPPO Deputy in every single national 
jurisdiction – and thus by applying national law, the suspect would still 
have the right to lex certa and lex praevia when it comes to the 
substantive competence of the EPPO, even were this composed by the 
composite of several national jurisdictions in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
In this article we will verify if the material scope of competence of 
the EPPO, as elaborated in the EPPO proposal, complies with the 
substantive legality principle under the Lisbon Treaty. Our analysis will 
include the proposed directive on the criminal law protection of the 
financial interests of the EU. We will conclude with a brief assessment 
of the compliance with the substantive legality principle of the EPPO 
proposal. 
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2. The Treaty Frame 
Article 86 TFEU provides a clear legal basis to establish the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office and also to elaborate the 
regulatory specificities when it comes to the investigation, prosecution, 
and adjudication of crimes affecting the financial interest (PIF-crimes) 
of the European Union. However, Article 86 TFEU is silent on the 
precise scope of the competence ratione materiae of the EPPO, as it 
contains a limited reference to a basic mandate to combat crime 
affecting the financial interest of the EU or, after a unanimous decision 
in the Council, to an extended mandate to combat serious crimes having 
a cross-border dimension. This divide is the result from the negotiations 
in Working Group X of the European Convention preparing the draft 
Constitutional Treaty, where Member States did not agree as to the 
necessity and added value of an EPPO3. Whereas some Member States 
wanted an EPPO to investigate and prosecute offences against the 
financial interests of the Union, others had a preference for an EPPO 
with a scope of action in line with the competences of Europol and 
Eurojust and also in line with the reach of the so-called euro-offences, 
which have been harmonised since the Treaty of Maastricht by 
conventions and framework decisions4 and are the subject of further 
                                                          
3 See the Final report of Working Group X “Freedom, Security and Justice”, CONV 
426/02, http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/reg/en/02/cv00/cv00426.en02.pdf, page 
20: “The Group agrees on the objective of a more efficient prosecution of offences 
against the Union’s financial interests. A significant number of members believe that 
current instruments are inadequate. The Group considered some proposals made in 
favour of the creation of a European Public Prosecutor responsible for detecting, 
prosecuting and bringing to judgment in the national courts the perpetrators of crimes 
prejudicial to the Union’s financial interests. They have proposed that the Treaty should 
provide a legal basis to that effect. Others have considered that a convincing case was 
not made for the creation of such a body and that there were strong objections on both 
practical and accountability grounds. To some other Members, the need exists for a 
proper European Public Prosecutor’s Office with a scope of action going beyond the 
protection of the financial interests of the Union. They believe that the current Eurojust 
could evolve towards that Office”. 
4 In particular the French Conseil d’état demanded that the scope of competence of 
the EPPO should be enlarged to cover not only offences against the financial interests 
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harmonisation under Article 83(1) TFEU. This divide resulted in the 
phrasing of the legal basis for the EPPO in Article III-274 of the draft 
Constitutional Treaty, which was to a very large extent copied and 
pasted to into Article 86 TFEU: 
Article 86: 
In order to combat crimes affecting the financial interests of the Union, 
the Council, by means of regulations adopted in accordance with a 
special legislative procedure, may establish a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust. 
4. The European Council may, at the same time or subsequently, adopt 
a decision amending paragraph 1 in order to extend the powers of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office to include serious crime having a 
cross-border dimension and amending accordingly paragraph 2 as 
regards the perpetrators of, and accomplices in, serious crimes affecting 
more than one Member State. 
Article 86 TFEU further indicates that the regulation by which the 
EPPO will be established shall determine the general rules applicable to 
the EPPO, apart from the specific rules on criminal procedure that are 
mentioned: 
Article 86: 
3. The regulations referred to in paragraph 1 shall determine the general 
rules applicable to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the 
conditions governing the performance of its functions, the rules of 
procedure applicable to its activities, as well as those governing the 
admissibility of evidence, and the rules applicable to the judicial review 
of procedural measures taken by it in the performance of its functions 
(…). 
It is rather unclear if the phrasing “determine the general rules 
applicable” refers also to the applicable substantive criminal law or is 
limited to general principles sensu strictu. 
The drafting of Article III-274 of the draft Constitutional Treaty and 
of Article 86 TFEU has predecessors, however and it is interesting to 
                                                                                                                               
of the EU, but also other forms of serious cross border criminality. See: Conseil d’Etat, 
Réfections sur l’institution d’un parquet européen, 24 February 2011, p. 58. 
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compare these texts with the one of the draft of Article III-175, 
prepared by the Convention5: 
Article III-175 
1. In order to combat serious crime having a cross-border dimension, as 
well as crimes affecting the interests of the Union, a European law 
of the Council of Ministers may establish a European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust. The Council of Ministers shall 
act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament. 
2. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office shall be responsible for 
investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment, where 
appropriate in liaison with Europol, the perpetrators of and 
accomplices in serious crimes affecting more than one Member 
State and of offences against the Union’s financial interests, as 
determined by the European law provided for in paragraph 1. It 
shall exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competent courts of 
the Member States in relation to such offences. 
3. The European law referred to in paragraph 1 shall determine the 
general rules applicable to the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, the conditions governing the performance of its functions, 
the rules of procedure applicable to its activities, as well as those 
governing the admissibility of evidence, and the rules applicable to 
the judicial review of procedural measures taken by it in the 
performance of its functions. 
It is not only surprising that the material scope of competence 
included PIF-crimes as well as serious crimes having a cross-border 
dimension, but also that Article III-175(2) clearly indicated that the 
determination of the substantive criminal law would be part of the 
regulatory package of the establishment of the EPPO. It is also clear 
from Article III-175(3) that the general rules are thus something other 
than substantive criminal law. 
It is also interesting to compare the text with the first proposal of the 
European Commission for a Treaty amendment in order to provide for a 
legal basis to establish an EPPO, namely the 2000 contribution to the 
Intergovernmental Conference on institutional reforms (preparing the 
                                                          
5 CONV 850/03 140. 
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Treaty of Nice) on “The criminal protection of the Community’s 
financial interests: a European Prosecutor”6: 
Proposed Article 280a: 
3. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure laid down by 
Article 251, shall lay down the general conditions governing the 
performance of the functions of the European Public Prosecutor and 
shall adopt, in particular: 
rules defining the facts constituting criminal offences relating to fraud 
and any other illegal activity prejudicial to the Community’s 
financial interests and the penalties incurred for each of them; 
rules of procedure applicable to the activities of the European Public 
Prosecutor and rules governing the admissibility of evidence; 
rules applicable to the judicial review of procedural measures taken by 
the European Public Prosecutor in the exercise of his functions. 
In the Communication, the European Commission clearly insists on 
the full package and the relationship between substantive criminal law 
and criminal procedure: 
In conclusion, the Commission proposes that the Conference 
supplement the current provisions concerning the protection of the 
Community’s financial interests with a legal basis allowing: 
the appointment of an independent European Public Prosecutor 
exercising the prosecution function in the courts of the Member 
States in the field of the protection of the Community’s financial 
interests and within the framework of specific rules adopted for this 
purpose; and 
the subsequent adoption through secondary legislation of: 
the regulations applicable to his office, 
rules of substantive law concerning the protection of financial 
interests by the European Public Prosecutor (offences and 
penalties), 
                                                          
6 Communication from the Commission: The Criminal Protection of the 
Community’s Financial Interests: A European Prosecutor, COM(2000) 608 final, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0608:FIN:EN:PDF; 
for analysis see also the EC Green Paper on Criminal-Law Protection of the Financial 
Interests of the Community and the Establishment of a European Prosecutor, 
COM(2001) 715 final, http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/documents/fwk-green-paper-
document/green_paper_en.pdf. 
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rules governing criminal procedure and the admissibility of 
evidence, 
rules concerning judicial review of actions taken by the Public 
Prosecutor in the performance of his duties7. 
We can thus conclude that Article 86 TFEU is phrased in an 
ambiguous way when it comes to the legal basis for harmonising the 
material scope of competence of the EPPO. Its predecessors were much 
clearer and did include an explicit reference to substantive criminal law 
as forming part of the EPPO regulatory package. However we cannot 
conclude that the legislator has deliberately excluded substantive 
harmonisation from the phrasing under Article 86. 
Given this intermediate conclusion it is wise to verify if there are 
other legal bases in the TFEU that could serve for the purpose of 
specifying the material scope of competence of the EPPO. In any case, 
Article 86 TFEU is part of the provisions in title V TFEU on an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. Within Title V TFEU, there are various 
legal bases providing for the harmonisation of substantive criminal law, 
and thus for the harmonisation of the actus reus, mens rea of the 
offences and for the harmonisation of the applicable criminal penalties. 
The most obvious legal basis for harmonising substantive criminal law 
is the one provided for under Article 83 TFEU. It contains twin-track 
possibilities, as Article 83(1) TFEU deals with euro-offences and 
Article 83(2) deals with criminal law enforcement of harmonised areas: 
Article 83 TFEU: 
1. The European Parliament and the Council may, by means of 
directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, establish minimum rules concerning the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious 
crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or 
impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a 
common basis. These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, 
trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and 
children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money 
laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, 
computer crime and organised crime. 
                                                          
7 COM(2000) 608 final, p. 8. 
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On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a 
decision identifying other areas of crime that meet the criteria 
specified in this paragraph. It shall act unanimously after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament. 
2. If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member 
States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a 
Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation 
measures, directives may establish minimum rules with regard to 
the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area 
concerned. Such directives shall be adopted by the same ordinary 
or special legislative procedure as was followed for the adoption of 
the harmonisation measures in question, without prejudice to 
Article 76. 
Article 83 directives are classic directives adopted under the co-
decision procedure to which the Community method applies. There are 
nonetheless some particularities under Article 83. Not only is there an 
emergency brake8, but there are Member States which either do not 
participate (Denmark) or have the privilege of an opting-in position (the 
United Kingdom and Ireland). When it comes to the criminal law 
enforcement of hard-core European interests, such as the combat 
against human trafficking in the AFSJ or the criminal law enforcement 
of market abuse and insider trading in the financial markets9, it is 
strange that some EU Member States do not participate or do not opt-in 
(as the United Kingdom did for the draft directive on market abuse)10. 
                                                          
8 Article 83(3) provides: “Where a member of the Council considers that a draft 
directive as referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 would affect fundamental aspects of its 
criminal justice system, it may request that the draft directive be referred to the 
European Council. In that case, the ordinary legislative procedure shall be suspended. 
After discussion, and in case of a consensus, the European Council shall, within four 
months of this suspension, refer the draft back to the Council, which shall terminate the 
suspension of the ordinary legislative procedure”. 
9 M. LUCHTMAN, J.A.E. VERVAELE, Enforcing the Market Abuse Regime (Insider 
Dealing and Market Manipulation): Towards an Integrated Model of Criminal and 
Administrative Law Enforcement in the EU? (forthcoming in 2014). 
10 For a more in detail analysis of Article 83 TFEU, see J.A.E. VERVAELE, 
Harmonised Policies and the Harmonization of Substantive Criminal Law, in F. GALLI, 
A. WEYEMBERGH (Eds.), Approximation of Substantive Criminal Law in the EU, 
Bruxelles, 2013, pp. 43-72. 
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Finally, the question arises (as it did in the past)11 if and to what 
extent it is possible to harmonise substantive criminal law on the basis 
of other articles in the Treaties, outside the framework of Title V TFEU 
on the AFSJ and thus decoupled from the requirement of ‘judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters’ (which is the title of Chapter 4 of Title 
5 TFEU). In the area of the protection of financial interests there is a 
specific provision in the TFEU, namely Article 325 TFEU: 
Article 325: 
1. The Union and the Member States shall counter fraud and any other 
illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union 
through measures to be taken in accordance with this Article, 
which shall act as a deterrent and be such as to afford effective 
protection in the Member States, and in all the Union’s institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies. (…) 
4. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with 
the ordinary legislative procedure, after consulting the Court of 
Auditors, shall adopt the necessary measures in the fields of the 
prevention of and fight against fraud affecting the financial 
interests of the Union with a view to affording effective and 
equivalent protection in the Member States and in all the Union’s 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. 
Article 325 TFEU replaced the former Article 280(4) of the 
European Community Treaty (as inserted by the Treaty of Amsterdam) 
which contained the sentence “these measures shall not concern the 
application of national criminal law or the national administration of 
justice”. This wording was deleted by the Lisbon Treaty. Article 235 
TFEU is a comprehensive article on the PIF-protection and contains a 
legal basis for the taking of measures in order to assure an effective and 
deterrent protection. Given the similar wording (fight against fraud 
affecting the financial interest of the Union) to that of Article 86 TFEU, 
these measures are clearly not limited to prevention. Moreover the 
article aims at affording effective and equivalent protection both at 
national level and at EU level (para. 3). So there is a certain logic to 
regarding Article 235 TFEU as a specialis in relation to the generalis 
article, Article 83(1-2). This does moreover exclude a couple of 
                                                          
11 Ibidem. 
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institutional disadvantages of Article 83(1-2) as this does not provide 
for an emergency break and does not include special positions for 
Member States (as non-participation or opting-in clauses). Finally, both 
directives and regulations can be adopted under Article 325. The tricky 
issue is if Chapter 4 of Title 5 and Article 83(1-2) are the exclusive 
legal basis in the TFEU for criminal law harmonisation or if this Article 
can be complemented by specific legal bases, such as that in Article 
325 TFEU. The Treaty gives us no guidance on this point and it will be, 
if the points arise, for the Court of Justice to decide. 
3. The EPPO-Proposal of the European Commission 
In July 2013, the European Commission submitted its proposal for a 
Council regulation on the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office12. From the recitals and the text it is clear that the 
Commission is aiming at a limited material scope of competence, and 
thus only PIF-offences and is excluding serious crimes having a cross-
border dimension (recital 21 and Article 4, Article 12). As regards the 
content of the material scope, the Commission definitely opts for a 
referral under national law, which criminalises acts or omissions 
affecting the Union’s financial interest and determines the applicable 
penalties by implementing the relevant Union legislation, in particular 
through the new 2013 draft Directive, which still under negotiation, on 
the fight against fraud on the Union’s financial interests by means of 
criminal law13 (recital 24). Furthermore the proposal extends the 
competence to offences that technically are not considered as PIF-
offences, but that, because of their constituent facts, are identical and 
inextricably linked with those of the PIF-offences (so-called ancillary 
competence for mixed cases). 
                                                          
12 COM(2013) 534 final, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
COM:2013:0534:FIN:EN:PDF. 
13 See point 4. 
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4. Substantive Harmonisation of PIF-Offences14 
Do we really know today which offences fall within the ambit of 
crimes “affecting” the financial interests of the Union? And will the 
EPPO know tomorrow what the content is of nullum crimen, nulla 
poena sine lege praevia? And will the citizen (suspect, victim, etc.) 
know tomorrow for which offences the EPPO can search, seize and 
prosecute, and which penalties could be applied? 
The actual harmonisation of PIF-offences goes back to a legislative 
package of 199515, containing a Convention and several Protocols, 
provided for under the Maastricht Treaty16. The Convention does not 
contain a specific list of PIF-offences, but rather a catch-all definition 
of fraud. The mens rea is clear, although the intentional nature of an act 
or omission may also be inferred from objective, factual circumstances 
(Article 1(4)). The actus reus is not clearly defined and contains rather 
a descriptive list of situations: 
Article 1: 
1. For the purposes of this Convention, fraud affecting the European 
Communities’ financial interests shall consist of: 
(a) in respect of expenditure, any intentional act or omission relating to: 
                                                          
14 P. ASP, The Substantive Criminal Law Competence of the EU, Stockholms, 2012; 
R. SICURELLA, Setting Up a European Criminal Policy for the Protection of EU 
Financial Interests: Guidelines for a Coherent Definition of the Material Scope of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in K. LIGETI (Ed.), Toward a Prosecutor for the 
European Union, Vol. 1: A Comparative Analysis, Oxford, 2013, pp. 870-904; K. 
LIGETI, Approximation of Substantive Criminal Law and the Establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office, in F. GALLI, A. WEYEMBERGH (Eds.), 
Approximation of Substantive Criminal Law in the EU, Bruxelles, 2013, pp. 73-84. 
15 The package contained also a regulation on administrative PIF-irregularities, 
regulation 2988/95 on the protection of the EC’s financial interests (OJ L 312, 23 
December 1995) and the legal basis for the OLAF-regulation 2185/96 concerning on-
the-spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the 
European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities, OJ L 
292, 15 November 1996. 
16 Convention of 26 July 1995, OJ C 316, 27 November 1995; First Protocol of 27 
September 1996, OJ C 313, 23 October 1996 and second Protocol of 19 June 1997, OJ 
C 221, 19.07.1997. 
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- the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete 
statements or documents, which has as its effect the 
misappropriation or wrongful retention of funds from the 
general budget of the European Communities or budgets 
managed by, or on behalf of, the European Communities, 
- non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, 
with the same effect, 
- the misapplication of such funds for purposes other than those for 
which they were originally granted; 
(b) in respect of revenue, any intentional act or omission relating to: 
- the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete 
statements or documents, which has as its effect the illegal 
diminution of the resources of the general budget of the 
European Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf 
of, the European Communities, 
- non-disclosure of information in violation of a specific obligation, 
with the same effect, 
- misapplication of a legally obtained benefit, with the same effect. 
Concerning criminal penalties, the Convention provides in Article 2 
as follows: 
Article 2: 
1. Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that 
the conduct referred to in Article 1, and participating in, instigating, or 
attempting the conduct referred to in Article 1(1), are punishable by 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties, including, at 
least in cases of serious fraud, penalties involving deprivation of liberty 
which can give rise to extradition, it being understood that serious fraud 
shall be considered to be fraud involving a minimum amount to be set 
in each Member State. This minimum amount may not be set at a sum 
exceeding ECU 50 000. 
It is clear from the outset that this harmonisation neither lays down a 
common term of imprisonment, nor minimum terms or maximum 
terms. 
The result is that this package has been implemented by the Member 
States in their national legislation in a very slowly and unconvinced 
way. The picture is a complete patchwork. Some Member States 
considered that their legislation did comply under common fraud 
provisions in their criminal codes; others provided for specific offences 
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but only linked, for instance, to subsidy-fraud – many did not elaborate 
specific criminal provisions in the area of structural funds. The result is 
also that not only the level of imprisonment but also the type of other 
criminal penalties is fully dependent upon the national legislator and 
thus does not offer a common set of equivalent standards of penalties in 
the AFSJ. The Commission’s reports on the implementation of the PIF 
Convention and Protocols show a real patchwork of gaps and pieces as 
regards implementation17. Even the anti-fraud unit of the EU (OLAF) 
has great difficulty in finding its way through the patchwork of 
applicable PIF-law in the Member States: 
The fact is that, nearly six years after the PFI convention was drawn up, 
the harmonisation objective has not been achieved and the whole area 
of the protection of Community financial interests continues to suffer 
from a lack of minimum standards of criminal law protection that can 
actually be applied throughout the European Union18. 
In the 1990s, within the Corpus Juris project19, academic experts 
elaborated a concrete set of PIF-offences. Their work inspired the 
Commission when proposing a directive in 2001 on the criminal law 
protection of the Communities financial interest, based upon Article 
280(4) of the Amsterdam Treaty20. The draft directive, aimed at 
replacing the 1995 Convention and Protocols contained more specific 
criminal law definitions of fraud, corruption and related money 
laundering. However in the field of criminal penalties this proposal did 
not prescribe minimum or maximum penalties or types of penalties 
                                                          
17 COM(2004) 709 final and COM(2008) 77 final. 
18 Point 1.2 of Explanatory Memorandum to Proposal for a directive on the criminal 
law protection of the Community’s financial interests, COM(2001) 272 final, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0272:FIN:EN:PDF. See also 
the two Reports of the Commission on the Implementation of the Convention on the 
Protection of the European Communities’ financial interests and its protocols, of 2004 
(COM(2004) 709 final) and 2008 (COM(2008) 77 final). 
19 M. DELMAS-MARTY (Ed.), Corpus Juris portant dispositions pénales pour la 
protection des intérêts financiers de l’Union européenne, Paris, 1997; M. DELMAS-
MARTY, J.A.E. VERVAELE, Implementation of the Corpus Juris in the Member States, 
Vol. 1-4, Cambridge, 2000-2002. 
20 COM(2001) 272 final. 
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either. This draft directive became bogged down in negotiations, both 
due to problems concerning both its content and its legal basis21 and 
was thus never adopted. 
In 2011 the European Commission insisted in its communication 
“On the protection of the financial interest of the EU by criminal law 
and by administrative investigations - An integrated policy to safeguard 
taxpayers’ money”22 on the importance of substantive law 
harmonisation in the field: 
4.2. Strengthening Substantive Criminal Law 
Criminal law is a cornerstone of EU action to prevent and fight damage 
to the EU budget. 
Due to the remaining loopholes in, and deficient implementation of, the 
Convention on the protection of financial interests, an initiative on the 
protection of EU financial interests will be prepared, replacing its 
pending proposal on the criminal-law protection of financial interests. 
Any new measure must guarantee consistency and fairness in 
application of criminal sanctions relating to fraud, depending on the 
particular way the offence was committed. Definitions of additional 
core offences, including on embezzlement and abuse of power should 
be envisaged as a part of the measure, to the extent relevant for the 
protection of EU financial interests. The approximation of rules on 
jurisdiction and time limitation will also be further analysed in order to 
improve criminal investigation results. This proposal may include, to 
the extent relevant for the protection of EU financial interests, more 
systematic rules on aiding and abetting, instigation, attempt, as well as 
on intent and negligence. It may also set out clearer rules on the 
criminal liability of appointed and elected office holders, and of legal 
persons regarding the protection of financial interests. 
In 2012, the European Commission submitted a new proposal for a 
directive on the fight against fraud on the Union’s financial interests by 
means of criminal law under the Lisbon Treaty23. The proposal not only 
sought to “Lisbonise” the existing acquis, but also included in Articles 
2-6 two additional offences not covered by previous third pillar 
                                                          
21 Article 280 was the predecessor of Article 325 TFEU. By using Article 280 the 
Commission avoided the criminal law harmonisation in the third pillar. 
22 COM(2011) 293 final. 
23 COM(2012) 363 final. 
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instruments, namely fraud in public procurement or grant procedures 
and misappropriation of funds24. The Commission did not include all 
the offences listed in the Corpus Juris project, neither did it include 
criminal liability for legal persons. The provisions on penalties in 
Articles 7-9 were more innovative. Article 7 required penalties to be 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive”, but Article 8 set out very 
innovative imprisonment thresholds. Fraud on the EU, public 
procurement fraud, and misappropriation of funds were to be 
punishable by a minimum penalty of at least six months imprisonment 
and a maximum penalty of at least five years imprisonment in cases 
involving an advantage or damage of at least €100,000. For money 
laundering and corruption, the same imprisonment thresholds were to 
apply in cases involving an advantage or damage of at least €30,000. In 
cases of involvement within a criminal organisation for all PIF-offences 
the minimum maximum penalty was required to be at least ten years 
imprisonment. The introduction of mandatory minimum penalties was 
entirely new. The proposed directive was based on Article 325(4) 
TFEU. 
During the negotiations at Council level, Member States obtained 
very substantial changes to this proposal. In the agreed general 
approach in the Council in June 2013 the legal base was changed from 
Article 325(4) TFEU to Article 83(2) TFEU. From the opinion of the 
Legal Service of the Council, which were in favour of this change, it is 
clear that all the limitations (viz., the fact of not being applicable to 
Denmark, the opting in arrangement for the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, and the emergency brake procedure) apply. In the event of 
there being no opt-in by the United Kingdom and Ireland, these would 
                                                          
24 The Commission has reflected on including the other offences mentioned in the 
Corpus Juris, namely a specific offence of abuse of office and the breach of 
professional secrecy. However, the Commission decided not to include a special 
offence on abuse of office as “it has been considered a superfluous addition to the 
offence of misappropriation. Similarly, an offence of breach of professional secrecy has 
not been included in the proposal as the conduct is already covered under the 
disciplinary-law measures of the EU Staff Regulations”. See L. KUHL, The Initiative for 
a Directive on the Protection of the EU Financial Interests by Substantive Criminal 
Law, in Eucrim, 2012, 2, p. 65. 
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remain bound by the 1995 PIF Convention. Secondly, the Member 
States have explicitly excluded revenues arising from VAT from the 
scope the directive. This is astonishing, as the Court of Justice has ruled 
clearly that VAT revenues are part of the financial interests of the 
Union25, and many serious EU fraud cases are related to VAT carousel 
cases. In relation to penalties, Member States deleted from the text any 
reference to minimum terms of imprisonment. As regards the minimum 
maximum terms of imprisonment, this was lowered to at least four 
years in the case of serious offences. 
Whether an offence is serious is defined according to national law, 
having regard to all relevant circumstances, such as the value of any 
damage done or advantages gained, or the damage to the integrity of or 
confidence in systems for managing the Union’s financial interests 
(recital 16). The commission of an offence within a criminal 
organisation is an aggravating circumstance. At the time of writing (the 
end of March 2014) the proposal is prepared to be submitted to for 
voting in April in the general assembly in the European Parliament. 
Both the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs 
(LIBE) and the Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) of the 
European Parliament have amended substantially the Council text and 
agreed on a new version. The scope of the offences has again been 
widened to include fraud in public procurement and VAT fraud. By 
doing this, the text has been reoriented in the direction of the original 
Commission proposal. However a strong lobby of NGO’s has changed 
the mind of the Parliamentary Committees with the result that 
minimum sanctions will not be reintroduced and that the legal basis will 
remain article 83(2). The emergency break procedure is seen by the 
NGO’s as a method to block proposals that does not offer sufficient 
protection of procedural safeguards. 
                                                          
25 Case C-539/09 Commission v Germany [2011] ECR I-11235, paragraph 72. 
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5. Conclusions 
The EPPO aims at establishing a coherent European system for the 
investigation and prosecution offences affecting the Union’s financial 
interest26. It also aims to contribute to a further development of an area 
of justice, and to enhance the trust of EU businesses and citizens in the 
Union’s institutions, while respecting all fundamental rights enshrined 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union27. 
Once the EPPO established, will a suspect know for which offences 
his can be held criminal liable and which penalties could be applied 
(substantive legality)? And will the citizen (suspect, victim, etc.) know 
for which offences the EPPO can apply coercive measures, like 
searches and tapping of telecommunications, can prosecute and which 
penalties could be applied? 
We have to take into account that the EPPO will bring suspects of 
PIF-offences to judgment before national courts, after having used a set 
of autonomous powers of investigation and prosecution28. The choice of 
the forum court and thus the adjudicative jurisdiction is not predefined 
and Article 27 of the EPPO proposal contains only discretionary 
guidance as to the forum choice. This means that the suspect cannot 
foresee the forum in which he has to stand trial. 
The European Commission has chosen to regulate the material 
scope of competence of the EPPO by harmonising national substantive 
criminal law through a directive based on Article 82(2). This means 
that equivalent components of substantive criminal law in the AFSJ for 
the competence ratione materiae of the EPPO depend on the level and 
content of the harmonisation in the directive and on the quality of the 
implementation in every single Member State. 
As regards the level and content of the harmonisation by the 
directive, it follows from our analysis in this article that the Directive, 
like the PIF-Convention and the 1995 protocols, aims only at a very 
minimalistic degree of minimum harmonisation. The text which the 
Member States in the Council have agreed upon as a general approach 
                                                          
26 Point 3.3 of the explanatory memorandum of the EPPO proposal. 
27 Idem. 
28 Recital 7 of the EPPO proposal. 
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and which is now under negotiation at the European Parliament has 
further watered down the minimum harmonisation which had been 
proposed by the Commission. The way the offences are spelled out in 
the draft directive leaves considerable leeway to the Member States 
when it comes to implementation. As regards the applicable criminal 
penalties, the general approach, agreed by the Council, does not at all 
result in foreseeable imprisonment terms, either as regards minimum 
levels or as regards precise maximum levels. Moreover the definition of 
the threshold of seriousness is left to national law. What does this mean 
as regards the level of implementation? Even when it comes to the 
common minimum harmonisation, Member States have a broad margin 
of discretionary power. Some of them will, as in the past, consider that 
their existing law does already provide for the criminal law protection 
and does not need any amendments, others will cherry pick, and others 
will go beyond the minimum level of harmonisation required. The 
result is twofold. First, the existing fragmentation of the design of the 
PIF-offences in the legal orders of the Member States will not be 
ended; apart from there being a legislative patchwork, there will also be 
gaps in implementation. Secondly, the implementation of the directive 
will not lead to a clear and precise body of law of PIF-offences and 
penalties and the differences between the Member States will remain 
substantial. 
This means that the suspect will have great difficulty knowing for 
which PIF-offences he can be held criminally liable and which 
penalties could be applied in all jurisdictions where he could stand trial. 
This means also that the substantive threshold for the triggering of 
autonomous European investigative measures will vary substantially 
from one Member State to another. Thus what results will be an 
unforeseeable géométrie variable instead of a clear, specific and 
definite body of offences and penalties. This harmonised patchwork of 
national law is not only a substantial threat for the rights of suspects, 
but also a substantial source of legal problems for the use of coercive 
powers by the EPPO. 
If we set up an EPPO, even with a structure that is strongly 
embedded in national law, a directive is definitely not the right 
instrument, as it aims at harmonising national law. What is needed is a 
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harmonised body of offences and penalties, that are prescribed by a 
regulation and can be applied and by the EPPO in cross-border 
investigations and by the EPPO-Deputies in national settings. These 
offences must obviously correspond to the autonomous definition of 
PIF in EU law, as defined by the Court of Justice, and thus cover all 
fields, including, for instance, VAT and structural funds. This body of 
PIF-offences can be laid down at national level in a specific part of the 
Criminal Code or in a special criminal act or statute. This regulation 
can be part of one of the regulations based on Article 86 TFEU29. Only 
by following this path will we arrive at a set of offences and penalties 
that will comply with the substantive legality principle and thus with 
the ECHR and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
and that will serve as a common level playing field for the criminal law 
enforcement by the EPPO. Otherwise, the EPPO is condemned to act as 
a prisoner of a composite of national arrangements. The added value 
will be very doubtful and the risk of non-compliance with minimum 
ECHR and Charter of Fundamental Rights standards will be high. 
                                                          
29 In the same vein of interpretation, see: L. PICOTTI, Le basi giuridiche per 
l’introduzione di norme penali comuni relative ai reati oggetto della competenza della 
Procura Europea, in G. GRASSO, G. ILLUMINATI, R. SICURELLA, S. ALLEGREZZA (Eds.), 
Le sfide dell’attuazione di una Procura europea: definizione di regole comuni e loro 
impatto sugli ordinamenti interni, Milano, 2013, pp. 65-108. See also on line: 
www.penalecontemporaneo.it. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 
 
EUROPEAN TERRITORIALITY AND JURISDICTION: 
THE PROTECTION OF THE EU’S FINANCIAL 
INTERESTS IN ITS HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL 
(EPPO) DIMENSION1 
1. An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and European 
Territoriality 
In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a new political and 
legal concept in the EU treaty, being the area of freedom, security and 
justice. In 2004, Walker declared it a novel legal brand under whose 
name a significant volume of law (hard and soft) has already been 
accumulated2. The area of freedom, security and justice was further 
strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty. There is no doubt that it will 
increasingly play a role in the constitutional landscape and frame of the 
EU integration process; it is part of its constitutional Odyssey. 
Despite the strengthening of the area of freedom, security and 
justice in the Lisbon Treaty, we still have great difficulty in defining its 
scope, its substantial characteristics and its legal consequences. In 
Article 67 TFEU we can read that the Union constitutes an area of 
freedom, security and justice without internal borders in which a high 
level of security is ensured but with respect for fundamental rights at 
the same time. Crime control and fundamental rights, including due 
process, are both part of the general provisions of the common area. 
From Article 82 TFEU we can deduce that judicial cooperation in the 
common area shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition and 
                                                          
1 This article was published as J.A.E. VERVAELE, European Territoriality and 
Jurisdiction: The Protection of the EU’s Financial Interests in its Horizontal and 
Vertical (EPPO) Dimension, in M. LUCHTMAN (Ed.), Choice of Forum in Cooperation 
against EU Financial Crime, The Hague-Portland, 2013, pp. 167-184. 
2 N. WALKER, Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Oxford, 2004. 
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that the EU shall (not may!) adopt measures to prevent and settle 
conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States. 
Is the area of freedom, security and justice a territorial or a 
functional concept? When it comes to judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, including the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (EPPO) under Article 86 TFEU, is the common area the 
equivalent of a European judicial space (espace judiciaire européen) 
with European territoriality? 
Why is it so important to define the scope, the substantial 
characteristics, and the legal consequences of the area of freedom, 
security and justice? Let me explain it with a very concrete example of 
great actuality. 
The financial services sector is one the key areas for criminal law 
policy, both in the internal market and in the area of freedom, security 
and justice. In a communication from 2010 on ‘Reinforcing sanctioning 
regimes in the financial services sector’3, the European Commission is 
pleading for a minimum common standard for administrative and 
criminal law enforcement in the field. However, the communication is 
not dealing at all with jurisdiction issues. In its key communication 
‘Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective 
implementation of EU policies through criminal law’ from 20 
September 20114, the European Commission refers explicitly to Article 
83(2) TFEU, the so-called annex-competence for harmonised areas. 
One of the priority areas for criminal law enforcement in the 
communication is the one related to financial markets. The European 
Commission pleads for the development of a level playing field for 
financial services within the internal market. However, in this 
communication there is no reference to jurisdiction issues. Finally, on 
October 20th 2011, the European Commission submitted a proposal for 
a new regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation5 and a 
proposal for a directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and 
                                                          
3 COM(2010) 716 final. 
4 COM(2011) 573 final. 
5 Proposal for a new regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation (market 
abuse), COM(2011) 651 final, amended by COM(2012) 421 final. 
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market manipulation6. Neither in the latter, nor in the former proposal 
are there clauses included about prevention or settlement of conflicts of 
jurisdiction. The result is that the European Commission is aiming at 
further substantive harmonisation of the administrative and criminal 
law enforcement of insider trading and market abuse, without 
regulating at all in the field of prevention and settlement of conflicts. 
The result is that the ne bis in idem principle is converted into a final 
regulator of conflicts of jurisdiction, in other words that the first final 
decision on insider dealing or market abuse can bar all the other ones. 
Is the ‘comes first, serves first’ practice really a problem in the internal 
market and the area of freedom, security and justice? We jump to the 
promised actual and concrete example to illustrate it. 
In 2007, just before the financial crisis and meltdown of 2008, 
Banco Santander, Fortis Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland obtained 
the control over ABN Amro bank through a hostile takeover bid for the 
amount of euro 72 billion, one of the biggest-ever deals in the financial-
services industry. The operation was approved by the European 
Commission, but Fortis Bank had to sell some activa. They were sold to 
Deutsche Bank. Fortis Bank had problems to finance its part of the 
takeover and decided to go the capital market for fresh capital and thus 
to offer new shares. The operation was widely advertised. Although the 
capital extension was successful, it was not enough to guarantee the 
financial position of Fortis bank and also due to the worsening financial 
situation of the financial market and the increasing distrust in the 
banking sector, Fortis Bank was about to collapse until governments of 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg intervened and nationalised, 
dismantled and partially sold Fortis Bank. This nationalisation and 
dismantling was certainly not done from the perspective of a common 
European approach, but rather a typical example of national-driven 
interest. 
Competent administrative and judicial authorities opened 
investigations against Fortis Bank for several suspicions of market 
manipulation and market abuse, both in Belgium and in the 
                                                          
6 Proposal for a directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market 
manipulation, COM(2011) 654 final. 
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Netherlands. Concurring and parallel investigations were conducted in 
the two countries, both by administrative and criminal authorities. The 
administrative enforcement authorities in the field of insider trading and 
market abuse have a European network, the European Securities and 
Markets Authority ESMA. In the Netherlands, the legal framework 
imposes a duty upon the administrative and judicial enforcement 
authorities to choose at a certain stage for one of the two enforcement 
regimes, in other words to opt either for administrative sanctions or 
criminal prosecution (the so-called una via principle). 
On February 5th 2012, the Dutch Financial Services Authority 
(AFM), the administrative enforcement agency, has imposed four fines7 
of 144.000 euro each upon two legal persons, being the two legal 
persons that integrate the Fortis Bank corporation/holding, Fortis NV 
Brussels and Fortis NV Utrecht. Fortis Bank has been found guilty of 
market manipulation/market abuse in two situations: 
- after the takeover of ABN Amro, the CEO of Fortis Bank has 
organised a press conference in which he insisted on the strong and 
sane financial position of Fortis. By doing so he has been 
misleading the investors; 
- the EC imposed upon Fortis Bank to sell some parts of the group. 
While putting these actives on the market Fortis Bank decided not 
to publish some negative information about the financial position of 
the group and by doing so manipulated the trading of the shares of 
Fortis at the stock exchange. 
Both infringements have been made by the same leading persons 
with instructions to the two groups. The total amount of the fine has 
been reduced to 50 percent for each part of the holding. These 
infringements are administrative irregularities both in the Netherlands 
and in Belgium, but also at the same time criminal offences in both 
countries. In the Netherlands and in Belgium there is also criminal 
liability of legal persons. 
                                                          
7See <www.afm.nl/~/media/files/boete/2010/fortis-besluit-nv.ashx> and <www. 
afm.nl/~/media/files/boete/2010/fortis-besluit-sanv.ashx>, last visited at 25.10.2012. 
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The imposition of the administrative fines by the AFM on the two 
legal persons composing the holding of Fortis Bank has for sure been 
coordinated with the Dutch judicial authorities. If the decision to go for 
the administrative enforcement way instead of the criminal was taken 
with the European dimension of the case in mind is unknown and 
difficult to guess. However, what is clear is that we can speak of a 
unilateral action of the Dutch authorities, without coordinating with the 
Belgian administrative and judicial authorities. In Belgium the 
Financial Services Authority (FMSA) recently finished its 
administrative investigation against the same legal persons for the same 
facts and submitted the case to its sanctioning committee, which could 
impose a sanction of 2,5 million euro. In April 2012 the FMSA also 
reported the case to the Belgian judicial authorities (already 
investigating the case), as they found indications of criminal offences 
committed by natural persons involved. Both Belgian authorities, 
administrative and judicial, have been investigating the case over the 
past three years. 
The legal consequences of the Dutch fines imposed by the AFM are 
far from clear8. AGEAS (former Fortis) CEO was fast to claim that the 
Dutch fine would bar further sanctions based on the ne bis in idem 
principle. At least we can say that the approach in this case does not 
show a clear coordination of jurisdiction of choice of allocation of 
jurisdiction. Moreover the result might be that further administrative 
fines and or criminal punishment in Belgium have been barred, at least 
as far as the legal person is concerned. 
Who says that the Dutch administrative enforcement regime was the 
most appropriate enforcement mechanism? The sanctions upon the 
legal persons seem to be rather modest, in relation to the magnitude of 
the victims (several hundreds of thousands) and the magnitude of the 
public interest at stake (integrity in the financial market in the EU). The 
financial markets are a key area of the internal market. The applicable 
substantial law is highly harmonised. The administrative enforcement 
regimes are harmonised as well, and the enforcement harmonisation 
                                                          
8See also M. LUCHTMAN (Ed.), Choice of Forum in Cooperation against EU 
Financial Crime: Freedom, Security and Justice and the Protection of Specific EU-
Interests, The Hague, 2013, section 4.3. 
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will soon be extended to administrative and criminal law 
harmonisation. Nonetheless, it still seems possible that the enforcement 
body that comes first is the final regulator, as it bars further proceedings 
through the ne bis in idem principle. When the first seems to be an 
administrative enforcement agency, the question also arises if and to 
what extent there is national executive steering support. 
What can we conclude from this striking example? First of all, even 
in key-areas of the internal market and the area of freedom, security and 
justice, the choice of jurisdiction remains exclusively in the hands of 
the Member States. Their rules and practices concerning jurisdiction are 
still a product of state sovereignty. Their rules are arms and legs of the 
substantive body of administrative and criminal law. Even in fields 
where these substantive norms have been harmonised by EU law, the 
Member States are using them as if they were purely national. In public 
law, there is a very strong relationship between the substantive norms 
on administrative irregularities and criminal (the jurisdiction to 
prescribe) and the applicable law and jurisdiction (the jurisdiction to 
enforce and the jurisdiction to adjudicate). In public law – and this is 
very different from international private law – the applicable law and 
jurisdiction are interlinked. The choice of jurisdiction determines which 
law will be applicable, both procedurally and substantively and this 
applicable law is linked with a Member State’s legal regime. In fact, the 
national rules on jurisdiction are not designed to prevent or to solve a 
conflict of jurisdiction between countries or in a common area. They 
are designed to claim competence, authority, Strafgewalt, ius puniendi 
in a unilateral way by one State. That means that the administrative or 
criminal judicial authority dealing with the question of competence is 
only checking if and to what extent he is competent, applying the 
classic jurisdiction criteria (locus delicti, active or passive personality, 
etc.). From this national perspective, these authorities are not dealing 
with the question of the most appropriate jurisdiction in the light of the 
common interest in the common space (internal market, area of 
freedom, security and justice). These authorities are not prepared and 
even not competent to deal with questions of appropriate allocation of 
cases in the common space. The national authorities are still 
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functioning within the ratio of the Nation-State as exclusive Sovereign 
when it comes to ius puniendi. 
The result is a risk of concurring investigation and prosecutions and 
a risk of multiple adjudications or the risk of final decisions that bar 
further proceedings through the ne bis in idem principle. The ne bis in 
idem principle is not necessarily the best regulator of conflicts of 
jurisdiction9. The result is also that in some cases nobody wants to 
trigger its jurisdiction and that the common area is confronted with a 
negative conflict of jurisdiction. To summarise, even in highly 
harmonised key-areas of the internal market, we have serious problems 
with the good and appropriate administration of justice because of lack 
of rules and steering when it comes to the choice of the most 
appropriate jurisdiction. 
The problem is of course broader than choice of jurisdiction, as 
there is no common frame for mutual exchange of law information 
related to judicial investigation, prosecution and bringing to judgment. 
There is even no duty to inform or duty to report between the national 
administrative and judicial authorities of the Member States on the 
ongoing investigations. 
2. A Common Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and Joint 
Responsibility 
In a common area of freedom, security and justice, as defined in 
Article 3(2) TEU, with common goals, common policies and common 
instruments, it is rather surprising that the chain of criminal justice still 
functions as if the boundaries of the Nation-States are the gold 
standard. In 1999 the European Court of Justice decided in case C-9/89, 
Spain v. Commission10, that in the field of the enforcement of common 
fisheries policies Member States have a joint responsibility when it 
comes to information exchange, monitoring of licenses and certified 
                                                          
9 For solutions, see A. BIEHLER ET AL. (Eds.), Freiburg Proposal on Concurrent 
Jurisdictions and the Prohibition of Multiple Prosecutions in the European Union, 
Freiburg i.Br, 2003. 
10 ECJ, 27 March 1990, Case C-9/89, Spain/Council, [1990] ECR I-1383. 
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documents and prosecution of infringements. The joint responsibility 
can even include that Member States that fail to initiate criminal or 
administrative proceedings or to transfer such proceedings to the 
Member State of registration of the vessel can be sanctioned for non-
compliance. In the same line of reasoning Advocate General Bot 
underlines in his conclusion in the Wolzenburg-case: ‘(…) that the 
opening of borders has made the Member States jointly responsible for 
combating crime. That is actually why it became necessary to create a 
European criminal-law-enforcement area, in order that the freedoms of 
movement are not exercised to the detriment of public security’11. He 
further links it up with the European citizenship to: ‘(…) the confidence 
which each Member State and its nationals must have in the justice 
systems of the other Member States seems to be a logical and inevitable 
outcome of creating the single market and European citizenship’12. 
Finally, the ECJ has clearly used the mutual trust between the criminal 
justice systems and in the criminal justice systems in the area of 
freedom, security and justice to create a transnational ne bis in idem 
principle, applicable between the judicial authorities in the common 
area of freedom, security and justice13. The European Court of Justice 
did not opt for a dual sovereignty ne bis in idem concept, one for the 
federal level and one for the national level, as in the US, but for the EU-
wide application of the same transnational fundamental right in an 
integrated area of European territoriality. Advocate-General Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer mentions even the concept of ‘common market of 
fundamental rights’ in his conclusion14. 
It becomes clear that the shared sovereignty in criminal matters de-
territorialise the criminal justice system. When the criminal justice 
system is acting in relation to European goals, its dimension is also 
European. This is not only true in relation to crime control, but also in 
relation to applicable human rights and due process. However, the 
                                                          
11 A-G Bot, Case C-123/08, Wolzenburg, [2009] ECR I-9621, Opinion, para. 105. 
12 A-G Bot, Case C-123/08, Wolzenburg, [2009] ECR I-9621, Opinion, para. 138. 
13 ECJ 11 February 2003, Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01, Gözütok and 
Brügge, [2003] ECR I-1345. 
14 A-G Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, ECJ 11 February 2003, Joined Cases C-187/01 and 
C-385/01, Gözütok and Brügge, [2003] ECR I-1345, para. 124. 
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concept of joint responsibility is not limited to these two aspects; it also 
includes common criminal policy and common administration of 
justice, including case allocation, when it comes to the criminal law 
enforcement of common values and common policies. 
We do have to rethink allocation of jurisdiction in the light of the 
common European interest and in line with the common institutional 
framework (area of freedom, security and justice). This is especially 
true for the jurisdiction to investigate and the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
in relation to a) the so-called euro-offences (the ones mentioned in 
Art. 83(1) TFEU and the criminal law protection of PIF and the single 
currency) and to b) the so-called annex-offences, being offences related 
to harmonised EU policies, as environment, fisheries, financial 
services, competition, etc., (foreseen under Art. 83(2) TFEU). For all 
these areas, the question of allocation of jurisdiction (both in relation to 
investigation and adjudication), prevention of conflicts and settlement 
of conflicts is of utmost importance. 
The framework decision on the prevention and resolution of 
jurisdictional conflicts of 2009, that should have been fully 
implemented by June 15th 2012, falls short of the EU’s stated objective 
of creating an area of freedom, security and justice, because it does not 
provide sufficient legal certainty and foreseeability as to the 
applicability of competing substantive laws, both for the Member 
State’s judicial authorities and for the suspect. In fact the framework 
decision contains only a mediation procedure with the aim of 
consenting on an ‘efficient solution’ and that can resolute in a reasoned 
recommendation of Eurojust about which Member State should be the 
focus of the investigation or about which Member States would be less 
suited as the potential centre of the proceedings. If a Member State is 
not following the recommendation it must give reasons for the 
derogation. In other words, the framework decision does not include 
binding decisions of Eurojust on matters of choice of jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, the Member States were unable to agree on a draft 
framework decision on the transfer of proceedings in criminal matters. 
It is high time to deal with the duty imposed under Article 82 TFEU: 
the EU shall adopt measures to prevent and settle conflicts of 
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jurisdiction between Member States in order to reinforce the principle 
of mutual recognition15. 
3. Choice of Jurisdiction and the EPPO 
3.1. Treaty Design of the EPPO 
The Lisbon Treaty has inserted in Article 86 TFEU a legal basis for 
the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office as an EU 
body within the area of freedom, security and justice. Its material scope 
of competence will probably be limited to PIF-offences, but can be 
extended to serious crimes having a cross-border dimension. This 
means that it has the potentiality to cover serious offences under Article 
83(1) and Article 83(2) TFEU. 
The wording of Article 86 TFEU defines the main task of the EPPO. 
It will be responsible for investigating, prosecuting and bringing to 
judgment the perpetrators of the offences under its competence. It is 
also clear from the Treaty provision that the adjudication will be at 
national level, so the EPPO has to exercise the functions of prosecutor 
in the competent criminal courts of the Member States. In other words, 
under this Treaty provision the EPPO will be combining supranational 
investigative powers with national adjudication in the common area of 
freedom, security and justice. Article 86 TFEU does not expand the 
institutional and procedural aspects of the EPPO but refers to 
regulations that shall have to determine the general rules applicable to 
the EPPO, the conditions governing the performance of its functions, 
the rules of procedure applicable to its activities, as well as those 
governing the admissibility of evidence and the rules applicable to the 
judicial review of procedural measures taken by it in the performance 
of its functions. Article 86 TFEU does not mention the word 
jurisdictions or choice of jurisdiction, but it is clear from its general 
task that the EPPO will have to decide on the its competence to 
                                                          
15 See A. SINN (Ed.), Jurisdiktionskonflikte bei grenzüberschreitender Kriminalität 
– Ein Rechtsvergleich zum Internationalen Strafrecht, Göttingen, 2012, for a model of 
statutory or a model of agreed jurisdiction. 
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investigate (jurisdiction to enforce) and on the choice of the forum to 
try the offences (jurisdiction to adjudicate). In other words the EPPO 
regulations will have to deal with the material competence (the norms) 
and these procedural aspects, including applicable law and jurisdiction. 
Article 86(2-3) TFEU contains the parameters for the institutional 
and procedural design in the EPPO-regulations: 
2. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office shall be responsible for 
investigating, prosecuting and bringing to judgment, where 
appropriate in liaison with Europol, the perpetrators of, and 
accomplices in, offences against the Union’s financial interests, as 
determined by the regulation provided for in paragraph 1. It shall 
exercise the functions of prosecutor in the competent courts of the 
Member States in relation to such offences. 
3. The regulations referred to in paragraph 1 shall determine the general 
rules applicable to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the 
conditions governing the performance of its functions, the rules of 
procedure applicable to its activities, as well as those governing the 
admissibility of evidence, and the rules applicable to the judicial 
review of procedural measures taken by it in the performance of its 
functions. 
Dealing with our topic, we have to construct some premises before 
analysing the substance of the topic. The EPPO will enjoy autonomous 
powers to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment. Being a 
European office it may investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment in 
the territory of all of those Member States that participate in its 
establishment (concept of European territoriality). 
Each part of its competence (investigating, prosecuting and bringing 
to judgment) has consequences on related jurisdiction issues. The 
supranational investigation by the EPPO will not only absorb the 
national judicial investigation(s), but the execution of some coercive 
measure by the EPPO will need prior or a posteriori judicial 
authorisation by a judge of freedoms. If the judge of freedoms is 
inserted in the judiciary of the Member States, there is a forum choice 
for this function. The other option is to empower the European Court of 
Justice with this function. 
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Also this decision to bring to judgment, meaning sending an 
indictment or accusation before a national court is of course a forum 
choice for the adjudication of the criminal case. 
3.2. EPPO in the Corpus Juris Study16 
The authors of the Corpus Juris study had already opted for a 
European judicial area when it comes to investigation and prosecution 
of PIF-offences. The territories of the Member State of the EU 
constitute a single space called the European Judicial Space, being the 
logical extension of the area of freedom, security and justice. One of 
the basic principles underlying the EPPO in the Corpus Juris study is 
the one of European territoriality. This means that the EPPO has 
autonomous investigative powers in the European judicial area. Judicial 
authorisation of the judge of freedom has legal value in the European 
judicial area and final decisions of criminal courts or out-of-court 
settlement have legal value in the European judicial area. The Corpus 
Juris study has a clear design when it comes to the jurisdiction to 
enforce/investigate as it spells out a clear vertical relationship in 
relation to allocation of investigation and division of labour between 
EPPO and national judicial authorities. The EPPO conducts 
investigations across the territory of the Union. This means that the 
EPPO (including its delegated structure) can apply its investigative 
competence in the European judicial space as a single space. The 
schemes of mutual legal assistance or mutual recognition are useless 
under that model. Of course for some coercive measures, the EPPO 
needs judicial approval by a national judge of freedoms. 
However, when it comes to the choice of jurisdiction related to the 
judge of freedoms and related to the allocation of the choice of the 
forum to adjudicate, the Corpus Juris study still has some ground to 
cover. Article 26 Corpus Juris tackles the point by stating that each case 
is tried in the Member State which seems appropriate in the interest of 
                                                          
16 M. DELMAS-MARTY, J.A.E. VERVAELE, The Implementation of the Corpus Juris 
in the Member States, Antewrp-Oxford-Portland, 2000, Vol. 1-4. 
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efficient administration of justice. The principal criteria for the choice 
of jurisdiction are defined as follows: 
a) the state where the greater part of the evidence is found; 
b) the State of residence or of nationality of the accused (or the 
principal persons accused); 
c) the State where the economic impact of the offence is the greatest. 
The main focus seems to be the proper administration of justice, not 
the rights of the citizen or the defendant. Why these three jurisdiction 
criteria have been chosen is not clear from the explanatory text. It is 
also unclear whether these criteria have a hierarchical order. 
It is interesting to compare this choice with the discussions in the 
Council of Europe on a draft Convention on the settlement of 
jurisdictions in criminal matters that failed to become reality. In 1965 
the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted 
Recommendation 420 on the settlement of jurisdictions in criminal 
matters, by which it attempted to establish a list of priorities. The 
starting point in the recommendation was that the State in which the act 
was committed should have priority to prosecute the offender. Other 
criteria should be subordinate to this principle. Hence prosecution in the 
State in which the offender is ordinarily resident would depend on the 
State where the offence has been committed renouncing prosecution. 
However, the Legal Committee drew up a text of a recommendation17, 
linked to the European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings, 
dealing with conflicts of jurisdiction. The Legal Committee came to the 
conclusion, dissenting from the Consultative Assembly, that the 
assumption that it is normally most appropriate to prosecute an offence 
where it has been committed is not justified. Rehabilitation of the 
offender and securing evidence are other very important considerations. 
The Legal Committee came to the conclusion that: 
The weight to be given in each case to conflicting considerations cannot 
be decided by completely general rifles. The decision must be taken in 
the light of the particular facts of each case. By attempting in this way 
                                                          
17 <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/reports/html/073.htm>, last visited 25.10.2012. 
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to arrive at an agreement between the various States concerned it will 
be possible to avoid the difficulties which they would encounter by a 
prior acceptance of a system restricting their power to impose 
sanctions18. 
The Corpus Juris proposal seems to be in line with this opinion, 
avoiding putting the national territoriality principle on the top of the 
list19. However, the Corpus Juris seems to put much emphasis on the 
effectiveness of law enforcement, by putting the seeking of evidence on 
the top. What remains clear is that neither the Corpus Juris draft nor the 
Recommendation is dealing with the procedure that could lead to a 
decision in a particular case. 
Finally, Article 28 addresses the competence of the Court of Justice 
to deal with the choice of jurisdiction, whether on request of the 
defendant or on request of the national criminal court. Also the EPPO 
can call in the Court of Justice when conflicts of jurisdiction arise in 
relation to the jurisdiction to investigate or related to the choice of 
jurisdiction for the authorisation by the judge of freedoms. 
3.3. EPPO and Jurisdiction to Enforce/Investigate under Article 86 
TFEU 
Given the fact that the European Commission still has to come up 
with its first draft proposals for an EPPO, scheduled in the second half 
of 2013, I propose to use the European Model Rules for the Procedure 
of the future EPPO20, as elaborated under the Hercule II Programme of 
the European Commission by a research team under the lead of 
University of Luxemburg. The advantage of doing so is that we can rely 
on a concrete design of the procedural framework of the EPPO. 
In the general part of the Model Rules, it becomes clear that the 
EPPO has primary authority for investigations and prosecutions (Rule 
                                                          
18 <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/reports/html/073.htm>, point 18, last visited 25.10.2012. 
19 On the revision of the territoriality principle: M. BÖSE, F. MEYER, Die 
Beschränkung nationaler Strafgewalten als Möglichkeit zur Vermeidung von 
Jurisdiktionskonflikten in der Europäischen Union, in Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Strafrechtsdogmatik, 5/2011. 
20 See <www.eppo-project.eu/index.php/EU-model-rules/english>, last visited 25.10.2012. 
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3). This means that it can take in cases based on a set of priority 
criteria, as for instance the cross-border dimension or the substantial 
harm to EU-interest test. This means that the case inflow for the EPPO 
is based upon prioritising jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute at the 
European level. This results in a division of labour based on good 
administration of justice. Once the jurisdiction of the EPPO has been 
activated, it has also exclusive authority (Rule 5), meaning that the 
national judicial authorities no longer have competence to investigate 
and prosecute the case. Finally, the EPPO conducts its investigative and 
prosecutorial capacity in the European territoriality (Rule 2), which 
means the territory of the Member States of the EU that constitutes a 
single legal area. 
What can be derived from this general part in relation to the EPPO 
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute? First of all, I would say, it 
gives the EPPO the possibility to overcome negative conflicts of 
(exercise) of jurisdiction in cases where transnational and/or EU 
interests are at stake. Second, it creates great opportunities to prioritise 
investigative and prosecutorial capacity in relation to the interests that 
deserve criminal law protection. In that sense, it would be wise if the 
EPPO, once established, elaborates further guidelines in that respect. 
The primary and exclusive authority of the EPPO does, however, not 
solve all the problems. It has to be duly informed by national judicial 
authorities in order to be able to prioritise and there must be 
mechanisms in place between national judicial authorities and the 
EPPO to refer the case back to the national investigative and 
prosecutorial jurisdiction, for instance if becomes clear that the case is 
minor or too intimately related to other national interests that deserve 
criminal law protection (Rule 5(2)). 
When it comes to the prior authorisation of some coercive measures, 
elaborated in section 4 of the Model Rules (Rule 47-57), Rule 7 
provides that a judge designated by each Member State shall be 
competent to decide upon this authorisation and that its decision is 
effective within the single legal area (European territoriality). In other 
words, the mutual recognition concept applies to the decision of the 
national judge of freedoms. The Model Rules are, first of all, silent on 
the criteria for the choice of the forum of the judge of freedoms. It is, 
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however, clear that this choice can affect the legal position of a 
defendant, as there are no harmonised or equivalent standards of 
procedural safeguards in relation to coercive measures in the Member 
States. Second, it is also unclear what the remedies are of the defendant 
and if the EPPO can challenge the decision of the national judge before 
the ECJ (as foreseen in the Corpus Juris study). 
3.4. EPPO and its Jurisdiction to Prosecute/Bring to Judgment 
When it comes to forum choice for the jurisdiction to try the 
criminal case (adjudicative jurisdiction), there is no doubt that the 
EPPO is the responsible authority for the bringing to judgment (Rule 1) 
of the perpetrators of the offences under its material competence. Rule 
64 deals with the forum choice for the trial. The starting point and basic 
line is the concept of the ‘most appropriate jurisdiction’, taking into 
consideration and (in the following sequence): 
a) the Member State in which the greater part of the conduct occurred; 
b) the Member State of which the perpetrator(s) is (are) a national or 
resident; and 
c) the Member State in which the greater part of the relevant evidence 
is located. 
The listed criteria under a-c are a classic set, if we suppose at least 
that under a) the damage dimension is also included. 
Rule 64(2) provides for a residual jurisdiction in case none of the 
criteria under a-b-c would apply, which might happen with EU fraud 
cases committed under EU aid schemes in third countries for example. 
If the residual scenario is triggered, the case shall be prosecuted in the 
jurisdiction where the EPPO has its seat. 
Rule 64(3) creates a remedy (right to appeal) for the accused and the 
aggrieved party before the ECJ on the choice of jurisdiction. 
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3.5. EPPO: From Conflict of Jurisdiction to Choice of Jurisdiction? 
In my opinion, it will be very important to extend a mechanism of 
choice of forum jurisdiction for the EPPO, in order to avoid forum 
shopping or criticism of forum conveniens. The mechanism for the 
choice of forum to adjudicate could also be useful for the choice of 
forum for the judge of freedoms, but with some important caveats. The 
judge of freedoms will be mostly activated in the crucial phase of 
gathering of evidence, i.e., when coercive measures are necessary. At 
that stage the EPPO cannot have a full picture of available evidence, of 
the locus delicti or of the main damage or the nationality/residence of 
all suspects. On the other hand, the procedure for the judicial 
authorisation by the judge of freedoms (a priori or a posteriori) can be 
harmonised under the Article 86 regulations, which is not the case with 
the merit proceedings at the stage of adjudication. 
The EPPO does not have to deal with conflicting jurisdictions for 
adjudications. It has to make a choice of forum jurisdiction in the light 
of a number of relevant criteria. The main question is what would be 
the most appropriate jurisdiction to adjudicate the case from the 
perspective and legitimate interest of the: 
a) good and proper administration of criminal justice in the area of 
freedom, security and justice; 
b) citizen-rights in the area of freedom, security and justice; and 
c) procedural guarantees of the suspect and the victim. 
These perspectives and legitimate interests combine effective and 
efficient law enforcement in the single area of freedom, security and 
justice, but in line with standards of rule of law and due process thus 
affording appropriate legal protection to those present on the European 
territory. Both crime control and due process have a European 
dimension in the single area of freedom, security and justice. 
It is also important to see the choice of jurisdiction not as a 
limitation or imposed obligation to the ius puniendi of sovereign states, 
creating negative or positive duties, but as a mechanism to protect 
common EU interests (euro crimes or annex competence) in the 
common area. The judiciaries of the Member States are all ‘juges 
communs’ of Union Law, also in the area of criminal adjudication. The 
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fact that they are organically national is not of so much interest; the 
important dimension is that they have European functions. Also the 
judiciaries of the Member States have to apply Union loyalty (Art. 4(3) 
TEU), including its positive duty of action and its negative duty of 
abstention. 
The good and proper administration perspective of criminal justice 
in the common area contains several elements. It is not only about 
efficient use of resources related to investigation, prosecution and 
adjudication but also about qualitative criteria. It is a task of the EPPO 
to prosecute suspected perpetrators of offences in a way that fulfils the 
objectives of the single area of freedom, security and justice. This 
means that it has to contribute to effective law enforcement under the 
rule of law. This might affect the choice of jurisdiction. A jurisdiction 
where the case might be time-barred or where the penalties in law or in 
practice are not effective, proportionate or dissuasive could play a role 
in the choice of jurisdiction. In other words the outcome of the choice 
of jurisdiction must contribute to effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
law enforcement in the light of the objectives of the single area of 
freedom, security and justice. The EPPO contributes to the avoidance 
of concurring prosecutions and trials and must motivate its choice of 
the forum from the perspective of the quality of the law enforcement. 
From the citizen-perspective (be it either the suspect or the victim), 
there is not such a thing as the right to a forum choice or the right to a 
natural judge in a specific state. The ECHR does not grant an accused 
or a victim the right to choose the jurisdiction of a court under Article 
the 6 ECHR ‘tribunal established by law’ concept. However, the 
decision on the forum must be lawful and based on reasonable 
grounds21. The same can be said about Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU: 
                                                          
21 See EComHR, 10 October 1990, G. v. Switzerland, appl. no. 16875/90 and 
EComHR, 2 December 1992, Kübli v. Switzerland, appl. no. 17495/90 and ECtHR, 12 
July 2007, Jorgic v. Germany, appl. no. 74613/01, para. 65. For comments see M.J.J.P. 
LUCHTMAN, Choice of Forum in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in Utrecht 
Law Review, 2011, pp. 74-101. 
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Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by 
law. 
This means that the EPPO cannot bring the judgment to a tribunal 
that would not be independent or impartial or would have been 
established post factum. 
The right to a natural judge22 is, however, part of the European 
common area. As the case can end up in 29 different jurisdictions, and 
the applicable law is not harmonised, the choice of the forum is a 
choice that affects citizen rights. For this reason the EPPO’s choice of 
jurisdiction must be based on a transparent procedure in which criteria 
are used that are accessible and foreseeable. In other words the right of 
the citizen to legal certainty does not mean the right to a preset natural 
judge in a particular state, but the right to a transparent procedure with 
accessible and foreseeable criteria for the forum choice in the European 
territoriality. 
The Article 86 regulatory framework for the EPPO should contain a 
regulation on choice of jurisdiction, providing for a procedural 
mechanism under which there are priority rules for adjudication for 
related cases/related persons (concentration priority rule). Second, the 
regulation should provide for a basket of principle-based criteria to 
come to a balanced and reasoned decision. The praetorian Swiss 
example, when dealing with inter-cantonal choices of jurisdiction, can 
be of good guidance in that respect: 
i. the interests of the place where most of the damaging effects of 
criminal conduct were felt (including the interests of the victim); 
ii. those of the suspect and his counsel to effectively defend himself 
(including language problems he may experience); 
iii. those of the courts, which must be put in the position to obtain, as 
far as possible, a complete overview of both the person of the 
accused and his actions; and 
                                                          
22 See also M. PANZAVOLTA, in M. LUCHTMAN (Ed.), Choice of Forum in 
Cooperation against EU Financial Crime: Freedom, Security and Justice and the 
Protection of Specific EU-Interests, The Hague, 2013, pp. 143-165. 
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iv. those of the speedy and efficient administration of justice23. 
This basket seems like a non-hierarchical set of various criteria, 
which could be qualified as facilitating forum conveniens choices. 
However, a hierarchical set of classic criteria (locus delicti, nationality, 
etc.), if strictly applied, does stand in the way of policy discretion in 
individual cases and in balancing the different perspectives mentioned. 
The criteria have to be applied and balanced on a rather flexible case-
by-case approach with a scope of policy discretion. Important, in my 
view, is not the strict application of so-called hierarchical criteria, but a 
reasoned and foreseeable decision. The statutory regulation must 
contain the basket of foreseeable criteria, but in a way to allow 
balanced allocation of cases, taking into account the different 
perspectives and interest, under court supervision. 
The binding decision of the EPPO on choice of forum does affect 
the legal position of the suspect and the victim. For this reason it must 
be possible for both of them to challenge the decision before the ECJ. 
The judicial review of a decision on jurisdiction by the ECJ 
presupposes that the statutory framework in the Article 85 TFEU 
regulation is transparent; this means that the suspect or victim can 
foresee how the judicial authorities will reasonably come to a decision. 
What would be challengeable is the lack of reasonableness, not the 
foreseeability of the specific applicable jurisdiction rule. In fact we are 
not talking here about the foreseeability of applicable law and 
applicable criminal sanctions (nullum crimen, nulla poenas sine lege 
and the lex certa principle). The guarantee of justiciability by the 
judicial review procedure aims at ensuring a proper, non-arbitrary 
                                                          
23 On that system, see P. GUIDON et al., Die aktuelle Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesstrafgerichts zum interkantonalen Gerichtsstand in Strafsachen, in Jusletter, 
2007; E. SCHWERI, F. BÄNZIGER, Interkantonale Gerichtsstandsbestimmung in 
Strafsachen, Bern, 2004; M. WAIBLINGER, Die Bestimmung des Gerichtsstandes bei 
Mehrheit von strafbaren Handlungen oder von Beteiligten, in ZStr, 1943. Cf. 
Bundesstrafgericht, 21 October 2004, no. BK_G 127/04, to be found at 
<www.bstger.ch/>. For further analysis see also M. LUCHTMAN (Ed.), Choice of Forum 
in Cooperation against EU Financial Crime: Freedom, Security and Justice and the 
Protection of Specific EU-Interests, The Hague, 2013, sections 4.2.2 and 6.4. 
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exercise of discretion by the EPPO. This means that the ECJ must test, 
when the forum decision is challenged, the reasonable use of policy 
discretion in an individual case and the lawfulness of the decision. 
Judicial review amounts to adjudication on whether the principles of 
reasonableness and of due process (including lawfulness) have been 
respected. The European Court of Justice has a longstanding practice in 
reviewing process-orientated justice matters24, as, for instance, in the 
field of the competition. Under the EU Competition enforcement 
system under regulation 1/2003, both the European Commission 
competition authority as the delegated national competition authorities 
have to take all the time decisions on investigative allocation of forum 
choices on the adjudication. 
If the national forum judge is not willing to activate its jurisdiction, 
following the decision of the EPPO, the EPPO should have the 
possibility to call on the Court to decide on the jurisdiction issue25. 
4. Conclusion 
In this article, I have analysed the European territoriality and 
jurisdiction in its horizontal and vertical (EPPO) dimension. 
The discussion on the settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction between 
Member States finalised in a deadlock on prioritisation of hierarchical 
criteria. The Council of Europe Convention on transfer of proceedings 
in criminal matters has not been very successful in practice. The reality 
is that European States establish and claim jurisdiction from a classic 
Nation-State sovereignty perspective. 
Within the frame of European integration and the establishment of a 
single area of freedom, security and justice, it has not been possible to 
make progress in the EU either. The content of the Framework 
                                                          
24 See K. LENAERTS, The European Court of Justice and Process-Oriented Review, 
in College of Europe/ Research Papers in Law, no 1/2012, <www.coleurope.eu/sites/ 
default/files/research-paper/researchpaper_1_2012_lenaerts_final.pdf>, last visited 25.10.2012. 
25 As does the Federal Criminal Court in Switzerland when there is a conflict 
between the Office of the Attorney General and cantonal criminal justice authorities; 
see art. 28 of Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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Decision 2009/948 on prevention and settlement of conflicts of exercise 
of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings has been watered down to a 
mediation procedure. The Member States were also unable to agree on 
a draft framework decision on the transfer of criminal proceedings. 
Already 40 years ago, in the explanatory report on the European 
Convention on the transfer of proceedings in criminal matters, we can 
read the following recommendation and appeal: 
The complexity of these problems is explained by the very nature of 
traditional criminal law, strongly impregnated with the principle of 
territorial sovereignty of the State. Criminal courts almost invariably 
apply their own criminal law. The problems of criminal law are 
therefore more difficult to solve than those of other fields of law where 
conflicts of legislation and of jurisdiction may be solved by the 
application of foreign law by the national court or by harmonising the 
legal provisions involved. 
In recent years, however, crime has assumed an international character, 
especially as a result of the extensive development of means of 
communication. The result is the necessity of closer co-operation 
among States prompting them to lower their legal barriers and review 
the traditional consequences of their national sovereignty26. 
In other words, it is more than high time to deal with the duty 
imposed under Article 82 TFEU: the EU shall adopt measures to 
prevent and settle conflicts of jurisdiction between Member States in 
order to reinforce the principle of mutual recognition and to realise the 
objectives of the single area of freedom, security and justice. 
The vertical (EPPO) dimension is not replacing the horizontal 
dimension, but reconfiguring it to a certain extent. The EPPO is of 
course not the catchall solution for the choice of jurisdiction in the 
single area of freedom, security and justice. It probably will have, in an 
initial stage, very limited material scope (the protection of the financial 
interest of the Union), and a limited number of participating Member 
States under the enhanced cooperation regime. The EPPO will 
moreover not deal with all cases for which conflicts of jurisdiction 
could arise. This means that with its establishment it will remain 
                                                          
26 See <conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/reports/html/073.htm>, point 9, last visited 
25.10.2012. 
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important to regulate, under Article 82 TFEU, the prevention and 
settlement of conflicts of jurisdiction and to tackle the problems in the 
single area from a perspective of joint responsibility between the 
Member States, taking into account that the joint enforcement must not 
only meet the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness, but also comply 
with the applicable human rights standards. 
The EPPO, as a European Office, will have great influence on the 
concentration of jurisdiction to investigate in its field of substantial 
competence. The elaboration of the division of labour between EPPO 
and the national judicial authorities will be of utmost importance. 
Prioritisation will be an important tool of criminal policy and to be 
elaborated in the perspective of the interests that deserve adequate and 
proper protection in the single area of freedom, security and justice. 
This division of labour does not mean that the EPPO is not embedded 
in the national system: actually, quite the contrary. The EPPO should be 
fully embedded in the national system, through its deputy structure and 
should work with the national enforcement community, being it judicial 
or administrative. The specialised law-enforcement agencies in the PIF-
field should form a law-enforcement network with a clear European 
dimension. This delegated and embedded structure of the EPPO is part 
of its supranational architecture. 
The EPPO will also be very useful to deal with problems of negative 
jurisdiction conflicts, as it can open investigative proceedings and 
decide on the adjudicative forum. 
When it comes to the choice of the adjudicative forum, there will be 
a need for a specific regulation under Article 86 TFEU, dealing with the 
statutory criteria for the choice of jurisdiction. These criteria do not 
have a hierarchical order, but are criteria to come to a balanced and 
reasoned decision that complies with the need for foreseeability for the 
citizen and can be challenged before the ECJ and thus providing for 
European justiciability in the single area of freedom, security and 
justice. 
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